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((Short description|none))
[[File:Tojo2.jpg|thumb|right|[[Hideki Tojo]], Japanese Prime Minister at the time of the attack]]
Japan's [[attack on Pearl Harbor]] took place on December 7, 1941. The [[United States military]] suffered 19 ships damaged or sunk, and 2,403 people were killed. Its most significant consequence was the entrance of the United States into [[World War II]]. The US had previously been officially neutral but subsequently entered the [[Pacific War]], and after [[Italian declaration of war on the United States|Italy's declaration of war]] and [[German declaration of war against the United States|Germany's declaration of war]] shortly after the attack, the [[Battle of the Atlantic]] and the [[European theatre of World War II|European theatre of war]]. Following the attack, the US [[Internment of Japanese Americans|interned 120,000 Japanese Americans]], [[Internment of German Americans|11,000 German Americans]], and [[Internment of Italian Americans|3,000 Italian Americans]].

==American public opinion prior to the attack==  
From the outbreak of [[World War II]] on September 1, 1939, to December 2, 1941, the United States was officially [[neutral country|neutral]], as it was bound by the [[Neutrality Acts of the 1930s|Neutrality Acts]] not to get involved in the conflicts raging in Europe and Asia. Prior to the [[attack on Pearl Harbor]], public opinion in the United States had not been unanimous. When polled in January 1940, 60% of Americans were in favor of helping the [[United Kingdom]] in the war.<ref name=":0">[http://ibiblio.org/pha/Gallup/Gallup%201941.htm Gallup Polling Data (1940–1941)]</ref> A majority of Americans believed that the safety of the United States was contingent on the UK winning the war, and an even larger majority believed that the UK would lose the war if the United States stopped supplying war materials.<ref name=":0" /> Despite this, the same poll reported that 88% of Americans would not support entering the war against [[Nazi Germany|Germany]] and [[Kingdom of Italy|Italy]].<ref name=":0" /> Public support for assisting the United Kingdom rose through 1940, reaching about 65% by May 1941.<ref>((Cite book|last=Berinsky|first=Adam|date=2007|title=America at War: Public Opinion During Wartime, from World War II to Iraq |publisher=University of Chicago Press |isbn=9780226043586))</ref> However, 80% disapproved of war against Germany and Italy.<ref name=":0" /> The only areas where most people favored formally going to war against Germany and Italy were a few [[Western United States|western states]] and [[Southern United States|southern states]].  Over 50% of those polled in [[Wyoming]] said "yes" when asked if the United States should formally enter the war on Britain's side.  The [[Tennessee|state of Tennessee]], the [[Tennessee Valley]] region of [[North Alabama]], all of [[Georgia (U.S. state)|Georgia]] and the regions of [[Western North Carolina]], [[Eastern North Carolina]], the [[South Carolina Lowcountry]], the [[Pee Dee]] region of [[South Carolina]] and [[Upstate South Carolina]] were all considered "hot-beds of [[Anglophile|Anglophilic]] sentiment" before Pearl Harbor.<ref>American Entry into World War II: A Historiographical Appraisal by Wayne S. Cole - The Mississippi Valley Historical Review - Vol. 43, No. 4 (Mar., 1957), pp. 595-617 (23 pages)</ref>

Americans were more unsure on the prospect of conflict with [[Empire of Japan]] around the same time frame. In a February Gallup poll, a majority believed that the United States should intervene in Japan's conquest of the Dutch East Indies and Singapore.<ref name=":0" /> However, in the same poll, only 39% supported going to war with Japan, while 46% opposed the prospect.<ref name=":0" />

==American response==
((Main|United States declaration of war on Japan))
[[File:Franklin Roosevelt signing declaration of war against Japan.jpg|thumb|200px|President [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] signing the declaration of war against Japan on the day following the attack]]
On December 7, 1941, the Japanese launched a surprise attack on the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor. After two hours of bombing, 21 U.S. ships were sunk or damaged, 188 U.S. aircraft were destroyed, and 2,403 people were killed. All of this happened while the U.S. and Japan were officially engaging in diplomatic negotiations for possible peace in Asia.

The day after the attack, President [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] addressed a joint session of the [[77th United States Congress]], calling December 7 [[Infamy Speech|"a date which will live in infamy"]]. Within an hour of Roosevelt's speech, Congress [[United States declaration of war upon Japan|declared war on the Empire of Japan]] amid outrage at the attack, the deaths of thousands of Americans, and Japan's deception of the United States by engaging in diplomatic talks with the country during the entire event. [[Pacifist]] [[United States House of Representatives|Representative]] [[Jeannette Rankin]], a [[Republican Party (United States)|Republican]] from [[Montana]], cast the only dissenting vote. Roosevelt signed the declaration of war later the same day. Continuing to intensify its military mobilization, the U.S. government finished converting to a [[war economy]], a process begun by [[Lend-Lease|provision of weapons and supplies]] to the [[Soviet Union]] and the [[British Empire]]. Japanese Americans from the [[West Coast of the United States|West Coast]] were sent to internment camps for the duration of the war.

The attack on Pearl Harbor immediately united a divided nation. Public opinion had been moving towards support for entering the war during 1941, but considerable opposition remained until the attack. Overnight, Americans united against the Empire of Japan in response to calls to "[[Pearl Harbor Survivors Association|remember Pearl Harbor!]]" A poll taken between December 12–17, 1941, showed that 97% of respondents supported a declaration of war against Japan.<ref>((Cite news |last=Saad |first=Lydia |date=December 5, 2016 |title=Gallup Vault: A Country Unified After Pearl Harbor |language=en-us |work=Gallup.com |url=http://news.gallup.com/vault/199049/gallup-vault-country-unified-pearl-harbor.aspx |access-date=2017-11-24))</ref> Further polling showed a dramatic increase in support for every able-bodied man serving in the military, up to 70% in December 1941.<ref>((Cite journal|last1=Berinsky|first1=Adam|last2=Yohai|first2=Ian|last3=Powell|first3=Eleanor|last4=Schickler|first4=Eric|date=July 2011|title=Revisiting Public Opinion in the 1930s and 1940s|url=http://web.mit.edu/berinsky/www/files/3040.pdf|journal=PS: Political Science and Politics|volume=44|issue=3|pages=515–520|doi=10.1017/S104909651100059X|hdl=1721.1/72361|s2cid=154436936 |hdl-access=free))</ref>

The attack also solidified public opinion against Germany, which was believed at the time to be responsible via inspiration or organization for the Pearl Harbor attack. A Gallup poll on December 10, 1941 (a day before Germany would declare war) found that 90% of respondents agreed with the question "Should President Roosevelt have asked Congress to declare war on Germany, as well as on Japan?" with 7% opposed.<ref>[https://archive.org/stream/publicopinion19300unse/publicopinion19300unse_djvu.txt Cantril, Hadley. Public Opinion: 1935-1946, P1173]</ref><ref>Norpoth, Helmut. "Unsurpassed: The Popular Appeal of Franklin Roosevelt." P39 [https://books.google.com/books?id=wJRqDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA39]</ref><ref>Hill, Richard F. "Hitler Attacks Pearl Harbor: Why the United States Declared War on Germany" P37 [https://books.google.com/books?id=61WMf6XRVT8C&pg=PA209]</ref> After the German declaration of war, the [[United States declaration of war on Germany (1941)|U.S. counter-declaration]] was unanimous.

American solidarity probably made possible the [[unconditional surrender]] position later taken by the Allies. Some historians, among them [[Samuel Eliot Morison]], believe the attack doomed Imperial Japan to defeat simply because it had awakened the "sleeping giant", regardless of whether the fuel depots or machine shops had been destroyed or even if the carriers had been caught in port and sunk. America's industrial and military capacity, once mobilized, was able to pour overwhelming resources into both the [[Pacific War|Pacific]] and [[European theatre of World War II|European theaters]]. Others, such as Clay Blair, Jr.<ref>''Silent Victory'' (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1975)</ref> and Mark Parillo<ref>''The Japanese Merchant Marine in World War II'' (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute Press, 1993)</ref> believe Japanese [[Convoy|trade protection]] was so incompetent that American submarines alone might have strangled Japan into defeat.

