A ceasefire signed in 1994 in Bishkek was followed by two decades of relative stability, which significantly deteriorated along with Azerbaijan's increasing frustration with the status quo, at odds with Armenia's efforts to cement it.[61] A four-day escalation in April 2016 became the deadliest ceasefire violation until the 2020 conflict.[62] A tentative armistice was established by the tripartite ceasefire agreement on November 10, 2020, by which most of the territories lost by Azerbaijan during the First Nagorno-Karabakh war were returned Azerbaijan's control. The president of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, claimed that the conflict has thus ended;[63] however the ceasefire agreement was followed by the 2021–2022 Armenia–Azerbaijan border crisis from May 2021 onwards, with continued casualties from both sides.
Following the breakup of the Russian Empire, the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh formed an unrecognised polity known as the Karabakh Council in 1918. Due to Azerbaijani–British pressure, the Karabakh Council in August 1919 was forced to provisionally recognise the authority of Azerbaijan pending the Paris Peace Conference's decision on the South Caucasus republics' international borders.[64] As the peace conference was inconclusive regarding Nagorno-Karabakh, the Azerbaijani governor-general Khosrov bey Sultanov, issued an ultimatum to the Armenians of Karabakh in early 1920, stipulating their acceptance of permanent inclusion into Azerbaijan. Armenia responded by dispatching its agents to organize a rebellion in Nagorno-Karabakh against Azerbaijani rule—the subversive prepations culminated in an abortive uprising that led to the massacre and displacement of Shusha's Armenian population.[65][g] By 1921, Nagorno-Karabakh was in the control of Soviet authorities who decided on the formation of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) within Soviet Azerbaijan.[67]
In 1964, the Armenians of Karabakh sent a letter to leader of the USSR, Nikita Khrushchev, complaining about the economic management of the NKAO and asking for their region and "all adjacent Armenian regions" to be joined to the Armenian SSR, "or to make them party of RSFSR."[68]
According to Stuart Kaufman, a professor of political science and international relations,[69] and Thomas de Waal, the first instance of violence in the conflict began in October 1987 when an Azerbaijani official "punished" the Armenian-populated village of Chardakhly (present-day Çardaqlı) with a raid for protesting against the appointment of a new collective-farm director[70]—During the raid, the village's women, children, and elderly were beaten up.[71] In his 2003 book Black Garden, Thomas de Waal speculated that "[p]ossibly in reaction to such incidents", Azerbaijanis in Armenia (specifically in the districts of Ghapan and Meghri) were in November 1987 driven out of their homes[71] in what is described as "interethnic violence", arriving at Baku in two freight cars.[72] However, Armenian scholars and investigative journalists have argued that there is no evidence to support such instances of mass violence taking place prior to February 1988.[73][74]
The modern phase of the conflict began in February 1988. According to the 1979 Soviet census, 160,841 Azeris lived in Armenia and 352,410 Armenians lived in Azerbaijan outside of Nagorno-Karabakh.[75] The 1989 Soviet census showed a decline of those minorities to 84,860 Azeris in Armenia and 245,045 Armenians in Azerbaijan outside of Nagorno-Karabakh.[75] De Waal writes that in the mid-1980s, there were approximately 350,000 Armenians in Azerbaijan outside of Nagorno-Karabakh, and 200,000 Azerbaijanis in Armenia.[70] During the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1989, ethnic tensions between Armenians and Azerbaijanis increased in the Nagorno-Karabakh region. As of 2017, public opinion on both sides has been noted as "increasingly entrenched, bellicose and uncompromising".[61] In this context, mutual concessions that might lower tensions in the long term could, in the short term, threaten internal stability and the survival of ruling elites, hence leaving little incentive for compromise.[61]
The First Nagorno-Karabakh War, also known as the Artsakh Liberation War in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, was an armed conflict that took place in the late 1980s to May 1994, in the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh in southwestern Azerbaijan, between the majority ethnic Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh backed by the Republic of Armenia, and the Republic of Azerbaijan. As the war progressed, Armenia and Azerbaijan, both former Soviet Republics, entangled themselves in a protracted, undeclared war in the mountainous heights of Karabakh as Azerbaijan attempted to curb the secessionist movement in Nagorno-Karabakh.
The enclave's parliament had voted in favor of uniting with Armenia. A referendum, boycotted by the Azerbaijani population of Nagorno-Karabakh, was held, whereby most of the voters voted in favor of independence. The demand to unify with Armenia, which began anew in 1988, began in a relatively peaceful manner. As the Soviet Union's dissolution neared, the tensions gradually grew into an increasingly violent conflict between ethnic Armenians and ethnic Azerbaijanis. Both sides made claims of ethnic cleansing and pogroms conducted by the other.[76][77]
Photos of fallen Armenian soldiers in Stepanakert, Nagorno Karabakh
Inter-ethnic clashes between the two broke out shortly after the parliament of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast in Azerbaijan voted to unify the region with Armenia on 20 February 1988. The circumstances of the dissolution of the Soviet Union facilitated an Armenian separatist movement in Soviet Azerbaijan. The declaration of secession from Azerbaijan was the final result of a territorial conflict regarding the land.[78] As Azerbaijan declared its independence from the Soviet Union and removed the powers held by the enclave's government, the Armenian majority voted to secede from Azerbaijan. In the process they proclaimed the unrecognizedRepublic of Nagorno-Karabakh.[79]
Full-scale fighting erupted in the late winter of 1992. International mediation by several groups, including the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), failed to bring resolution. In the spring of 1993, Armenian forces captured territory outside the enclave itself, threatening to catalyze the involvement of other countries in the region.[80] By the end of the war in 1994, the Armenians were in full control of most of the enclave and also held and currently control approximately 9% of Azerbaijan's territory outside the enclave.[81] As many as 230,000 Armenians from Azerbaijan and 800,000 Azerbaijanis from Armenia and Karabakh have been displaced as a result of the conflict, essentially cleansing Armenia and Karabakh from Azerbaijanis and Azerbaijan of Armenians.[82] A Russian-brokered ceasefire was signed in May 1994, leading to diplomatic mediation.[83]
Some clashes occurred in the years following the 1994 ceasefire.[84]
Armenian sources accused Azerbaijan of trying to take advantage of ongoing unrest in Armenia.[88] Azerbaijani sources blamed Armenia, claiming that the Armenian government was trying to divert attention from internal tensions in Armenia.[88]
Following the incident, on March 14 the United Nations General Assembly by a recorded vote of 39 in favour to 7 against adopted Resolution 62/243, demanding the immediate withdrawal of all Armenian forces from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan.[89]
The 2010 Mardakert clashes were a series of violations of the ceasefire that ended the First Nagorno-Karabakh War. They took place across the line of contact dividing Azerbaijan and the ethnic Armenian military forces of the unrecognized but de facto independent Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. Both sides accused the other of violating the ceasefire regime. These were the worst violations of the cease-fire (which has been in place since 1994) in two years and left Armenian forces with the heaviest casualties since the Mardakert clashes of March 2008.[93]
Between 2008 and 2010, 74 soldiers were killed on both sides.[94]
