In psychology, primal world beliefs (also known as primals) are basic beliefs humans hold about the general character of the world. Historically, the most extensively studied primal world belief is Just world belief, which is the belief the world is a karmic place where outcomes are typically deserved. Primal world beliefs were recently mapped empirically via statistical dimensionality reduction analysis in a 2019 journal article by Dr. Jeremy D. W. Clifton and colleagues at the University of Pennsylvania. This effort revealed twenty-six primal world beliefs that subjects held. Most cluster under the beliefs the world is Safe, Enticing and Alive, which in turn cluster under the overall belief the world is Good.[1] Each primal is a normally-distributed continuous variable.[2] Primals have been shown to be temporally quite stable over time, including across the first several months of the COVID-19 pandemic.[3] [4] Primal world beliefs are largely orthogonal to most demographic variables but strongly correlated with many personality and wellbeing variables including depression, optimism, spirituality, extraversion, curiosity, and so forth.[5] Primals are thought to inform a wide range of human experiences, from parenting[6] to political ideology.[7]

History and Select Extant Scholarship

Statements about the overall nature of the world can be found across history, including in the discourse of the pre-Socratic philosophers, who debated whether the world was defined by principles like apeiron (the indefinite), nous (intelligence) or Heraclitus’ ta panta rhei (constant change). In 1919, the psychiatrist and philosopher Karl Jaspers published his Psychologie der Weltanschauungen (Psychology of World Views), a philosophical “typology of mental attitudes… intended to provide an interpretive account of basic psychological dispositions.”[8] A 2004 review of the worldview literature conducted by Dr. Mark Koltko-Rivera suggests that most of this research focuses on beliefs about topics more specific than the world’s overarching character, with the main exception being just world belief.[9]

Of the 26 empirically established primals, the most extensively researched are the beliefs that the world is Just and Dangerous.[10] Just world belief, related to the just-world hypothesis, is essentially the conviction that the word is a place where people ‘get what they deserve.’ This belief has been tied to greater gross domestic product[11] and personal life satisfaction, as well as a greater tendency to blame victims for their misfortune; among children it has been linked to less participation in bullying and to higher grades.[12]

Research has tied dangerous world belief (i.e. low endorsement of the primal “Safe world belief”) to beliefs about vulnerability to disease and the ubiquity of germs,[13] and suggested that it is moderated by ambient darkness.[14] Another thread of belief in a dangerous world research has posited a relationship with political conservatism.[15] Recent studies show that this literature, however, relies on a measure that emphasizes dangers like societal decline and deemphasizes some other types of threat.[16] Subsequent research on primals and political ideology, conducted with the new primal world beliefs measure, shows a negligible association between dangerous world belief and conservatism.[17]

Another precursor to the primals construct within the world-belief literature is Ronnie Janoff-Bulman’s shattered assumptions theory, which proposes that humans hold broad, schematic beliefs about the self and the world (e.g. ‘the world is benevolent’). According to this theory, new information and experiences are integrated with these existing schemas -- except in instances of trauma which may “shatter” a person’s positive assumptions about the world.[18] Though highly influential, this conclusion is complicated by some research showing small effect sizes even in populations that have experienced highly traumatic events.[19]

The psychological study of beliefs has supported significant developments in clinical practice, including cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT), a common form of talk therapy developed by Dr. Aaron Beck. CBT is based on the proposition that inaccurate and negative beliefs about the self, the future, and the world (what Beck called the “cognitive triad”) cause and maintain depression; when these maladaptive beliefs are corrected through therapy, patients’ symptoms may be reduced.[20] CBT can be equally efficacious as antidepressant medication for severely depressed patients, and has been shown to reduce rates of relapse /recurrence.[21]

Identification

Primal world beliefs were identified through a broad-based empirical effort by a research team at the University of Pennsylvania led by Dr. Jeremy D. W. Clifton from 2014-2019. The process began with systematic identification of candidate primals through:

Inputs from these and other candidate primal identification efforts were synthesized in phases, with latter phases failing to introduce additional world beliefs, suggesting saturation. A measurement model was tested through multiple rounds of exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis and examined for validity and reliability. The results revealed 26 primal world beliefs, most of which fall under the beliefs that the world is Safe, Enticing and Alive (“secondary primals”), which in turn form the overarching belief that the world is Good (“primary primal”).[22]

Primal world beliefs are measurable with the following psychometrically validated scales:

Dr. Clifton and his team made these surveys available to the general public on the www.myprimals.com website in July of 2022.