The closest friend Roosevelt had in the developing Allied alliance, Sir [[Winston Churchill]], stated that his first thought regarding American assistance to the United Kingdom was that "We have won the war,"<ref>((cite book|last=Stokesbury|first=James L.|title=A Short History of WWII|publisher=William Morrow and Company, Inc.|year=1980|location=New York|page=171|isbn=978-0-688-03587-7))</ref> very soon after Pearl Harbor was attacked.

Perceptions of treachery in the attack before a declaration of war sparked fears of [[Fifth column|sabotage]] or [[List of Japanese spies, 1930-45|espionage by Japanese sympathizers]] residing in the U.S., including [[Japanese Americans|citizens of Japanese descent]], and was a factor in the subsequent [[Japanese internment in the United States|Japanese internment]] in the [[western United States]]. Other factors included misrepresentations of intelligence information suggesting sabotage, notably by General [[John L. DeWitt]], commanding general of [[Western Defense Command]] on the [[West Coast of the United States|Pacific Coast]], who harbored personal feelings against Japanese Americans.<ref>Testimony of John L. DeWitt, 13 April 1943, House Naval Affairs Subcommittee to Investigate Congested Areas, Part 3, pp. 739–40 (78th Cong., 1st Sess.), cited in [http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=323&invol=214#fff2 ''Korematsu v. United States''], footnote 2, reproduced at findlaw.com, accessed 13 April 2007</ref> In February 1942, Roosevelt signed [[United States Executive Order 9066]], requiring all Japanese Americans to submit themselves for internment.

[[American propaganda during World War II|Propaganda]] made repeated use of the attack, because its effect was enormous and impossible to counter.<ref>Anthony Rhodes, ''Propaganda: The art of persuasion: World War II'', p257 1976, Chelsea House Publishers, New York</ref> "Remember Pearl Harbor!" became the watchwords of the war.<ref>[[Andrew Gordon (historian)|Andrew Gordon]], ''A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa to the Present'', p210, ((ISBN|0-19-511060-9)). ((OCLC|49704795))</ref>

The [[Federal government of the United States|American government]] understated the damage inflicted in the hope of preventing the Japanese from learning it, but the Japanese had, through surveillance, a good estimate.<ref name="Kennett">Lee Kennett, ''For the Duration.. . : The United States Goes To War'' p 141 ((ISBN|0-684-18239-4))</ref>

==Japanese views==
((Main|Japanese declaration of war on the United States and the British Empire))
[[File:9 Gunshin.jpg|thumb|left|215px|Japanese heroic depiction of nine submarine crewmembers lost during the attack, excluding the POW, [[Kazuo Sakamaki]]]]
On December 8, 1941, [[Japanese declaration of war on the United States and the British Empire|Japan declared war on the United States and the British Empire]]. The Japanese document discussed [[world peace]] and the disruptive actions of the United States and the United Kingdom. The document stated all avenues for averting war had been exhausted by the government of Japan.

Although the Imperial Japanese government had made some effort to prepare their population for war by anti-American propaganda, it appears most Japanese were surprised, apprehensive, and dismayed by the news they were now at war with the U.S., a country many of them admired. Nevertheless, the people at home and overseas thereafter generally accepted their government's account of the attack and supported the war effort until their nation's surrender in 1945.<ref>Robert Guillain, ''I saw Tokyo burning: An eyewitness narrative from Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima'' (J. Murray, 1981). ((ISBN|0-7195-3862-9))</ref>

Japan's national leadership at the time appeared to have believed war between the U.S. and Japan had long been inevitable. In any case, relations had already significantly deteriorated since Japan's invasion of China in the early 1930s, which the U.S. strongly disapproved of. In 1942, [[Saburō Kurusu]], former Japanese ambassador to the United States, gave an address in which he talked about the "historical inevitability of the war of Greater East Asia."<ref name="ibiblio.org">[[Saburō Kurusu]], [http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1942/421126a.html Historical inevitability of the war of Greater East Asia], Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, Tokyo, November 26, 1942 (accessed June 10, 2005).</ref> He said war had been a response to Washington's longstanding aggression toward Japan. Some of the provocations against Japan that he named were the [[Gentlemen's Agreement of 1907|San Francisco School incident]], the [[Washington Naval Treaty|Naval Limitations Treaty]], other [[unequal treaties]], the [[Nine Power Pact]], and constant economic pressure, culminating in the "belligerent" [[scrap metal]] and oil embargo in 1941 by the United States and Allied countries to try to contain or reverse the actions of Japan, especially in Indochina, during her expansion of influence and interests throughout Asia.

Japan's dependence on imported oil made the trade embargoes especially significant.  These pressures directly influenced Japan to ally with [[Nazi Germany|Germany]] and [[Italian fascism|Italy]] through the [[Tripartite Pact]]. According to Kurusu, the actions showed that the Allies had already provoked war with Japan long before the attack at Pearl Harbor and that the U.S. was already preparing for war with Japan.  Kurusu also stated that the U.S. was looking beyond just Asia to world domination, with "sinister designs".<ref name="ibiblio.org"/> Some of that view seems to have been shared by [[Adolf Hitler]], who called it one of the reasons Germany declared war on the United States. He had many years earlier mentioned European imperialism toward Japan. Therefore, according to Kurusu, Japan had no choice but to defend itself and so should rapidly continue to militarize, bring Germany and Italy closer as allies and militarily combat the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands.

Japan's leaders also saw themselves as justified in their conduct, believing that they were building the [[Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere]]. They also explained Japan had done everything possible to alleviate tension between the two nations. The decision to attack, at least for public presentation, was reluctant and forced on Japan. Of the Pearl Harbor attack itself, Kurusu said it came in direct response to a virtual ultimatum from the U.S. government, the [[Hull note]], and so the surprise attack was not treacherous. Since the Japanese-American relationship already had hit its lowest point, there was no alternative. In any case, had an acceptable settlement of differences been reached, the [[Carrier Striking Task Force]] could have been called back.

==Germany and Italy declare war==
((Main|German declaration of war against the United States|Italian declaration of war on the United States|United States declaration of war on Germany (1941)|United States declaration of war on Italy|||))
((See also|Internment of German Americans|Internment of Italian Americans|Germany–Japan relations|Italy–Japan relations))
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 183-1987-0703-507, Berlin, Reichstagssitzung, Rede Adolf Hitler.jpg|thumb|[[s:Adolf Hitler's Declaration of War against the United States|Hitler declares war against the United States]] in the [[Reichstag (Nazi Germany)|Reichstag]], December 11, 1941.]]
[[File:Franklin Roosevelt signing declaration of war against Germany.jpg|thumb|right|upright|Franklin Roosevelt's signing of the declaration of war against Germany, December 11, 1941.]]
[[File:Matsuoka signs the Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact-1.jpg|thumb|right|[[Yōsuke Matsuoka]], Japan's foreign minister, signs the [[Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact]] in April 1941 following the [[Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact|German–Soviet Nonaggression Pact]], a sign that Japan might not [[Kantokuen|attack the Soviets]] to assist Hitler.]]
On December 11, 1941, [[German declaration of war against the United States|Nazi Germany]] and [[Italian declaration of war on the United States|Fascist Italy]] declared war on the United States, and the United States reciprocated, formally entering the [[European Theatre of World War II|war in Europe]].

