Basel III (or the Third Basel Accord or Basel Standards) is a global, voluntary regulatory framework on bank capital adequacy, stress testing, and market liquidity risk. This third installment of the Basel Accords (see Basel I, Basel II) was developed in response to the deficiencies in financial regulation revealed by the financial crisis of 2007–08. It is intended to strengthen bank capital requirements by increasing minimum capital requirements, holdings of high quality liquid assets, and decreasing bank leverage.

Basel III was agreed upon by the members of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in November 2010, and was scheduled to be introduced from 2013 until 2015; however, implementation was extended repeatedly to 1 January 2022 and then again until 1 January 2023, in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic.[1][2][3][4]


The Basel III standard aims to strengthen the requirements from the Basel II standard on bank's minimum capital ratios. In addition, it introduces requirements on liquid asset holdings and funding stability, thereby seeking to mitigate the risk of a run on the bank.

Key principles

See also: List of bank stress tests

CET1 capital requirements

The original Basel III rule from 2010 required banks to fund themselves with 4.5% of Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) (up from 2% in Basel II) of risk-weighted assets (RWAs). Since 2015, a minimum CET1 ratio of 4.5% must be maintained at all times by the bank.[5] This ratio is calculated as follows:

The minimum Tier 1 capital increases from 4% in Basel II to 6%,[5] applicable in 2015, over RWAs.[6] This 6% is composed of 4.5% of CET1, plus an extra 1.5% of Additional Tier 1 (AT1).

CET1 capital comprises shareholders equity (including audited profits), less deductions of accounting reserve that are not believed to be loss absorbing "today", including goodwill and other intangible assets. To prevent the potential of double-counting of capital across the economy, bank's holdings of other bank shares are also deducted.

Furthermore, Basel III introduced two additional capital buffers:

Leverage ratio

Basel III introduced a minimum "leverage ratio". This is a transparent, simple, non-risk-based leverage ratio and is calculated by dividing Tier 1 capital by the bank's average total consolidated assets (sum of the exposures of all assets and non-balance sheet items).[7][8] The ratio acts as a back-stop to the risk-based capital metrics. The banks are expected to maintain a leverage ratio in excess of 3% under Basel III.

For typical mortgage lenders, who underwrite assets of a low risk weighting, the leverage ratio will often by the binding capital metric.

In July 2013, the U.S. Federal Reserve announced that the minimum Basel III leverage ratio would be 5% for 8 systemically important financial institution (SIFI) banks and 6% for their insured bank holding companies.[9] In the EU, whilst banks have been required to disclose their leverage ratio since 2015, a binding requirement has not yet been implemented. The UK operates its own leverage ratio regime, with a binding minimum requirement for banks with deposits greater than £50bn of 3.25%. This higher minimum reflects the PRA's differing treatment of the leverage ratio, which excludes central bank reserves in 'Total exposure' of the calculation.

Liquidity requirements

Basel III introduced two required liquidity/funding ratios.[10]

US version of the Basel Liquidity Coverage Ratio requirements

On 24 October 2013, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors approved an interagency proposal for the U.S. version of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS)'s Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR). The ratio would apply to certain U.S. banking organizations and other systemically important financial institutions.[12] The comment period for the proposal closed on 31 January 2014.

The United States' LCR proposal came out significantly tougher than BCBS's version, especially for larger bank holding companies.[13] The proposal requires financial institutions and FSOC designated nonbank financial companies[14] to have an adequate stock of high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) that can be quickly liquidated to meet liquidity needs over a short period of time.

The LCR consists of two parts: the numerator is the value of HQLA, and the denominator consists of the total net cash outflows over a specified stress period (total expected cash outflows minus total expected cash inflows).[15]

The Liquidity Coverage Ratio applies to U.S. banking operations with assets of more than $10 billion. The proposal would require:

The US proposal divides qualifying HQLAs into three specific categories (Level 1, Level 2A, and Level 2B). Across the categories, the combination of Level 2A and 2B assets cannot exceed 40% HQLA with 2B assets limited to a maximum of 15% of HQLA.[15]

The proposal requires that the LCR be at least equal to or greater than 1.0 and includes a multiyear transition period that would require: 80% compliance starting 1 January 2015, 90% compliance starting 1 January 2016, and 100% compliance starting 1 January 2017.[17]

Lastly, the proposal requires both sets of firms (large bank holding companies and regional firms) subject to the LCR requirements to submit remediation plans to U.S. regulators to address what actions would be taken if the LCR falls below 100% for three or more consecutive days.