Secondary Primals

Most person-level variance across primals is explained by the three beliefs that the world is Safe (vs. dangerous), Enticing (vs. dull) and Alive (vs. mechanistic). These can be understood as the three main reasons to view the world as an overall Good (rather than bad) place, and are among the primals most strongly correlated to wellbeing and other mental health indicators. The following description of Safe, Enticing, and Alive extracted from the foundational 2019 empirical article on primal world beliefs:

“Those low on Safe see a Hobbesian world defined by misery, decay, scarcity, brutality and dangers of all sorts. Base rates for hazards—from germs to terrorism to getting stabbed in the back— are generally higher. In response to chronic external threats, they remain on high alert, often viewing the nonvigilant as irresponsible. Those high on Safe see a world of cooperation, comfort, stability, and few threats. To them, things are safe until proven otherwise, vigilance appears neurotic, risk is not that risky, and, in general, people should calm down. Those low on Enticing inhabit dull and ugly worlds where exploration offers low return on investment. They know real treasure—truly beautiful and fascinating things—is rare and treasure-hunting appropriate only when it’s a sure bet. Those high on Enticing inhabit an irresistibly fascinating reality. They know treasure is around every corner, in every person, under every rock, and beauty permeates all. Thus, life is a gift, boredom a misinformed lifestyle choice, and exploration and appreciation is the only rational way to live. Those low on Alive inhabit inanimate, mechanical worlds without awareness or intent. Since the universe never sends messages, it makes no sense to try to hear any. Those high on Alive sense that everything happens for a purpose and are thus sensitive to those purposes. To them, life is a relationship with an active universe that animates events, works via synchronicity, communicates, and wants help on important tasks.”

There are also five ‘neutral’ primals that are unrelated to the beliefs that the world is Good, Safe, Enticing or Alive. These are Acceptable (vs. unacceptable), Changing (vs. not changing), Hierarchical (vs. nonhierarchical), Interconnected (vs. separable), Understandable (vs. too hard to understand).[26] Hierarchical world belief is the primal that is most associated with political ideology, explaining 20 times more variance in political ideology than low Safe world belief.[27]

