On the morning of September 11, 1974, while conducting an instrument approach in dense ground fog into Douglas Municipal Airport in Charlotte, the aircraft crashed at 7:34 am EDT more than three miles (5 km) short of Runway 36, killing 72 of the 82 on board.[2] Thirteen survived the initial impact, including the first officer and one flight attendant,[3] but three of the initial survivors ultimately died from severe burn injuries[4] as late as 29 days after the accident.[5]
Among the fatalities was the vice president for academic affairs of the Medical University of South Carolina, James William Colbert Jr.,[6] and two of his sons; they were the father and brothers of future television personality Stephen Colbert.[7][8]
The aircraft was a five-year-old McDonnell Douglas DC-9-31 registered as N8984E, which was delivered to Eastern Airlines on January 30, 1969.[5]: 25 The captain was 49-year-old James E. Reeves, who had been with the airline since 1956. He had 8,876 flight hours, including 3,856 hours on the DC-9.[5]: 24 The first officer was 36-year-old James M. Daniels Jr. He had been with the airline since 1966 and had 3,016 flight hours, including 2,693 hours on the DC-9.[5]: 24
Crash investigation and recommendations
While investigating this accident, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) reviewed the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) and found that the flight crew had engaged in unnecessary and "nonpertinent" conversation during the approach phase of the flight, discussing subjects "ranging from politics to used cars."[5] The NTSB concluded that conducting such nonessential chatter can distract pilots from their flying duties during the critical phases of flight, such as instrument approach to landing, and recommended that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) establish rules and educate pilots to focus exclusively on flying tasks while operating at low altitudes. It was later realized that this rule should also apply to takeoffs; for example, the lack of a sterile cockpit environment was a contributing factor to the crash of Air Florida Flight 90 on January 13, 1982. The FAA, after more than six years of consideration, finally published the sterile cockpit rule in 1981.[9][10]
The NTSB also found that the crew was apparently trying to visually locate the airport while executing an instrument approach in the presence of low-lying fog. In addition, a persistent attempt to visually identify the nearby Carowinds amusement park tower, known as "Carowinds Tower" to pilots,[11] which rose to an elevation of 1,314 feet (401 m), or 340 feet (105 m) above ground level (AGL), may have further distracted and confused the flight crew. The first officer was operating the flight controls, and none of the required altitude callouts were made by the captain, which compounded the flight crew's nearly total lack of altitude awareness.
During the investigation, the issue of the flammability of passengers' clothing materials was raised. There was evidence that passengers who wore double-knit synthetic fiber clothing articles sustained significantly worse burn injuries during the post-crash fire than passengers who wore articles made from natural fibers.[5]
The NTSB released its final report on May 23, 1975,[5] concluding that the accident was caused by the flight crew's lack of altitude awareness and poor cockpit discipline.[12] The NTSB issued the following official probable cause:[12]
"The flight crew's lack of altitude awareness at critical points during the approach due to poor cockpit discipline in that the crew did not follow prescribed procedure".
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