In late April 2011, border clashes left three Nagorno-Karabakh soldiers dead,[95] while on 5 October, two Azerbaijani and one Armenian soldier were killed.[96] In all during the year, 10 Armenian soldiers were killed.[97]
The following year, border clashes between the armed forces of Armenia and Azerbaijan took place from late April through early June. The clashes resulted in the deaths of five Azerbaijani and four Armenian soldiers. In all during 2012, 19 Azerbaijani and 14 Armenian soldiers were killed.[98] Another report put the number of Azerbaijani dead at 20.[84]
Throughout 2013, 12 Azerbaijani and 7 Armenian soldiers were killed in border clashes.[98]
In 2014, several border clashes erupted that had resulted in 16 fatalities on both sides by 20 June.[99]
On 2 August, Azerbaijani authorities announced that eight of their soldiers had been killed in three days of clashes with NKO forces, the biggest single death toll for the country's military since the 1994 war.[100] NKO denied any casualties on their side, while saying the Azerbaijanis had suffered 14 dead and many more injured.[100] Local officials in Nagorno-Karabakh reported at least two Armenian military deaths in what was the largest incident in the area since 2008.[101] Five more Azerbaijani troops were killed the following night, bringing the death toll from the August clashes to at least 15. The violence prompted Russia to issue a strong statement, warning both sides not to escalate the situation further.[102]
By August 5, 2014, the fighting that started on 27 July had left 14 Azerbaijani and 5 Armenian soldiers dead. Overall, 27 Azerbaijani soldiers had died since the start of the year in border clashes.[103]
In a separate incident in July 2014, the NKR Defense Army announced that troops had killed one and arrested two members of an Azerbaijani subversive group that had penetrated the contact line.[104] In addition to spying on Armenian troop movements and military installations and civilian settlements in Karvachar (Kelbajar), the team was charged with the murder of Smbat Tsakanyan, a seventeen-year-old Armenian boy and resident of the village of Jumen. Both surviving members of the group were sentenced to life in prison by an Armenian court. In July 2015, video footage recorded by the team was released to the public and aired on Armenian state television.[105]
On November 12, 2014, the Azerbaijani armed forces shot down a Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Army Mil Mi-24 helicopter over Karabakh's Agdam district. Three servicemen were killed in the incident. Armenia's Defense Ministry stated the aircraft was unarmed and called its downing an "unprecedented provocation". Azerbaijani authorities claimed the helicopter was "trying to attack" Azerbaijani army positions.[106] Armenian authorities stated that Azerbaijan will face "grave consequences".[107] With the crash, 2014 became the deadliest year for Armenian forces since the 1994 ceasefire agreement, with 27 soldiers killed in addition to 34 fatalities on the Azerbaijani side.[108] Six Armenian civilians also died in 2014, while by the end of the year the number of Azerbaijanis killed rose to 39 (37 soldiers and 2 civilians).[84]
2015 sporadic fighting
In 2015, 42 Armenian soldiers and 5 civilians were killed as border clashes continued.[109] In addition, at least 64 Azerbaijani soldiers also died.[110][111]
Over the years, Azerbaijan had been growing impatient with the status quo. In this regard, propelled by oil and gas windfall, the country embarked in a military build-up. In 2015 alone, Baku spent $3bn on its military, more than Armenia's entire national budget.[61]
Early 2016 clashes
Throughout January and February 2016, four Armenian and four Azerbaijani soldiers were killed in fighting at the Nagorno-Karabakh border.[119] The first casualty of 2016 was a Nagorno-Karabakh soldier Aramayis Voskanian, who was killed by Azerbaijani sniper fire while serving in the eastern direction of the Line of Contact.[120][121] In mid-February, Hakob Hambartsumyan, an Armenian herdsman from Vazgenashen, was killed by an Azerbaijani sniper.[122] In March, two Azerbaijani and one Armenian soldier were killed in clashes along the border between Azerbaijan and Armenia.[123][124]
Between 1 and 5 April 2016, heavy fighting along the Nagorno-Karabakh frontline left 88 Armenian and 31–92 Azerbaijani soldiers dead. One Armenian and three Azerbaijani soldiers were also missing. In addition, 10 civilians (six Azerbaijani and four Armenian) were also killed.[125][126] During the clashes, an Azerbaijani military helicopter and 13 unmanned drones were shot down[127] and an Azerbaijani tank was destroyed,[128] while Nagorno-Karabakh lost 14 tanks.[129]
2016–2017 renewed border clashes
Between 8 April and 16 June 2016, sporadic fighting left 14 Armenian and three Azerbaijani soldiers dead, as well as one Azerbaijani civilian.[130][131] On 5 October 2016, Armenian artillery shelled Azerbaijani positions on the line of contact with one Azerbaijani soldier being killed.[132] One Armenian soldier was killed on 11 October 2016 in a skirmish on the line of contact.[133] On 15 November, an Azerbaijani soldier was killed on the line of contact.[134] On 27 November, Azerbaijani forces reported shooting down an Armenian drone which had crossed the line of contact.[135]
A Nagorno-Karabakh soldier was killed in action with Azerbaijiani forces on 6 February 2017.[136] On 8 February 2017, one Nagorno-Karabakh soldier was killed and another wounded in a firefight with Azerbajiani troops along the line of contact.[136] On 24 February 2017, Azerbaijani forces shelled the Armenian positions near the village of Talish with artillery.[137] The next day a large firefight broke out with Azerbajiani forces approaching Armenian lines in the same area, 5 Azerbaijani soldiers were killed in the ensuing engagement.[137][138]
On 15 May 2017, a Karabakh Osa air defense system was damaged or destroyed by a guided missile launched by Azerbaijani forces.[139] On 20 May 2017, an Armenian soldier was killed in a firefight with Azeri troops, the Azerbaijani military utilized anti-tank grenades and 60mm mortar fire in the action.[140] On 26 May 2017, a Nagorno-Karabakh soldier was killed in a skirmish with Azerbajiani forces involving mortars and grenade launches.[141][142] On 16 June 2017, three Nagorno-Karabakh soldiers were killed by Azeri forces.[143] On 22 June 2017, four Azeri soldiers were killed by Nagorno-Karakakh soldiers.[144] On July 4, 2017, an Azeri woman and her two-year-old grandchild were killed as a result of shelling by Armenian forces.[145] On 10 July 2017, a Nagorno-Karabakh soldier was killed in shelling by the Azerbaijani forces.[146] On 25 July 2017, Azerbaijan claimed that one of its soldiers was wounded by a munition dropped from an Armenian UCAV.[147] On 31 August 2017, Azerbaijani military positions were fired at and shelled at from Armenian military positions. The Armenian military were using large-caliber machine guns.[148]
A Nagorno-Karabakh soldier was killed by an Azerbaijani sniper near the line of contact on 7 January 2018.[149]
A Nagorno-Karabakh soldier was killed by Azerbaijani fire on 7 February 2018.[150] Three civilian volunteers were killed in a demining operation in Nagorno-Karabakh on 29 March 2018.[151]
A Nagorno-Karabakh soldier was killed by Azerbaijani fire on 9 April 2018.[152] A Nagorno-Karabakh soldier was killed in a firefight with Azeri forces on 10 June 2018.[153] In September 2018 a soldier of the Armenian Army was killed by Azeri gunfire whilst serving at a border post.[154] In the same month, two Nagorno-Karabakh soldiers were killed by the Azeri army.[155][156]
On 27 September 2020, serious clashes in Nagorno-Karabakh re-erupted, leading to Armenia declaring martial law and mobilization.[161] On the same day, Azerbaijan's Parliament declared a martial law and established curfews in several cities and regions following the clashes.[162] In terms of casualties, the clashes were the worst since the 1994 ceasefire and caused alarm in the international community.[163]
A truck with the slogan "Karabakh is Azerbaijan" at the Baku Victory Parade on 10 December. The parade was held in honor of the Azeri victory in the 2020 conflict.
