The Galwan River flows from the disputed Aksai Chin area administered by China to the Union Territory of Ladakh, India. It originates near the caravan campsite Samzungling on the eastern side of the Karakoram range and flows west to join the Shyok River. The point of confluence is 102 km south of Daulat Beg Oldi. Shyok River itself is a tributary of the Indus River, making Galwan a part of the Indus River system.
The narrow valley of the Galwan River as it flows through the Karakoram mountains has been a flashpoint between China and India in their border dispute. In 1962, a forward post set up by India in the upper reaches of the Galwan Valley caused an "apogee of tension" between the two countries. China attacked and eliminated the post in the 1962 war, reaching its 1960 claim line. In 2020, China attempted to advance further in the Galwan Valley,[1][2][3] leading to a bloody clash on 16 June 2020.
Etymology
The river is named after Ghulam Rasool Galwan (1878–1925), a Ladakhi explorer and caravan manager of Kashmiri descent, who accompanied numerous expeditions of European explorers. The river appears with the Galwan name in Survey of India maps from 1940 onwards.[4]
(It was earlier unlabelled.)
Folklore holds that in the 1890s, Galwan was part of a British expedition team exploring north of the Chang Chenmo valley, and when the team got caught in a storm Galwan found a way out through the Galwan valley. Harish Kapadia notes that this is one of the rare instances where a major geographical feature was named after a native explorer.[5][6][a]
Geography
Galwan River basin in the Karakoram mountains
45km 30miles
Changchenmo
Kugrang
Changlung
Karakash River
Pangtung La
Dehra Kompas
Galwan Kangri
Shyok River
Galwan River
Samzungling
Source of Galwan
Galwan River in Eastern Ladakh
The Galwan river runs across the entire width of the Karakoram range at this location, for about 30 miles (48 km), where it cuts deep gorges along with its numerous tributaries.[9] At the eastern edge of this 30 mile range, marked by the Samzungling camping ground, the main channel of the Galwan river runs north–south, but several other streams join it as well. To the east of Samzungling, the mountains resemble an elevated plateau, which gradually slopes down to the Lingzi Tang Plains in the east. To the west of Samzungling lie numerous mountains of the Karakoram range, the majority of which are drained by the Galwan river through a multitude of tributaries.
At the northeastern edge of the Galwan River basin, the mountains form a watershed, sending some of their waters into the Karakash River basin. The watershed between the two river basins is difficult to discern, as noted by British cartographers.
To the south of the Galwan river, the Karakoram range divides into two branches, one that lies between the Kugrang and Changlung rivers (both tributaries of Chang Chenmo), and the other to the east of Changlung.[10]
Travel routes
Changchenmo routes through Aksai Chin, showing a western route through Samzungling and an eastern route through Nischu
The narrow gorge of the Galwan river prohibited human movement, and there is no evidence of the valley having been used as a travel route. Samzunling however formed an important halting point of a north–south caravan route (the westernmost "Changchenmo route") to the east of Karakoram range. One reaches Samzungling from the Changchenmo valley by following the channel of the Changlung river and crossing over to the Galwan river basin via the Changlung Pangtung La[b][11] Beyond Samzungling, one follows the Galwan channel to one of its sources, after which the Lingzi Tang plain is entered. The next halting point on the caravan route is Dehra Kompas.[13] Thus the upper Galwan Valley formed a key north–south communication link between the Chang Chenmo valley and the Karakash River basin.[14]
In modern times, the Chinese Wen Jia Road (温加线) traverses this route up to the Galwan River.[15] The eastern route through Nischu now carries the Tiankong Highway (Tianwendian–Kongka highway) and a new Galwan Highway links the two.[16]
Sino-Indian border dispute
Ladakh border claimed by the Republic of China in a 1947 map.[c]Chinese claim lines in the Galwan valley: 1956 claim line in green, 1960 claim line shown as a dark brown and orange double line. The purple line, drawn by linking the Chinese posts present in September 1992, shows two posts in the Galwan valley: Samzungling and 'Day 9'.[d][e]
There is no evidence of Qing China making any claims on the Aksai Chin plateau.[17] The Republic of China (1912–1949), having faced a revolution in Tibet in 1911, apparently made secret plans to acquire Aksai Chin plateau in order to create a road link between Xinjiang and Tibet. These plans began to get manifested in public maps only towards the end of its rule.[18]
While the Republican Chinese claims included the Aksai Chin proper, they stopped at the foot of the Karakoram mountains, leaving all the rivers that flow into the Shyok River within India. (See map.) Communist China also published the "Big Map of the People's Republic of China" in 1956 with a similar boundary, now called the 1956 claim line. In the Galwan Valley, this line just skirted the Samzungling campsite, leaving the rest of the valley within India.[19][20]
However, in 1960 China advanced its claim line to the western end of the Galwan river, running along the crest of the mountain ridge adjoining the Shyok river valley.[20] The Chinese said little by way of justification for this advancement other than to claim that it was their "traditional customary boundary" which was allegedly formed through a "long historical process". They claimed that the line was altered in the recent past only due to "British imperialism".[f][21][22][23]
Meanwhile, India continued to claim the entire Aksai Chin plateau.
