United States copyright law governs the legally enforceable rights of creative and artistic works under the laws of the United States.

Copyright law in the United States is part of federal law, and is authorized by the U.S. Constitution. The power to enact copyright law is granted in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, also known as the Copyright Clause, which states:

The Congress shall have Power [. . .] To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.

This clause forms the basis for U.S. copyright law ("Science", "Authors", "Writings") and patent law ("useful Arts", "Inventors", "Discoveries"), and includes the limited terms (or durations) allowed for copyrights and patents ("limited Times"), as well as the items they may protect ("exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries").

In the U.S., registrations of claims of copyright, recordation of copyright transfers, and other administrative aspects of copyright are the responsibility of the United States Copyright Office, a part of the Library of Congress.

History

The U.S. Congress first exercised its power to enact copyright legislation with the Copyright Act of 1790. The Act secured an author the exclusive right to publish and vend "maps, charts and books" for a term of 14 years, with the right of renewal for one additional 14 year term if the author was still alive. The act did not regulate other kinds of writings, such as musical compositions or newspapers and specifically noted that it did not prohibit copying the works of foreign authors. The vast majority of writings were never registered — between 1790 and 1799, of 13,000 odd titles published in the United States, only 556 works were registered.

Copyright law has been modified many times since to encompass new technologies such as music recording, to extend the duration of protection, and to make other changes. U.S. courts have interpreted this clause of the Constitution to say that the ultimate purpose of copyrights is to encourage the production of creative works for the public benefit, and that therefore the interests of the public are primary over the interests of the author when the two conflict. These rulings have since been formalized into fair use laws and decisions. Certain attempts by copyright owners to restrict uses beyond the rights provided for by copyright law may also subject them to the copyright misuse doctrine, preventing enforcement against infringers.

Key laws regulating U.S. copyrights and their key effects include:

• Copyright Act of 1790 - established U.S. copyright with term of 14 years with 14-year renewal
• Copyright Act of 1831 - extended the term to 28 years with 14-year renewal
• Copyright Act of 1909 - extended term to 28 years with 28-year renewal
• Universal Copyright Convention - ratified by the U.S. in 1954, and again in 1971, this treaty was developed by UNESCO as an alternative to the Berne Convention
• Copyright Act of 1976 - extended term to either 75 years or life of author plus 50 years; extended federal copyright to unpublished works; preempted state copyright laws; codified much copyright doctrine that had originated in case law
• Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988 - established copyrights of U.S. works in Berne Convention countries
• Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA) of 1994 - restored U.S. copyright for certain foreign works
• Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 - extended terms to 95/120 years or life plus 70 years
• Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 - criminalized some cases of copyright infringement
• Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005 - criminalized more cases of copyright infringement, permitted technology to "sanitize" works

Statutory provisions relating to copyright currently in effect are codified in Title 17 of the United States Code. Key international agreements affecting U.S. copyright law include:

• Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works
• Universal Copyright Convention
• Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights

The United States became a Berne Convention signatory in 1988, and the treaty entered into force with respect to the U.S. on March 1, 1989. The U.S. is also a party to TRIPS, which itself requires compliance with Berne provisions, and is enforceable under the WTO dispute resolution process. To meet the treaty requirements, protections were extended to architecture (where previously only building plans were protected from copying, not buildings, though currently the law makes exception for reproduction of buildings in photographs or paintings if they are ordinarily visible from a public place), and certain moral rights of visual artists.

Early US copyright law

The British Statute of Anne did not apply to the American colonies, although some scholars have asserted otherwise. The colonies' economy was largely agrarian, hence copyright law was not a priority, resulting in only three private copyright acts being passed in America prior to 1783. Two of the acts were limited to seven years, the other was limited to a term of five years. In 1783 several authors' petitions persuaded the Continental Congress "that nothing is more properly a man's own than the fruit of his study, and that the protection and security of literary property would greatly tend to encourage genius and to promote useful discoveries." But under the Articles of Confederation, the Continental Congress had no authority to issue copyright, instead it passed a resolution encouraging the States to "secure to the authors or publishers of any new book not hitherto printed... the copy right of such books for a certain time not less than fourteen years from the first publication; and to secure to the said authors, if they shall survive the term first mentioned,... the copy right of such books for another term of time no less than fourteen years.^[1] Three states had already enacted copyright statutes in 1783 prior to the Continental Congress resolution, and in the subsequent three years all of the remaining states except Delaware passed a copyright statute. Seven of the States followed the Statute of Anne and the Continental Congress' resolution by providing two fourteen year terms. The five remaining States granted copyright for single terms of fourteen, twenty and twenty one years, with no right of renewal.^[2]