German dictator [[Adolf Hitler]] and Italian dictator [[Benito Mussolini]] were under no obligation to declare war on the United States under the mutual defense terms of the [[Tripartite Pact]] until the US counterattacked Japan. However, relations between the European Axis Powers and the United States had deteriorated since 1937. The United States had been in an undeclared state of war with Germany in the [[Battle of the Atlantic]] since Roosevelt publicly confirmed a "shoot on sight" policy on 11 September 1941.<ref>Burns, James MacGregor (1970). Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. hdl:2027/heb.00626. ((ISBN|978-0-15-678870-0)). p. 141-42</ref> Hitler could no longer ignore the military aid the US was giving Britain and the Soviet Union in the [[Lend-Lease]] programme.<ref>((Cite news|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/december/11/newsid_3532000/3532401.stm|title=1941: Germany and Italy declare war on US|date=December 11, 1941|via=news.bbc.co.uk))</ref> On December 5, 1941, the Germans learned of the [[United States Armed Forces]]' contingency planning to invade [[German-occupied Europe|Nazi-occupied Continental Europe]] by 1943; this was [[Rainbow Five]], published by the ''[[Chicago Tribune]]'' on the previous day.<ref>((cite web |url=http://ariwatch.com/Links/RainbowFive.htm |title=The Big Leak |last=Fleming |first=Thomas |date=December 1987 |website=ariwatch.com |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080214190026/http://www.americanheritage.com/articles/magazine/ah/1987/8/1987_8_64.shtml |archive-date=February 14, 2008 |publisher=ARI Watch |access-date=December 12, 2016 |quote=Blazoned in huge black letters across page one of the December 4, 1941, issue of the Chicago Tribune was the headline: F.D.R.’S WAR PLANS! The Times Herald, the Tribune's Washington, D.C. ally, carried a similarly fevered banner. In both papers Chesly Manly, the Tribunes Washington correspondent, revealed what President Franklin D. Roosevelt had repeatedly denied: that he was planning to lead the United States into war against Germany. The source of the reporter's information was no less than a verbatim copy of Rainbow Five, the top-secret war plan drawn up at FDR's order by the Joint Board of the Army and Navy.))</ref> Moreover, with Roosevelt's initiation of a [[Neutrality Patrol]], which in fact also escorted British ships, as well as orders to U.S. Navy [[destroyer]]s first to actively report [[U-boats]], then "shoot on sight", American neutrality was honored more in the breach than observance.<ref>((Cite web|url=http://www.historyplace.com/worldwar2/timeline/pearl.htm|title=The History Place - World War II in Europe Timeline: December 7, 1941 - Japanese Bomb Pearl Harbor|website=www.historyplace.com))</ref> Admiral [[Ernest King]] privately stated he believed the US was already at war with Germany in December 1940.<ref>((cite web | url=https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/article/undeclared-war-in-the-atlantic/ | title=Undeclared War in the Atlantic | date=4 June 2021 ))</ref> Admiral [[Erich Raeder]] had urged Hitler to declare war throughout 1941, so the [[Kriegsmarine]] could begin the [[Second Happy Time]] in the [[Battle of the Atlantic]].<ref>Murray, Williamson & Millet, Alan A War to Be Won Fighting the Second World War, Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2000, ((ISBN|9780674006805))., p. 248</ref>

Hitler had agreed that Germany would almost certainly declare war when the Japanese first informed him of their intention to go to war with the United States on 17 November 1941.<ref>Longerich, Peter Hitler: A Life (2019) p. 784</ref> He had already decided war with the United States was unavoidable, and the Pearl Harbor attack, the publication of [[United States color-coded war plans#Rainbow plans|Rainbow Five]], and Roosevelt's post-Pearl Harbor address, which focused on European affairs as well as the situation with Japan, probably contributed to the declaration. Hitler expected the United States would soon declare war on Germany in any event in view of the [[Second Happy Time]].<ref>Kershaw, Ian. ''Fateful Choices: Ten Decisions the Changed the World, 1940–1941'' New York: Penguin, 2007. pp.444–46 ((ISBN|978-1-59420-123-3))</ref> He disastrously underestimated American military production capacity, the United States' own ability to fight on two fronts, and the time his own [[Operation Barbarossa]] would require. Similarly, the Nazis may have hoped the declaration of war, a showing of solidarity with Japan, would result in closer collaboration with the Japanese in [[Eurasia]], particularly against the Soviet Union and planned for [[Kantokuen|in secret by Japan]] — something that would not materialize, due to existing [[Japan-Soviet Union relations#1932–1945: Deteriorating relations and war|relations between Moscow and Tokyo at that time]]. Soviet code-breakers had broken the Japanese diplomatic codes, and Moscow knew from signals intelligence that there would be no Japanese attack on the Soviet Union in 1941.<ref>Andrew, Christopher; Gordievsky, Oleg (1990), ''KGB: The Inside Story of Its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev'', New York: Harper Collins, ((ISBN|0060166053)), p. 271</ref>

The decision to declare war on the United States allowed the United States to enter the European war in support of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union without much public opposition.<ref>Alexander, Bevin. ''How Hitler Could Have Won World War II'' New York: Crown, 2000. p.108 ((ISBN|0-8129-3202-1))</ref><ref>[[Ian Kershaw|Kershaw, Ian]]. ''Fateful Choices: Ten Decisions the Changed the World, 1940–1941'' New York: Penguin, 2007. pp.382–430  ((ISBN|978-1-59420-123-3))</ref><ref>[[Joachim C. Fest|Fest, Joachim C.]] ''Hitler'' New York: Vintage, 1975. pp.655–657 ((ISBN|0-394-72023-7))</ref><ref>[[Michael Burleigh|Burleigh, Michael]] ''The Third Reich: A New History'' New York: Hill and Wang, 2000. pp.731–732 ((ISBN|9780809093250))</ref><ref>[[William L. Shirer|Shirer, William L.]] ''[[The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich]]'' New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960. p.900</ref>

Even as early as mid-March 1941,<ref>[[Franklin Delano Roosevelt|Roosevelt, Franklin Delano]] [http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/fdrwarineurope.htm "On U.S. Involvement in the War in Europe" (speech)] Washington, D.C. (March 15, 1941)</ref> President Roosevelt was quite acutely aware of [[New Order (Nazism)#Plans for North America|Hitler's hostility towards the United States, and the destructive potential it presented]], in reference to Hitler's statement of a [[New Order (Nazism)|"new order in Europe"]] during the ''Führer's'' own [[Berlin Sportpalast]] speech of January 30, 1941, the eighth anniversary of the Nazis' ''[[Machtergreifung]]''.<ref>((cite web |url=https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/hitler013041.html |title=Adolf Hitler: Speech at the Berlin Sports Palace (January 30, 1941) |author=<!--Staff writer(s); no by-line.--> |website=www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org |publisher=Jewish Virtual Library |access-date=February 14, 2015))</ref> In a speech to the [[White House Correspondents' Association]] on U.S. involvement in the war in Europe, Roosevelt stated:

((Blockquote|...Nazi forces are not seeking mere modifications in colonial maps or in minor European boundaries. They openly seek the destruction of all [[Democracy|elective systems of government]] on every continent, including our own. They seek to establish systems of government based on the regimentation of all human beings by a handful of individual rulers who seize power by force.<br>
Yes, these men and their hypnotized followers call this a "New Order." It is not new, and it is not order. For order among nations presupposes something enduring, some system of justice under which individuals over a long period of time are willing to live. Humanity will never permanently accept a system imposed by conquest, and based on slavery. These modern tyrants find it necessary to their plans to eliminate all democracies — eliminate them one by one. The nations of Europe, and indeed we, ourselves, did not appreciate that purpose. We do now.<ref>Speech by FDR to the [[White House Correspondents' Association]] on U.S. involvement in the war in Europe [http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/fdrwarineurope.htm]</ref>))

Author [[Ian Kershaw]] records Hitler's initial reaction to the attack, when he was first informed about it on the evening of 7 December at [[Führer Headquarters]]: "We can't lose the war at all. We now have an ally which has never been conquered in 3,000 years".<ref>((cite web |url=http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2011/1207/Pearl-Harbor-Day-How-did-Adolf-Hitler-react-to-the-attack |title=Pearl Harbor Day: How did Adolf Hitler react to the attack? |author=Peter Grier |date=December 7, 2011 |work=The Christian Science Monitor |access-date=2012-09-09))</ref> Well before the attack, in 1928 Hitler had confided in the text of his then-unpublished ''[[Zweites Buch#Zweites Buch and Mein Kampf|Zweites Buch]]'' that while the Soviet Union was the most important immediate foe that the Third Reich had to defeat, the United States was the most important long-term challenge to Nazi aims.<ref>Hillgruber, Andreas ''Germany and the Two World Wars'', Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 1981 pages 50–51</ref>

Hitler awarded Imperial Japanese ambassador to Nazi Germany [[Hiroshi Ōshima]] the [[Order of the German Eagle|Grand Cross of the Order of the German Eagle in Gold]] (1st class) after the attack, praising Japan for striking hard and without first declaring war.<ref>Trial transcripts at Nuremberg 11 December 1945. More details of the exchanges at the meeting are available online at [http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-02/tgmwc-02-16-09.shtml nizkor.org] ((Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120308220925/http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-02/tgmwc-02-16-09.shtml |date=2012-03-08 ))</ref>

