The 1958 Lebanon crisis was a political crisis in Lebanon caused by political and religious tensions in the country that included a United States military intervention. The intervention lasted for around three months until President Camille Chamoun, who had requested the assistance, completed his term as president of Lebanon. American and Lebanese government forces successfully occupied the Port of Beirut and Beirut International Airport. With the crisis over, the United States withdrew.
After the end of World War II in 1945, the United States and Soviet Union were the two major world powers. Two years later, the Truman Doctrine was issued, aimed at containing the spread of communism and the Soviet Union.[1][2] The Cold War is generally considered to have begun around this time.[3] As the world divided into the Eastern (communist) and Western (capitalist) Blocs, a struggle for ideological geopolitical supremacy between the US and USSR emerged. One of the ways it manifested was through proxy wars in various global regions. One of those regions was the Middle East, where the Arab Cold War took place.[4] After the Suez Crisis in 1956, there was an increase in Arab hostility to the West as well as increased Soviet influence in Egypt and Syria. The crisis also encouraged pan-Arabism and increased the popularity and influence of Gamal Abdel Nasser, President of Egypt. The United States feared that the region was susceptible to the spread of communism.[5]
The partition of the Ottoman Empire divided present-day Syria and Lebanon under the Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon in 1923.[9] Lebanon completely became an independent nation on 22 November 1943 when the French Mandate formally ended.[10] Around the time of independence, the National Pact was agreed upon, stating that, among other things, "Lebanon was to be a completely independent sovereign state. The Christians were to forego seeking foreign [...] protection or attempting to bring Lebanon under foreign control or influence. In return, the Muslims were to forego making any attempt to bring Lebanon into any political union with Syria, or into the formation of any Arab Union". The Pact marked a compromise between several religious sects living in the country—namely Maronite Christians, Sunni Muslims, Shia Muslims, Greek Orthodox Christians, Greek Catholic Christians and Druzes.[11]
Camille Chamoun was elected as the second President of Lebanon in the presidential elections in 1952, replacing Bechara El Khoury in the post. Described as "quite openly anti-Communist", the United States viewed Chamoun as "definitely our friend."[12] In 1956, Prime Minister Abdallah El-Yafi and Minister of State Saeb Salam resigned in protest due to Chamoun's refusal to condemn the British-French invasion of Egypt during the Suez Crisis. This caused Muslim opposition groups to form the United National Front in 1957. The United States agreed to provide military assistance to the Lebanese government from 6 June 1957.[13]
In 1957, shortly after the announcement of the Eisenhower Doctrine—which Chamoun's regime had been the only Arab government to openly endorse "without reservation"—the United States became concerned that parliamentary elections set for June would result in the election of a parliament that was hostile to the US. Many Muslims in the nation supported Nasser and the United Arab Republic (UAR). Kamal Jumblatt and Rashid Karami, Druze and Sunni leaders, respectively, condemned Chamoun's support for the doctrine as violating the National Pact. US attempts to influence the election included approving the sending of $12.7 million in military or financial aid and sending operatives from the Central Intelligence Agency (including David Atlee Phillips, Miles Copeland Jr. and Wilbur Eveland) to the region, who provided "campaign contributions" towards pro-West politicians.[14] In late May 1957 pro-Chamoun troops killed seven and wounded seventy-three protesters in Beirut and the following month opposition leaders argued that Chamoun "had bought so many votes and gerrymandered so many districts that the balloting would be meaningless." The election was an American success, as fifty-three out of sixty-six parliamentarians supported Chamoun. The US continued to provide aid to Chamoun, fearing Soviet and UAR influence in the region. Chamun's opponents maintained that the election was invalid and needed to be re-held.[15]
On 8 May 1958 a Lebanese journalist, Nasib Al Matni, was assassinated in his office in Beirut.[16] He was a pro-Nasserist and anti-Chamoun Maronite.[16] Following this incident intensive protests occurred in Beirut and Tripoli.[16]
In 1958, Camille Chamoun was in the sixth and final year of his term as President of Lebanon.[17]
Heightened tensions
On 1 February 1958, Syria and Egypt united, forming the UAR.[18][19] The United States feared initially that the new nation would become the dominant power in the Middle East, but recognized it on February 25 after deciding that the UAR could be beneficial in halting communism's spread and keeping Nasser contained.[19] Chamoun and Charles Malik worried that "the peril of subversion in Lebanon" by the UAR "was immediate" and asked for American aid.[20]
Tensions were increasing in Lebanon throughout early 1958. Although Chamoun's term would have expired on 23 September 1958, he intended to run for president again, which was not permitted in the Constitution of Lebanon, and asked for American support in his effort.[20][21][22] While the United States feared that a movement against Chamoun could harm their interests in the region, they were reluctant to withdraw support for him, as Fouad Chehab, the chief of staff of the Lebanese Army, was the most likely figure to succeed Chamoun. Robert M. McClintock, American ambassador to Lebanon, described Chehab as "a neutral legume who would require careful pruning to grow in the right direction."[23] As a result, the US did not formally support Chamoun's effort.[24]
Protests by various groups—mainly the Sunnis and the Druzes—began in February against the Christian Chamoun, who had also aligned himself in support of the US and Britain, actions that protesters considered breaches of the National Pact.[25] Demonstrations also protested that Chamoun had not allowed Lebanon to join the UAR.[17] The protesters felt that "Chamoun was not willing to modify his foreign policy unless he was forced to."[26] Tensions between Maronite Christians and Arab Muslims continued to rise after the killing of Nasib Al Matni on 8 May. Matni was the editor of Al Telegraf and had been critical of Chamoun's rule.[21][22] Fighting erupted on the streets of Beirut as a Muslim mob burned the US Information Service library down. Heightened tensions existed around the country, including in the Beqaa Valley, where Shia militants were receiving weapons from Syria.[27]The New York Times dated the beginning of a formal armed rebellion to 10 May 1958.[28] Chamoun requested American military intervention in early May against the threat to his power under the Eisenhower Doctrine, although McClintock noted that there was an "absence of overt Communist aggression".[29]
Eisenhower responded by authorizing Operation Blue Bat on 15 July 1958, in the first application of the Eisenhower Doctrine in which the US announced that it would intervene to protect regimes that it considered to be threatened by international communism. The goal of the operation was to bolster Chamoun's pro-Western Lebanese government from internal opposition and threats from Syria and Egypt. The plan was to occupy and secure Beirut International Airport, a few miles south of the city, and then to secure the port of Beirut and the approaches to the city.