The man moved his head left and right. "They did allow it [the airdrops]... When they allowed it, we supposed it was all part of the cold war and that it would go on like that. And it did go on. You remember, Highness, we established the post in July so that we might cut the supply line to a new Chinese post there on the Galwan. You remember, for it was printed in the news, that we stood firm in spite of all their jeers and threats. They came to within fifteen yards of our post and we said we would shoot if they came nearer. They halted then, and our two governments exchanged notes. They withdrew. Again we supposed that this was all part of the cold war. ... "
These claims and counterclaims led to a military standoff in the Galwan River valley in 1962.
The Indian Intelligence Bureau proposed in September 1961 that the Galwan Valley should be patrolled and posts established up in the valley because it was strategically connected to the Shyok Valley.[25] Nehru supported the proposal and the CGS[g]B. M. Kaul ordered the setting up of a forward post. However, the terrain of the valley proved too difficult for the troops to proceed up the valley.[26] In April 1962, Kaul ordered that a southern route should be tried. By this time, the Chinese had announced that they were resuming patrols and it was also learnt that they had established a post at Samzungling. The Western Command's objections that the establishment of an Indian post would be a provocative act were overruled by the high command.[27]
A platoon of Indian Gorkha troops set out from Hot Springs in the Chang Chenmo Valley, and, by 5 July, arrived at the upper reaches of the Galwan Valley.[h] They established a post on a ridge overlooking the valley from the south, on the bank of a tributary that China calls "Shimengou".[i][30]
The post ended up cutting the lines of communication to a Chinese post downstream along the Galwan River, called 'Day 9'.[31] The Chinese interpreted it as a premeditated attack on their post, and surrounded the Indian post, coming within 100 yards of it.[j]
The Indian government warned China of "grave consequences" and informed them that India was determined to hold the post at all costs. The post remained surrounded for four months and was supplied by helicopters.[33][34]
The Central Intelligence Agency opined that the presence of the post temporarily blocked any further movement of the Chinese troops down the Galwan Valley.[35]
Scholar Taylor Fravel states that the standoff marked the "apogee of tension" for China's leaders.[36]
A regimental level headquarters was organised under the chief of staff of the 10th Regiment to assume control of the Chinese forces in the Galwan region. Both Chairman Mao Zedong and the Chinese government were monitoring the situation at the highest level. Termed 'armed coexistence', detailed guidance was issued to the troops on the ground:[37]
Firstly, follow the principle of not firing the first bullet; adopt the measure of 'you encircle me, I encircle you'; 'you cut me off, I cut you off'. Secondly, If Indian forces attack us, warn them, if warning is ineffective time and again, then carry out self defence. While laying siege of Indian forces, try and not to kill them; leave a gap for Indian forces to retreat... If Indian troops do not withdraw, then stalemate them.[37]
The commanders at the front were ordered to report any unexpected situation arising, and ask for instructions without taking initiative on their own accord.[37]
Nevertheless, sporadic firing incidents occurred throughout the western front. At Galwan Valley itself, fire was exchanged on 2 September.[38] As a result of the standoff, the Chinese were compelled to withdraw some of the posts in the Galwan Valley because they could not be supplied. Indian leaders saw this as a sign of success for their forward policy.[39]
1962 war
The Colombo proposals for truce
By the time the Sino-Indian War started on 20 October 1962, the Indian post had been reinforced by a company of troops. The Chinese PLA bombarded it with heavy shelling and employed a battalion to attack it. The garrison suffered 33 killed and several wounded, while the company commander and several others were taken prisoner.[33][34] By the end of the war, China is said to have reached its 1960 claim line.[20] There is however no evidence that the Chinese troops trekked through the Galwan Valley to reach their claim line.[k]
The elimination of the sole Indian post in the Galwan Valley (near the tributary called Shimengou) implied that they had control up to their claim line. The Indian post at the confluence of Galwan with the Shyok River was intact throughout the war and the Chinese never made any contact with it.[40]
The Chinese later claimed, implicitly, via a map annexed to a 1962 letter from then Chinese premier Zhou Enlai to heads of certain Afro-Asian nations, that they had reached the confluence of Galwan with the Shyok River.[l] However, the Afro-Asian nations, in their Colombo proposals for truce between China and India, drew the line very close to China's 1960 claim line. The Chinese still persist with the line on their maps, calling it the "Line of Actual Control of 1959".[m]
Infrastructure
The Chinese Galwan Highway
