The Maletti Group(Italian: Raggruppamento Maletti) was an ad hocmechanised unit formed by the ItalianRoyal Army (Regio Esercito) in Italian North Africa (Africa Settentrionale Italiana, ASI), during the initial stages of the Western Desert Campaign of the Second World War. The Italian army had three armoured divisions in Europe but all were needed for the occupation of Albania and the forthcoming invasion of Greece, which began on 28 October 1940. The Raggruppamento Maletti was formed in June 1940, as part of the 10th Army (General Mario Berti) and contained all of the M11/39 medium tanks in Libya.
The medium tanks and tankettes already in the colony were to be combined with medium tanks sent from Italy, to form a new armoured division and a new headquarters, the Libyan Tank Command was established on 29 August. The Raggruppamento Maletti participated in Operazione E, the Italian invasion of Egypt in 1940 and reached Sidi Barrani on 16 September. The group was destroyed at the Nibeiwa camp on 9 December, during Operation Compass, a British raid against the 10th Army positions inside Egypt. The rest of the command and tank units arriving in Libya were combined in the Babini Group which was also destroyed at the Battle of Beda Fomm (6–7 February 1941), the final defeat of the 10th Army, which led to the British occupation of Cyrenaica.
Background
32nd Tank Infantry Regiment
The 32nd Tank Infantry Regiment was formed on 1 December 1938 and on 1 February 1939 became part of the 132nd Armored Division "Ariete", the second Italian armoured division. At the Italian declaration of war on 11 June 1940, the 32nd Tank Infantry Regiment moved with the Ariete from Veneto to the border with France, as part of the Army of the Po but the war ended so quickly that the division was not used. On 28 July 1939, the I and II Tank Battalion "M"s received 96 Fiat M11/39 tanks to replace its Fiat 3000s. The inadequacies of the M11/39 tanks led to a decision on 26 October 1939, to replace them with M13/40 tanks and the first batch, built by Ansaldo at Genoa in October 1940, were used to equip the III Tank Battalion "M" with 37 of the new tanks.[1]
Raggruppamento Maletti
The I Tank Battalion "M" (Major Victor Ceva) and the II Tank Battalion "M" (Major Eugenio Campanile) and their M11/39 tanks, landed in Libya on 8 July 1940 and transferred from the 32nd Tank Infantry Regiment in Italy to the command of the 4th Tank Infantry Regiment in Libya. The two battalions had an establishment of 600 men,72 tanks,56 vehicles,37 motorcycles and 76 trailers. The medium tanks reinforced the 324 L3/35 tankettes already in Libya.[1]Raggruppamento Maletti (GeneralPietro Maletti) was formed at Derna the same day, with seven Libyan motorised infantry battalions, a company of M11/39 tanks, a company of L3/33 tankettes, motorised artillery and supply units as the main motorised unit of the 10th Army and the first combined arms unit in North Africa.[2]
Prelude
Libyan Tank Command
On 29 August, as more tanks arrived from Italy, the Comando carri della Libia (Libyan Tank Command) was formed under the command of General Valentino Babini, with three Raggruppamenti. Raggruppamento Aresca (Colonel Pietro Aresca) with the I Tank Battalion "M" and the 31st, 61st and 62nd Tank Battalion "L"s, Raggruppamento Trivioli (Colonel Antonio Trivioli), with the II Tank Battalion "M", less one company and the IX, XX, and LXI Tank Battalion "L"s and Raggruppamento Maletti with the LX Tank Battalion "L" and the remaining M11/39 company from the II Tank Battalion "M".[3]Raggruppamento Maletti became part of the Regio Corpo Truppe Coloniali della Libia (Royal Corps of Libyan Colonial Troops), with the 1st Libyan Division and the 2nd Libyan Division.[4]
Military operations, 13 September 1940 – 7 February 1941 (click to expand)
Marshal Rodolfo Graziani revised Operazione E, the plan for the invasion of Egypt by the 10th Army and made Sidi Barrani the objective, six days before the deadline for an invasion imposed by Mussolini. XXII Corps (Generale di Corpo d'Armata Petassi Manella) was in general reserve, XXI Corps (Generale di Corpo d'Armata Lorenzo Dalmazzo) was at Tobruk as the 10th Army reserve with the un-motorized 61st Infantry Division "Sirte", 2nd CC.NN. Division "28 Ottobre" and a Tank Battalion "L". The XXIII Corps (Generale di Corpo d'ArmataAnnibale Bergonzoli) comprised the un-motorized 64th Infantry Division "Catanzaro" and 4th CC.NN. Division "3 Gennaio". [5] A northern column with the Italian non-motorised divisions was to advance along the coast on the Via Balbia, cross the frontier and attack through the Halfaya Pass, to occupy Sollum and capture Sidi Barrani. A southern column with the 1st Libyan Division, 2nd Libyan Division and the Raggruppamento Maletti were to advance along the track from Dayr al Hamra to Bir ar Rabiyah and Bir Enba south of the escarpment, round the British inland (southern) flank.[6]
