Brazilian criminal organization
Comando Vermelho The letters "CV" sprayed on a wall in Salvador, Brazil, representing the organization |
| Founded | 1979 |
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| Founding location | Candido Mendes Prison, Ilha Grande, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil |
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| Years active | 1979–present |
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| Territory |
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| Leader(s) |
- Luiz Fernando da Costa[1]
- Márcio dos Santos Nepomuceno
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| Activities | Murder, drug trafficking, bribery, loan sharking, arms trafficking, assault, rioting, money laundering, hijacking, fraud, and bank robbery[2] |
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| Allies | Primeiro Grupo Catarinense, Paraguayan crime groups, Comando da Paz, Bala na Cara, Sindicato do Crime do Rio Grande do Norte, Okaida, Comando Revolucionário Brasileiro da Criminalidade, Primeiro Comando de Vitória |
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| Rivals | Primeiro Comando da Capital,[3] Terceiro Comando, Terceiro Comando Puro, Amigos dos Amigos, Brazilian police militias, Família do Norte, Guardiões do Estado |
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Comando Vermelho (Portuguese: [koˈmɐ̃du veʁˈmeʎu], Red Command or Red Commando), also known as CV, is a Brazilian criminal organization engaged primarily in drug trafficking, arms trafficking, protection racketeering, kidnapping-for-ransom, hijacking of armored trucks, loansharking, irregular warfare, narco-terrorism, and turf wars against rival criminal organizations, such as Primeiro Comando da Capital and Terceiro Comando Puro.[2] The gang formed in 1979 out of a prison alliance between common criminals and leftist guerrillas who were imprisoned together at Cândido Mendes, a maximum-security prison on the island of Ilha Grande.[4] The prisoners formed the alliance to protect themselves from prison violence and guard-inflicted brutality; as the group coalesced, the common criminals were infused with leftist social justice ideals by the guerrillas.[4] In 1979, prison officials labeled the alliance "Comando Vermelho", a name which the prisoners eventually co-opted as their own.[5] In the 1980s, the gang expanded beyond Ilha Grande into other prisons and the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, and became involved in the rapidly growing cocaine industry. Meanwhile, Brazil's shift towards democracy and the eventual end of the military dictatorship in 1985 allowed the leftist guerrillas to re-enter society; thus, the CV largely abandoned its left-wing ideology.[6]
The cocaine trade brought the CV massive profits and growth; by the end of 1985 the gang controlled as much as 70% of the drug trade in Rio de Janeiro's favelas.[7] During this period, the CV established trading relationships with Colombian cartels. However, the group's decentralized leadership structure and disputes over profits prompted infighting, causing splinter groups such as the Terceiro Comando and Amigos dos Amigos to emerge. Conflicts with these splinter groups, as well as fierce resistance to state crackdowns on their operations, drove a sharp uptick in violence in Rio and throughout Brazil throughout the late 1980s and into the 2000s.[8]
Violence continued to escalate until 2008, when the state government implemented a new policy to mitigate violent crime, called Pacification, which used new permanent proximity-policing units (Unidade de Policia Pacificadora, or UPPs) to "maintain state control and provide social order" in favelas. Pacification proved initially successful; a sharp decline in violence between the state and the CV followed after implementation.[9]
However, in 2013, Pacification efforts eroded, and widespread violent conflict between the CV and state forces quickly returned.[9] Additionally, in 2016, a 20-year-old truce between the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC), a rival criminal organization based in São Paulo, and the CV broke down, sparking an outbreak in violent clashes between the two groups[10]
Today, while not as powerful as at its peak, the CV remains a significant presence in Rio and throughout Brazil; recent estimates suggest the group is the second-largest criminal organization in Brazil behind the PCC.[11] InSight Crime reports the CV may boast as many as 30,000 members throughout Brazil.[12] The gang continues to engage in drug trafficking, arms trafficking, and turf wars with rival gangs. Notably, in recent years a struggle has intensified between the CV, the PCC, and other rival gangs over control of trade routes and territory in the Amazon region.[13]
History
Origins (1964–1979)
The exact year that the Comando Vermelho was founded is officially 1979, stemming from a prison alliance between leftist guerrillas and common criminals housed together during the 1970s by Brazil's military dictatorship at Cândido Mendes, a maximum security Brazilian prison.[14][15][4]
