This article has multiple issues. Please help improve it or discuss these issues on the talk page. (Learn how and when to remove these template messages) This article relies excessively on references to primary sources. Please improve this article by adding secondary or tertiary sources. Find sources: "Designing Economic Mechanisms" – news · newspapers · books · scholar · JSTOR (July 2008) (Learn how and when to remove this template message) This article includes a list of references, related reading, or external links, but its sources remain unclear because it lacks inline citations. Please help to improve this article by introducing more precise citations. (August 2021) (Learn how and when to remove this template message) (Learn how and when to remove this template message)
Designing Economic Mechanisms
AuthorLeonid Hurwicz, Stanley Reiter
LanguageEnglish
SubjectMechanism design
PublisherCambridge University Press
Publication date
May 22, 2006
Media typePrint, e-book
Pages356
ISBN978-0521836418
OCLC823653501

Designing Economic Mechanisms is a 2006 book by economists Leonid Hurwicz and Stanley Reiter. Hurwicz received the 2007 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences with Eric Maskin and Roger Myerson for their work on mechanism design. In this book, Hurwicz and Reiter presented systematic methods for designing decentralized economic mechanisms whose performance attains specified goals.

Summary

The authors of this book, Leonid Hurwicz and Stanley Reiter, helped found the field of mechanism design. This book provides a guide for those who would design mechanisms.

A decentralized mechanism is a mathematical structure that models institutions for guiding and coordinating economic activity. Such institutions are usually created by administrators, lawmakers, and officers of private companies to achieve their desired goals. Their purpose is to achieve their desired goal in a way that economizes on the resources needed to operate the institutions, and that provides incentives that induce the required behaviors. In this book, systematic procedures for designing mechanisms that achieve specified performance goals, and economize on the resources required to operate the mechanism, i.e., informationally efficient mechanisms, are presented. Most of the book deals with the systematic design procedures which are algorithms for designing informationally efficient mechanisms. In the book, informationally efficient dominant strategy implementation is also studied.

Bibliography

References

This article needs additional or more specific categories. Please help out by adding categories to it so that it can be listed with similar articles. (August 2021)
Categories