The flanking manoeuvre by the Raggruppamento Maletti misfired, because it lacked adequate maps and navigation equipment for desert travel and the group got lost as it moved to its jumping-off point at Sidi Omar. XXIII Corps Headquarters (HQ) had to send aircraft to guide the group into position. The accompanying 1st Libyan Division and 2nd Libyan Division were also delayed in reaching the rendezvous near Fort Capuzzo and the fiasco led Graziani to cancel the wide flanking manoeuvre. The 10th Army, in a mass of five divisions and the armoured groups, was ordered to move down the coast road, occupy Sollum and advance to Sidi Barrani through Buq Buq. Once at Sidi Barrani, the army would consolidate, extend the Via Balbia by building the Via della Vittoria to move supplies forward, destroy British counter-attacks and then advance to Mersa Matruh. The immobility of the non-motorized infantry divisions forced Graziani to use the coast road, despite the mechanised forces in the army, to try to defeat the British with mass rather than manoeuvre.[7]
Western Desert Campaign
Invasion of Egypt
XXIII Corps advanced to Sidi Barrani along the coast road, having received enough lorries to motorise one infantry division and partly to motorise three more for the advance. Bergonzoli planned the advance with the 1st Raggruppamento Carri forward, followed by the fully motorised 1st CC.NN. Division "23 Marzo" and the 62nd Infantry Division "Marmarica" and 63rd Infantry Division "Cirene", which had been partly motorised and could shuttle elements forward. The un-motorized 1st Libyan Division and 2nd Libyan Division, were to march on foot for the 97 km (60 mi) to the objective and the Raggruppamento Maletti was to form the rearguard.[5] The 1st Raggruppamento Carri was also kept in reserve, except for the LXII Tank Battalion "L" with L3/33 tankettes, which was attached to the 62nd Infantry Division "Marmarica" and the LXIII Tank Battalion "L" assigned to the 63rd Division Infantry "Cirene". The 2nd Raggruppamento Carri remained at Bardia, except for the IX Tank Battalion "L" which joined the 2nd Libyan Division. The Raggruppamento Maletti (3rd Raggruppamento Carri) had the II Tank Battalion "M" with M11/39 tanks and three Libyan infantry battalions, all motorised.[5]
The 10th Army advanced to Sollum then along the coast road two divisions forward, behind a screen of motorcyclists, tanks, motorised infantry and artillery. On 14 September, the rest of the 1st Raggruppamento Carri followed the 1st Libyan Division and 2nd Libyan Division toward Bir Thidan el-Khadim. At Alam el Dab, just short of Sidi Barrani, about fifty Italian tanks supported by motorised infantry and artillery, tried to outflank and trap the British rear guard, which forced the 3rd Coldstream Guards battalion to retreat.[8] By late on 16 September, the 1st Raggruppamento Carri had reached an area south-east of Sidi Barrani, with the 1st CC.NN. Division "23rd Marzo" and the XXIII Corps artillery, having been used cautiously for infantry support. The Raggruppamento Maletti was west of the objective, having been hampered by lack of supplies and disorganisation.[9] The 1st CC.NN. Division "23 Marzo" took Sidi Barrani and the advance stopped at Maktila, 10 mi (16 km) beyond.[10]
The 10th Army planned to advance on Mersa Matruh on 16 December but the attack was forestalled by Operation Compass. Only the IX Tank Battalion "L" with L3/33 tankettes attached to the 2nd Libyan Division, the II Tank Battalion "M" with M11/39s, with the Raggruppamento Maletti at Nibeiwa camp and the LXIII and XX Tank Battalion "L"s, with the XXI Corps HQ, were still in Egypt. The five fortified camps from the coast to the escarpment were well defended but too far apart for overlapping fields of fire and the defenders relied on ground and air patrols to link the camps and watch the British.[11] The camp at Nibeiwa was a rectangle about 1.6 km × 2.4 km (1 mi × 1.5 mi), with a bank and an anti-tank ditch. Mines had been laid but at the north-west corner, there was a gap in the minefield for delivery lorries and a British night reconnaissance found the entrance.[12]
