Although the trilateral ceasefire statement envisaged unblocking all regional communications, since the end of 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, Azerbaijan and Turkey have been promoting the concept of "Zangezur corridor", a quasi-irredentist geopolitical corridor that would connect Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan through Armenia's Syunik Province if implemented.
The terminology, the potential routes, and the modes of transport connections have since been points of contention between Azerbaijan and Armenia, which are still maintaining a mutual blockade.[b] Azerbaijan has initiated construction projects on its territory presenting them as part of the implementation of a so-called "Zangezur corridor" and threatened that should Armenia not want it, Azerbaijan "will decide it by force".[20]
During 2021 trilateral talks, Armenia expressed willingness to participate in rebuilding the Soviet-era railway links historically connecting Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan, which Azerbaijan interpreted as Armenian consent to the "Zangezur corridor". According to Russia, the third party, what is being discussed is unblocking regional communications, and not creating a "corridor".[21][22]
Various observers have commented on the "Zangezur corridor", analyzing the political implications of the term's usage, and the effects of it if implemented, some characterizing the concept as a pan-Turkist agenda, drawing from irredentism, and others emphasizing the solution to the blockade as a key aspect.
Map of the 2002 Azerbaijani territorial proposal made to Armenia. In light green below Armenia is the "Meghri corridor", to be created for connecting Azerbaijan with Nakhichevan.
In Soviet times, two railway connections used to link Nakhichevan ASSR with the main territory of Azerbaijan SSR. The shorter line that passed via Syunik region (the southernmost Armenian province), was built earlier in 1941, whereas the Yerevan-Ijevan-Qazax line further to the North, was constructed in the 1980s as an alternative route, connecting Yerevan to Baku and Russia. Both lines were abandoned since 1992 due to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.[23]
Since 1989, Azerbaijan has blocked shipments of materials to both Armenia and Karabakh, countered by Armenia's blockade of Nakhichevan.[24] Nakhchivan has suffered significantly from the economic blockade by Armenia[25] as did the landlocked Armenia suffer from an economic blockade imposed by Azerbaijan and its ally Turkey. Air and land connections between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic have had to be made through Turkish or Iranian territory.[3]
In 2002, Azerbaijan unsuccessfully proposed to Armenia to formally take over Lachin corridor, that is, the strip of land around city of Lachin which linked southern Armenia to Artsakh (de facto under the control Artsakh Defence Army but de jure in Azerbaijan at that point), in exchange for giving Azerbaijan control over a strip of Armenian land along the Iranian border between Nakhichevan and main territory of Azerbaijan in return. At this time, the term "Meghri corridor" was occasionally used.[26]
All economic and transport connections in the region shall be unblocked. The Republic of Armenia shall guarantee the security of transport connections between the western regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic in order to arrange unobstructed movement of persons, vehicles and cargo in both directions. The Border Guard Service of the Russian Federal Security Service shall be responsible for overseeing the transport connections.[27]
In December 2020, Russia signaled its desire to connect Nakhichevan to the rest of Azerbaijan through a railway link that would go through Armenia.[28] Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia created a trilateral working group in order to unblock communications in the region. Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov said that the activity of this group will serve the implementation of confidence-building measures and resolution of humanitarian problems, and that the interests of Turkey and Iran are taken into account during trilateral consultations.[29] On 31 December 2020 Azerbaijan's president Ilham Aliyev announced plans to build a railroad line from Horadiz to Zangilan, from where it would use trucks to move goods to Nakhchivan and Turkey, suggesting a potential future transport link between Zangilan and Nakhchivan through Syunik.[30] According to Aliyev, the "corridor" could eventually become a part of the International North–South Transport Corridor, connecting Iran to Russia via Azerbaijan and Armenia, while Armenia would get a railway link to Russia, Iran and potentially to Turkey.[31]
Usage of the term
2021 "corridor" dispute
In January 2021 trilateral meeting of Russian, Azerbaijani and Armenian leaders, Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasized the issue of opening economic, commercial and transportation links and borders, announcing that a joint working group under the chairmanship of the deputy prime ministers of these countries is formed to work on it.[32]
