Global policeman (or world police[1]) is an informal term for a superpower which seeks or claims the right to intervene in other sovereign states. It has been used, firstly for the United Kingdom and, since 1945, for the United States,[2][3] though it has been suggested that China has been seeking to take over the role in the 21st century.[4][better source needed]

The two terms hegemon and global policeman are not identical in meaning. The former term defines capacity for dominant control anywhere on earth, whereas the latter may also include small or large areas outside control, along with monitoring and attempted enforcements, but does not define any level of effectiveness.

In international law

Further information: Westphalian sovereignty

No formal recognition of this position exists. Theoretically, in international law, all nations are equal; "par in parem non habet imperium", no authority between equals, is the principle applied, although, in reality some states are relatively more powerful than others. States are "immortal" and cannot be indicted.[5]

Comparison with state policing

Within states, law restrains and limits power; between states, the opposite is true.[6]

The Peelian principles of policing include: the duty to prevent crime, keep the peace and uphold the law, with the consent of the public, and with minimal use of force and restraint; to act impartially; and not to usurp the powers of the judiciary.[7] The latter standard requires a presumption of innocence. Candidates for police recruitment and promotion are appointed on merit, whereas a 'global policeman' is self-appointed faute de mieux.

Within states, a monopoly on violence is the norm; the police may carry weapons, but few others do so (the US is an exception, prompting Charles Lane to ask if it is 'really a state'[8]) Internationally, a 'global policeman' is but one heavily armed state among two hundred others.

To confer the role of 'global policeman' on any self-interested, expansionary state implies a conflict of interest. States wage war with maximum force; engage in arms sales; form alliances and thus lack impartiality.[9]

History

The UK made efforts to end the slave trade through the West Africa Squadron.[10] In 1827, Britain, jointly with France and Russia, intervened on the side of Greek independence, destroying the Turkish fleet at the Battle of Navarino. In 1854, Britain, jointly with France, prevented Russia from destroying the Ottoman Empire. Russia had to withdraw from Moldavia and Wallachia, and Sevastopol was besieged in the Crimean war.

From 1914–1945 no one state was hegemonic, with Britain's power decreasing, but still very much a leading, world role, and with rising powers such as the United States, the Empire of Japan, and later Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. In an era of multipolarity and diffused responsibility, fascist dictators arose and Europe sank into two world wars. According to Richard J Evans, "The authoritarian German challenge to democratic Britain then, is comparable to the authoritarian Chinese challenge to democratic America now.".[11]

Between the years 1945 and 1990, the world trade was dominated by the Soviet Union and the United States in what was known to be the Cold War.

The Truman Doctrine of 1947 promised assistance to anti-communist allies. "The right of neutrality was abolished... it was an era of aggressive peacetime policy which marked the beginning of America's role as global policeman."[12] Since the end of the Cold War "The enemy is terrorism not communism".[12] But after a disastrous intervention in Somalia in 1993, the US was reluctant to engage in humanitarian intervention in Bosnia[13] and Rwanda.[14]

The US-led Invasion of Iraq, officially a policing mission to find Weapons of Mass Destruction, was, according to some, an illegal cover for ulterior, unethical motives: the need to secure US regional bases, oil supplies, and the loyalty of key allies.[15][16]

Since then, serious doubts have been raised about the validity of US overseas intervention and destabilization in Iraq, Libya and Syria.[17][18] As the 21st century progresses, the morality of global policing itself is increasingly in question, with the inevitable loss of self-determination by nations in which intervention occurs.[19] Furthermore, with the advent of non-state threats to global security, prior legal justifications such as general "laws of war" are of questionable jurisdiction.

Modelski's long cycles theory

George Modelski defined global order as a 'management network centred on a lead unit and contenders for leadership, (pursuing) collective action at the global level'.[20] The system is allegedly cyclical. Each cycle is about 100 years' duration and a new hegemonic power appears each time:

  1. Portugal 1492–1580; in the Age of Discovery
  2. The Netherlands 1580–1688; beginning with the Eighty Years' War, 1579–1588
  3. United Kingdom (1) 1688–1792; beginning with the wars of Louis XVI
  4. United Kingdom (2) 1792–1914; beginning with the French Revolution and Napoleonic wars
  5. The United States 1914 to (predicted) 2030; beginning with World War I and two.[21]

Each cycle has four phases:

  1. Global war, which a) involves almost all global powers, b) is 'characteristically naval'[22] c) is caused by a system breakdown, d) is extremely lethal, e) results in a new global leader, capable of tackling global problems.[23] The war is a 'decision process' analogous to a national election.[24] The Thirty Years War, though lasting and destructive, was not a 'global war'[25]
  2. World Power, which lasts for 'about one generation'.[26] The new incumbent power 'prioritises global problems', mobilises a coalition, is decisive and innovative.[27] Pre-modern communities become dependent on the hegemonic power[28]
  3. Delegitimation. This phase can last for 20–27 years; the hegemonic power falters, as rival powers assert new nationalistic policies.[29]
  4. Deconcentration. The hegemony's problem-solving capacity declines. It yields to a multipolar order of warring rivals. Pre-modern communities become less dependent.[30] A challenger appears (successively, Spain, France, France, Germany, and the USSR)[21] and a new global war ensues.