44 days of fighting ended on November 10 the same year, with a peace deal brokered by Russia. Armenian forces agreed to return to Azerbaijan all occupied territory outside of the former Soviet Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, with Russian peacekeepers guaranteeing safe passage through the region of Lachin which separates Nagorno-Karabakh from Armenia.[164]
An ongoing border crisis started on 12 May 2021, when Azerbaijani soldiers crossed several kilometers into Armenia in the provinces of Syunik and Gegharkunik, occupying about 41 square kilometres (16 sq mi) of Armenian territory.[28][165][166][167] Azerbaijan has not withdrawn its troops from internationally recognised Armenian territory despite calls to do so by European Parliament, United States and France – two of the three co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group.[168][169]
The crisis further escalated in July 2021, with clashes taking place on the Armenia–Nakhchivan border. The clashes then spread to the Gegharkunik–Kalbajar area, with casualties being reported from both sides. Joint statement on 17 November 2021 by the Chair of the Delegation for relations with the South Caucasus, Marina Kaljurand, the European Parliament's Standing Rapporteur on Armenia Andrey Kovatchev and the European Parliament's Standing Rapporteur on Azerbaijan, Željana Zovko called the military operation launched by Azerbaijan on 16 November 2021 the worst violation to-date since the 2020 ceasefire agreement.[170]
Renewed clashes in August 2022 resulted in three people being killed, with Russia accusing Azerbaijan of breaking the ceasefire.[171] On the morning of 13 September 2022, large-scale[172] clashes erupted between Azerbaijani and Armenian troops.[173] The Armenian Defense Ministry said Azerbaijan had attacked Armenian positions near the cities of Vardenis, Goris, Sotk and Jermuk with artillery and heavy weapons.[174][175] The Azerbaijani Defence Ministry said that Armenia had staged a "large-scale provocations" near the Dashkasan, Kalbajar, and Lachin regions.[176][177] At least 49 Armenian soldiers and 50 Azeri military personnel were killed.[178][179]
Fatalities
1988–1994
An estimated 28,000–38,000 people were killed between 1988 and 1994.[181]
Armenian military fatalities were reported to be between 5,856[182] and 6,000,[180] while 1,264 Armenian civilians were also killed.[182] Another 196 Armenian soldiers[182] and 400 civilians were missing.[183] According to the Union of Relatives of the Artsakh War Missing in Action Soldiers, as of 2014, 239 Karabakhi soldiers remain officially unaccounted for.[184]
Azerbaijan stated 11,557 of its soldiers were killed,[185] while Western and Russian estimates of dead combatants on the Azerbaijani side were 25,000–30,000.[180][186][182] 4,210 Azerbaijani soldiers[183] and 749 civilians were also missing.[183] The total number of Azerbaijani civilians killed in the conflict is unknown, although 167–763 were killed on one day in 1992 by the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh's forces.[187]
1994–2019
Although no precise casualty figures exist, between 1994 and 2009, as many as 3,000 people, mostly soldiers, had been killed, according to most observers.[45] In 2008, the fighting became more intense and frequent.[188] With 72 deaths in 2014, the year became the bloodiest since the war had ended.[84] Two years later, between 1 and 5 April 2016, heavy fighting along the Nagorno-Karabakh front left 91 Armenian (11 non-combat)[189][125] and 94 Azerbaijani soldiers dead, with two missing.[126] In addition, 15 civilians (nine Armenians and six Azerbaijanis) were killed.[190][191]
Azerbaijan stated 398 of its soldiers and 31 civilians were killed between 1994 and up to September 2020, right before the start of the 2020 conflict.[192] In comparison, the Caspian Defense Studies Institute NGO reported 1,008 Azerbaijani soldiers and more than 90 civilians were killed between 1994 and 2016.[193]
In the two-month 2020 fighting, thousands were killed, primarily soldiers, but also almost two hundred civilians.[204]
Between January and September 2020, 16 Azerbaijani[205] and 8 Armenian soldiers,[206] as well as an Azerbaijani civilian, were killed in sporadic clashes.[207] On 27 September 2020, a new large-scale war erupted that lasted until 10 November. According to Azerbaijan, the fighting left 2,906 Azerbaijani soldiers[208] and 100 civilians dead,[209] while six servicemen were still missing.[210] Armenian authorities stated the fighting had left 3,825 Armenian soldiers[211] and 85 civilians dead,[212] while 187 servicemen and 21 civilians were still missing.[213] Additionally, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights documented the deaths of 541 Syrian mercenaries fighting for Azerbaijan.[214] Two Russian soldiers were also killed when their helicopter was shot down by Azerbaijan by accident while flying in Armenian airspace near the border.[215] In addition, a 13-year-old Russian citizen was killed during an Armenian missile strike on the city of Ganja.[216]
Following the end of the war, eleven more Azerbaijani soldiers, six Azerbaijani civilians and one Russian peacekeeper were killed in clashes and landmine explosions in the region by the end of the year.[217][218][219][220]
2021–present
Twelve Azerbaijani civilians[221] and two soldiers were killed in 2021, by landmine explosions.[222][223][224] Seventeen Armenian[225] and ten Azerbaijani soldiers were also killed in shoot-outs in the border area,[226][227][228][229] while 38 Armenian soldiers were captured.[230][231] Twenty-eight of the captured Armenian soldiers were subsequently released.[232][233]
In 2022, three Armenian soldiers were killed and 14 wounded in an attack by Azerbaijani drones in Nagorno-Karabakh on 25 March.[234]
Russia is officially neutral and has sought to play the role of a mediator.[235][236][237] In its official statements, Russia calls for a peaceful settlement and restraint during skirmishes.[238] British journalist Thomas de Waal has argued that there is an Azerbaijani narrative that Russia has "consistently supported the Armenian side." According to de Waal, Russia "has more supported the Armenian side," but there have been various "different Russian actors at different times supporting both sides in this conflict." He argues that President Boris Yeltsin did not "want to see the Armenian side be defeated, but he also didn't want to supply them with too many weapons." De Waal concluded in 2012 that "Russia [is] playing both sides", but "ultimately more in the Armenian side."[239] Other commentators have argued that Russia plays both sides in the conflict.[240][241]Svante Cornell argued in 2018 that Russia "had been playing both sides of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict to gain maximum control over both, a policy that continues to this day."[242]
During the war, "Russia was widely viewed as supporting the Armenian position. Much of this perception stemmed from the fact that Russia transferred military support to Armenia."[243] According to Razmik Panossian, Russian forces indirectly supported the Armenian side by "supplying arms, fuel and logistical support."[2] Russia supplied around $1 billion worth of weapons and, thus, "made a vital contribution to the Armenian victory."[1] According to de Waal, "greater Russian support for the Armenians" was one of the main factors behind the Armenian victory.[244] De Waal notes, "Yet it is not entirely clear how this support for the Armenians was translated on to the battlefield; to complicate things further, the Russians also gave some assistance to Azerbaijan."[245]