==British reaction==
((Main|United Kingdom declaration of war on Japan))
The [[United Kingdom declaration of war on Japan|United Kingdom declared war on Japan]] nine hours before the U.S. did, partially due to Japanese attacks on the British colonies of [[British Malaya|Malaya]], [[Singapore]], and [[British Hong Kong|Hong Kong]]; and partially due to [[Winston Churchill]]'s promise to declare war "within the hour" of a Japanese attack on the United States.<ref>Staff (December 15, 1941) [https://web.archive.org/web/20080206234630/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,772812,00.html "The U.S. At War, The Last Stage"] ''[[Time (magazine)|Time]]''</ref>

The war had been going poorly for the [[British Empire]] for more than two years. The United Kingdom was by now the sole country in [[Western Europe]] unoccupied by the Nazis, other than the [[Neutral powers during World War II|neutral powers]].((citation needed|date=April 2021))  [[Prime Minister of the United Kingdom|Prime Minister]] [[Winston Churchill]] was deeply concerned about the future; he had long attempted to persuade America to enter the war against the Nazis but had been continually rebuffed by American isolationists who argued that the war was purely a European issue and should not be America's concern, and who had prevented Roosevelt from involving the U.S. any further than selling food, [[British Purchasing Commission|weapons and other military materiel]], and supplies to the British. On December 7, Churchill was at his country estate, [[Chequers]], with a few friends and his family. Just after dinner he was given news of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Churchill correctly surmised the consequences of the attack for the course of the entire war.

((Blockquote
|text=So, we had won after all! …We had won the war. England would live; Britain would live; the [[Commonwealth of Nations]] and the [[British Empire|Empire]] would live. How long the war would last or in what fashion it would end no man could tell, nor did I at this moment care. . . .  but now we should not be wiped out. Our history would not come to an end. We might not even have to die as individuals. Hitler's fate was sealed. Mussolini's fate was sealed. As for the Japanese, they would be ground to powder. All the rest was merely the proper application of overwhelming force.<ref>((cite book|last1=Fullilove|first1=Michael|title=Rendesvous with Destiny|date=2013|publisher=Penguin Books|isbn=978-0-14-312562-4|page=[https://archive.org/details/rendezvouswithde0000full/page/343 343]|url=https://archive.org/details/rendezvouswithde0000full/page/343))</ref>))

==Canadian response==
Following the Japanese attack on the Americans, [[William Lyon Mackenzie King]], the [[Prime Minister of Canada|Prime Minister of the Dominion of Canada]] advised [[George VI of the United Kingdom|George VI]], [[Monarchy of Canada|King of Canada]], that a state of war should exist between [[Canada]] and Japan, and the King accordingly issued this proclamation on December 8:
<blockquote>Whereas by and with the advice of our [[Privy Council for Canada]] we have signified our approval of the issue of a proclamation in the ''[[Canada Gazette]]'' declaring that a state of war with Japan exists and has existed in Canada as and from the 7th day of December 1941.

Now, therefore, we do hereby declare and proclaim that a state of war with Japan exists and has existed as and from the seventh day of December 1941.

Of all which our loving subjects and all others whom these presents may concern are hereby required to take notice and to govern themselves accordingly.<ref>((cite web|url=http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/timeline/411208bwp.html|title=CANADA DECLARES WAR ON JAPAN|access-date=2011-02-28))</ref>
</blockquote>

As part of the [[British Empire in World War II|British Empire forces]], Canada remained focused on the [[European theatre of World War II|European theatre]], like the United States, and following [[VE Day]] was still in the process of transitioning its military force for a campaign in East Asia and the western Pacific when [[VJ Day]] arrived.

==Investigations and blame==
President Roosevelt appointed the [[Roberts Commission]], headed by U.S. Supreme Court Justice [[Owen Josephus Roberts|Owen Roberts]], to investigate and report facts and findings with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor. It was the first of many official investigations (nine in all). Both the Fleet commander, Rear Admiral [[Husband E. Kimmel]], and the Army commander, Lieutenant General [[Walter Short]] (the Army had been responsible for air defense of Hawaii, including Pearl Harbor, and for general defense of the islands against hostile attack), were relieved of their commands shortly thereafter. They were accused of "dereliction of duty" by the Roberts Commission for not making reasonable defensive preparations.

None of the investigations conducted during the War, nor the Congressional investigation afterward, provided enough reason to reverse those actions. The decisions of the Navy and War Departments to relieve both was controversial at the time and has remained so ever since. However, neither was court-martialed, as would normally have been the result of dereliction of duty. On May 25, 1999, the U.S. Senate voted to recommend both officers be exonerated on all charges, citing "denial to Hawaii commanders of vital intelligence available in Washington".

A [[Joint congressional committee|Joint Congressional Committee]] was also appointed, on September 14, 1945, to investigate the causes of the attack and subsequent disaster.  It was convened on November 15, 1945.<ref name=Jessup>((cite book |last1=Jessup |first1=John E. |title=A Chronology of Conflict and Resolution, 1945–1985  |year=1989  |publisher=Greenwood Press |location=New York  |isbn=978-0-313-24308-0  ))</ref>

==Rise of anti-Japanese sentiment and historical significance==
((See also|Anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States|Internment of Japanese Americans|In Defense of Internment|List of Japanese spies, 1930–45|Niihau incident))
[[File:PropagandaHitlerTojo.jpg|thumb|right|United States World War II propaganda poster depicting [[Adolf Hitler]] and [[Hideki Tōjō]] (without his mustache)]]
[[File:Bullet holes at headquarters building of Hickam Air Force Base.jpg|thumb|right|Damage to the headquarters building at [[Hickam Field]], which is still visible]]

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor coupled with their alliance with the Nazis and the ensuing war in the Pacific fueled [[anti-Japanese sentiment]], racism, [[xenophobia]], and anti-[[Axis powers|Axis]] sentiment in the Allied nations like never before. Japanese, Japanese-Americans and Asians having a similar physical appearance were regarded with deep-seated suspicion, distrust and hostility. The attack was viewed as having been conducted in an extremely underhanded way and also as a very "treacherous" or "sneaky attack". Suspicions were further fueled by the [[Niihau incident]], as historian [[Gordon Prange]] stated "the rapidity with which the three resident Japanese went over to the pilot's cause", which troubled the Hawaiians. "The more pessimistic among them cited the Niihau Incident as proof that no one could trust any Japanese, even if an American citizen, not to go over to Japan if it appeared expedient."<ref>((cite book | last = Prange | first = Gordon W | author-link = Gordon Prange | year = 1962 | title = December 7, 1941: The Day the Japanese Attacked Pearl Harbor | publisher = McGraw Hill | location = New York | pages=375–377))</ref>

The attack, the subsequent declarations of war, and fear of "[[Fifth Column]]ists" resulted in internment of Japanese, German, and Italian populations in the United States and others, for instance the [[Japanese American internment]], [[German American internment]], [[Italian American internment]], [[Japanese Canadian internment]], and [[Italian Canadian internment]]. The attack resulted in the United States fighting the Germans and Italians, among others, in Europe and Japan in the Pacific.

The consequences were world-changing. Prime Minister [[Winston Churchill]] knew that the survival of the British Empire depended on American aid, and since 1940 had frequently asked Roosevelt to declare war. Churchill aide [[Jock Colville|John Colville]] stated that the prime minister and [[United States Ambassador to the United Kingdom|American Ambassador]] [[John Gilbert Winant]], who also supported the British, "sort of danced around the room together" as the United States would now enter the war, making a British victory likely.<ref name="olson2010">((Cite book |title=Citizens of London: The Americans Who Stood With Britain In Its Darkest, Finest Hour |last=Olson, Lynne |publisher=Random House |year=2010 |isbn=978-1-58836-982-6 |pages=[https://archive.org/details/citizensoflondon0000olso/page/164 164–165] |url=https://archive.org/details/citizensoflondon0000olso/page/164 ))</ref> Churchill later wrote, "Being saturated and satiated with emotion and sensation, I went to bed and slept the sleep of the saved and thankful."<ref>((cite book| first=Winston| last=Churchill| title=The Second World War, Vol. 3| pages=539))</ref>

By opening the [[Pacific War]], which ended in the unconditional surrender of Japan, the attack on Pearl Harbor led to the breaking of an Asian check on Soviet expansion. The Allied victory in this war and the subsequent U.S. emergence as a dominant world power, eclipsing Britain, have shaped international politics ever since.