Prior to the 1962 war, China had already constructed a road linking its bases at Kongka Pass and Heweitan. There was also a feeder road leading to the Samzungling area and covering the southern tributaries such as Shimengou.[43]
Following the war, there was no further activity in the Galwan Valley from either India or China, till about 2003. Between 2003 and 2008, China embarked on a large-scale infrastructure development exercise in the run-up to the Beijing Olympics.[44] Starting in 2010, the Aksai Chin Road (G219) was repaved at a cost of $476 million.[45]
Along with it, numerous improvements to the border infrastructure within Aksai Chin also became visible.[46]
The existing road to the Heweitan military base was improved and extended under a new name "Tiankong Highway". The feeder road into Galwan Valley was also upgraded to a paved all-weather road and renamed the "Galwan Highway" (Chinese: 加勒万公路; pinyin: Jiā lè wàn gōnglù).
India also commissioned a road link to Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) at its northern frontier in 2001, scheduled to be completed by 2012. The road would start from the Shyok village and run along the western bank of the Shyok River and then move on to Depsang Plains near Murgo. The initial road did not meet the all-weather requirement, and it had to be rebuilt on an improved alignment later. The road was eventually completed in 2019 and named the Darbuk–Shyok–DBO Road (DS-DBO Road).[47]
India also built a military outpost near the confluence of Galwan with the Shyok River, called 'KM 120'. It is said to have been a source of discomfort to China.[48]
The site of Galwan clash. The red line is the LAC marked by the US Office of Geographer.
China is said to have initiated the construction of a large number of "supporting facilities" in the Galwan Valley in September 2019.[50]
These would include dams, bridges, camping grounds and power lines along the existing Galwan Highway, as well as an effort to extend the highway further towards the Line of Actual Control.
In April 2020, India started its own construction efforts to build a feeder road off the DS-DBO Road, along the last 4–5 km stretch of Galwan Valley on its side of the LAC. According to Zhao Lijian, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, Indian forces started "unilaterally" building roads and bridges in the "Galwan region". They are said to have persisted with their efforts despite repeated protests from China, which allegedly "intensified cross-border troubles".[51]
The Indian Army chief dismissed the complaints, saying, "There is no reason for anyone to object. They are doing development on their side, we are doing development on our side."[52][53]
The problem for China was that its own roadway was still quite far from the LAC.[54]
On 5 May 2020, China initiated a standoff by deploying troops in tented posts all along the Galwan Valley.[55][56]
The Chinese also brought in heavy vehicles and monitoring equipment, presumably in an effort to accelerate the road construction.[57]
And the Chinese government mouthpiece Global Times initiated a high-pitched rhetoric.[58]
India responded by moving its own troops to the area in equal measure.[59]
The Chinese eventually set up a post at a 90-degree bend in the river, close to the official LAC, which the Indians regarded as Indian territory and a patrol point (PP-14). The bend was to eventually become the new border.[60]
To create a roadway through the narrow valley, the Chinese bulldozers dug out earth from the cliff sides, and used it to dredge the river bed. The river was constrained to flow in a narrow channel so that the rest of the river bed could be used for traffic and encampments.[61][62]
Eventually, the standoff led to a violent clash on 15 June near PP-14 in Galwan Valley. Twenty Indian Army soldiers and an unknown number of Chinese soldiers were killed.[63][64]
The causes of the clash remain unclear, but there had been reports, starting 10 June, of a "limited pull-back" agreed by the two sides by 1 to 2 kilometres from the confrontation site.[65]
According to a detailed report published by India Today the Chinese had reneged on the agreement and reinstated a post at PP-14, which led to a series of brawls on 15 June, lasting till midnight and causing deaths on both sides.[66][n]
A US Congressional review alleged that the Chinese government had planned the clash including its potential for fatalities.[69]
Following the clash, both the sides resumed their construction activity. India completed the contested bridge on the Galwan River by 19 June.[70]
China extended its road till India's PP-14 by 26 June, in addition to erecting a full-blown post at the location. The Indians made no attempt to dismantle it a second time.[71]
The final deescalation happened in stages starting 6 July.[72]
With China's occupation of PP-14, the effective LAC in the Galwan Valley has shifted by about one kilometre in China's favour.[73][67]
In popular culture
The web series 1962: The War in the Hills is inspired by the events that took place in the Galwan Valley during the 1962 war.[74]
^The folklore dates the event to 1892–93 when Galwan accompanied an expedition of Lord Dunmore.[7] This is almost certainly incorrect as Lord Dunmore did not travel through this region.[8] The identity of the 1899 expedition is unknown.