Summary of originally-proposed changes (2010) in Basel Committee language

As of September 2010, proposed Basel III norms asked for ratios as: 7–9.5% (4.5% + 2.5% (conservation buffer) + 0–2.5% (seasonal buffer)) for common equity and 8.5–11% for Tier 1 capital and 10.5–13% for total capital.[21]

On 15 April 2014, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) released the final version of its "Supervisory Framework for Measuring and Controlling Large Exposures" (SFLE) that builds on longstanding BCBS guidance on credit exposure concentrations.[22]

On 3 September 2014, the U.S. banking agencies (Federal Reserve, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) issued their final rule implementing the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR).[23] The LCR is a short-term liquidity measure intended to ensure that banking organizations maintain a sufficient pool of liquid assets to cover net cash outflows over a 30-day stress period.

On 11 March 2016, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision released the second of three proposals on public disclosure of regulatory metrics and qualitative data by banking institutions. The proposal requires disclosures on market risk to be more granular for both the standardized approach and regulatory approval of internal models.[24]

US implementation

The US Federal Reserve announced in December 2011 that it would implement substantially all of the Basel III rules.[25] It summarized them as follows, and made clear they would apply not only to banks but also to all institutions with more than US$50 billion in assets:

As of January 2014, the United States has been on track to implement many of the Basel III rules, despite differences in ratio requirements and calculations.[31]

European implementation

Main article: Capital Requirements Regulation and Directive

The implementing act of the Basel III agreements in the European Union has been the new legislative package comprising Directive 2013/36/EU (CRD IV) and Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms (CRR).[32]

The new package, approved in 2013, replaced the Capital Requirements Directives (2006/48 and 2006/49).[33]

On 7 December 2017, ECB chief Mario Draghi declared that for the banks of the European Union, the Basel III reforms were complete.[34]

Key milestones

Capital requirements

Date Milestone: Capital requirement
2014 Minimum capital requirements: Start of the gradual phasing-in of the higher minimum capital requirements.
2015 Minimum capital requirements: Higher minimum capital requirements are fully implemented.
2016 Conservation buffer: Start of the gradual phasing-in of the conservation buffer.
2019 Conservation buffer: The conservation buffer is fully implemented.

Leverage ratio

Date Milestone: Leverage ratio
2011 Supervisory monitoring: Developing templates to track the leverage ratio and the underlying components.
2013 Parallel run I: The leverage ratio and its components will be tracked by supervisors but not disclosed and not mandatory.
2015 Parallel run II: The leverage ratio and its components will be tracked and disclosed but not mandatory.
2017 Final adjustments: Based on the results of the parallel run period, any final adjustments to the leverage ratio.
2018 Mandatory requirement: The leverage ratio will become a mandatory part of Basel III requirements.

Liquidity requirements

Date Milestone: Liquidity requirements
2011 Observation period: Developing templates and supervisory monitoring of the liquidity ratios.
2015 Introduction of the LCR: Initial introduction of the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR), with a 60% requirement. This will increase by ten percentage points each year until 2019. In the EU, 100% will be reached in 2018.[35]
2018 Introduction of the NSFR: Introduction of the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR).
2019 LCR comes into full effect: 100% LCR is expected.

Analysis of Basel III impact

In the United States higher capital requirements resulted in contractions in trading operations and the number of personnel employed on trading floors.[36]

Macroeconomic impact

An OECD study, released on 17 February 2011, estimated that the medium-term impact of Basel III implementation on GDP growth would be in the range of −0.05% to −0.15% per year.[37][38][39] Economic output would be mainly affected by an increase in bank lending spreads, as banks pass a rise in bank funding costs, due to higher capital requirements, to their customers. To meet the capital requirements originally effective in 2015 banks were estimated to increase their lending spreads on average by about 15 basis points. Capital requirements effective as of 2019 (7% for the common equity ratio, 8.5% for the Tier 1 capital ratio) could increase bank lending spreads by about 50 basis points.[citation needed] The estimated effects on GDP growth assume no active response from monetary policy. To the extent that monetary policy would no longer be constrained by the zero lower bound, the Basel III impact on economic output could be offset by a reduction (or delayed increase) in monetary policy rates by about 30 to 80 basis points.[37]

Basel III was also criticized as negatively affecting the stability of the financial system by increasing incentives of banks to game the regulatory framework.[40]


Think tanks such as the World Pensions Council have argued that Basel III merely builds on and further expands the existing Basel II regulatory base without fundamentally questioning its core tenets, notably the ever-growing reliance on standardized assessments of "credit risk" marketed by two private sector agencies- Moody's and S&P, thus using public policy to strengthen anti-competitive duopolistic practices.[41][42] The conflicted and unreliable credit ratings of these agencies is generally seen as a major contributor to the US housing bubble. Academics have criticized Basel III for continuing to allow large banks to calculate credit risk using internal models and for setting overall minimum capital requirements too low.[43]

Opaque treatment of all derivatives contracts is also criticized. While institutions have many legitimate ("hedging", "insurance") risk reduction reasons to deal in derivatives, the Basel III accords:

Since derivatives present major unknowns in a crisis these are seen as major failings by some critics [44] causing several to claim that the "too big to fail" status remains with respect to major derivatives dealers who aggressively took on risk of an event they did not believe would happen—but did. As Basel III does not absolutely require extreme scenarios that management flatly rejects to be included in stress testing this remains a vulnerability. Standardized external auditing and modelling is an issue proposed to be addressed in Basel 4 however.