Pearl Harbor is generally regarded as an extraordinary event in American history, remembered as the first time since the [[War of 1812]] that America was attacked in strength on its territory by foreign people – with only the [[September 11 attacks]] almost 60 years later being of a similarly catastrophic scale.

==Perception of the attack today==
Some [[Japanese nationalism|Japanese nationalists]] today feel they were compelled to fight because of threats to their national interests and an [[ABCD line|embargo imposed by the United States, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands]]. The most important embargo was on oil on which its Navy and much of the economy was dependent.<ref>Haruko Taya & Theodore F. Cook, ''Japan at War: An Oral History'' (New Press; Reprint edition, 1993). ((ISBN|1-56584-039-9))</ref> For example, ''[[Japan Times]]'', an English-language newspaper owned by one of the major news organizations in Japan (Asahi Shimbun), ran numerous columns in the early 2000s echoing Kurusu's comments in reference to the Pearl Harbor attack.<ref>Charles Burress, "[http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?eo20010719a2.htm Biased history helps feed U.S. fascination with Pearl Harbor] ((Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060108094740/http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?eo20010719a2.htm |date=2006-01-08 ))", ''Japan Times'', July 19, 2001 (accessed June 10, 2005)</ref>

In putting the Pearl Harbor attack into context, Japanese writers repeatedly contrast the thousands of U.S. citizens killed there with the hundreds of thousands of Japanese civilians killed in [[Air raids on Japan|U.S. air attacks on Japan]] during the war, even without mentioning the 1945 [[atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki]] by the United States.

However, in spite of the perceived inevitability of the war by many Japanese, many also believe the Pearl Harbor attack, although a tactical victory, was actually part of a seriously flawed strategy against the U.S. As one columnist wrote, "The Pearl Harbor attack was a brilliant tactic, but part of a strategy based on the belief that a spirit as firm as iron and as beautiful as cherry blossoms could overcome the materially wealthy United States. That strategy was flawed, and Japan's total defeat would follow."<ref>Burritt Sabin, [http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?fl20040208x3.htm "The War's Leagacy &#91;sic&#93;: Dawn of a tragic era"] ((Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060108091406/http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?fl20040208x3.htm |date=2006-01-08 )), ''Japan Times'', February 8, 2004 (accessed June 10, 2005).</ref>
In 1941, the [[Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan)|Japanese Foreign Ministry]] released a statement saying Japan had intended to make a formal declaration of war to the United States at 1&nbsp;p.m. Washington time, 25 minutes before the attack at Pearl Harbor was scheduled to begin. This officially acknowledged something that had been publicly known for years. Diplomatic communications had been coordinated well in advance with the attack, but had failed delivery at the intended time. It appears the Japanese government was referring to the "14-part message", which did not actually break off negotiations, let alone declare war, but did officially raise the possibility of a break in relations. However, because of various delays, the Japanese ambassador was unable to deliver this message until well after the attack had begun.

Imperial Japanese military leaders appear to have had mixed feelings about the attack. [[Gensui (Imperial Japanese Navy)|Fleet Admiral]] [[Isoroku Yamamoto]] was unhappy about the botched timing of the breaking off of negotiations. He is on record as having said, in the previous year, "I can run wild for six months ... after that, I have no expectation of success."<ref>Isoroku Yamamoto to Shigeharu Matsumoto (Japanese cabinet minister) and Fumimaro Kondoye (Japanese prime minister), quoted in [[Ronald Spector]], ''Eagle Against the Sun: The American War With Japan'' (Vintage, 1985).</ref> The reports of American reactions, terming it a "sneak attack" and "infamous behavior", confirmed that the effect on American morale had been the opposite of what was intended.<ref>[[Edwin P. Hoyt]], ''Japan's War'', p. 232 ((ISBN|0-07-030612-5))</ref>

The [[Prime Minister of Japan]] during World War II, [[Hideki Tōjō]], later wrote, "When reflecting upon it today, that the Pearl Harbor attack should have succeeded in achieving surprise seems a blessing from Heaven."((citation needed|date=June 2018))

In January 1941 Yamamoto had said, regarding the imminent war with the United States, "Should hostilities once break out between Japan and the United States, it is not enough that we take [[Guam]] and [[Commonwealth of the Philippines|the Philippines]], nor even [[Territory of Hawaii|Hawaii]] and [[San Francisco]]. We would have to march into [[Washington, D.C.|Washington]] and sign the treaty in the [[White House]]. I wonder if our politicians (who speak so lightly of a Japanese-American war) have confidence as to the outcome and are prepared to make the necessary sacrifices?"<ref>((Cite web |url=http://plasma.nationalgeographic.com/pearlharbor/ngbeyond/people/people11.html |title=National Geographic mini-biography of Isoroku Yamamoto |access-date=2007-10-28 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071011234428/http://plasma.nationalgeographic.com/pearlharbor/ngbeyond/people/people11.html |archive-date=2007-10-11 |url-status=dead ))</ref>

===Revisionism controversies===
[[File:Yasukuni Yusyukan.jpg|right|thumb|Some exhibits of Yasukuni Yusyukan have been criticised because of justification of the attack on Pearl Harbor.]]
There are some [[Historical revisionism (negationism)|revisionists]] in Japan who claim that the attack on Pearl Harbor was a legitimate attack. These historical perspectives are often claimed by Japanese [[Shintoist]]s and [[nationalist]]s and have been criticized from both inside and outside Japan.
* An exhibit at the [[Yasukuni Shrine]] Museum ([[Yūshūkan]]) asserts that the attack on Pearl Harbor was a trick by U.S. President [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] and denies that Japan committed any atrocities.<ref>((cite web|url=https://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2005-06-22-tokyo-shrine_x.htm |title=Tokyo shrine a focus of fury around Asia |access-date=2011-11-23 |date=2005-06-22 |work=[[USA Today]]))</ref><ref>((cite web|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/05/opinion/05bass.html |title=A Shrine to Japan's Tainted Past |access-date=2011-11-23 |date=2006-08-05 |work=[[The New York Times]]))</ref><ref>((cite web|url=http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/eo20070602rl.html |title=Lee should avoid Yasukuni |access-date=2011-11-23 |date=2007-06-02 |work=[[The Japan Times]]))</ref>
* In 2006, [[Henry Hyde]], chairman of the United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs, sent a letter to House Speaker [[Dennis Hastert]] on April 26 to show concern about [[Junichiro Koizumi]]'s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. He pointed out that this shrine honors [[Hideki Tōjō]] and other convicted Class-A war criminals who were involved in the Pearl Harbor attack.<ref>((cite web|url=http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20060517a1.html |title=Bid to address Congress has Yasukuni proviso |access-date=2011-11-23 |date=2006-05-17 |work=[[The Japan Times]]))</ref>
* In May 2007, the Japan [[Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (Japan)|Ministry of Education]] distributed an animated DVD ''[[Hokori]]'' (''Pride'') which was created by [[Junior Chamber International Japan]] (JC). [[Japanese Communist Party]] Diet member [[Yuko Ishii]] introduced and criticized it to the [[House of Representatives of Japan]] on May 17, and revealed that its contents glamorized Class-A war criminals and had the main character Yuta tell his girlfriend Kokoro that the battle was a "self-defense attack" and "Asian colonial liberation" against [[American imperialism]].<ref>((cite web|url=http://www.jcp.or.jp/akahata/aik07/2007-05-18/2007051803_01_0.html |title=Brainwashing for justification – Ministry of Education deploying "Yasukuni DVD" – |access-date=2011-11-23 |date=2007-05-18 |work=[[Shimbun Akahata]]))</ref>
* On October 31, 2008, [[Toshio Tamogami]], former chief of staff of Japan's [[Air Self-Defense Force]], published an essay which argued that [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]], who had allegedly been manipulated by the [[Comintern]], drew Japan into the attack on Pearl Harbor. Following the essay's publication, Defense Minister [[Yasukazu Hamada]] removed Tamogami from his post and ordered him to retire, since the essay's viewpoint contradicted the government position.<ref>Hongo, Jun, "[http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20081108a1.html New ASDF chief Hokazono sorry for Tamogami's 'damaging' essay]", ''[[Japan Times]]'', 8 November 2008, p. 1.</ref><ref>Hongo, Jun, "[http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20081226a5.html Tamogami's cohorts reprimanded]", ''[[Japan Times]]'', 26 December 2008.</ref> Tamogami, on November 3, 2008, confirmed that the essay accurately expressed his views on the war and Japan's role in it.<ref>Onishi, Norimitsu, "[https://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/05/world/asia/05briefs-NEWFALLOUTFR_BRF.html Japan: New Fallout From Essay On War]", ''[[The New York Times]]'', November 5, 2008, p. 20.</ref>