^Also called Pangtung La.[11] The term "Chunglang Pass" is also used, but best avoided due to confusion with multiple "Changlung passes". The Gazetteer of Kashmir and Ladak lists two passes to the east of Pangtung La: Changlung Burma La and Changlung Yokma La.[12] China uses anotherr pass to the west for its Wenjia Road.
^Even though the map is of very low resolution, it is apparent that the Chip Chap River, a headwater of the Shyok River is shown entirely within Ladakh. Qaratagh-su, a stream that flows down from the Qaratagh Pass and joins the Karakash River is shown as the source of Karakash. Karackattu, The Corrosive Compromise (2020, Figure 1) gives more detailed maps showing Samzungling and Galwan river as part of Ladakh.
^Map by the US Army Headquarters in 1962. In addition to the two claim lines, the blue line indicates the position in 1959, the purple line that in September 1962 prior to the Sino-Indian War, and the orange line, which coincides with the dark brown line, the position the end of the war. The dotted lines bound a 20-km demilitarisation zone proposed by China after the war.
^The purple line's intersection with the Galwan valley indicates the location of a Chinese 'Day 9' post, whose domination by an Indian post on higher ground caused an "apogee of tension".
^But the military justification for the advancement is not hard to see. The 1956 claim line ran along the watershed dividing the Shyok River basin and the Lingzitang lake basin. It conceded the strategic higher ground of the Karakoram Range to India. The 1960 claim line advanced it to the Karakoram ridge line despite the fact that it did not form a dividing line of watersheds.
^Chief of the General Staff, a senior "staff" appointment. General Kaul had more power than is normally applicable to this role because he had the trust of Nehru.
^The Indian sources state that it took them a month to reach the location,[28] which suggests that the normal travel route via the Changlung river valley might have been invested by Chinese troops. The location of the post is on the bank of a southern tributary of Galwan, called "Shimengou" by the Chinese is to the west of Changlung valley.
^China provided the coordinates of the post as "34 degrees 37 minutes 30 seconds north, 78 degrees 35 minutes 30 seconds east" (34°37′30″N78°35′30″E / 34.625°N 78.5917°E / 34.625; 78.5917) and described it as "six kilometres inside Chinese territory in the Galwan Valley area".[29]
^The Economist reported that the Chinese troops came within 15 yards of the post. The "remarkable coolness of the junior Gurkha officer" is said to have persuaded them to pull back.[32]
^In the midst of the 2020 China-India skirmishes, the Chinese foreign ministry claimed that “the Galwan Valley is located on the Chinese side of the LAC in the western section of the Sino-Indian border".[41] The Indian external affairs ministry responded that such "exaggerated and untenable claims" were not acceptable.[42]
^According to the Indian version of the events, a small contingent of Indian troops led by a colonel went to PP-14 to verify that the Chinese had withdrawn as per agreement. Having found troops there, they challenged it leading to a brawl.[67] The Chinese version says that the clash occurred because the Indian troops had crossed the LAC and acted in an indisciplined way.[68]
References
^Ajai Shukla, A new and worrying chapter: Chinese intrusions in Ladakh gather paceArchived 3 March 2021 at the Wayback Machine, Business Standard, 23 May 2020: "That means that, in sending thousands of PLA troops three-to-four kilometres into the Galwan Valley, China has violated its own claim line and occupied territory that Beijing itself has traditionally acknowledged to be Indian.... Indian troops in the area were taken by surprise when a large Chinese force crossed the LAC into the Galwan area in late April."