The hegemonic nations tend to have: 'insular geography'; a stable, open society; a strong economy; strategic organisation, and strong political parties. By contrast, the 'challenger' nations have: closed systems; absolute rulers; domestic instability; and continental geographic locations.[31]

The long cycle system is repetitive, but also evolutionary. According to Modelski, it originated in about 1493 through a) the decline of Venetian naval power, b) Chinese abandonment of naval exploration, and c) discovery of sea routes to India and the Americas.[32] It has developed in parallel with the growth of the nation-state, political parties, command of the sea, and 'dependency of pre-modern communities'.[33] The system is flawed, lacking in coherence, solidarity, and capacity to address the North-South divide.[34] Modelski speculates that US deconcentration might be replaced by a power based in the 'Pacific rim' or by an explicit coalition of nations, as 'co-operation is urgently required in respect of nuclear weapons'.[35]

Modelski 'dismisses the idea that international relations are anarchic'. His research, influenced by Immanuel Wallerstein, was 'measured in decades... a major achievement' says Peter J. Taylor.[36]

See also

References

  1. ^ "Team America, World Police: The Need for Accountability". Harvard International Review. 3 September 2020. Retrieved 12 May 2022.
  2. ^ Linda Colley, 'Britain and the US once ran the world. Now they're all at sea', The Guardian, 14 June 2017.
  3. ^ Gideon Rachman, 'The world would miss the American policeman', Financial Times, 2 September 2013.
  4. ^ Jonas Parello-Plesner and Parag Khanna, 'Stop fretting about Beijing as a global policeman', Financial Times, 28 December 2011.
  5. ^ Martin Wight, Power Politics (Wight book), 1978, p 98- 109
  6. ^ Martin Wight, Power Politics, 1978 , p 102
  7. ^ Charles Reith, A new study of police history, Oliver and Boyd, 1956, appendix.
  8. ^ 'In the US, who has the monopoly on force?', Washington Post, 13 July 2016
  9. ^ Daniel L Davis, 'What the 'world police' analogy gets wrong,' The National Interest, 2 October 2016
  10. ^ http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk>pdf>britain-and-the-trade.pdf
  11. ^ 'Before the first world war: what can 1914 tell us about 2014?' New Statesman, 23 January 2014
  12. ^ a b Wendy McElroy, 'How America became the World's Policeman', Independent Institute, 20 March 2015
  13. ^ Connor Murphy, 'World Police Force?' psu.edu, 31 October 2013
  14. ^ Scott Baldauf, 'Why the US didn't intervene in the Rwandan massacre', Christian Science Monitor 7 April 2009.
  15. ^ Richard Norton-Taylor, 'Top judge: US and UK acted as vigilantes in Iraq invasion, Guardian, 17 November 2008
  16. ^ David Usborne, 'WMD just an excuse for war, admits Wolfowitz', Independent, 29 May 2003
  17. ^ Tariq Ali, 'America's selective vigilantism will make as many enemies as friends', The Guardian, 6 September 2011
  18. ^ Nathan Gardels and Hans Blix, 'America is not the world's policeman – in Syria or Iraq', Christian Science Monitor, 27 August 2013
  19. ^ Daniel L Davis, 'What the World Police Analogy gets wrong', The National Interest, 2 October 2016
  20. ^ George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics, University of Washington, 1987, p8
  21. ^ a b George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics, University of Washington, 1987, p40
  22. ^ George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics, University of Washington, 1987, p101
  23. ^ George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics, University of Washington, 1987, p43-6
  24. ^ George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics, University of Washington, 1987, p36-7
  25. ^ George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics, University of Washington, 1987, p45
  26. ^ George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics, University of Washington, 1987, p157
  27. ^ George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics, University of Washington, 1987, p14, 83, 93
  28. ^ George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics, University of Washington, 1987, chapter 8
  29. ^ George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics, University of Washington, 1987, p40, p119
  30. ^ George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics, University of Washington, 1987, p119-20, p207
  31. ^ George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics, University of Washington, 1987, p90, p220-5, chapter 7
  32. ^ George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics, University of Washington, 1987, p41-3, p95
  33. ^ George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics, University of Washington, 1987, chapters 6, 7, 8; p153
  34. ^ George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics, University of Washington, 1987, p201
  35. ^ George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics, University of Washington, 1987, p41-3, p230-33
  36. ^ Book reviews : Modelski, G. 1987: Long cycles in world politics. London: Macmillan. 244 pp. £29.50 cloth – Peter J. Taylor, 1989 (sagepub.com)

Further reading

Categories