Soon after their regime began in 1964, Brazil's military dictatorship faced a persistent challenge from leftist guerrilla rebels, made up largely of "middle-class intellectuals". In hopes of delegitimizing the rebels, in the early 1970s the Brazilian government began placing those they captured in prison alongside common criminals. One such prison, Candido Mendes, located on Ilha Grande, housed a mix of violent criminals and guerrillas in its notoriously brutal "Block B", or "The Pit".[16][14] Inmates there were subject to frequent abuse at the hands of both their peers and the guards. The inmates banded together for mutual protection, shielding themselves from guard beatings and establishing a code of conduct for prisoners. Additionally, the guerrillas began to spread ideas about resistance, revolution, and social justice among the common criminals.[4] As the alliance cemented, members introduced a common code of prison rules, designed to promote loyalty among members, reduce violence within the prison, and advance the common cause of the prisoners, while still maintaining a degree of autonomy for individual members to act as they desired.[17]
In attempts to break up the alliance, prison officials moved inmate leaders to different wings and prisons, but this instead helped the group spread throughout the prison system.[18] During this period prison officials gave the group its name: one official called the group "Comando Vermelho" in a memo to his colleagues. The name was adopted first by the press and then later by the group itself.[19]
Split with the guerrillas and the cocaine boom (1979 – late 1980s)
In 1979, sensing an impending democratization movement, newly-installed President Joao Figueiredo and his military regime began to fear that they and members of their armed forces could face trial for human rights violations in a democratic system.[20] To protect themselves, Figueiredo "manipulated a grassroots movement demanding amnesty for thousands of political prisoners and exiles to insulate himself and his colleagues from potential indictments," and passed the sweeping 1979 Amnesty Law, protecting political prisoners and their government captors from prosecution.[20] As a result, the leftist guerrilla elements of the CV were released from prison, weakening the group's ideological bent.[21]
Meanwhile, the CV began to spread beyond prison gates. While many of its original members were bank robbers, the group quickly became involved in the burgeoning cocaine market. CV members helped traffic drugs overseas for Colombian cartels and distributed cocaine into the local Rio de Janeiro market. The cocaine trade proved incredibly lucrative and the CV grew rapidly: "by the end of 1985, the gang already controlled 70% of the drug market in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro."
During this period, the CV became increasingly involved in the provision of social services and administration of justice for the favela communities which it controlled.[22] In exchange for the cooperation of favela residents, the CV prohibited theft, robbery, and rape, and provided public goods like school supplies, medical equipment, and food distribution for the poor.[23]
The official end of the military dictatorship in 1985 marked the end of all remaining ties between the leftist guerrillas and the CV. Many of the guerrillas re-entered society and "rose inside political parties;" some would go on to hold elected office.[24]
Infighting and growing cartel-state violence (late 1980s – 2008)
Massive profits created incentives for different CV factions to splinter off as local leaders sought larger profit shares. Notable break-away groups which emerged during this period include Terceiro Comando and Amigos dos Amigos. As these groups clashed over territory in Rio, violence rapidly increased throughout the city.[25]
After Pablo Escobar's death, the CV established a working relationship with the FARC, a Colombian guerrilla group which moved into the cocaine trade. Led by Luiz Fernando da Costa (a.k.a. Fernandinho Beira-Mar or Seaside Freddy) the CV procured arms and ammunition, which they delivered to the FARC in exchange for their supply of cocaine.
Pacification (2008–2013)
Beginning in 2008, in an effort to combat the widespread gang-related violence, Rio state police forces implemented a new "Pacification" strategy, "inspired by notions of community-oriented policing."[26] The strategy, which proceeds in stages, begins with state occupation of a target favela using overwhelming military force, followed by the installation of a proximity-policing unit (Unidade de Policia Pacificadora, UPP), which remains in the favela after military withdrawal. Rather than eliminating the drug trade, the UPPs were primarily tasked with securing the favela communities from gang-related violence.[9]
The early period of Pacification (2008–2010) saw 40 UPP battalions installed across 200 communities, and was largely successful for the state. The CV, which suddenly ceased their violent confrontation with state forces, ceded significant territory to the state; one UPP effort left "the CV's principal stronghold firmly in the hand of the state for the first time in more than a generation."[27]
Resurgence in violence (2013–present)
Despite its initial success for the state, corruption and over-expansion caused erosion of the Pacification system, and by 2013 the program began to break down. Since then, violent clashes between the CV and state forces have surged.[28] In 2016, following the collapse of a 20-year truce between the CV and the PCC, violence surged further.[29] In 2023, sources consistently reported frequent violent clashes between the CV and the PCC as well as other rival gang groups.[30]
Additionally, an emerging struggle for control of the Amazon region has intensified between rival gangs including the CV.[13] Seeking access to the valuable trafficking routes in the Colombia-Brazil-Peru tri-border region, the CV, the PCC, the Familia do Norte, and Colombian militia groups including the Border Command and the Carolina Ramirez Front have violently fought, contributing to a significant uptick in regional fatalities.[30]