  1. ^ Clifton, Jeremy D. W.; Baker, Joshua D.; Park, Crystal L.; Yaden, David B.; Clifton, Alicia B. W.; Terni, Paolo; Miller, Jessica L.; Zeng, Guang; Giorgi, Salvatore; Schwartz, H. Andrew; Seligman, Martin E. P. (January 2019). "Primal world beliefs". Psychological Assessment. 31 (1): 82–99. doi:10.1037/pas0000639. ISSN 1939-134X.
  2. ^ Clifton, Jeremy D. W.; Meindl, Peter (2021). "Parents think—incorrectly—that teaching their children that the world is a bad place is likely best for them". The Journal of Positive Psychology. 17 (2): 182–197. doi:10.1080/17439760.2021.2016907.
  3. ^ Clifton, Jeremy D. W.; Baker, Joshua D.; Park, Crystal L.; Yaden, David B.; Clifton, Alicia B. W.; Terni, Paolo; Miller, Jessica L.; Zeng, Guang; Giorgi, Salvatore; Schwartz, H. Andrew; Seligman, Martin E. P. (January 2019). "Primal world beliefs". Psychological Assessment. 31 (1): 82–99. doi:10.1037/pas0000639. ISSN 1939-134X.
  4. ^ Ludwig, Vera U.; Crone, Damien L.; Clifton, Jeremy D. W.; Rebele, Reb W.; Schor, Jordyn A.; Platt, Michael L. (19 October 2022). "Resilience of primal world beliefs to the initial shock of the COVID ‐19 pandemic". Journal of Personality. doi:10.1111/jopy.12780. ISSN 0022-3506.
  5. ^ Clifton, Jeremy D. W.; Baker, Joshua D.; Park, Crystal L.; Yaden, David B.; Clifton, Alicia B. W.; Terni, Paolo; Miller, Jessica L.; Zeng, Guang; Giorgi, Salvatore; Schwartz, H. Andrew; Seligman, Martin E. P. (January 2019). "Primal world beliefs". Psychological Assessment. 31 (1): 82–99. doi:10.1037/pas0000639. ISSN 1939-134X.
  6. ^ Brooks, Arthur C. (1 September 2022). "Don't Teach Your Kids to Fear the World". The Atlantic.
  7. ^ Esfahani Smith, Emily (October 2, 2019). "Is the world an exciting or a terrifying place? Your answer can powerfully shape your life and your political views, new research says". Washington Post.
  8. ^ Thornhill, Chris; Miron, Ronny (2022). "Karl Jaspers". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
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  10. ^ Clifton, Jeremy D. W.; Baker, Joshua D.; Park, Crystal L.; Yaden, David B.; Clifton, Alicia B. W.; Terni, Paolo; Miller, Jessica L.; Zeng, Guang; Giorgi, Salvatore; Schwartz, H. Andrew; Seligman, Martin E. P. (January 2019). "Primal world beliefs". Psychological Assessment. 31 (1): 82–99. doi:10.1037/pas0000639. ISSN 1939-134X.
  11. ^ Furnham, Adrian (1993). "Just world beliefs in twelve societies". Journal of Social Psychology. 133: 317–329.
  12. ^ Bartholomaeus, Jonathan; Strelan, Peter (1 December 2019). "The adaptive, approach-oriented correlates of belief in a just world for the self: A review of the research". Personality and Individual Differences. 151: 109485. doi:10.1016/j.paid.2019.06.028. ISSN 0191-8869.
  13. ^ Schaller, Mark; Park, Justin; Faulkner, Jason (1 January 2003). "Prehistoric dangers and contemporary prejudices". European Review of Social Psychology. 14 (1): 105–137. doi:10.1080/10463280340000036. ISSN 1046-3283.
  14. ^ Schaller, Mark; Park, Justin H.; Mueller, Annette (May 2003). "Fear of the Dark: Interactive Effects of Beliefs about Danger and Ambient Darkness on Ethnic Stereotypes". Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. 29 (5): 637–649. doi:10.1177/0146167203029005008. ISSN 0146-1672.
  15. ^ Perry, Ryan; Sibley, Chris G.; Duckitt, John (1 February 2013). "Dangerous and competitive worldviews: A meta-analysis of their associations with Social Dominance Orientation and Right-Wing Authoritarianism". Journal of Research in Personality. 47 (1): 116–127. doi:10.1016/j.jrp.2012.10.004. ISSN 0092-6566.
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  19. ^ Clifton, Jeremy D. W. (2020). "Testing If Primal World Beliefs Reflect Experiences—Or at Least Some Experiences Identified ad hoc". Frontiers in Psychology. 11. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01145.((cite journal)): CS1 maint: unflagged free DOI (link)
  20. ^ Beck, Aaron T. (1979). Cognitive therapy and the emotional disorders. New York, NY: Penguin.
  21. ^ Driessen, Ellen; Hollon, Steven D. (1 September 2010). "Cognitive Behavioral Therapy for Mood Disorders: Efficacy, Moderators and Mediators". Psychiatric Clinics of North America. 33 (3): 537–555. doi:10.1016/j.psc.2010.04.005. ISSN 0193-953X.
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  25. ^ https://doi.org/10.1037/pas0000639. ((cite journal)): Cite journal requires |journal= (help); Missing or empty |title= (help)
  26. ^ https://doi.org/10.1037/pas0000639. ((cite journal)): Cite journal requires |journal= (help); Missing or empty |title= (help)
  27. ^ Clifton, Jeremy D. W.; Kerry, Nicholas (1 September 2022). "Belief in a Dangerous World Does Not Explain Substantial Variance in Political Attitudes, But Other World Beliefs Do". Social Psychological and Personality Science: 194855062211193. doi:10.1177/19485506221119324. ISSN 1948-5506.