At the Constitutional Convention 1787 both James Madison of Virginia and Charles Pinckney of South Carolina submitted proposals that would allow Congress the power to grant copyright for a limited time. These proposals are the origin of the Copyright Clause in the United States Constitution, which allows the granting of copyright and patents for a limited time to serve a utilitarian function, namely "to promote the progress of science and useful arts". The first federal copyright act, the Copyright Act of 1790 granted copyright for a term of "fourteen years from the time of recording the title thereof", with a right of renewal for another fourteen years if the author survived to the end of the first term. The act covered not only books, but also maps and charts. With exception of the provision on maps and charts the Copyright Act of 1790 is copied almost verbatim from the Statute of Anne.^[3]

At the time works only received protection under federal statutory copyright if the statutory formalities, such as a proper copyright notice, were satisfied. If this was not the case the work immediately entered into the public domain. In 1834 the Supreme Court ruled in Wheaton v. Peters, a case similar to the British Donaldson v Beckett of 1774, that although the author of an unpublished work had a common law right to control the first publication of that work, the author did not have a common law right to control reproduction following the first publication of the work.^[4]

Federal law

Historically, copyright protection was provided by a dual system under both federal and state laws. Federal law provided what was commonly called "statutory copyright" and the laws of each state would provide what was called "common-law copyright," even though many states have statutes governing copyright as well. Roughly speaking, the old "statutory copyright" protected works that were registered and the old "common-law copyright" protected works that were not.

In 1976 Congress abolished most state copyrights through preemption of state copyright law. The federal preemption provision is codified at 17 U.S.C. § 301(a), which states, in relevant parts:

On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright ... in works of authorship that ... come within the subject matter of copyright ... are governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such work under the common law or statutes of any State.

The preemption is complete insofar as works fall within the federal copyright statute. A work that falls generally within the subject matter of copyright (such as, a writing) must either qualify to be protected under federal law, or it cannot be protected at all. State law cannot provide protection for a work that federal law does not protect.^[5] It covers enforcement too. A person accused of copyright infringement cannot be prosecuted in state courts.^[6]

State copyright law is not preempted by nonprotected works. For example, those that have "not been fixed in any tangible medium of expression are not covered."^[7] "Examples would include choreography that has never been filmed or notated, an extemporaneous speech, original works of authorship communicated solely through conversations or live broadcasts, a dramatic sketch or musical composition improvised or developed from memory and without being recorded or written down."^[8]

Scope of copyright law

The purpose of copyright law is "to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." ^[9] Current copyright law has expanded coverage to include the idea of stimulating the creation of as many works of art, literature, music, and other works of authorship. The goal is to promote Progress of Science and (as we would say today) engineering and manufacturing as much as possible, per the constitution, as well works of art, literature, music, and other works of authorship, in order to benefit the public. The United States recognizes no absolute, natural right in an author to prevent others from copying or otherwise exploiting his work. The copyright laws give authors limited property rights in their works, but for the ultimate purpose of benefiting the public by encouraging the creation and dissemination of more works. The author's interest is secondary to that of the public.

As is the case with other intellectual property doctrines, copyright law attempts to reach an optimal balance between the potential conflicting public interests of:

1. Encouraging creativity by giving exclusive property rights in creations
2. Fostering a competitive marketplace by giving the freest possible public access to works of authorship and the ideas they encompass.

The balance in copyright is drawn by limiting property rights to the author's particular method of expressing an idea or information. Copyright never gives rights in the idea being expressed, or in facts or other elements of the public domain which an author may incorporate into his work. Others are free to express the same idea as the author did, or use the same facts, as long as they do not copy the author's original way of expressing the ideas or facts. In addition, even those rights granted in the author's expression are limited in duration and are subject to certain exceptions permitting public use under limited circumstances.

The United States copyright law protects "original works of authorship,"^[10] including literary, dramatic, musical, artistic, and certain other intellectual works. This protection is available to both published and unpublished works.

Copyright law includes the following types of works

• Literary
• Musical
• Dramatic
• Pantomimes and choreographic works
• Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works
• Audiovisual works
• Sound recordings
• Derivative works
• Compilations
• Architectural works

Idea/expression

An important limitation on the scope of copyright protection is the idea/expression dichotomy: While copyright law protects the expression of an idea, it does not protect the idea itself.

The distinction between "idea" and "expression" is a fundamental part of U.S. law, but it is not always clear. From the 1976 Copyright Act (17 U.S.C. § 102):

In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.

A paper describing a political theory, for example, is copyrightable; it may not be reproduced by anyone else without the author's permission. But the theory itself (which is an idea rather than a specific expression) is not copyrightable. Another author is free to describe the same theory in his or her own words without violating copyright law, and in fact need not even give credit to the original author (although failing to do so may be considered plagiarism, an ethical transgression). Courts disagree on how much of the story and characters of a copyrighted novel or film should be considered copyrightable expression.