^Johri, Chinese Invasion of Ladakh (1969), p. 106: "The peculiarity of the Galwan theatre was that the main Karakoram Range in this region is better defined than in the Northern Sector. It is cut by the Galwan river at a place about 30 miles to the east of the Shyok-Galwan river junction."
^Johri, Chinese Invasion of Ladakh (1969), p. 106: "In the south it divides itself into two ranges. One separates the Kugrang river from the Changlung and the other runs along the left bank of the latter and is also called the Nischu Mountains. The first is named Karakoram I and the second Karakoram II."
^Fisher, Rose & Huttenback, Himalayan Battleground (1963), p. 117: "The other main route ran through Shamal Lungpa and Samzung Ling [Samzungling] to Dehra Compas, along the upper valley of the Qara Qash River to Qizil Jilga and Chungtosh, through the Qara Tagh Pass and the Chibra valley to Malikshah and Shahidulla."
^Hudson, Aksai Chin (1963), p. 15: "There is no evidence that under the Ch'ing dynasty China ever attempted to come further south than this [a pillar 64 miles south of the Suget Pass]. In other words, they accepted the Kuen Lun range as the frontier, and both Kashmir and the Government of India were equally willing to accept it..."
^Hudson, Aksai Chin (1963), pp. 17–18: "As a part of India, it [Aksai Chin] formed an awkward salient projecting between Sinkiang and Tibet; to get rid of this salient must be an objective of Chinese policy whenever opportunity might offer".
^Fisher, Rose & Huttenback, Himalayan Battleground (1963), p. 103: 'However, the "Big Map of the People's Republic of China" published in 1956, reverted to the alignment shown on the 1947 Kuomintang map. It is important to note that Chou En-lai, in a letter of December 17, 1959, stated that the 1956 map "correctly shows the traditional boundary between the two countries in this sector."'
^Fisher, Rose & Huttenback, Himalayan Battleground (1963), pp. 7–8: "When questioned on the divergence between the two maps, Chen Yi, the Chinese Foreign Minister, made the demonstrably absurd assertion that the boundaries as marked on both maps were equally valid. There is only one interpretation that could make this statement meaningful: this was an implied threat to produce another map claiming additional Indian territory if New Delhi continued in its stubborn refusal to cede Aksai Chin."
^Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India (2010), p. 266: "Beijing insisted that there was no disparity between its maps of 1956 and 1960, a claim that only served to reinforce Delhi’s opinion that the Chinese were untrustworthy. By the summer of 1960 meaningful diplomacy juddered to a halt."
^Van Eekelen, Indian Foreign Policy and the Border Dispute (1967), pp. 101–102: "The Chinese officials maintained ... [the] traditional customary line, reflected in their map, was formed gradually through a long historical process, mainly by the extent up to which each side had exercised administrative jurisdiction;... Without admitting any inconsistency they also argued that the line of actual control differed from the traditional customary line because of British imperialism and the recent pushing forward of India. These factors apparently could not contribute to the continuous process of change."
^Buck, Pearl S. (1970), Mandala, New York: The John Day Company, p. 115 – via archive.org
^Mullik, The Chinese Betrayal (1971), p. 311: "In September, 1961, we prepared another note on the problems of frontier security and suggested that in Northern Ladakh we should reconnoitre the Galwan River Valley and open posts as far eastward as possible, because this valley was connected with the Shyok valley through which the Shyok River ran and finally joined the Indus in Pakistan-held territory. If the Chinese commanded the Galwan valley, it would give them easy access to Skardu, Gilgit, etc. and our routes to Murgo, Daulat Beg Oldi, Panamik would be cut."
^Kler, Unsung Battles of 1962 (1995), pp. 110–111: He [General Daulet Singh] concluded that, in the circumstances, no Indian post could be established at Samzungling but Kaul overruled him. "The Galwan river was an axis along which the Chinese can make a substantial advance", he replied, and therefore they must be forestalled.'
^Shishir Gupta, The Himalayan Face-off (2014), Chapter 3: "In 2003, China initiated a major highway renovation project, which led to an upgrading of 51,000 km of roads in Tibet by the Beijing Olympics in 2008.... According to official Indian estimates, the road development undertaken by Beijing has given it the capability to move 11,500 tonnes per day whereas only 200 tonnes per day are required to sustain major military operations for sustained periods."