While not specifically directed at revisionism, but more as a likely result of Prime Minister [[Shinzo Abe]]'s controversial visits to the [[Yasukuni Shrine]], where some [[Yasukuni Shrine#Post-war issues and controversies|1,600 war criminals were enshrined after their executions]], by February 2015 some concern within the [[Imperial House of Japan]] — which normally does not issue such statements — over the issue was voiced by then-[[Naruhito, Crown Prince of Japan|Crown Prince Naruhito]].<ref>((cite web |url=https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/japanese-experiments-u-s-pows-exhibit-shows-brutal-history-n338231 |title=Japan's Experiments on U.S. POWs: Exhibit Highlights Horrific History |last=Yamamoto |first=Arata |date=April 9, 2015 |work=NBC News |access-date=April 9, 2015))</ref> Naruhito stated on his 55th birthday (February 23, 2015) that it was "important to look back on the past humbly and correctly", in reference to Japan's role in World War II-era war crimes, and that he was concerned about the ongoing need to "correctly pass down tragic experiences and the history behind Japan to the generations who have no direct knowledge of the war, at the time memories of the war are about to fade".<ref>((cite web |url=https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/world-war-ii-should-not-be-forgotten-japans-prince-naruhito-n311561 |title=World War II Should Not Be Forgotten, Japan's Prince Naruhito Says |last=Itasaka |first=Kiko |date=February 24, 2015 |work=NBC News |access-date=April 9, 2015))</ref>

==Analysis==
[[File:Remember december 7th.jpg|thumb|200px|left|Posters like Allen Saalberg's strengthened American resolve against the Axis powers.]]

===Tactical implications===
The attack was notable for its considerable destruction, as putting most of the U.S. battleships out of commission was regarded—in both navies and by most military observers worldwide—as a tremendous success for Japan. Influenced by the earlier [[Battle of Taranto]], which pioneered the all-aircraft naval attack but resulted in far less damage and casualties, the Japanese struck against Pearl Harbor on a much larger scale than did the British at Taranto.<ref>"The Dorn report did not state with certainty that Kimmel and Short knew about Taranto. There is, however, no doubt that they did know, as did the Japanese. Lt. Cdr. Takeshi Naito, the assistance naval attaché to Berlin, flew to Taranto to investigate the attack first hand, and Naito subsequently had a lengthy conversation with Cdr. [[Mitsuo Fuchida]] about his observations. Fuchida led the Japanese attack on 7 December 1941." ''Kimmel, Short, and Pearl Harbor: The Final Report Revealed.''</ref>

The attack was a great shock to all the Allies in the [[Pacific War|Pacific Theater]], and it was initially believed Pearl Harbor changed the [[Balance of power in international relations|balance of power]], similar to how Taranto did the [[Battle of the Mediterranean|Mediterranean]], both in the attackers' favor. Three days later, with the [[sinking of Prince of Wales and Repulse|sinking of ''Prince of Wales'' and ''Repulse'']] off the coast of [[British Malaya|Malaya]], British Prime Minister [[Winston Churchill]] exclaimed, "In all the war I never received a more direct shock. As I turned and twisted in bed the full horror of the news sank in upon me. There were no British or American capital ships in the Indian Ocean or the Pacific except the American survivors of Pearl Harbor who were hastening back to California. Over this vast expanse of waters Japan was supreme and we everywhere were weak and naked."<ref name="forcez-survivors">((cite web|url=http://www.forcez-survivors.org.uk/|title=Welcome to the website of the Force Z Survivors Association|publisher=forcez-survivors.org.uk|access-date=2014-07-11|archive-date=2018-10-10|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181010175752/http://www.forcez-survivors.org.uk/|url-status=dead))</ref>

However, Pearl Harbor did not have as crippling an effect on American operations as initially thought. Unlike the close confines of the [[Battle of the Mediterranean|Mediterranean]], the vast expanses of the Pacific limited the tactical value of battleships as a [[fleet in being]]. Furthermore, unlike new [[fast battleship]]s such as the ((sclass|Iowa|battleship|4)), the slow battleships were incapable of operating with carrier task forces, so once repaired they were relegated to delivering pre-invasion bombardments during the [[Leapfrogging (strategy)|island hopping]] offensive against Japanese-held islands. These Pearl Harbor veterans were later part of a force that defeated IJN battleships at the [[Battle of Leyte Gulf#The Battle of Surigao Strait (25 October)|Battle of Surigao Strait]], an engagement very lopsided in the USN's favor in any case.<ref name="Morison1956">((cite book |chapter=Leyte, June 1944 – January 1945 |title=History of United States Naval Operations in World War II |volume=XII |last=Morison |first=Samuel E. |year=1956 |publisher=Little & Brown |location=Boston |title-link=History of United States Naval Operations in World War II ))</ref><ref name="Howard1999">Howard (1999). <!-- What title is that? --></ref> A major flaw of Japanese strategic thinking was a belief that the ultimate Pacific battle would be between battleships of both sides, in keeping with the doctrine of Captain [[Alfred Mahan]]. Seeing the decimation of battleships at the hands of aircraft, Yamamoto (and his successors) hoarded his battleships for a "decisive battle" that never happened, only committing a handful to the forefront of the Battles of [[Battle of Midway|Midway]] and [[Guadalcanal Campaign|Guadalcanal]].

One of the main Japanese objectives was to destroy the three American [[aircraft carrier]]s stationed in the Pacific, but they were not present: ((USS|Enterprise|CV-6|2)) was returning from Wake, ((USS|Lexington|CV-2|2)) from Midway, and ((USS|Saratoga|CV-3|2)) was under refit at [[Puget Sound Naval Shipyard]]. Had Japan sunk the American carriers, the U.S. would have sustained significant damage to the [[United States Pacific Fleet|Pacific Fleet]]'s ability to conduct offensive operations for a year or so (given no further diversions from the [[Atlantic Fleet (United States)|Atlantic Fleet]]). As it was, the elimination of the battleships left the U.S. Navy with no choice but to place its faith in aircraft carriers and submarines—particularly the large numbers under construction of the U.S. Navy's [[Essex-class aircraft carrier|''Essex''-class aircraft carrier]]s, [[Essex-class aircraft carrier#Ships in class|11 of which]] had been ordered before the attack—the very weapons with which the U.S. Navy halted and eventually reversed the Japanese advance.

[[File:PearlHarborCarrierChart.jpg|thumb|275px|right|Carrier Striking Task Force two-way route. Legend:((legend|#000000|
[[Attack on Pearl Harbor order of battle|''Kido Butai'']]))
((legend|#FF0000|((USS|Enterprise|CV-6))))
((legend|#0000FF|((USS|Lexington|CV-2))))]]

====Battleships====
Despite the perception of this battle as a devastating blow to America, only three ships were permanently lost to the U.S. Navy. These were the battleships ((USS|Arizona|BB-39|2)), ((USS|Oklahoma|BB-37|2)), and the old battleship ((USS|Utah|BB-31|2)) (then used as a target ship); nevertheless, much usable material was salvaged from them, including the two aft main turrets from ''Arizona''. The majority of each battleship's crews survived; there were exceptions as heavy casualties resulted from ''Arizona''(('s)) magazine exploding and the ''Oklahoma'' capsizing. Four ships sunk during the attack were later raised and returned to duty, including the battleships ((USS|California|BB-44|2)), ((USS|West Virginia|BB-48|2)) and ((USS|Nevada|BB-36|2)). ''California'' and ''West Virginia'' had an effective torpedo-defense system which held up remarkably well, despite the weight of fire they had to endure, resulting in most of their crews being saved. ((USS|Maryland|BB-46|2)) and ((USS|Tennessee|BB-43|2)) suffered relatively light damage, as did ((USS|Pennsylvania|BB-38|2)), which was in drydock at the time.