Armed militia groups in Rio represent another growing challenge for the CV. Militia groups, formed by former and current police officers purporting to fight crime, have grown to control substantial territory throughout Rio. In recent years, violence between militias and gangs has intensified; in 2020 and 2021, "clashes between gangs and militias were responsible for 28% of reported fatalities" in Rio.[31] For example, in July and August 2022, the CV clashed frequently with the Campinho police militia for "control of the Morro do Fuba community in the North Zone."[31]
Structure
The Comando Vermelho's structure is loosely hierarchical yet allows significant autonomy throughout the organization. While there is no one single boss, imprisoned senior leaders exercise authority over favela leaders, known as donos, who deliver rents to the prison leaders as a form of "insurance scheme."[32] Essentially, non-imprisoned members provide financial support and carry out instructions from imprisoned leaders, thus protecting themselves from retribution in the event that they are captured themselves. Beneath the favela donos, there are gerentes de boca ('drug mouth bosses') who carry out drug trafficking, soldados ('soldiers') who protect the favela's turf, and vapors, the lowest-level gang members, who are often young teens.[33]
Within this structure, there is significant freedom for gang members to run operations as they see fit. According to Penglase, the "CV is most accurately described as a loose association of drug traffickers who come together for reciprocal assistance yet who act with great degrees of autonomy."[34] Members of the CV operate with a shared identity and a common set of norms, but negotiate separately with individual drug suppliers, known as matutos.[35] High levels of autonomy have been characteristic of the CV since its inception on Ilha Grande: while prisoners were barred from violence against each other, they were freely allowed to pursue independent business.[36] Another distinct aspect of CV structure is that they allow their leaders to freely step away from gang activity if they choose to do so, in stark contrast with many comparable gangs who require members to remain active until death.
Inside prisons with a strong CV presence, senior leaders practice internal criminal governance. These leaders "rule prison life, settle internal faction disputes that occur outside of prison and make the final decision on any matters of mutual interest for faction affiliates."[37]
Conflict with government
A defining characteristic of the CV is their willingness to openly engage the state in armed confrontation. Since the mid-1980s, as state forces steadily increased the severity of their crackdowns, the CV has responded with frequent violent clashes. Lessing writes that "nowhere else in Brazil, or in much of the world for that matter," have Rio cartels, and primarily the CV, "systematically engaged the state in armed confrontation for so long."[38] Currently, the CV continues to violently fight with state forces, and the ACLED reports that state violence represents a disproportionate share of reported fatalities in Rio de Janeiro.[31]
One suggested explanation for the CV's violent conflict with the state is the varying levels of conditionality in state crackdowns––whether the state cracks down harder on violent cartel behavior. In 2008, after the highly-conditional Pacification policy was implemented, cartel-state violence declined, only to see a resurgence after the policy eroded.[9]
Examples of CV–state conflict
On 19 November 2016, a Rio de Janeiro police helicopter was shot down by small arms fire during a clash with CV gang members and crashed in a ditch. All four police officers on board were killed.[39][40] In June 2018, the CV launched attacks on a Bolivian Army base in Porvenir and a Brazilian police station in Epitaciolandia, in both instances stealing weapons and ammunition.[41]
Comando Vermelho and funk carioca
The Comando Vermelho continue to attract new Brazilian youth and bring them into their ranks.[42][43] In addition to sponsoring groups like neighborhood associations and special interest clubs, and organizing sporting events, one of the most common ways in which the criminal organization is able to catch the youth's attention is through the popular musical style of funk carioca, a form of Brazilian music derived from Miami bass. Due to the genre's popularity with young Brazilians, the group "is known to have subsidized funk parties to recruit young kids for drug dealing".[44]
In addition to these funk parties (bailes funk), "where drugs and sex attract even bourgeois or petty-bourgeois youth",[45] held regularly by the organization every Sunday, funk artists are also sponsored by the CV to record songs and even entire CDs that promote the group and eulogize the group's dead members. Because the CV pays for the production and recording of the funk songs, they "are often well recorded and of a high technical quality, and are being played on pirate radio stations and sold by hundreds of street vendors in Rio de Janeiro and in São Paulo."[45] Thus the funk artists that are in league with the CV sometimes garner significant sales and airplay despite making a type of music that is Proibidão, or 'extremely prohibited', in terms of where it can be sold and who can play it. In addition to promoting the crime group, the funk sponsored by the CV also challenges the ideas and laws of the Division of the Repression Against Drugs.[44]