In the post-war period, Russia is Armenia's main arms supplier and the two countries are military allies.[246][247] Russia is sometimes described as Armenia's supporter in the conflict,[248][249] however, this view is widely challenged as Russia extensively sells arms to Azerbaijan.[50][250][251][252] At the same time, Armenia buys Russian weaponry at a discount, while Azerbaijan pays the full price.[253]
Turkey is widely considered Azerbaijan's main supporter in the conflict.[254][255][256]Svante Cornell wrote in 1998 that Turkey is the "only country that constantly expressed its support for Azerbaijan."[257] It provided Azerbaijan "active military help" during the war.[258] Turkey also supports Azerbaijan diplomatically.[259][260] Turkish and Azerbaijani armed forces cooperate extensively[261] and regularly hold military exercises.[262][263] Azerbaijan has also bought weapons from Turkey.[264]
Turkey closed its border with Armenia in April 1993 after Armenian forces captured Kalbajar.[265] Prior to that, the border was only open "on demand and only for transferring the humanitarian aid (mainly wheat delivery) to Armenia and for the operation of the weekly Kars-Gyumri train, which had been crossing the Turkish-Armenian border since the days of the Soviet Union."[266] Turkey has repeatedly refused to normalize and establish diplomatic relations with Armenia in solidarity with Azerbaijan over Karabakh.[267][268]
Iran
Iran is officially neutral and has sought to play the role of a mediator,[269] most notably in 1992. In its official statements, Iran calls for a peaceful settlement[270] and restraint during skirmishes.[271] At the same time, Iranian officials have repeatedly reaffirmed their support for Azerbaijan's territorial integrity.[h] Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated in 2020 that "While respecting the territorial integrity of the Azerbaijan Republic, Iran is fundamentally opposed to any move that would fuel conflict between the two neighbouring countries of the Azerbaijan Republic and Armenia."[277]
During the war, "Iran was domestically torn in devising a policy", but de facto "pursued a policy that combined official neutrality with growing support for Armenia," according to Svante Cornell.[278] Cornell argues that Iran has "pursued policies in the conflict inclined towards Armenia."[257] However, Iran's tacit support for the Armenian side[279][280][281] was limited to economic cooperation.[282][283]Terhi Hakala noted in 1998 that "as a geopolitical counter-weight to Turkey, Iran has strongly supported Armenia, especially by alleviating the effects of the Turkish blockade."[284] Cornell notes that during the war, Iran served as Armenia's "main purveyor of electricity and goods, and once the Armenian conquest of Karabakh had been completed, Iranian trucks began to supply most of the secessionist enclave's needs."[278] According to Bahruz Balayev, "Iran supported the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and gave some humanitarian aid to the [Azerbaijani] refugees, but in the meantime widely cooperates with Armenia and even Karabakh Armenian authorities."[285]Brenda Shaffer wrote that "Iran's cooperation with Armenia and its tacit support in the conflict with Azerbaijan over Karabagh strengthened Yerevan's actual and perceived power and consequently may have lessened its sense of urgency to resolve the conflict."[286]
In 2013, Mohsen Rezaee, who was commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) during the war, claimed that he "personally issued an order [...] for the Republic of Azerbaijan army to be equipped appropriately and for it to receive the necessary training." Rezaee added that "Many Iranians died in the Karabakh War. In addition to the wounded, who were transported to [Iran], many of the Iranian martyrs of the Karabakh War are buried in Baku."[287] In 2011, Hassan Ameli, a leading Iranian cleric, claimed that Iran provided Azerbaijan with arms and helped Afghan mujaheddin move to Azerbaijan.[288][289] The Iranian embassy in Armenia stated that they would not like unreliable information to affect friendly Armenian-Iranian relations: "We do not exclude the possibility that there are forces, which aim to create hindrances for our friendly relations."[290] In October 2020, several protests erupted in Iranian cities, including the capital Tehran and Tabriz, in support of Azerbaijan,[291][292] with many Iranian Azerbaijanis chanting pro-Azerbaijan slogans and protesting Iran's alleged arms support to Armenia via the Nordooz border crossing.[293]
Thomas Ambrosio suggested in 2000 that the US "supported Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, but enacted policies that effectively supported Armenia's irredentist policies."[294]Sergo Mikoyan argued in 1998 that the US response to the conflict has been "inconsistent, pulled in different directions by the legislative and executive branches of power." Congress was under the influence of the Armenian lobby, while the executive branch (the White House and the State Department) pursued a pro-Azerbaijani policy, which "reflects Turkish influence and the interests of oil companies."[295]Richard C. Longworth and Argam DerHartunian expressed similar views.[296][297]
Congress's pro-Armenian position was expressed in passing the Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act in 1992, which banned any assistance to Azerbaijan. It was effectively amended by the Senate in 2001 and waived by President George W. Bush starting from 2002.[298] The US provides military aid to both countries. Between 2005 and 2016 Azerbaijan received $8.5 million for counternarcotics assistance and $11.5 million for counterterrorism aid. In the same period, Armenia received only $41,000 for counternarcotics assistance and none for counterterrorism aid. According to EurasiaNet, "Much of the money for Azerbaijan has been targeted toward naval forces, to reduce the risk that it could be used against Armenia."[299] The Trump administration greatly increased the US military aid to Azerbaijan to around $100 million in fiscal years 2018–19, compared to less than $3 million in a year in FY 2016–17. The US aid is primarily "offered in the context of U.S. policy to increase pressure on Iran and focuses on Azerbaijan's Iranian border, but it also has implications for Armenia," according to Emil Sanamyan. In FY 2018, Armenia received $4.2 million in U.S. security assistance.[300]
The US has also provided humanitarian aid to Artsakh (some $36 million between 1998 and 2010),[301] including for demining.[302] The humanitarian aid has been criticized by Azerbaijan for legitimizing the "illegal regime in the occupied lands and damages the reputation of the US as a neutral mediator."[303]
Arms suppliers
In 1992, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) "requested its participating states to impose an embargo on arms deliveries to forces engaged in combat in the Nagorno-Karabakh area." However, it is a "voluntary multilateral arms embargo, and a number of OSCE participating states have supplied arms to Armenia and Azerbaijan since 1992."[304] The UN Security Council Resolution 85, passed in July 1993, called on states to "refrain from the supply of any weapons and munitions which might lead to an intensification of the conflict or the continued occupation of territory." According to SIPRI, "since 2002, the UN Security Council has no longer listed that it is 'actively seized of the matter'. As such, since 2002, it is assumed that the non-mandatory UN embargo is no longer active."[305]
Several foreign groups fought on both sides in the intense period of fighting in 1992–94. According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), both sides used mercenaries during the war, namely "Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian mercenaries or rogue units of the Soviet/Russian Army have fought on both sides."[329]
Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan made extensive use of mercenary pilots. According to HRW, "Most informed observers believe that mercenaries pilot most of Azerbaijan's air force."[330]
Several foreign groups fought on the Azerbaijani side: Chechen militants, Afghan mujahideen,[331] members of the Turkish nationalist Grey Wolves,[332] and the Ukrainian nationalist UNA-UNSO.[333] The Chechen fighters in Karabakh were led by Shamil Basayev, who later became Prime Minister of Ichkeria (Chechnya), and Salman Raduyev.[334] Basayev famously participated in the battle of Shusha in 1992.[334][335] Saudi-born Ibn al-Khattab may have also joined them.[336] The Afghan mujahideen were mostly affiliated with the Hezb-e Islami, led by Afghan Prime Minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.[337][338] According to HRW, they were "clearly not motivated by religious or ideological reasons" and were, thus, mercenaries.[338] The recruitment of Afghan mujahideen, reportedly handled by paramilitary police chief Rovshan Javadov, was denied by Azerbaijani authorities.[338][339] They first arrived to Azerbaijan in fall 1993 and numbered anywhere between 1,500 and 2,500[338] or 1,000 and 3,000.[340] Armenia alleged that they were paid for by Saudi Arabia.[337] Afghan mujahideen constituted the most considerable influx of foreign fighters during the war.[340] Some 200 Grey Wolves were still present in the conflict zone as of September 1994 and were engaged in training Azerbaijani units.[341]
During the war, Greece adopted a pro-Armenian position[356] and supported it in international forums.[357][282] During the April 2016 and July 2020 clashes, Cyprus condemned Azerbaijan for violating the ceasefire.[358][359]
Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan reportedly told the Greek ambassador in 1993 that France and Russia were Armenia's only allies at the time.[360] According to a US State Department cable released in 2020, the French ambassador to the UN, Jean-Bernard Mérimée, succeeded in changing the wording of the UNSC Resolution 822 to state that it was "local Armenian forces", not "Armenian forces" that occupied Kalbajar. He also suggested treating the Armenian capture of Kalbajar not under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (an act of aggression), but Chapter VI (a dispute that should be settled peacefully).[361]
Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan has received explicit diplomatic support in the conflict from several countries and international organizations. Azerbaijan's strongest diplomatic supporters are Turkey and Pakistan,[362][363] which is the only UN member state not to have recognized Armenia's independence in support for Azerbaijan.[364] Turkish-backed unrecognized Northern Cyprus (Turkish Cyprus) also supports Azerbaijan.[365] The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)[366] and the Turkic Council[367] have repeatedly supported the Azerbaijani position. Some member states of these organizations, namely Uzbekistan[368] and Saudi Arabia[369] have voiced support for Azerbaijan's position on their own repeatedly. Lebanon, on the other hand, has not supported OIC's pro-Azerbaijani resolutions.[370]
Azerbaijan has received diplomatic support, namely for its territorial integrity, from three post-Soviet states that have territorial disputes: Ukraine,[371] Georgia,[372] and Moldova.[373] These three countries and Azerbaijan form the GUAM organization and support the Azerbaijani position in the format as well.[374] Serbia, with its own territorial dispute over Kosovo, also explicitly supports Azerbaijan's territorial integrity.[375][376][377]
On March 14, 2008, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution which "reaffirmed Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, expressing support for that country's internationally recognized borders and demanding the immediate withdrawal of all Armenian forces from all occupied territories there." It was adopted by a vote of 39 in favor to 7 against, while most countries either abstained or were absent. It was backed mostly by Muslim states[384][385] (31 were members of the OIC).[l] Non-Muslim states that supported the resolution included three post-Soviet states: Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, and five other nations: Cambodia, Colombia, Myanmar, Serbia, and Tuvalu. Thus, it was supported by seven OSCE members;[m] one NATO member (Turkey) and no EU member state.[386]
It was opposed by Angola, Armenia, France, India, Russia, United States, Vanuatu.[386] The OSCE Minsk Group co-chair countries (France, US, Russia) voted against the resolution. They argued that it "selectively propagates only certain of [the basic] principles to the exclusion of others, without considering the Co-Chairs' proposal in its balanced entirety." The co-chair countries called it a unilateral resolution, which "threatens to undermine the peace process," but reaffirmed their "support for the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, and thus do not recognize the independence of NK."[387]
A Russian-brokered ceasefire was signed in May 1994 and peace talks, mediated by the OSCE Minsk Group (Russia, US, France) have been held ever since by Armenia and Azerbaijan.[83] Azerbaijan has repeatedly accused the Minsk Group (Russia, US, France) of being pro-Armenian.[388][389][390] In 1996, when France was chosen by the OSCE to co-chair the Minsk Group, Azerbaijan asked the OSCE to reconsider the decision because France was perceived by Azerbaijan as pro-Armenian.[391]Svante Cornell argued in 1997 that France, the US and Russia are "more or less biased towards Armenia in the conflict."[392][393] argued in 1997 that France, the US and Russia are "more or less biased towards Armenia in the conflict."[394] In 2018 Azerbaijan accused the US and France of bias for allowing Bako Sahakyan, the then president of Artsakh, to visit their countries.[395][396]
^"Throughout the Soviet period, Moscow supported the Azerbaijani authorities against Armenian secessionists."[1] "Until the dissolution of the USSR, the Soviet authorities sided, in general, with Azerbaijan. [...] Soviet troops sent to the conflict area [...] on numerous occasions, took the side of the Azerbaijani forces to 'punish' the Armenians for raising the NK issue."[2] "Soviet troops have been in Nagorno-Karabakh for 2 1/2 years [...] The troops support armed Azerbaijani militias who have imposed a blockade of the region..."[3] Soviet troops directly intervened during Operation Ring in April–May 1991 on the Azerbaijani side.[4][5] It was essentially a "combined Soviet-Azerbaijan operation."[6]
^Armenia: 44,800 active servicemen (2019, IISS)[34] Artsakh: 18,000–20,000 active servicemen (2008, ARAG)[35]
^Also called the Karabakh conflict,[49]Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict,[50] or Armenian–Azerbaijani conflict. Usually referred to as the Artsakh conflict in Armenia[51] and the Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in Azerbaijan.[52]
^According to the Caucasian Calendar for 1917, in 1916 Shusha had an Armenian population of 23,396, forming 53.3% of the city's population.[66]
^The political status of Abkhazia is disputed. Having unilaterally declared independence from Georgia in 1992, Abkhazia is formally recognised as an independent state by 5 UN member states (two other state recognised it but then withdrew its recognition), while Georgia continues to claim it as part of its own territory, designating it as Russian-occupied territory.