In February 2021, a dispute arose around a clause in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire agreement that provided for unblocking all economic and transport connections in the region, including that between the western regions of Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev declared that the ceasefire agreement contained a special provision on the establishment of a so-called "Nakhichevan corridor".[33] The Armenian government and Armenian opposition parties rejected this claim emphasizing that the ceasefire agreement did not contain any provisions for establishing such "corridor".[27][33][34]
In April 2021, Aliyev announced that Azerbaijani people would return to what he described as "West Zangazur" and Azerbaijan's "historic lands" within the borders of Armenia,[35] but that Azerbaijan does not have territorial claims to any foreign country.[36]
However, a week later, he warned that Azerbaijan would establish the "Zangezur corridor" by force if Armenia would not accede to the creation of the corridor.[37] The Armenian foreign ministry responded that the country would "take all necessary measures to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity." In May 2021, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said that while Armenia is not willing to discuss 'corridor logic', it is keen on opening transport links as means of direct railway communication with Iran and Russia.[38] The dispute has been cited as one of the reasons for the 2021 Armenia–Azerbaijan border crisis.[39]
A new round of trilateral talks began on 20 October 2021. A day earlier, Armenian Deputy Prime Minister Mher Grigoryan said that progress was made toward the railway connections dating from the Soviet period being restored.[40] A day after the talks had begun, Aliyev was quoted as saying that the Armenian side has agreed to the "Zangezur corridor".[41]
On 9th November 2021, the Deputy Prime Minister of Russia and the co-chair of the trilateral task force dealing with cross-border connections Alexei Overchuk said that "Armenia and Azerbaijan will retain sovereignty over roads passing through their territory". The Russian Foreign Ministry confirmed this, commenting on the media speculation about the "so-called Zangezur corridor".[42] The chairman of Azerbaijan's Center of Analysis of International Relations Farid Shafiyev said that if Armenia does not want to say "corridor", then an alternative term can be used, but insisted that unimpeded access for unimpeded movement to Nakhchivan must be given without any Armenian checkpoints, with the security of transport links provided only by the Russian border guards.[11] According to Anar Valiyev, the dean of the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy, “What Azerbaijan wants is no checkpoints, not to have to stop at the border . . . We are in a situation where we have leverage, we have time and we can dictate terms.” [43]
On 15 December 2021, in Brussels, during a press conference with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, Aliyev expressed a view that the "Zangezur corridor" should function as the Lachin corridor. During this, he said that the opening of the Zangezur corridor "is provisioned in the 10 November 2020 ceasefire agreement", adding that just as Azerbaijan assures security and entry to Lachin corridor, Armenia should provide the same unhampered entrance to the Zangezur corridor, without customs enforcement, and threatening that "if Armenia insists on customs points to control the movement of goods and people over the Zangezur Corridor, then [Azerbaijan] will insist on the same conditions in the Lachin corridor". In response to this, Pashinyan said that "Azerbaijan is trying to take the process of unblocking the regional connections to a deadlock" and that "the parallels made to the Lachin corridor do not have even the slightest connection to discussions and announcements signed to this date, and are unacceptable to Armenia".[44]
Reportedly related construction projects
During 2021, Azerbaijan has been building roads and a railway section in the areas it regained control over after the war; its officials have said that these construction projects have been undertaken in connection to the "Zangezur corridor".[17][45]
Analyses
As a pan-Turkist agenda
Azerbaijan and Turkey promote their vision of "Zangezur corridor" as a means of "uniting the Turkic world"[15][16]
When hosting Erdogan in Zangelan on 27 October 2021, Aliyev said that "the corridor that is going to pass through here is going to unite the whole Turkic world".[15] He repeated this during the meeting of the representatives of Organization of Turkic States on 12 November 2021, adding that the corridor will become for Turkic states a link with Europe.[16]
According to Iranian-born American political scientist Shireen Hunter, Turkey has been trying for a long time to establish a direct link to Azerbaijan by eliminating Iran's access to Armenia.[46] Hunter explains that "Turkey has long wanted to have a land route to Azerbaijan and from there to northern Iran and Central Asia".[46] She added: "if Turkey decides to push its long-held ambition of creating a direct link to the republic of Azerbaijan by eliminating Iran's access to Armenia, then the risk of escalation will increase".[46]