[[Chester Nimitz]] said later, "It was God's mercy that our fleet was in Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941." Nimitz believed if Kimmel had discovered the Japanese approach to Pearl Harbor, he would have sortied to meet them. With the American carriers absent and Kimmel's battleships at a severe disadvantage to the Japanese carriers, the likely result would have been the sinking of the American battleships at sea in deep water, where they would have been lost forever with tremendous casualties (up to twenty thousand dead), instead of in Pearl Harbor, where the crews could easily be rescued, and six battleships ultimately restored to duty.<ref>[[Gordon Prange|Prange, Gordon]], ''Miracle at Midway'', 1983, paperback, p.9</ref> This was also the reaction of [[Joseph Rochefort]], head of [[Station HYPO|<small>HYPO</small>]], when he remarked the attack was cheap at the price.

Many of the surviving battleships were extensively refitted, including the replacement of their outdated secondary battery of anti-surface [[5"/51 caliber gun]]s with more useful turreted dual-purpose [[5"/38 caliber gun]]s, allowing them to better cope with the new tactical reality.<ref>In fact, their rate of fire was too low to deal with aircraft, as experience with ''[[kamikaze]]'' would demonstrate. Not until the introduction of a fully automatic 3 inch {76 mm} postwar was a suitable solution found.</ref> Addition of modern [[radar]] to the salvaged vessels would give them a marked qualitative advantage over those of the IJN.<ref name="Morison1956" /><ref name="Howard1999" />

The repaired U.S. battleships primarily provided fire support for amphibious landings. Their low speed was a liability to their deployment in the vast expanses of the [[Pacific War|Pacific]], for instance they could not accompany the fleet carriers that had become the dominant combatants. Six of the Standard Type vessels participated in the last battleship versus battleship engagement in naval history, the [[Battle of Surigao Strait]], where none of them were hit. During active duty, being well protected by escorts and air cover, none of the Pearl Harbor battleships suffered serious damage save for [[USS Pennsylvania (BB-38)#1945|''Pennsylvania'']] which was permanently crippled by a torpedo in the closing stages of the war; on September 2, 1945, ''West Virginia'' was among the [[List of Allied ships at the Japanese surrender|Allied fleet in Tokyo Bay]] when the Japanese [[Japanese Instrument of Surrender|officially surrendered]].

====Carriers====
The attack on Pearl Harbor failed to sight, or destroy, any of the Pacific Fleet's three aircraft carriers; they had been designated as primary targets along with the battleships.<ref name="IJN97">[http://ibiblio.org/pha/monos/097/index.html Japanese Monograph Number 97] Pearl Harbor operation Prepared by Military History Section Headquarters, Army Forces Far East from ibiblio.org/pha.</ref> The carriers ''Lexington'' and ''Enterprise'' were ferrying additional fighters to American bases on the islands of [[Wake Island|Wake]] and [[Midway Island|Midway]] while ''Saratoga'' was under refit at [[Puget Sound Naval Shipyard]].<ref>Richard Holmes, ''The World Atlas of Warfare: Military Innovations that Changed the Course of History'' (Viking, 1988), p.211.</ref> At the time of the Japanese attack, the US was expecting imminent war with Japan, beginning in any of several places, such as the Philippines or Allied bases in Borneo.<ref name="renamed_from_272337_on_20081227171108">[http://ibiblio.org/pha/timeline/411127acno.html War warning, dated 27 November 1941] The involvement of numerous units of the Japanese Army and the apparent disposition of IJN forces suggested amphibious operations against either the Philippines, the Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo, which was the reason warning cables had been sent to all Pacific commands by both the Navy and War Departments at Washington.</ref>
Nagumo's hesitation, and failure to find and destroy the American carriers, may have been a product of his lack of faith in the attack plan, and of the fact he was a gunnery officer, not an aviator. In addition, Yamamoto's targeting priorities, placing battleships first in importance, reflected an out-of-date [[Alfred Mahan|Mahanian]] [[doctrine]], and an inability to extrapolate from history, given the damage German submarines did to British trade in World War I. In the end, Japan achieved surprisingly little for all her daring and apparent success<ref name="auto">Willmott, ''op. cit.''; Peattie and Evans, ''op. cit.''.</ref> - with the first of the fourteen wartime-commissioned U.S. Navy [[Essex-class aircraft carrier]]s, [[USS Essex (CV-9)|''CV-9'']], being commissioned just over a year (New Year's Eve Day 1942) after the Pearl Harbor attack.

====Shore installations====
Tank farms, containing 140&nbsp;million U.S. gallons (530&nbsp;million liters) of bunker oil, were unscathed, providing a ready source of fuel for American fleets at the submarine base. About this missed opportunity, Admiral [[Chester Nimitz]] would later say, "Had the Japanese destroyed the oil, it would have prolonged the war another two years."<ref>[[Daniel Yergin|Yergin, Daniel]], ''[[The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power]]'', (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991) pp.326–327.]</ref> These were vital to the initial phase of the war, and to commerce raiding throughout, and illustrate the deficiencies of Japanese planning for the attack. The Navy Yard, critical to ship maintenance, and repair of ships damaged in the attack was untouched. The engineering and initial repair shops, as well as the torpedo store, <!-- don't correct this. "store" is proper usage--> were intact. Other items of base infrastructure and operation, such as power generation, continued to operate normally. Also critical to the way the Pacific War was actually fought was the [[cryptanalysis]] unit, [[Station Hypo|Station <small>HYPO</small>]], located in the basement of the old Administration Building. It was undamaged and even benefited by gaining staff from unemployed ship's bands.<ref>Willmott, H.P. (1983), ''The Barrier and the Javelin: Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies, February to June 1942'', Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, ((ISBN|0-87021-092-0)) ; Blair, ''op. cit.''; Beach, ''Submarine!''; Holmes, ''Double-Edged Secrets'' and ''Undersea Victory''.</ref>

The [[United States Army Air Forces|United States Army Air Force]]'s loss of aircraft must be balanced against the fact that many of them were obsolete, such as the [[Curtiss P-40 Warhawk]]'s predecessor, the [[Curtiss P-36 Hawk]]. Japan might have achieved a good deal more with not much additional effort or loss.<ref>Caidin, ''op. cit.'' and ''Fork-Tailed Devil'' (Ballantine, 1968).</ref>

====Charts====
((Col-begin|width=100%))
((Col-break))
{| Class = "wikitable"
|+Capital ships prior to attack<ref name="NP">[http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/misc/forces.html Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings, Pt. 15], p. 1901-06 from http://www.ibiblio.org</ref>
! Location !! Battleships !! Aircraft carriers
|-
| colspan = 3 | <div style="text-align: center;">[[File:US Naval Jack 48 stars.svg|23 px]] '''United States''' [[File:US flag 48 stars.svg|23 px]] </div>
|-
| Atlantic
| 6 (+2*)
| 4 (+1*)
|-
| Pacific
| 9
| 3
|-
| colspan = 3 | <div style="text-align: center;">((flagicon|Empire of Japan|naval)) '''Japan''' ((flagicon|Empire of Japan)) </div>
|-
| Pacific
| 10 (+1*)
| 10
|-
|colspan = 3 | <small>*Plus ships completed but not yet commissioned. <br />US: ''North Carolina'', ''Washington'' and ''Hornet''<br />Japan: ''Yamato''</small>
|}
((Col-break))
{| Class = "wikitable"
|+ Capital ships after attack
! Location !! Battleships !! Aircraft carriers
|-
| colspan = 3 | <div style="text-align: center;">[[File:US Naval Jack 48 stars.svg|23 px]] '''United States''' [[File:US flag 48 stars.svg|23 px]] </div>
|-
| Atlantic
| 6 (+2*)
| 4 (+1*)
|-
| Pacific
| 1 (+6**)
| 3
|-
| colspan = 3 | <div style="text-align: center;">((flagicon|Empire of Japan|naval)) '''Japan''' ((flagicon|Empire of Japan)) </div>
|-
| Pacific
| 10 (+1*)
| 9
|-
|colspan = 3 | <small>**Ships which can be repaired:<br />''California'', ''West Virginia'', ''Nevada'', ''Maryland'', ''Tennessee'', ''Pennsylvania''.</small>
|}
((Col-break))
{| Class = "wikitable"
|+ Capital ships 12/1942
! Location !! Battleships !! Aircraft carriers
|-
| colspan = 3 | <div style="text-align: center;">[[File:US Naval Jack 48 stars.svg|23 px]] '''United States''' [[File:US flag 48 stars.svg|23 px]] </div>
|-
| Atlantic
| 4
| 1
|-
| Pacific
| 12 (+3**)
| 3
|-
| colspan = 3 | <div style="text-align: center;">((flagicon|Empire of Japan|naval)) '''Japan''' ((flagicon|Empire of Japan)) </div>
|-
| Pacific
| 10
| 6
|-
|colspan = 3 | ((smalldiv|1=<nowiki>**</nowiki>Ships which can be repaired:<br />
''California'',''West Virginia'', ''Nevada''<br />
US ships lost:<br /> ''Lexington'', ''Yorktown'', ''Wasp'', ''Hornet''<br />
US ships gained:<br />''Essex'', ''North Carolina'', ''Washington'', ''South Dakota'', ''Indiana'', ''Massachusetts'', ''Alabama''<br />
Japanese ships lost:<br />''Shoho'', ''Akagi'', ''Kaga'', ''Soryu'', ''Hiryu'', ''Hiei'', ''Kirishima''<br />Japanese ships gained: ''Yamato'', ''Musashi'', ''Junyo'', ''Hiyo''.))
|}
((col-end))