Compilations and the sweat of the brow doctrine

Facts are considered synonymous to "ideas" or "discoveries" under this law and are not copyrightable. By extension, a compilation of facts is also unable to be copyrighted. However, § 103 of the Copyright Act allows for the protection of "compilations," provided there is a "creative" or "original" act involved in such a compilation, such as in the selection (deciding which things to include or exclude), and arrangement (how they are shown and in what order). The protection is limited only to the selection and arrangement, not to the facts themselves, which may be freely copied.

The Supreme Court decision in Feist v. Rural further made clear the requirements that a compilation be original in its composition, in denying protection to telephone "white pages". The Feist court rejected what was known as the "sweat of the brow" doctrine, in ruling that no matter how much work was necessary to create a compilation, a non-selective collection of facts ordered in a non-creative way is not subject to copyright protection.

Authorship

The author of a work is the initial owner of the copyright in it, and may exploit the work himself or transfer some or all the rights conferred by the copyright to others.^[11] The author generally is the person who conceives of the copyrightable expression and fixes it or causes it to be fixed in a tangible form. Exceptions and special cases in determining the author are:

• Works for hire. If a work is made "for hire" within the meaning of the Copyright Act, the employer or commissioning party, who paid for the work and took the economic risk of it, is deemed the author for copyright purposes and is the initial owner of the copyright.^[12] Any other work done by that writer on his own without compensation and without using company resources usually is owned by the writer (though employers often try to claim ownership of such work). The circumstances under which a work may be found to be a work for hire are:

• Work prepared by an employee within the scope of his employment. In Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989), the Supreme Court held that the term "employee" in this context should be interpreted according to common law agency principles. If the person doing the work is an "employee" within the meaning of the common law, and the work was done within the scope of his employment (whether the work is the kind he was employed to prepare; whether the preparation takes place primarily within the employer's time and place specifications; and whether the work was activated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the employer), then the work is a work for hire and the employer is the initial owner of the copyright, rather than the employee who actually conceived and fixed the expression.^[12]
• Specially ordered or commissioned works. Works created by independent contractors (rather than employees) can be deemed works for hire only if two conditions are satisfied. First, the work must fit into one of these categories: a contribution to a collective work, part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, a translation, a supplementary work, a compilation, an instructional text, a test, answer material for a test, or an atlas. Second, the parties must expressly agree in a written, signed instrument that the work will be considered a work made for hire.^[12]

• Ownership of copyright in a joint work. The authors of a joint work are co-owners of a single copyright in the work. A joint work is "a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or independent parts of a unitary whole."^[12]
• Ownership of copyright in a collective work: A collective work is a collection of independent, separately copyrightable works of authorship, such as a newspaper, magazine, or encyclopedia.^[12] In the absence of an express assignment of copyright, the author of each individual work in the collection retains copyright in that work.^[11] The compiler, or author of the collection, owns copyright in the expression he or she contributed, which is primarily the selection and arrangement of the separate contributions, but may include such things as a preface, advertisements, etc., that the collective author created.^[12]

Useful articles

If a pictorial, graphic or sculptural work is a "useful article", it is copyrighted only if its aesthetic features are separable from its utilitarian features. A useful article is an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information. They must be separable from the functional aspect to be copyrighted.^[13]

There are several different tests available for conceptual separability. The first, the Primary Use test, asks how is the thing primarily used: art or function? The second, the Marketable as Art test, asks can the article be sold as art, whether functional or not. This test does not have much backing, as almost anything can be sold as art. The third test, Temporal Displacement, asks could an individual conceptualize the article as art without conceptualizing functionality at the same time. Finally, the Denicola test says that copyrightability should ultimately depend on the extent to which the work reflects the artistic expression inhibited by functional consideration. If something came to have a pleasing shape because there were functional considerations, the artistic aspect was constrained by those concerns.^{[citation needed]}

Definition of "copy"

Several important rights under United States copyright law exist only for “copies” of works—material objects in which the work is embodied.^[14] Section 106(1) prohibits the reproduction only of copies of works, and section 106(3) prohibits the distribution only of copies of works.^[15] Thus, as the Ninth Circuit held in the Perfect 10 case, a link (even a deep link or inline link) to an image does not involve reproduction of a copy of the image by the person on whose Web page the link appears.^[16] An instruction to a browser to jump to a URL is not a reproduction or distribution of a copy of what is at the referenced URL.^[17]

Furthermore, a three-dimensional counterpart of a two-dimensional drawing is usually not a “copy” of the drawing, under United States copyright law. Thus, the copyright in a drawing of the approach to the Triboro Bridge is not infringed when the bridge approach is built.^[18] On the other hand, however, because the essence of what is protected in a cartoon is captured by a doll depicting the cartoon figure, courts have repeatedly held unauthorized dolls to infringe the copyright in the underlying cartoons.^[19]

Works by the federal government

17 U.S.C. § 105 withholds copyright from most publications produced by the United States Government, and its agents or employees while in their employment. All such work is therefore in the public domain in some sense. The specific language is as follows:

Copyright protection under this title is not available for any work of the United States Government, but the United States Government is not precluded from receiving and holding copyrights transferred to it by assignment, bequest, or otherwise.