^India, Ministry of External Affairs, ed. (1962), Report of the Officials of the Governments of India and the People's Republic of China on the Boundary Question, Government of India Press, Chinese Report, Part 1Archived 13 October 2020 at the Wayback Machine, pp. 4–5
The location and terrain features of this traditional customary boundary line are now described as follows in three sectors, western, middle and eastern. ... [From the Chip Chap river] It then turns south-east along the mountain ridge and passes through peak 6,845 (approximately 78° 12' E, 34° 57' N) and peak 6,598 (approximately 78° 13' E, 34° 54' N). From peak 6,598 it runs along the mountain ridge southwards until it crosses the Galwan River at approximately 78° 13' E, 34° 46' N.
^加勒万河谷冲突我军因何占上风 这三点因素是关键Archived 5 June 2021 at the Wayback Machine (Three factors are the key to the conflict in the Kalwan Valley: why our army has the upper hand), news.sina.com, 21 June 2020. Machine-translated: 'In fact, as early as September last year, my country initiated the construction of a large number of supporting facilities for the river valley area, and the cross-border provocation by the Indian army did not affect the progress of Chinese highways. It is foreseeable that the People’s Liberation Army will follow up the same "infrastructure construction" as in the Donglang area to ensure that we can have permanent outposts and a better patrol environment in the highlands of the Kalwan River valley, and prevent the Indian army from reusing better geography.'
^Dongpo, 中国公布加勒万河谷流血冲突全过程：印度早前同意撤人拆越界建筑Archived 5 June 2021 at the Wayback Machine (China Announces the Whole Process of the Bleeding Conflict in the Calvin Valley), Deutsche Welle (Chinese), 20 June 2020. Machine-translated:
"Since April this year, the Indian border defense forces have unilaterally continued to build roads, bridges and other facilities in the Galle Valley region. China has repeatedly made representations and protests on this, but the Indian side has intensified cross-border troubles."
^Sushant Singh, India builds road north of Ladakh lake, China warns of ‘necessary counter-measures’Archived 28 May 2020 at the Wayback Machine, The Indian Express, 21 May 2020. "The Chinese, sources said, have objected to construction of a new road which branches off the Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie (DSDBO) road along the riverbank towards the LAC.... “Galwan is not a disputed area between India and China, unlike Pangong Tso. Both sides agree on the LAC and patrol accordingly. There was no transgression by Chinese patrols in the area in the past two years. The issue is the construction of the road, which is well inside our territory, and, therefore, their objection is hard to comprehend,” a source said."
^Henry Boyd, Meia Nouwens, Understanding the military build-up on the China–India borderArchived 22 June 2020 at the Wayback Machine, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 18 June 2020. "There is little indication that this detachment is equipped with armour or artillery, and the planned Chinese road along the valley remains unfinished, complicating the PLA’s ability to maintain a more substantial presence in this area for now."
^Manu Pubby, Troops rushed to Galwan amid Chinese buildupArchived 20 April 2021 at the Wayback Machine, The Economic Times, 19 May 2020. ProQuest2404087053.
'Titled "Chinese troops tighten control in Galwan Valley after India trespasses Chinese territory", the article says India has built defensive fortifications and obstacles to "unilaterally change the current border control situation".'
^Vinayak Bhat, How China channelled Galwan river to claim territoryArchived 7 March 2021 at the Wayback Machine, India Today, 21 June 2020.
"The Chinese soon realised that there is no space for deployment of a large force along this waterway. Chinese engineers then thought of a unique method of claiming-- by canalising the Galwan river deeper with dozers and JCBs in order to restrict its size."
^Stephen Hutcheon; Mark Doman; Alex Palmer (10 July 2020). "High stakes in a Himalayan hotspot". ABC News (Australia). Archived from the original on 23 February 2021. Retrieved 25 February 2021.
"Zooming in, you can see excavators at work. One is transferring earth from the mountain side. Another is working on the edge of the river bank. The construction teams also appear to have built several crossings over the river. And the width of the bank suggests that it can easily accommodate a two-lane road. Another 1.3km upstream there is a larger Chinese camp."
^Brad Lendon, Maneeva Suri, Satellite images show buildup at site of deadly India-China border clashArchived 12 February 2021 at the Wayback Machine, CNN, 26 June 2020.
"[Nathan] Ruser said his analysis of satellite photos showed that since May the number of Chinese troops and vehicles within a kilometer of the border had gone from three to 46 while on the Indian side that number had decreased from 84 to 17."
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