Of the 22 Japanese ships that took part in the attack, only one survived the war, the ''[[Japanese destroyer Ushio (1930)|Ushio]]''. As of 2006, the only U.S. ships in that were present at Pearl Harbor during the attack still remaining afloat are the [[USCGC Taney (WHEC-37)|Coast Guard Cutter ''WHEC-37'']] and the yard tug ((ship||Hoga|YT-146|2)).((Relevance inline|date=February 2021)) Both remained active over 50 years after the attack and have been designated as museum ships.

===Strategic implications===
((Unreferenced section|date=September 2017))
A common view is that the Japanese fell victim to [[victory disease]] because of the perceived ease of their first victories. It has also been stated by the Japanese military commanders and politicians who visited and lived in the United States, that their leadership (mostly military personnel) took the war with the United States relatively lightly, compared to them. For instance, Admiral Yamamoto and General [[Tadamichi Kuribayashi]] expressed concerns about the greater industrial power of the United States.

The "Europe First" strategy, loss of air cover over Pearl Harbor, and subsequent [[Philippines campaign (1941–1942)|loss of the Philippines]], meant the U.S. Army and Army Air Forces<ref>[[1941 in aviation#June]]</ref>((Unreliable source?|date=September 2017|reason=Wikipedia articles are not reliable sources, WP:CIRC|certain=yes)) were unable to play a significant role in the [[Pacific War]] for several months. Japan was temporarily free of worries about its major rival Pacific naval power, which was at least part of the intention of the attack. Because Australian, New Zealand, Dutch and most British forces were in Europe, Japan conquered nearly all of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific, and extended her reach far into the [[Indian Ocean]] without significant interference and with nearly universal tactical success.

In the long term, the attack on Pearl Harbor was a [[grand strategy|grand strategic]] blunder for Japan. Indeed, Admiral Yamamoto, who conceived it, predicted even success here could not win a war with the United States, because the American industrial capacity was too large. It spurred the United States into a determination to seek complete victory. The war resulted in the destruction of the Japanese armed forces, the [[Occupation of Japan|occupation of the home islands]] (a state never before achieved in Japan's history), and the occupation of [[United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands|Okinawa and the Ryukyu Islands]] by the United States until 1972, while the Soviet Russian re-annexation of the [[Kuril Islands]] and [[Sakhalin]]'s southern part, and the restoration of [[Taiwan under Japanese rule|Formosa (Taiwan)]] to [[Republic of China (1912–49)|China]], and the loss of [[Korea under Japanese rule|Korea]] have not been reversed to this day.

====Contrast to other similar operations====
The earlier [[Battle of Taranto|British raid on Taranto]], which is often regarded as the inspiration for the Pearl Harbor attack, achieved its strategic goal being a considerably smaller operation that inflicted much less devastation. Not only did it cost the Italian fleet half of its capital ships in one night, furthermore in response the ''[[Regia Marina]]'' immediately transferred its undamaged ships from Taranto to Naples to protect them from similar attacks,<ref name = "sturtivant">((cite book|last=Sturtivant|first=Ray|year=1990|title = British naval aviation: the Fleet Air Arm 1917–1990|location=London | publisher =Arms & Armour Press |pages= 48–50|isbn = 0-85368-938-5))</ref> until the defences at Taranto (mainly the anti-torpedo nets) were brought up to adequate levels to protect them from further attacks of the same kind (which happened between March and May 1941).<ref>((cite book|last1=Giorgerini|first1=Giorgio|title=La guerra italiana sul mare : la marina tra vittoria e sconfitta : 1940–1943|date=2002|publisher=Mondadori|location=Milano|isbn=9788804501503|page=223|edition=1. ed. Oscar storia.))</ref> After Taranto the balance of power swung to the [[Mediterranean Fleet|British Mediterranean Fleet]] which now enjoyed more operational freedom: when previously forced to operate as one unit to match Italian capital ships, they could now split into two battlegroups; each built around one aircraft carrier and two battleships.<ref>((cite book|last =O'Hara | first =Vincent| author-link = Vincent P. O'Hara | title= Struggle for the Middle Sea|year= 2009 | location = London |page = 65))</ref> Battleships were found to be more useful in the confines of the Mediterranean as opposed to the expanses of the Pacific; furthermore the [[Standard-type battleship|older US battleships]] were too slow to escort the carriers and were chiefly used as fire support for amphibious operations.<ref>((cite book |title=Battle at Sea |first=John |last=Keegan |author-link=John Keegan |pages=157–211 |publisher=[[Pimlico (publishing imprint)|Pimlico]] |location=London |date=1993 |isbn=0-7126-5991-9))</ref>  Although the US Pacific fleet had five out of eight battleships sunk (three of them permanent losses) at Pearl Harbor, this instead meant a reliance upon the untouched aircraft carriers for offensive operations against the Japanese.<ref name="auto"/>

[[Truk Lagoon]], often considered by some as the Japanese equivalent of Pearl Harbor, was attacked by US carrier aircraft in [[Operation Hailstone]] in 1944. Beforehand the Combined Fleet evacuated their major units - carriers, battleships, and heavy cruisers - so the only warships lost were two light cruisers and four destroyers.  Nonetheless the Japanese shipping losses totalled almost 200,000 tons including auxiliaries and cargo ships which hampered logistics, particularly serious was the loss of valuable [[Replenishment oiler|fleet oilers]].<ref>((cite book
|last=Toll
|first=Ian
|author-link = Ian W. Toll
|title=The Conquering Tide: War in the Pacific Islands, 1942–1944: War in the Pacific Islands, 1942–1944
|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=4OlwBgAAQBAJ
|year=2015
|publisher=W. W. Norton
|isbn=978-0-393-24820-3
|pages=413–414))</ref> The US strikes damaged Truk's dockyards, communications centers, the submarine base, and supply dumps including destroying 17,000 tons of stored fuel, while Pearl Harbor's equivalents were largely untouched in the 1941 attack.<ref>((Cite book|last=Hornfischer|first=James D.|url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/951742544|title=The fleet at flood tide : America at total war in the Pacific, 1944-1945|date=2016|isbn=978-0-345-54870-2|edition=First|location=New York|oclc=951742544))</ref>  Afterward Operation Hailstone, the US went on to isolate the whole area of operations with submarine and air attacks, severing Japanese shipping lanes between empire waters and critical fuel supplies to the south.

==See also==
[[File:Pearl az.jpg|thumb|right|250px|''Arizona'' [[barbette]], 2005]]
* [[Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group]]
* [[Japanese war crimes]]
* [[Unrestricted submarine warfare]]

((clear))

==Notes==
((reflist))

<!--spacing, please do not remove-->

==External links==
* [http://www.historynet.com/four-days-in-december-germanys-path-to-war-with-the-u-s.htm Four Days in December: Germany's Path to War With the U.S.]
* [http://www.sdh-fact.com/essay-article/886/ Japan's attack on Pearl Harbour ignited the liberation of Asia from Western domination ]

((Pearl Harbor attack))
((World War II))

[[Category:Attack on Pearl Harbor]]
[[Category:Axis powers]]

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