The intent of the section is to place in the public domain all work of the United States Government, which is defined in 17 U.S.C. § 101 as work prepared by an officer or employee of the United States Government as part of that person's official duties. In most cases, contractors are not employees.

The government may restrict access to works it has produced through other mechanisms. For instance, confidential or secret materials are not protected by copyright, but are restricted by other applicable laws. However, even in case of non-secret materials there are specific prohibitions against automatic access to work otherwise covered under 17 U.S.C. § 105 for commercial purposes.^[20]

Federal and state laws are not copyrighted

Federal statutes are in the public domain and no copyright attaches to them. The same is true of court decisions. It is not difficult to see the motivations behind this:

The citizens are the authors of the law, and therefore its owners, regardless of who actually drafts the provisions, because the law derives its authority from the consent of the public, expressed through the democratic process. (State of Georgia v Harrison Co, 548 F Supp 110, 114 (ND Ga 1982))

Edicts of government, such as judicial opinions, administrative rulings, legislative enactments, public ordinances, and similar official legal documents are not copyrightable for reasons of public policy. This applies to such works whether they are Federal, State, or local as well as to those of foreign governments. (Compendium II: Copyright Office Practices section 206.01[1] Paragraph 3.6 at 14 February 2006)

In the United States the exclusion of legislation from the scope of copyright laws dates to 1834, when the Supreme Court interpreted the first federal copyright laws and held that "no reporter has or can have any copyright in the written opinions delivered by this Court". In the same case it was argued – and accepted by the Court – that "it would be absurd, for a legislature to claim the copyright; and no one else can do it, for they are the authors, and cause them to be published without copyright … Statutes were never copyrighted." Further, "it is the bounden duty of government to promulgate its statutes in print". "[A]ll countries ... subject to the sovereignty of the laws" hold the promulgation of the laws, from whatever source, "as essential as their existence." "If either statutes or decisions could be made private property, it would be in the power of an individual to shut out the light by which we guide our actions." (Wheaton v. Peters, 33 US (8 Pet) 591, 668 (1834))

That the public interest is the primary determinant is clear from Banks v Manchester (128 US 244, 9 S Ct 36 (1888)). In this the United States Supreme Court denied a copyright to a court reporter in opinions of the Ohio Supreme Court, on the grounds that "There has always been a judicial consensus, from the time of the decision in the case of Wheaton v. Peters, that no copyright could, under the statutes passed by Congress, be secured in the products of the labor done by judicial officers in the discharge of their judicial duties. The whole work done by the judges constitutes the authentic exposition and interpretation of the law, which, binding every citizen, is free for publication to all, whether it is a declaration of unwritten law, or an interpretation of a constitution or statute."

The law, as thus (widely) defined, is in the public domain, and therefore not amenable to copyright. In Howell v Miller, (91 F 129 (1898)) Justice Harlan denied an injunction sought for the compiler of Michigan statutes, holding that "no one can obtain the exclusive right to publish the laws of the state in a book prepared by him." The question of formal ownership of the text of laws and decisions is perhaps secondary to the question of the dissemination of the law.

Exclusive rights

There are five basic rights protected by copyright, sometimes called the five "pillars" of copyright. The owner of copyright has the exclusive right to do and to authorize others to do the following:

• To reproduce the work in copies or phonorecords;
• To prepare derivative works based upon the work;
• To distribute copies or phonorecords of the work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
• To publicly perform the work, in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, and sound recordings by means of digital audio transmission;
• To publicly display the work, in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work.^[21]

A violation of any of the exclusive rights of the copyright holder is said to be a copyright infringement.

Transfers and licenses

Three types of transfers exist for copyrighted works.

• Assignment
• Exclusive License
• Non-exclusive License

The first two, assignment and exclusive licenses, require the transfer to be in writing. Nonexclusive licenses need not be in writing and they may be implied by the circumstances. Transfers of copyright always involve one or more of the exclusive rights of copyright. For instance, a license may provide a right to perform a work, but not to reproduce it or to prepare a derivative work (adaptation right).^{[citation needed]}

The terms of the license is governed by the applicable contract law, however there is substantial academic debate about to what extent the Copyright Act preempts state contract law principles.^{[citation needed]}

An author, after transferring a copyright, can terminate the transfer under certain circumstances. This right to terminate the transfer is absolute and cannot be waived.^[22]

Duration of copyright

Works created in or after 1978 are extended copyright protection for a term defined in 17 U.S.C. § 302. With the passage of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, these works are granted copyright protection for a term ending 70 years after the death of the author. If the work was a work for hire (e.g., those created by a corporation) then copyright persists for 120 years after creation or 95 years after publication, whichever is shorter.

