Fifth encirclement campaign
Part of the Chinese Civil War
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in 1933
Date 25 September 1933 – 10 October 1934 (1 year, 2 weeks and 1 day) Location Jiangxi province Result Nationalist victory Jiangxi Soviet eliminated Red Army forced onto Long March
Belligerents
Nationalist China National Revolutionary Army Allied warlords Supported by: Germany	Soviet China Chinese Red Army Supported by:  Soviet Union
Commanders and leaders
Chiang Kai-shek Chen Jitang Chen Cheng Xue Yue Gu Zhutong Tang Enbo A. von Falkenhausen	Wang Ming Zhou Enlai Bo Gu Otto Braun Lin Biao Peng Dehuai
Strength
500,000 under Chiang Kai-shek 300,000 under Chen Jitang 200,000 from various Manchuria Sichuan Hunan Fujian Guangxi. 1,000,000 total mobilized	70,000-150,000
Casualties and losses
1,000 killed	60,000 killed

The fifth encirclement campaign against the Jiangxi Soviet^[a] was a series of battles fought during the Chinese Civil War from 25 September 1933, to October 1934 between Chiang Kai-shek's Chinese Nationalists (Kuomintang) and the Chinese Communists.^[1] During this campaign, the Kuomintang successfully overran the communist Chinese Soviet Republic and forced the Communists on the run, an event later known as the Long March.

Prelude

After the failure of the fourth encirclement campaign in the spring of 1933, Chiang Kai-shek immediately mobilized troops for the next campaign. Nationalist troops eventually totaled more than one million, mostly forces under various regional warlords, of which the largest part were men from the Guangdong warlord Chen Jitang's army of 300,000+ (or 30% of the total nationalist force). Chen Jitang's troops were mobilized to blockade the southern border of the Jiangxi Soviet. However, most of the warlords were somewhat half-hearted towards the campaign, due to a mixture of only wanting to keep their own power and having already seen four previous campaigns fail. In the end, the majority of warlord troops only participated as block-troops and occupiers of the captured communist regions. Chiang Kai-shek's own Kuomintang troops carried out the majority of the fighting.

NRA plan

In July 1933 the NRA established a review team to identify and rectify mistakes made in previous encirclement campaigns. Divisional level training organisations were formed to improve the capability of NRA forces, foreign advisors namely the German mission were further integrated into operations and their expertise was utilised to improve the tactics and strategies of the NRA forces. The German advisors proposed a more systematic strategy.^[2]

Firstly, the Soviet would be surrounded and blockaded, cutting off crucial goods that were important to the logistics of the Red Army such as raw materials, rice, and salt. The second step was to establish a line of blockhouses of concrete and other fortifications to provide fire support and create a strong defensive line to deny the CCP an opportunity to break out, as the line advanced rear blockhouses would be abandoned and forward ones constructed and manned. Lastly, roads were built in rear areas to facilitate the delivery of supplies, these strategies were adopted piecemeal before to varying often limited success.^[2]

The KMT recognised that the defeat of the CCP was 70% political and 30% military and a slogan to that effect was widespread. The ancient Baojia system was revived by NRA forces under KMT instruction to provide security teams and create new revived village administrations.^[2][3]

The KMT army was 700,000 strong in total broken down into 4 Armies and supported by 5 air corps. The Northern Army contained 30 divisions and garrisoned the Jishui-Jinzhi-Nangeng-Li'an front. The Southern Army contained 11 Guangdong divisions and one independent regiment it garrisoned the Wuping-Anyuan-Ganxian-Shangyou line. The Western Army contained 9 Hunanese divisions and 3 independent regiments it garrisoned the Gan River preventing a western push from the Red Army. The Eastern Army contained 14 divisions and garrisoned the Fujian-Jiangxi border (following the Fujian incident). The Fujian-Jiangxi-Zhejiang Military Region Headquarters was given 11 divisions and 4 security regiments to block the Northeastern region.^[2]

This gave a total force of 75 divisions and 8 independent regiments. The estimates of the main attack force vary from 400,000 to 500,000 with a total of 1,000,000 men committed to the offensive, the estimates of the 5 air Corps vary from 200 to 270.^[4][2][3]

Red Army

The Red Army had prepared little for the encirclement campaign focusing beforehand on recruiting a large army for fighting a conventional war, by late October 1933 the Red army contained some 100,000 soldiers though this strained the logistics system as fielding a large army was beyond the capability of the Soviet. Revenue and supply collection only began in August 1933.^[5]

It is alternatively stated to have a strength of 150,000 or 70,000.^[5][3]

As the commander-in-chief of the Nationalist forces, Chiang Kai-shek established his headquarters in Nanchang. In addition to mobilizing the warlords' troops, Chiang also adopted the strategy of systematic encirclement of the Jiangxi Soviet region with fortified blockhouses. This strategy has been attributed to his German advisers' (Hans von Seeckt and Alexander von Falkenhausen), however this is unlikely. Instead, the Nationalists innovated the strategy themselves.^[6]

The blockhouses proved to be very effective. In an effort to break the blockade, the Red Army—under the orders of a three-man committee consisting of Bo Gu, Zhou Enlai and Li De (Otto Braun)—besieged the forts many times, but suffered heavy casualties with little success. The Jiangxi Soviet shrunk significantly due to the Chinese Red Army's disastrous loss of manpower and material throughout the year, and by the end only a handful of towns and cities remained in Communist hands.