A lack of Italian air–ground co-operation was exploited by the British to attack Nibeiwa camp from the rear, with the 11th Brigade Group of the 4th Indian Division and the Matildainfantry tanks of the 7th Royal Tank Regiment (7th RTR).[4] Italian air reconnaissance spotted British vehicle movements in the area but Maletti was apparently not informed. On 8 January, Maletti alerted the nearby 2nd Libyan Division that unusual low-level flying by the RAF was probably intended to disguise the movement of armoured units. At 6:30 a.m. on 9 January, well before the beginning of the main British attack, Maletti had contacted the commanders of the 1st Libyan Division and the 2nd Libyan Division, reporting the British preparatory movements.[13]
Italian 47 mm anti-tank gun, 1941 (AWM 044455)
At 5:00 a.m. on 9 December, British artillery commenced a one-hour diversionary bombardment from the east and at 7:15 a.m., the main 4th Indian divisional artillery opened fire. The 11th Indian Infantry Brigade Group and the 7th RTR attacked from the north-west, with Bren carriers on the flanks, all firing on the move. About twenty Italian medium tanks outside the camp were destroyed in the initial British attack, while warming their engines before breakfast. Italian artillery and machine-gun fire began as isolated parties of Italians tried to hunt the British Infantry tanks with hand grenades.[14] At 7:45 a.m. Scottish and Indian infantry began methodically to sweep through the camp, backed by artillery and the tanks. By 10:40 a.m., the camp had been overrun and 2,000 Italian and Libyan prisoners had been taken, along with a large quantity of supplies and water for a British loss of 56 men.[15] A total of 819 Italian and Libyan soldiers had been killed along with Maletti and 1,338 were wounded.[16]
Aftermath
Analysis
In his history of the 32nd Tank Infantry Regiment, Maurizio Parri wrote that a company of the II Tank Battalion "M" with its M11/39s had tried to counter-attack the British Matildas but the crews misunderstood flag signals, which caused delays and the attack failed.[1] In 1944, Moorehead wrote that Maletti was wounded while rallying his men, then retreated to his tent with a machine-gun, where he was killed. Maletti's mortal remains were to be seen at the entrance of his tent when war correspondents visited the camp.[17] Moorehead wrote that he saw unattended donkeys wandering around looking for water and soldiers looting extravagant Italian army uniforms and lunching on luxury foods, wines and Recoaro mineral water. New equipment, weapons and ammunition strewed the ground, already disappearing under the sand and dozens of dug-outs were found to be full of food, new equipment and ammunition.[17]
La prima offensiva britannica in Africa settentrionale (ottobre 1940 – febbraio 1941) [The First British Offensive in North Africa (October 1940 – February 1941) I. annexe 32] (in Italian). Roma: Esercito. Corpo di stato maggiore. Ufficio storico. 1979. OCLC6863876.
Montanari, Mario (1985). Sidi el Barrani (giugno 1940 – febbraio 1941) [Sidi Barrani (June 1940 – February 1941)]. Le Operazioni in Africa Settentrionale (in Italian). Vol. I. Roma: Ufficio Storico dello Stato Maggiore Esercito. OCLC868634287.
Moorehead, A (2009) [1944]. The Desert War: The Classic Trilogy on the North African campaign 1940–43 (Aurum Press ed.). London: Hamish Hamilton. ISBN978-1-84513-391-7.
Playfair, I. S. O.; Stitt, G. M. S.; Molony, C. J. C. & Toomer, S. E. (1954). Butler, J. R. M. (ed.). The Mediterranean and Middle East: The Early Successes Against Italy (to May 1941). History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series. Vol. I. OCLC494123451.
Walker, I. W. (2003). Iron Hulls, Iron Hearts: Mussolini's Elite Armoured Divisions in North Africa. Marlborough: Crowood. ISBN978-1-86126-646-0.
Macksey, Major Kenneth (1971). Beda Fomm: The Classic Victory. Ballantine's Illustrated History of the Violent Century. New York: Ballantine Books. OCLC473687868.
The Italian empire before WWII is shown in red. Pink areas were annexed/occupied for various periods between 1940 and 1943. Italian concessions and forts in China are not shown.