^South Ossetia's status is disputed. It considers itself to be an independent state, but this is recognised by only a few other countries. The Georgian government and most of the world's other states consider South Ossetia de jure a part of Georgia's territory.
^Transnistria's status is disputed. It considers itself to be an independent state, but this is not recognised by any country. The Moldovan government and the international community consider Transnistria a part of Moldova's territory.
^Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brunei, Comoros, Djibouti, Gambia, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Yemen.
^Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Serbia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uzbekistan
^Cornell, Svante E. (1999). "The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict"(PDF). Report no. 46, Department of East European Studies. Uppsala University. p. 26. Sporadic clashes became frequent by the first months of 1991, with an ever-increasing organization of paramilitary forces on the Armenian side, whereas Azerbaijan still relied on the support of Moscow. [...] In response to this development, a joint Soviet and Azerbaijani military and police operation directed from Moscow was initiated in these areas during the Spring and Summer of 1991.
^Tsvetkova, Maria; Auyezov, Olzhas (9 November 2020). "Analysis: Russia and Turkey keep powder dry in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict". Reuters. Retrieved 4 March 2021. Turkey's support for Azerbaijan has been vital, and Azerbaijan's superior weaponry and battlefield advances have reduced its incentive to reach a lasting peace deal. Ankara denies its troops are involved in fighting but Aliyev has acknowledged some Turkish F-16 fighter jets remained in Azerbaijan after a military drill this summer, and there are reports of Russian and Turkish drones being used by both sides.
^Rudolph, Joseph Russell, ed. (2003). Encyclopedia of Modern Ethnic Conflicts. Greenwood Press. p. 208. ISBN978-0313313813. When the Soviet Union broke up in 1991 [...] the Karabakh conflict escalated further, from guerrilla warfare to full-scale conventional combat.
^Hauer, Neil (October 9, 2020). "Caucasus war a result of US retreat from the world". Asia Times. The past two weeks have provided one of the starkest examples of the consequences of this: the re-eruption of full-scale war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh.
^Tchilingirian, Hratch (1999). "Nagorno Karabagh: Transition and the elite". Central Asian Survey. 18 (4): 450. doi:10.1080/713656168. As characterized by Karabagh's defence minister, the current post-war situation in the region is 'a cold war between Azerbaijan and Karabagh'.
^Mutschler, Max; Bales, Marius (February 2020). "Global Militarisation Index 2019"(PDF). Bonn International Center for Conversion. p. 2. ISSN2521-7844. The unresolved secessionist conflict between Armenia (position 3) and Azerbaijan (position 10) over the Nagorno-Karabakh region continues to keep militarisation in the South Caucasus at a very high level.
Mulcaire, Jack (9 April 2015). "Face Off: The Coming War between Armenia and Azerbaijan". The National Interest. Archived from the original on 3 January 2017. Retrieved 14 December 2016. The mostly Armenian population of the disputed region now lives under the control of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, a micronation that is supported by Armenia and is effectively part of that country.
Cornell, Svante (2011). Azerbaijan Since Independence. New York: M.E. Sharpe. p. 135. ISBN978-0-7656-3004-9. Following the war, the territories that fell under Armenian control, in particular Mountainous Karabakh itself, were slowly integrated into Armenia. Officially, Karabakh and Armenia remain separate political entities, but for most practical matters the two entities are unified."
^ abChorbajian, Levon; Patrick Donabedian; Claude Mutafian (1994). The Caucasian Knot: The History and Geopolitics of Nagorno-Karabagh. London: Zed Books. pp. 13–18. ISBN1856492885. Unless otherwise stated, the statistics cited by the authors is from data compiled by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in its annual The Military Balance, published in 1993. Reference to these statistics can be found on pages 68–69 and 71–73 of the report.
^ ab"Armenia and Azerbaijan: Preventing War"(PDF). Europe Briefing N°60. International Crisis Group. 8 February 2011. p. 3. Archived from the original(PDF) on 20 May 2016. There are no exact casualty figures since 1994, but most observers agree that as many as 3,000 people, mostly soldiers, have died. Crisis Group phone interview, Jasur Sumerinli, military expert, August 2009.
^ abRezvani, Babak (2014). Conflict and Peace in Central Eurasia: Towards Explanations and Understandings. Brill. p. 159. ISBN978-9004276369. The Karabakh conflict is an ethno-territorial conflict....
^Yamskov, A. N. (1991). Ethnic Conflict in the Transcausasus: The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh. Theory and Society. Vol. 20. p. 659.
^Hambardzumyan, Viktor (1978). Լեռնային Ղարաբաղի Ինքնավար Մարզ (ԼՂԻՄ) [Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Region (NKAO)] (in Armenian). Vol. 4. Armenian Soviet Encyclopedia. p. 576.
^Thomas De Waal (May 2003). Black Garden. pp. 194, 212, 215, 285. ISBN0-8147-6032-5.