The chain of command for Operation Blue Bat was as follows: the Eisenhower administration at the strategic level; Specified Command, Middle East (SPECCOMME, a 'double-hat' for Commander in Chief, US Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean) at the operational level; the United States Sixth Fleet, with aircraft carriers USS Saratoga, USS Essex and USS Wasp, cruisers USS Des Moines and USS Boston, and two destroyer squadrons, including the USS The Sullivans DD-537, USS Leary, USS Vesole and the USS William M. Wood. At the end of June, Essex and Boston were anchored at Piraeus, Greece, while Des Moines, from which Vice Admiral Charles R. Brown was flying his flag, was at Villefranche-sur-Mer, France.[33] Land forces included the 2nd Provisional Marine Force (Task Force 62) and the United States Army Task Force 201 at the tactical level.[34] Each of these three components influenced Operations Plan 215-58 and its execution.
Eisenhower sent the diplomat Robert Daniel Murphy to Lebanon as his personal representative. Murphy played a significant role in convincing both sides of the conflict to reach a compromise by electing the moderate Christian general Fouad Chehab as incoming president, but allowing Chamoun to continue in power until the end of his term, on September 22.
Lebanese Prime Minister Rashid Karami formed a national reconciliation government after the end of the 1958 crisis.
^Thomas A. Bryson, Tars, Turks, and Tankers: The Role of the United States Navy in the Middle East, Scarecrow Press, Inc.: Metuchen (NJ) and London, 1980, 128.
^Scott Jackman, Political Success in War: A Criterion for Success, DTIC.
^For more on the naval and Marine Corps forces involved, see Bryson, 1980, 126–140.
Lesch, David W. (1996). "Prelude to the 1958 American Intervention in Lebanon". Mediterranean Quarterly. 7 (3): 87–108.
Little, Douglas (1996). "His Finest Hour? Eisenhower, Lebanon, and the 1958 Middle East Crisis". Diplomatic History. 20 (1): 27–54. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7709.1996.tb00251.x.
Mesquita, Ana Guedes; White, Nigel D. (2015). "United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL)". In Koops, Alexander; MacQueen, Norrie; Tardy, Thierry; Williams, Paul D. (eds.). Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 153–159. ISBN978-0-19-968604-9.
Ovendale, Ritchie (1994). "Great Britain and the Anglo-American Invasion of Jordan and Lebanon in 1958". The International History Review. 16 (2): 284–304. doi:10.1080/07075332.1994.9640677.
Tinguy, Edouard de (2007). "The Lebanese crisis of 1958 and the U.S military intervention". Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique (in French). 4. Paris: A. Pédone.
Alin, Erika G. The United States and the 1958 Lebanon Crisis, American Intervention in the Middle East, 1994.
Brands, H.W. Into the Labyrinth: The United States and the Middle East, 1945-1993 (1994) excerpt pp 72–80.
Gendzier, Irene L. Notes from the Minefield: United States Intervention in Lebanon and the Middle East 1945–1958, 1997
Korbani, Agnes G. U.S. Intervention in Lebanon, 1958–1982: presidential decisionmaking, 1991.
Schulimson, Jack. Marines in Lebanon 1958, Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, Department of the Navy, United States Marine Corps, 1966, 60 p.
Wright, Quincy. "United States intervention in the Lebanon." American Journal of International Law 53.1 (1959): 112–125.
Yaqub, Salim. Containing Arab Nationalism, The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East, 2003.
Pierrick el Gammal, Politique intérieure et politique extérieure au Liban de 1958 à 1961 de Camille Chamoun à Fouad Chehab, Sorbonne University (Paris), 1991. (French)
Nawaf Salam, L'insurrection de 1958 au Liban, Sorbonne University (Paris), 1979. (French)
Primary sources
Mohammed Shafi Agwani, ed. The Lebanese Crisis, 1958: A Documentary Study, 1965.
This list includes World War I and later conflicts (after 1914) of at least 100 fatalities each Prolonged conflicts are listed in the decade when initiated; ongoing conflicts are marked italic, and conflicts with +100,000 killed with bold.
United States
Gamal Abdel Nasser
