Briefing at the headquarters of Army Group Vistula
Heinz Guderian had originally urged the creation of a new army group as an essentially defensive measure to fill the gap opening in German defences between the lower Vistula and the lower Oder.[2]
The new Army Group Vistula was duly formed from an assortment of rebuilt, new and existing units. Guderian intended to propose Field-Marshal Maximilian von Weichs as commander.[3] However, in a reflection of Hitler's desire to transfer control of the conflict from the Wehrmacht to the SS, Heinrich Himmler was appointed.[4] Himmler, who lacked any real military knowledge,[note 1] proved inadequate to the task; General Gotthard Heinrici replaced Himmler as commander of Army Group Vistula on 20 March, subsequent to its participation in the German offensive codenamed Operation Solstice and the following defence against the Soviet East Pomeranian Offensive.
Between January and February 1945, Army Group Vistula sustained 98,000 casualties, including 15,000 dead, 50,000 wounded (not counting non-evacuees), and 33,000 missing.[1]: 559 On 1 April 1945, it had 185,975 assigned personnel (split between the 9th Army and the 3rd Panzer Army), with 104,162 soldiers in active combat, 21,946 sick and wounded since 1 February, and 318 vacationers.[1]: 607
The Army Group's only offensive action was Operation Solstice, the failed attempt to relieve the fortress of Kustrin late in March 1945, during which the subordinate XXXIX Panzer Corps took heavy casualties.
Under the command of Gotthard Heinrici, parts of the army group fought through the Battle of Berlin and Battle of Halbe, with some of its elements not surrendering until the end of the war in Europe on 8 May 1945. Army Group Vistula's strength was in the region of 500,000 troops;[3][note 2] in general, the army group was poorly equipped, many of its units being little more than the 'paper' formations typical of the German military at the end of World War II. Indeed, when first set up it was found that the army group lacked many essential facilities, such as proper maps or a headquarters signals detachment—the sole means of communication being Himmler's private telephone.[5]
The 2nd Army of GeneraloberstWalter Weiß, which as part of Army Group Centre had been defending the line of the Narew river on the borders of East Prussia. The East Prussian Offensive had cut it off from the remnants of its parent formation, and by late January it defended a long sector from Elbing in the east running westwards through Pomerania. It therefore formed the new army group's northern and eastern flank.
The 11th SS Panzer Army was a 'new' formation which had been assembled in western Pomerania. Soon after its formation it received the commander ObergruppenführerFelix Steiner and other staff of the 3rd Panzer Army, which had been largely destroyed in East Prussia.
During the East Pomeranian Offensive, the Second Army was finally cut off from the remainder of the army group and withdrew into Danzig, where it was eventually destroyed. The rest of Army Group Vistula was forced west of the Oder, though the Third Panzer Army retained a small bridgehead at Altdamm until the middle of March.
^Although this was not Himmler's first such operational military high command appointment. Between 10 December 1944 and 24 January 1945 (the day before he took up this command) he commanded Army Group Oberrhein.
^who states that German sources give the group's size as 32-34 divisions, while a "good Soviet source" identifies it as having 450,000 troops. Duffy 1991, p. 177
Footnotes
^ abcLakowski, Richard (2008). "Der Zusammenbruch der deutschen Verteidigung zwischen Ostsee und Karpaten". In Müller, Rolf-Dieter (ed.). Die Militärische Niederwerfung der Wehrmacht. Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg (in German). Vol. 10/1. München: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt. pp. 491–681. ISBN9783421062376.
Nazi Germany
German Army