The §302 term above also applies to works created before 1978 that were not yet published or registered prior to 1978, with the exception that such copyrights would not expire before 2003. Prior to 1978, works had to be published or registered to receive copyright protection. Upon the effective date of the 1976 Act (January 1, 1978) this requirement was removed and these works received protection despite having not been published or registered. However, Congress intended to provide an incentive for these authors to publish their unpublished works. To provide that incentive, these works, if published before 2003, will not have their protection expire before 2048.

Works published or registered before 1978 currently have a maximum copyright duration of 95 years from the date of publication, if copyright was renewed during the 28th year following publication^[23] (such renewal was made automatic by the Copyright Renewal Act of 1992; prior to this the copyright would expire after 28 years if not renewed). The date of death of the author is not a factor in the copyright term of such works.

All copyrightable works published in the United States before 1923 are in the public domain;^[24] works created before 1978 but not published until recently may be protected until 2047.^[25] For works that received their copyright before 1978, a renewal had to be filed in the work's 28th year with the Library of Congress Copyright Office for its term of protection to be extended. The need for renewal was eliminated by the Copyright Renewal Act of 1992, but works that had already entered the public domain by non-renewal did not regain copyright protection. Therefore, works published before 1964 that were not renewed are in the public domain. With rare exception (such as very old works first published after 2002), no additional copyrights will expire (thus entering the public domain) until at least 2019 due to changes in the applicable laws.

Before 1972, sound recordings were not subject to federal copyright, but copying was nonetheless regulated under various state torts and statutes, some of which had no duration limit. The Sound Recording Amendment of 1971 extended federal copyright to recordings fixed on or after February 15, 1972 (the effective date of the act), and declared that recordings fixed before that date would remain subject to state or common law copyright. The Copyright Act of 1976 maintained this until February 15, 2047, which was subsequently extended by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act to the same date in 2067.^[26] As a result, no sound recording can reliably be considered in the public domain in the United States before that date, even if the recording was in existence before 1923 and even if it originated in another country where it has entered the public domain.^[27]

Procedural issues

Registration of copyright

While copyright in the United States automatically attaches upon the creation of an original work of authorship, registration with the Copyright Office puts a copyright holder in a better position if litigation arises over the copyright. A copyright holder desiring to register his or her copyright should do the following:

1. Obtain and complete appropriate form.
2. Prepare clear rendition of material being submitted for copyright
3. Send both documents to U.S. Copyright Office in Washington, D.C.

Registration of copyright refers to the act of registering the work with the United States Copyright Office, which is an office of the Library of Congress. As the United States has joined the Berne Convention, registration is no longer necessary to provide copyright protection. However, registration is still necessary to obtain statutory damages in case of infringement.

Copyright Act §407 provides that the owner of copyright in a published or unpublished work may, at any time during the copyright, register the work with the Copyright Office. The purpose of the registration provisions is to create as comprehensive a record of U.S. copyright claims as is possible. To register, the registrant must complete an application form and send it, along with the filing fee and copies or phonorecords of the work, to the Copyright Office.

The Copyright Office reviews applications for obvious errors or lack of copyrightable subject matter, and then issues a certificate of registration.

Registration as a prerequisite to claim of moral rights violation: it's not necessary for any author to register prior to bringing suit for violation of the rights of attribution or integrity in a work of visual art, pursuant to Copyright Act §106A.

Deposit requirement

The United States Copyright Office requires that applicants for registration must deposit with that office copies of the work for which protection is sought. This requirement serves two purposes. First, if an action arises from the infringement of the work, the owner may prove that the material that is infringed is exactly the same material for which the owner has secured a registration. Second, this requirement assists the Library of Congress in building its collection of works.

The Copyright Office has authority to make some exceptions to this rule by regulation, and has done so. Failure to comply with the deposit requirement, as modified by Copyright Office regulations, is punishable by fine, but does not result in forfeiture of copyright.

Deposits can be made electronically through the eCO Online System.

Subject matter jurisdiction

The United States district courts have exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over copyright cases.^[28]

Copyright notices

Prior to 1989, use of a copyright notice — consisting of the copyright symbol (©, the letter C inside a circle), the abbreviation "Copr.", or the word "Copyright", followed by the year of the first publication of the work and the name of the copyright holder — was part of United States statutory requirements.^[29][30] Several years may be noted if the work has gone through substantial revisions. The proper copyright notice for sound recordings of musical or other audio works is a sound recording copyright symbol (℗, the letter P inside a circle), which indicates a sound recording copyright. Similarly, the phrase All rights reserved was once required to assert copyright.