A few critics argue that capitalization regulation is inherently fruitless due to these and similar problems and—despite an opposite ideological view of regulation—agree that "too big to fail" persists.[45]

Basel III has been criticized similarly for its paper burden and risk inhibition by banks, organized in the Institute of International Finance, an international association of global banks based in Washington, D.C., who argue that it would "hurt" both their business and overall economic growth. Basel III was also criticized as negatively affecting the stability of the financial system by increasing incentives of banks to game the regulatory framework.[46] The American Bankers Association,[47] community banks organized in the Independent Community Bankers of America, and others voiced opposition to Basel III in their comments to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,[48] saying that the Basel III proposals, if implemented, would hurt small banks by increasing "their capital holdings dramatically on mortgage and small business loans".[49]

Former US Secretary of Labor and Professor of Economics at the University of California, Berkeley Robert Reich has argued that Basel III did not go far enough to regulate banks since, he believed, inadequate regulation was a cause of the global financial crisis [50] and remains an unresolved issue despite the severity of the impact of the Great Recession.[51] In 2019, American investor Michael Burry criticized Basel III for what he characterizes as "more or less remov[ing] price discovery from the credit markets, meaning risk does not have an accurate pricing mechanism in interest rates anymore."[52]

Before the enactment of Basel III in 2011, the Institute of International Finance (IIF, a Washington D.C.-based, 450-member banking trade association), argued against the implementation of the accords, claiming it would hurt banks and economic growth. The American Banker's Association,[53] community banks organized in the Independent Community Bankers of America, and some of the most liberal Democrats in the U.S. Congress, including the entire Maryland congressional delegation with Democratic Sens. Cardin and Mikulski and Reps. Van Hollen and Cummings, voiced opposition to Basel III in their comments submitted to FDIC,[54] saying that the Basel III proposals, if implemented, would hurt small banks by increasing "their capital holdings dramatically on mortgage and small business loans."[55]

On 6 January 2013 the global banking sector won a significant easing of Basel III Rules, when the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision extended not only the implementation schedule to 2019, but broadened the definition of liquid assets.[56] In December 2017, the Basel Committee's oversight body, the Group of Central Bank Governors and Heads of Supervision (GHOS), extended the implementation of capital requirements again to 2022.[57] In March 2020, implementation of the Basel III Standards was extended yet again, with revised standardised approaches for credit risk, operational risk framework, and market risk framework, as well as the revised Pillar 3 disclosure framework, all extended to January 1, 2023, with implementation of "the accompanying transitional arrangements for the output floor" extended further still, to January 1, 2028.[58]