^Кавказский календарь на 1917 год [Caucasian calendar for 1917] (in Russian) (72nd ed.). Tiflis: Tipografiya kantselyarii Ye.I.V. na Kavkaze, kazenny dom. 1917. pp. 190–197. Archived from the original on 4 November 2021.
^"Q&A with Arsène Saparov: No Evidence that Stalin 'Gave' Karabakh to Azerbaijan". armenian.usc.edu. 10 December 2018. Of all the documents I have seen, there is no direct evidence of Stalin doing or saying something in those 12 days in the summer of 1921 that [resulted in this decision on Karabakh]. A lot of people just assume that since Stalin was an evil person, it would be typical of someone evil to take a decision like that.
^Four UN Security Council resolutions, passed in 1993, called for the withdrawal of Armenian forces from the regions falling outside the borders of the former NKAO.
^Using numbers provided by journalist Thomas de Waal for the area of each rayon, as well as the area of the Nagorno-Karabakh Oblast and the total area of Azerbaijan are (in km2):
1,936, Kelbajar;
1,835, Lachin;
802, Kubatly;
1,050, Jebrail;
707, Zangelan;
842, Aghdam;
462, Fizuli;
75, exclaves;
totaling 7,709 km2 (2,976 sq mi) or 8.9%: De Waal. Black Garden, p. 286.
^By 21 October 2021, the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Azerbaijan (MN) published a list of 2,908 servicemen who were confirmed killed during the war,[22] although at least two of the soldiers named were killed after the conflict ended,[23][24] leaving a total of 2,906 servicemen confirmed killed in the war.
^By 27 September 2021, 84 civilians were confirmed killed in the conflict, 80 of which died in the Republic of Artsakh and 4 were killed in Armenia.[25][26] Another 22 were still missing.[27] Subsequently, the number of civilians missing was updated to 21 by 21 March 2022,[28] bringing the total number of confirmed civilian fatalities to 85.
^18 civilians were killed by landmines between November 2020, and July 2021,[29] of which six died in 2020,[30] leaving a total of 12 reported killed in 2021.
^Benson, Brett V. (2012). Constructing International Security: Alliances, Deterrence, and Moral Hazard. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 67. ISBN978-1107027244.
^Buniatian, Heghine (February 28, 2019). "Armenia, Russia Sign More Arms Deals". azatutyun.am. RFE/RL. The military alliance with Russia entitles Armenia to buying Russian weapons at discounted prices. Moscow lent the Armenian government $200 million for such arms acquisitions in 2015.
^Bhutia, Sam (October 28, 2019). "Armenia-Azerbaijan: Who's the big defense spender?". EurasiaNet. Russia, one of the largest arms exporters in the world, sells weapons to both sides in the conflict – though Armenia, as a member of the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization, gets a discount.
^Balayev, Bahruz (2013). The Right to Self-Determination in the South Caucasus: Nagorno Karabakh in Context. Lexington Books. p. 70. ISBN978-0739178287.
^"Iran Report". rferl.org. RFE/RL. August 17, 2004. Archived from the original on 9 August 2020. Khatami said Iran is ready to contribute to a peaceful solution of the conflict. He added that Iran considers Nagorno-Karabakh part of Azerbaijan and that the use of force in settling international problems is "unacceptable."
^ abcDinu, Mihai-Ștefan (2010). "The ethnical-religious context of the armed conflicts from the Caucasus between 1990 and 2002". Strategic Impact. Bucharest: Romanian National Defence University "Carol I" Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies (4): 35. Archived from the original on 2013-09-21. However, Russia was not the only ally of Armenia, but also Greece and Iran, both with a long history of tense relations with Turkey. Greece supported Armenia both by delivering military and economic assistance and diplomatic representation by promoting Armenia's interests in the EU and NATO. Iran provided trade opportunities and an opening to the maritime space.
^Rudolph, Joseph Russell (2008). Hot Spot: North America and Europe. ABC-CLIO. pp. 185–186. ISBN978-0313336218. Iran supports Armenia [...] To be sure, the assistance provided to Armenia and Azerbaijan respectively by these neighboring states has been limited to diplomatic support and occasional economic favors.
^Balayev, Bahruz (2013). "Islamic Republic of Iran". The Right to Self-determination in the South Caucasus: Nagorno Karabakh in Context. Rowman & Littlefield. p. 69. ISBN978-0739178270.
^Vaserman, Arie; Ginat, Rami (1994). "National, Territorial or Religious Conflict? The Case of Nagorno‐Karabakh". Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 17 (4): 358. doi:10.1080/10576109408435961.. Original source: S. Mitin and M. Madza, "Russia with Armenia's Help Tries to Put Pressure on Azerbaijan" (an interview with Yagub Mamedov, the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan), Izvestiia, March 25, 1992, p. 2.
^Azadian, Edmond Y. (1999). History on the Move: Views, Interviews and Essays on Armenian Issues. Wayne State University Press. p. 173. ISBN978-0814329160. But as subsequent events evolved it became all too apparent that Ukraine has steadfastly stood behind Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict all along. ...it was reported from Stepanakert that Ukraine had shipped 40 tanks to Azerbaijan. Later that number was raised to 59. Ukraine had also supplied Azerbaijan with Mig-21 attack planes....
^Chorbajian, Levon; Mutafian, Claude; Donabedian, Patrick (1994). The Caucasian Knot: The History and Geopolitics of Nagorno-Karabagh. Zed Books. p. 34. ISBN978-1856492874. Alpaslan Turkesh, founder of the Turkish fascist Grey Wolves, acknowledged that his followers were fighting in Karabagh with Azerbaijani forces, though it was reported in late 1992 that they had returned to Turkey.
^In a 2010 interview, Mykola Karpyuk, a leader of the UNA-UNSO said that "many Ukrainians", including members of the organization fought on the Azerbaijani side. Baiyev, Bakhram (17 September 2010). "В случае войны мы окажем Баку посильную помощь". vesti.az (in Russian). Archived from the original on 12 August 2020.
^Khalilova, Konul (May 14, 2002). "Chechen Fighter's Death Reveals Conflicted Feelings in Azerbaijan". eurasianet.org. EurasiaNet. Archived from the original on 19 August 2020. Some say he joined the Chechen guerrillas fighting on Azerbaijan's side during the 1992–93 Nagorno-Karabakh war, though Ashurov and the Ministry of Defense's spokesman dismiss this idea.
^Center for Strategic and International Studies (1997). Brzezinski, Zbigniew; Sullivan, Paige (eds.). Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States: Documents, Data, and Analysis. M.E. Sharpe. p. 616. ISBN978-1563246371. It is also revealed that a new force of 200 armed members of the Grey Wolves organization has been dispatched from Turkey in preparation for a new Azeri offensive and to train units of the Azeri army.