In 1989, the U.S. enacted the Berne Convention Implementation Act, amending the 1976 Copyright Act to conform to most of the provisions of the Berne Convention. As a result, the use of copyright notices has become optional to claim copyright, because the Berne Convention makes copyright automatic.^[31] However, the lack of notice of copyright using these marks may have consequences in terms of reduced damages in an infringement lawsuit — using notices of this form may reduce the likelihood of a defense of "innocent infringement" being successful.^[32]

Public domain

At most, terms end 120 years after publication in the United States, but they may end or have already ended sooner in certain situations.^[33] Although it is held under Feist v. Rural that Congress does not have the power to re-copyright works that have fallen into the public domain, re-copyrighting has happened: "After World War I and after World War II, there were special amendments to the Copyright Act to permit for a limited time and under certain conditions the recapture of works that might have fallen into the public domain, principally by aliens of countries with which we had been at war."^[34] Works published with notice of copyright or registered in unpublished form in the years 1964 through 1977 automatically had their copyrights renewed for a second term. Works published with notice of copyright or registered in unpublished form on or after January 1, 1923, and prior to January 1, 1964, had to be renewed during the 28th year of their first term of copyright to maintain copyright for a full 95-year term.^[35] With the exception of maps, music, and movies, the vast majority of works published in the United States before 1964 were never renewed for a second copyright term.^[36]

Works "prepared by an officer or employee of the U.S. government as part of that person's official duties" are automatically in the public domain by law.^[37] Examples include military journalism, federal court opinions (but not necessarily state court opinions), congressional committee reports, and census data. However, works created by a contractor for the government are still subject to copyright. Even public domain documents may have their availability limited by laws limiting the spread of classified information.

The claim that "pre-1923 works are in the public domain" is correct only for published works; unpublished works are under federal copyright for at least the life of the author plus 70 years. For a work made for hire, the copyright in a work created before 1978, but not theretofore in the public domain or registered for copyright, subsists from January 1, 1978, and endures for a term of 95 years from the year of its first publication, or a term of 120 years from the year of its creation, whichever expires first.^[38] If the work was created before 1978 but first published 1978–2002, the federal copyright will not expire before 2047.

Until the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, the lack of a proper copyright notice would place an otherwise copyrightable work into the public domain, although for works published between January 1, 1978 and February 28, 1989, this could be prevented by registering the work with the Library of Congress within five years of publication. After March 1, 1989, an author's copyright in a work begins when it is fixed in a tangible form; neither publication nor registration is required, and a lack of a copyright notice does not place the work into the public domain.^[39]

Sound recordings

Very few sound recordings are in the public domain in the United States. Sound recordings fixed in a tangible form before February 15, 1972, have been generally covered by common law or in some cases by anti-piracy statutes enacted in certain states, not by federal copyright law, and the anti-piracy statutes typically have no duration limit. The 1971 Sound Recordings Act, effective 1972,^[40] and the 1976 Copyright Act, effective 1978, provide federal copyright for unpublished and published sound recordings fixed on or after February 15, 1972. Recordings fixed before February 15, 1972, are still covered, to varying degrees, by common law or state statutes.^[41][42] Any rights or remedies under state law for sound recordings fixed before February 15, 1972, are not annulled or limited by the 1976 Copyright Act until February 15, 2067.^[43] On that date, all sound recordings fixed before February 15, 1972, will go into the public domain in the United States.

For sound recordings fixed on or after February 15, 1972, the earliest year that any will go out of copyright and into the public domain in the U.S. will be 2043,^[44] and not in any substantial number until 2048.^[45] Sound recordings fixed and published on or after February 15, 1972, and before 1978, which did not carry a proper copyright notice on the recording or its cover entered the public domain on publication.^[46] From 1978 to March 1, 1989 the owners of the copyrights had up to five years to remedy this omission without losing the copyright.^[47] Since March 1, 1989, no copyright notice has been required.^[48]

Examples

In the United States, the images of Frank Capra's film It's a Wonderful Life (1946) entered into the public domain in 1974, because the copyright holder failed to file a renewal application with the Copyright Office during the 28th year after the film's release or publication. However in 1993, Republic Pictures utilized the 1990 United States Supreme Court ruling in Stewart v. Abend to enforce its claim of copyright because the film was a derivative work of a short story that was under a separate, existing copyright, to which Republic owned the film adaptation rights, effectively regaining control of the work in its complete form.^[49]

