Battle of Mekelle
Part of the First Italo-Ethiopian War
Ethiopian troops attacking the besieged Italians
Date 7-21 January 1896 Location Mek'ele, Ethiopia 13°28′59.99″N 39°28′0.01″E / 13.4833306°N 39.4666694°E / 13.4833306; 39.4666694 Result Ethiopian victory
Belligerents
Italy	Ethiopia
Commanders and leaders
Giuseppe Galliano	Menelik II
Strength
1,306[1] (1,114 Askari & 192 Italians) 2 mountain guns	27,000
Casualties and losses
35 killed 78 wounded [1]	~600 killed[1]
Location within Ethiopia Show map of Ethiopia Battle of Mekelle (1896) (Africa) Show map of Africa

The Battle of Mekelle, sometimes known as the siege of Mekelle, took place in January 1896 during the First Italo-Ethiopian War. Italian forces surrendered a partially completed fort at Mekelle, a city in the northern Tigray Region of Ethiopia which they had occupied since 1895, to Ethiopian forces.

History

The Italians numbered 20 officers, 13 non-commissioned officers, and 150 privates, they were supported by 1,000 Askari and two mountain guns. The Ethiopian army numbered around 27,000 men.

Ras Makonnen laid siege to the fort, and on the morning of 7 January 1896, the defenders of the fort spotted a huge red tent among the besiegers, showing that the emperor had arrived.^[2] On 8 January 1896, the emperor's elite Shoan infantry captured the fort's well, and then fought off desperate Italian attempts to retake the well.^[2] On 19 January 1896, the fort's commander, Major Galliano, whose men were dying of dehydration, raised the white flag of surrender.^[2] Major Galliano and his men were allowed to march out, surrender their arms and to go free.^[2] Menelik stated he allowed the Italians to go free as "to give proof of my Christian faith," saying his quarrel was with the Italian government of Prime Minister Francesco Crispi that was trying to conquer his nation, not the ordinary Italian soldiers who been conscripted against their will to fight in the war.^[2] Menelik's magnanimity to the defenders of Fort Mekele may have been an act of psychological warfare. Menelik knew from talking to French and Russian diplomats that the war and Crispi himself were unpopular in Italy, and one of the main points of Crispi's propaganda were allegations of atrocities against Italian POWs. From Menelik's viewpoint allowing the Italian POWs to go free and unharmed was the best way of rebutting this propaganda and undermining public support for Crispi.^[3]