First phase

The campaign officially began on 25 September 1933, when the first Kuomintang assault on Communist positions was launched. Three days later the Communists lost Lichuan. Although their force managed to stop the Nationalist advance on the southwest of Lichuan, further operations ended in failure: when the 24th division of the Chinese Red Army attempted to take Xiaoshi [zh] on 9 October 1933, not only did the city remain firmly in Nationalist hands, but the communists were forced to withdraw over the next few days while suffering heavy casualties. Witnessing this success, Chiang Kai-shek issued a new order on 17 October 1933, requiring troops to follow the principle of tactical defense, strategic offense in order to perfect his German advisers' blockhouse strategy. In contrast, the Communist leadership refused to adjust their tactics and stubbornly continued futile attacks on Kuomintang blockhouses. Between September 25, 1933, and mid-November 1933, the Chinese Red Army failed to achieve any major victories and suffered serious losses, not only in battle but from defection and disease.

Second phase

On 11 December 1933, a total of eight columns of Kuomintang troops ventured out of their fortifications and started the second offensive. The Communist leadership decided to face the numerically and technically superior Nationalist army in open battle. As a result, Communist forces suffered badly. By the end of January 1934, warlord forces began to participate, and men from the Fujian warlord armies struck from the east in coordination with Nationalists from the north and south.

Third phase

On April 10, 1934, eleven divisions of the National Revolutionary Army began their attack on Guangchang, and the communists decided to concentrate a total of nine divisions in its defense. Due to overwhelming Nationalist superiority, Communist strongholds at Ganzhu, Daluo Mountain (大罗山) and Yanfuzhang (延福嶂) fell. On the dawn of 19 April 1934, the Communists launched a counterattack against the Nationalist force at the Daluo Mountain, only to be driven off. On 27 April 1934, the Nationalists launched their final assault on Guangchang, succeeding in taking it by the evening and inflicting over 5,500 casualties on its Communist defenders. Remnants of the shattered Communist defense fled to the south and west under the cover of darkness.

Final phase

The three-man committee of the communist leadership divided their force into six different groups in early July 1934. On 5 August 1934, nine Nationalist divisions ventured out of their forts, taking areas north of Yiqian [zh] and adjacent regions. By the late September 1934, the Chinese Soviet Republic was left with only Ruijin, Huichang, Xingguo, Ningdu, Shicheng, Ninghua and Changting.

It was at this point that Zhou Enlai's spy network within Chiang Kai-shek's headquarters in Nanchang passed intelligence to the Communists revealing that Chiang was massing for a final push. The decision was made to abandon the Jiangxi Soviet, resulting in the beginning of the Long March. As a result of the Communist failure to defeat the fifth encirclement, the largest Communist base in China was lost.

Conclusion

Communist failures were mainly due to the policies of the Communist leadership:

• The fifth encirclement campaign was a war of attrition, and the Communists were unable to replace lost troops and material. Unlike Mao Zedong, the new leadership believed the era of guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare was over, and tried to engage in regular warfare.
• Hostility towards all Nationalist troops. Under Mao's direction, warlord forces had been distinguished from Central Army units of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government, sometimes allowing for a tenuous neutrality with the warlords. As a result, only 50,000 of Chiang Kai-shek's own troops were available in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and - to a great degree - 4th encirclement campaigns. When the new leadership took over, all Nationalist troops and those fighting with them were regarded as enemies of equal danger. Instead of having to fight an enemy force much smaller than it was on paper, the Communists had to fight a much larger enemy.
• Static defense: in addition to head-on clashes, the Red Army was also ordered to emulate the Nationalist static defense. Unlike the Nationalist's concrete fortifications, which were immune to virtually all Communist bombardments, Communist bunkers were built with wood and mud and were susceptible not only to Nationalist artillery but even to heavy rain and wind. These hastily, and badly constructed, bunkers only served to aid the Nationalists by becoming death traps for Communist defenders.
• Poor use of intelligence. The Communist leadership lacked serious interest in intelligence collection or use. While the Communists had already broken the Nationalist codes in the previous Counter encirclement campaigns, greatly helping in earlier successes, the new leadership did not trust the cryptography enough to make or alter plans according to new intelligence. This problem continued until the Long March, when Mao finally returned to power and began utilizing both cryptographic and human intelligence collection as a major part of their campaigns.
• Increased nationalist strength. In previous campaigns, Nationalist forces had insufficient troops to occupy newly conquered regions or act as rearguards, so soldiers were only stationed in urban areas or fixed fortifications. Large gaps were left between these garrisons, which Communists were able to use to harry defences and penetrate deep into the heart of Nationalist-controlled regions. During the fifth encirclement campaign, Chiang had ten times the number of troops at his disposal than in previous campaigns, with a total of half a million. As a result, the encirclement was far more effective, with gaps between garrisons eliminated and conquered regions more easily consolidated.