Charles Chaplin re-edited and scored his 1925 film The Gold Rush for reissue in 1942. Subsequently, the 1925 version fell into the public domain when Chaplin's company failed to renew its copyright in 1953, although the 1942 version is still under US copyright.^[50]

The distributor of the cult film Night of the Living Dead, after changing the film's title at the last moment before release in 1968, failed to include a proper copyright notice in the new titles, thereby immediately putting the film into the public domain after its release.^[51] This provision of US copyright law was revised with the United States Copyright Act of 1976, which allowed such negligence to be remedied within five years of publication.^[52]

A number of TV series in America have lapsed into the public domain, in whole or only in the case of certain episodes, giving rise to wide distribution of some shows on DVD. Series that have only certain episodes in the public domain include Petticoat Junction, The Beverly Hillbillies, The Dick Van Dyke Show, Bonanza, and Annie Oakley, while Decoy is an example of a series that lies completely within the public domain.^{[citation needed]}

Enforcement

Enforcement procedure usually follows this path:

• Send a cease-and-desist letter
• File lawsuit
• Seek a preliminary injunction to prevent further or continuing infringement during the trial
• Proceed through trial to arrive at a final decree on permanent injunction and damages

Infringement

Infringement is defined in 17 U.S.C. § 501. Infringement requires

• a protected work
• that the defendant copied the protected work
• that the defendant's copying of the protected work was an infringement

If a work is not protectable it cannot be infringed upon. For instance, spoken conversations that are unrecorded ("fixed in a tangible medium of expression") are not protectable. Similarly, if two individuals both create a story that by pure coincidence is nearly identical, but each without knowledge of the other, there is no infringement since there is no copying. Typically this is referred to as the defense of independent creation; however, technically this is not a defense since without copying there is not an infringement to begin with. Even if a defendant copied protected works that act might be permissible under one of the defenses or limitations. Fair use is one such defense. Quoting from a book in a review might be a copying of protected material, however this copying may well be permissible under 17 U.S.C. § 107. The fair use factors are described below.

Parodies

Although a parody can be considered a derivative work under United States Copyright Law, and thus within the exclusive rights of the copyright owner, it may qualify for the "fair use" exception to the exclusive rights, which is codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107. Parodic works are not automatically fair use of the material parodied, however. The Supreme Court of the United States stated that parody "is the use of some elements of a prior author's composition to create a new one that, at least in part, comments on that author's works." That commentary function provides some justification for use of the older work; in contrast, a satire (which is not targeted at the work borrowed from) does not require use of the original work to make its point. (See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.)

Defenses and limitations

US copyright law includes numerous defenses, exceptions, and limitations. These protect both the boundary with the free expression guarantees of the First Amendment and establish carve-outs to address specific situations.

Some of the most important include:

• Subject matter limitations and the "idea/expression dichotomy". Copyright applies only to certain subject matter, codified within 17 USC 102. Works that are not "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression" are not subject to copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) codifies that copyright protection does not extend to ideas, procedures, processes, systems, etc. Facts may not be copyrighted. This doctrine was explored in some detail in the Feist case discussed above.
• The "fair use" exception is codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107, and states that "the fair use of a copyrighted work ... is not an infringement of copyright." The section lists four factors that must be assessed to determine whether a particular use is fair.
• The first sale doctrine is codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109, and limits the rights of copyright holders to control the distribution and display of copies of their works. The owner of a particular copy is entitled to "sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy" and to "display the copy publicly ... to viewers present at the place where the copy is located."
• The "good faith" defense (Section 504(c)(2)) protects educational institutions, libraries, archives, and public broadcasters, by permitting the court to limit statutory damages to only $200 if they reasonably believed their infringement was a fair use under 17 U.S.C. § 107.
• 17 U.S.C. § 108 and § 110-122 include specific exemptions for types of works and particular entities, such as libraries (§ 108), public broadcasters (§ 110 and § 118), braille (§ 121), software backup copies (§ 117), "cover license" permitting sound recording covers (§ 115), and jukebox compulsory licenses (§ 116).
• Section 512 ("OCILLA", passed as part of the DMCA in 1998) provides a contingent "safe harbor" for online service providers from secondary liability for their users' copy infringements.

Government infringement

The U.S. government, its agencies and officials, and corporations owned or controlled by it, are subject to suit for copyright infringement. All infringement claims against the U.S. that did not arise in a foreign country must be filed with the United States Court of Federal Claims within three years of the infringing action.^[53] Claims filed in the wrong court are dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The government and its agencies are also authorized to settle the infringement claims out of court.

Provisions for the handicapped

There is specific statutory provision for reproduction of material for the blind or other persons with disabilities. Specific legislation permits the reproduction of copyright works in Braille, audio, electronic, Web-Braille, or other necessary formats. The program is administered by the National Library Service for the Blind and Physically Handicapped (NLS).