Ahmad Kazemi, the author of the book Security in South Caucasus, told Iran's Strategic Council on Foreign Relations that "Azerbaijan is seeking to establish the so-called pan-Turkist illusionary Zangezur corridor in south of Armenia under the pretext of creating connectivity in the region", arguing that "this corridor is not compatible with any of the present geopolitical and historical realities of the region".[47]
As a solution to the blockade
In the opinion of Thomas de Waal, a former journalist and a senior fellow with Carnegie Europe, "The economic benefits of the opening of closed transport routes in the South Caucasus, including as set out in the November 2020 ceasefire agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, could extend to all the countries of the region as well as to Russia, Turkey, and Iran. But the politics remains difficult within the region and between its neighboring powers, with trust in short supply". According to de Waal, "Security concerns also haunt plans to reopen the crucial transport route across southern Armenia to and from Azerbaijan's exclave of Nakhchivan. Azerbaijan and Turkey are already connected by road through the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway across Georgia. A new route via southern Armenia would have the important result of de-isolating Nakhchivan and lifting its economy. Beyond that, this route would acquire more significance only if traffic across it is subjected to minimal checks and controls; Armenia for its part insists that it does not want a "corridor" across its territory over which it has no control, and it is supported in this stance by Iran".[48]
Michael Rubin, a senior scholar at the right-leaning think tank American Enterprise Institute (AEI), wrote that Turkey and Azerbaijan presidents are trying to redefine the clause on unblocking regional communications in trilateral ceasefire agreement by interpreting it as granting them a corridor bisecting sovereign Armenian territory and ignoring the first sentence in the clause about unblocking economic and transport connections across the region. Rubin called this reinterpretation unwarranted and illegitimate, arguing that the removing the double blockade of Armenia in order to reduce Armenian dependence upon Russia and Iran would be the best way forward from the situation. According to him, "while Turkey hopes its trucks could drive through Zangezur to Armenia, Armenian vehicles should likewise be able to drive from Yerevan to Istanbul. If Turks hope to enjoy unhampered trade with Central Asia all the way to the Chinese border, then Armenians in Artsakh should enjoy the same unhampered trade through Turkey all the way to France or the UK".[49]
International reaction
A joint statement by the European Parliament DSCA Chair Marina Kaljurand and Standing Rapporteurs on Armenia, Andrey Kovatchev, and Azerbaijan, Željana Zovko, among other things, condemned the statements made by the Azerbaijani side: "To de-escalate the situation, it is of utmost importance that inflammatory rhetoric ceases immediately. In this context, we condemn in particular recent statements by Azerbaijani representatives regarding so-called 'West Zangezur' and referring to the territory of the Republic of Armenia as Azerbaijani 'ancestral land'. Such statements are highly irresponsible and threaten to undermine regional security further."[50]
French Ambassador to Armenia Jonathan Lacôte objected to the use of "corridor" expression, because in his opinion the "corridors" have left a very bad memory in the history of diplomacy, such as the Polish Danzig Corridor,[51] which was central to Nazi policy and served as a pretext to World War II.[52]
The Shusha Declaration signed by presidents of Azerbaijan and Turkey on 15 June 2021 included a passage on the "Zangezur corridor", and both Aliyev and Erdogan stressed the importance of its implementation in the following joint press conference.[18] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia condemned their joint visit to Shusha, calling it a provocation.[53]
Russian vice prime minister Overchuk attested in September 2021 that the trilateral group, which Russia is part of, discusses unblocking regional communications but not creating a "corridor".[21][22]
Notes
^Zangezur refers to the historical and geographical region in the Caucasus. In Azerbaijan, the variation "Zangazur corridor" is used as well.[1][2]The concept has also been referred to by press and media as the "Nakhchivan corridor"[3][4] (Armenian: Նախիջևանի միջանցք, Azerbaijani: Naxçıvan dəhlizi), the "Meghri corridor",[5][6] (Armenian: Մեղրիի միջանցք; Azerbaijani: Meğri dəhlizi) and the "Syunik corridor"[7][8] (Armenian: Սյունիքի միջանցք; Azerbaijani: Sünik dəhlizi).
^With the exception of Armenia conceding to Azerbaijani flights over its territory.
^The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica (ed.). "Polish Corridor". Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved 22 August 2021. The Polish Corridor was the issue, or at least the apparent pretext, over which World War II began. In March 1939 the Nazi dictator of Germany, Adolf Hitler, demanded the cession of Danzig and the creation of extraterritorial German highways across the corridor connecting to East Prussia.((cite encyclopedia)): |editor-last= has generic name (help)