See also


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  2. ^ Financial Times report Oct 2012
  3. ^ "Basel III – Implementation - Financial Stability Board". Retrieved 21 March 2019.
  4. ^ "Governors and Heads of Supervision announce deferral of Basel III implementation to increase operational capacity of banks and supervisors to respond to Covid-19". 27 March 2020. Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  5. ^ a b "Phase 3 arrangements" (PDF).
  6. ^ "Archived copy" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 11 December 2013. Retrieved 30 April 2015.CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link)
  7. ^ "Basel III leverage ratio framework and disclosure requirements" (PDF). Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. January 2014.
  8. ^ " -".
  9. ^ "FDIC Publication" (PDF).
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  11. ^ Hal S. Scott (16 June 2011). "Testimony of Hal S. Scott before the Committee on Financial Services" (PDF). Committee on Financial Services, United States House of Representatives. pp. 12–13. Retrieved 17 November 2012.
  12. ^ a b "Archived copy" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 2 November 2013. Retrieved 2 November 2013.CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link)
  13. ^ "Fed Liquidity Proposal Seen Trading Safety for Costlier Credit". Bloomberg.
  14. ^ a b "Nonbank SIFIs: FSOC proposes initial designations more names to follow".
  15. ^ a b c "Liquidity coverage ratio: another brick in the wall".
  16. ^ "Federal Reserve Board proposes rule to strengthen liquidity positions of large financial institutions".
  17. ^ "Fed proposes new liquidity rules for banks". Financial Times.
  18. ^ "Strengthening the resilience of the banking sector" (PDF). BCBS. December 2009. p. 15. Tier 3 will be abolished to ensure that market risks are met with the same quality of capital as credit and operational risks.
  19. ^ "Basel II Comprehensive version part 2: The First Pillar – Minimum Capital Requirements" (PDF). November 2005. p. 86.
  20. ^ Susanne Craig (8 January 2012). "Bank Regulators to Allow Leeway on Liquidity Rule". New York Times. Retrieved 10 January 2012.
  21. ^ Proposed Basel III Guidelines: A Credit Positive for Indian Banks
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  23. ^ "First take: Liquidity coverage ratio". PwC Financial Services Regulatory Practice, September, 2014.
  24. ^ "Five key points from Basel's enhanced disclosure proposal". PwC Financial Services Risk and Regulatory Practice. March 2016.
  25. ^ Edward Wyatt (20 December 2011). "Fed Proposes New Capital Rules for Banks". New York Times. Retrieved 6 July 2012.
  26. ^ "Press Release". Federal Reserve Bank. 20 December 2011. Retrieved 6 July 2012.
  27. ^ "Press Release". Federal Reserve. 1 April 2020. Retrieved 16 March 2021.
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  33. ^ "Implementing Basel III in Europe - European Banking Authority".
  34. ^ Hinge, Daniel (7 December 2010). "Mario Draghi confirms Basel III is complete". Central Banking. Infopro Digital Risk (IP) Limited.
  35. ^ "Liquidity Coverage Requirement Delegated Act: Frequently Asked Questions". Brussels: European Commission. MEMO/14/579. 10 October 2014. Retrieved 1 November 2016.
  36. ^ Nathaniel Popper (23 July 2015). "In Connecticut, the Twilight of a Trading Hub". The New York Times. Retrieved 26 July 2015. ...the set of international banking rules that have had the single largest impact require banks to hold capital as a buffer against trading losses—rules broadly referred to as Basel III.
  37. ^ a b Patrick Slovik; Boris Cournède (2011). "Macroeconomic Impact of Basel III". OECD Economics Department Working Papers. OECD Publishing. doi:10.1787/5kghwnhkkjs8-en. Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  38. ^ John B. Taylor (22 September 2012). "Regulatory Expansion Versus Economic Expansion in Two Recoveries" (blog).
  39. ^ Jones, Huw (15 February 2011). "Basel rules to have little impact on economy". Reuters.
  40. ^ Slovik, Patrick (2012). "Systemically Important Banks and Capital Regulations Challenges". OECD Economics Department Working Papers. OECD Publishing. doi:10.1787/5kg0ps8cq8q6-en. Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  41. ^ M. Nicolas J. Firzli, "A Critique of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision" Revue Analyse Financière, 10 November 2011 & Q2 2012
  42. ^ Barr, David G. (23 November 2013). "What We Thought We Knew: The Financial System and Its Vulnerabilities" (PDF). Bank of England. Archived from the original (PDF) on 1 February 2014.
  43. ^ Ranjit Lall (2012). "From Failure to Failure: The Politics of International Banking Regulation". Review of International Political Economy. 19 (4): 609–638. doi:10.1080/09692290.2011.603669. S2CID 154898296.
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  45. ^ "Basel III Capital Standards Do Not Reduce the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem". 23 April 2014.
  46. ^ Patrick Slovik (2012). "Systemically Important Banks and Capital Regulations Challenges". OECD Economics Department Working Papers. OECD Publishing. doi:10.1787/5kg0ps8cq8q6-en. Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
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  48. ^ 95 entities listed at Retrieved 13 March 2013
  49. ^ Samuel A. Vallandingham, on behalf of Independent Community Bankers of America (15 July 2014). "Examining Regulatory Relief Proposals for Community Financial Institutions" (PDF). (Testimony before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the U.S. House Financial Services Committee). Retrieved 19 February 2021.
  50. ^ Robert Reich (25 October 2011). "Wall Street is Still Out of Control, and Why Obama Should Call for Glass-Steagall and a Breakup of Big Banks". Robert
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  55. ^ "Testimony of William A. Loving" (PDF). Retrieved 12 September 2013.
  56. ^ NY Times 1 July 2013
  57. ^ Bank of International Settlements (BIS) (7 December 2017). "Governors and Heads of Supervision finalise Basel III reforms" (Press Release). Retrieved 19 February 2021.
  58. ^ Bank of International Settlements (BIS) (27 March 2020). "Governors and Heads of Supervision announce deferral of Basel III implementation to increase operational capacity of banks and supervisors to respond to Covid-19" (Press Release). Retrieved 19 February 2021.