Relief available for infringement

A person whose copyright has been violated (infringed upon) may pursue relief. These remedies, however, require the copyright holder to actively enforce his or her rights. There is no "copyright police" that enforces copyright without the right holder complaining. For example, the FBI investigates cases of criminal infringement (mostly audio and video products), but even then, it does not do so on its own, only on cases where a complaint is received from the copyright holder. The FBI has its own guidelines on which cases to investigate.

Civil remedies

Barring investigation by law enforcement, therefore, a copyright holder must file a lawsuit in federal court to pursue his or her remedies. These remedies fall into two general categories: Injunctions and damages.

Injunctions: Copyright Act §502 authorizes courts to grant both preliminary and permanent injunctions against copyright infringement and against violations of the author's rights of attribution and integrity in works of visual art. There are also provisions for impounding allegedly infringing copies, phonorecords, and other materials used to infringe, and for their ultimate destruction upon a final judgment of infringement.

Damages and/or profits: Section §504 of the 1976 Act gives the copyright owner/author a choice of recovering: (1) their actual damages and any additional profits of the defendant; or (2) statutory damages.

Equitable relief

Both temporary and permanent injunctions are available to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright.^[54] Where the infringer is the government, however, injunctions are not available and the copyright holder can only seek monetary damages.^[54]

One form of equitable relief that is available in copyright cases is a seizure order. At any time during the lawsuit, the court may order the impoundment of any and all copies of the infringing products. The seizure order may include materials used to produce such copies, such as master tapes, film negatives, printing plates, etc. Items that are impounded during the course of the lawsuit can, if the plaintiff wins, be ordered destroyed as part of the final decree.

Monetary damages

A copyright holder can also seek monetary damages. Injunctions and damages are not mutually exclusive. One can have injunctions and no damages, or damages and no injunctions, or both injunctions and damages. There are two types of damages: actual damages and profits, or statutory damages.^[55] During the course of the lawsuit, the copyright holder can ask the court for both, in the alternative. However, at the end of the case, they are mutually exclusive: Only one can be awarded and not the other.^[56]

Actual damages are the actual losses suffered by the copyright holder as a result of the infringement. Profits are the profits gained by the wrongdoer as a result of the infringement. In theory, the copyright holder can recover both his or her own actual damages, and also the wrongdoer’s profits.

Statutory damages are available as an alternative to actual damages and profits.^[56] This is sometimes preferable if actual damages and profits are either too small, or too difficult to prove, or both. There are, however, situations where statutory damages are not available. 17 U.S.C. § 412 provides:

• Statutory damages are not available if the work is unpublished and the infringement began before the effective date of its registration.
• Statutory damages are not available if the work is published but the infringement commenced after the first publication and before the effective date of its registration, unless registration is made within three months after the first publication.

Statutory damages are calculated per work infringed.^[56] Statutory damages range from a few hundred dollars to hundreds of thousands:

• Statutory damages range from $750 per work to $150,000 per work
• In case of “innocent infringement”, the range is $200 to $150,000 per work. "Innocent" is a technical term. In particular, if the work carries a copyright notice, the infringer cannot claim innocence.^[57]
• In case of “willful infringement” (again, “willful” is a technical term), the range is $750 to $300,000 per work.

Damages in copyright cases can be very high. In Lowry’s Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason Inc.,^[58] a 2003 lawsuit between a publisher of stock analysis newsletters against a company that buys one copy of the newsletters and makes multiple copies for use in-house, the jury awarded damages - actual damages for some newsletters and statutory damages for other newsletters - totaling $20 million.

Attorney’s fees

Cost and attorney fees: Copyright Act §505 permits courts, in their discretion, to award costs against either party and to award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.

The court may (but is not required to) award to the "prevailing party" a reasonable attorney’s fees.^[59] This applies to both the winning plaintiff (right holder) and the winning defendant (accused infringer).^[60] However, attorney’s fees award is not available against the government. Like statutory damages, attorney’s fees are not available if the work infringed is not registered at the time of infringement.

Criminal penalties

In addition to the civil remedies, the Copyright Act provides for criminal prosecution in some cases of willful copyright infringement. There are also criminal sanctions for fraudulent copyright notice, fraudulent removal of copyright notice, and false representations in applications for copyright registration. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act imposes criminal sanctions for certain acts of circumvention and interference with copyright management information. There are not criminal sanctions for violating the rights of attribution and integrity held by the author of a work of visual art.

Criminal penalties for copyright infringement include:

• A fine of not more than $500,000 or imprisonment for not more than five years, or both, for the first offense.
• A fine of not more than $1 million and imprisonment for not more than 10 years, or both, for repeated offenses.

Nonprofit libraries, archives, education institutions and public broadcasting entities are exempt from criminal prosecution.