^Blakkisrud, Helge; Kolstø, Pål (2012). "Dynamics of de facto statehood: the South Caucasian de facto states between secession and sovereignty". Southeast European and Black Sea Studies. 12 (2): 295. doi:10.1080/14683857.2012.686013. S2CID153522424. ...the three South Caucasian de facto states have mutually recognized each other, as well as being recognized by (unrecognized) Transnistria.
^"Telephone conversation with NKR Foreign Minister Karen Mirzoyan". mid.gospmr.org. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PMR. 4 April 2016. Archived from the original on 9 April 2016. The head of the Pridnestrovian diplomacy expressed compassion and support to the people of Artsakh in connection with the escalation of tension on the part of the Republic of Azerbaijan.
^Yiallourides, Christodoulos K.; Tsakonas, Panayotis J., eds. (2001). Greece and Turkey after the End of the Cold War. New York and Athens: Aristide D. Caratzas. p. 412. ISBN0892415649. Greece, on the other hand, had no particular reasons to shun Azerbaijan, but its historical friendship with the Armenian people, and shared concerns over Turkish aggression, naturally induced a pro-Armenian Greek policy.
^Leonidas Chrysanthopoulos, Ambassador of Greece to Armenia in 1993–94:
Chrysanthopoulos, Leonidas (2002). Caucasus Chronicles: Nation-building and Diplomacy in Armenia, 1993–1994. Gomidas Institute. ISBN978-1884630057.
p. 66: "I told him that they should be very careful on the Fizuli issue, because if it were to fall into Armenian hands, the international condemnation would be so strong that Greece would no longer be able to support Armenia in international forums and particularly in the European Union.
p. 68: "Greece was doing everything possible in all the other international forums to help Armenia and to bring peace to the troubled area.
^Leonidas Chrysanthopoulos, Ambassador of Greece to Armenia in 1993–94, wrote: "Ter-Petrossian [...] told me that at the moment Russia and France were the only allies of Armenia. Both countries had reacted in an effective way to Turkey within the United Nations Security Council and the CSCE, and they forced the United States to adopt a more objective position on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue." Chrysanthopoulos, Leonidas (2002). Caucasus Chronicles: Nation-building and Diplomacy in Armenia, 1993–1994. Gomidas Institute. pp. 67–68. ISBN978-1884630057.
"Узбекистан и Азербайджан наращивают сотрудничество [Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan are increasing cooperation]". old.president.uz (in Russian). Press Service of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan. 25 September 2010. Archived from the original on 9 August 2020. В этой связи позиция Республики Узбекистан по решению проблемы Нагорного Карабаха остается твердой и неизменной. Узбекистан открыто ее подтверждал при голосовании инициированных Азербайджаном соответствующих резолюций Генеральной Ассамблеи ООН в 2008 году. Узбекистан последовательно выступал и продолжает выступать за мирное, политическое решение нагорно-карабахского конфликта и при этом главным условием урегулирования считает обеспечение территориальной целостности и суверенитета Азербайджана.
"Joint press statements of Presidents of Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan". en.president.az. President of the Republic of Azerbaijan. 27 September 2010. Archived from the original on 23 November 2017. While describing Uzbekistan's position on the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, Islam Karimov said: [...] Uzbekistan considers the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan as one of the key preconditions for its settlement. I believe that this position is absolutely consistent with international standards, meets historical parallels. Uzbekistan's position on this issue remains unchanged: the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan is a sacred concept, and it must be followed in all solution options of this problem.
^Alrmizan, Mohammed (September 2019). "Azerbaijan and Saudi Arabia: Bilateral Opportunities in a Changing Middle East"(PDF). kfcris.com. King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies. p. 5. Archived from the original(PDF) on 9 August 2020. In this matter, the Saudis have backed the right of Azerbaijan in the United Nations General Assembly meetings and in the OIC, asserting its internationally recognized authority over Nagorno-Karabakh. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia does not have yet any level of official or even unofficial ties with Armenia. This is because the Saudis have tended to side with Azerbaijan, especially on this particular issue.
"Sauid Arabia Will Not Change Its Position on Nagorno-Karabakh Problem". azertag.az. Azerbaijan State News Agency. 14 July 2010. Archived from the original on 9 August 2020. ...Speaker of the Saudi Arabia's Shura Council Abdullah Bin Mohammed Bin Ibrahim Al-Sheikh told journalists here. He underlined Saudi Arabia supports all international organizations` decisions and resolutions supporting resolution of the conflict based on territorial integrity of Azerbaijan.
"Azerbaijan Report: February 28, 2003". rferl.org. RFE/RL. February 28, 2003. Archived from the original on 9 August 2020. Ali Hasan Jafarin, Saudi Arabia's ambassadors to Baku, said in an interview with the independent newspaper "525" that his country unanimously supports the Azerbaijani position on Nagorno-Karabakh in all international organizations and forums.
^Malysheva, Dina (2001). "The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh: its impact on security in the Caspian region". In Chufrin, Gennady (ed.). The Security of the Caspian Sea Region. Oxford University Press/Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. p. 264. ISBN0199250200. Because of its proximity to the Karabakh conflict zone, Georgia is vitally concerned with the settlement of the conflict. It is officially Azerbaijan's strategic partner, upholds the preservation of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and supports the latter in its conflict with Armenia on most contentious issues. [...] ...Georgia's obviously pro-Azerbaijan approach to the Karabakh problem...
Le Grix, Victor (February 2019). "A Positive Influence in the South Caucasus? Georgia's Potential as a Regional Stabilizer"(PDF). Policy Brief. Georgian Institute of Politics (15): 5. Due to its vital national interest, Georgia cannot support a self-determination policy. This is actually an important factor why on the international stage, Tbilisi officially calls for the respect of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity.
Zurabashvili, Tornike; Kapanadze, Sergi (12 April 2016). "Georgia: Fearing the worst from the Karabakh flare-up". ecfr.eu. European Council on Foreign Relations. Archived from the original on 19 May 2016. The declarations of support for each other's territorial integrity, have become a lasting tradition in Georgian-Azerbaijani diplomatic encounters, which is hardly any surprise from two countries that have similar territorial issues. While Georgia has supported Azerbaijan in the past, it opted not to this time.
"Georgia supports territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Azerbaijan". mfa.gov.ge. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia. Archived from the original on 24 July 2020. Georgia supports territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Azerbaijan within its internationally recognized borders and supports the peaceful settlement of conflict based on the principles and norms of international law.
"Minsk will not engage in conflicts in Post-Soviet space". Belarus in Focus. April 22, 2016. Archived from the original on 11 August 2020. Belarus has consistently supported peaceful reintegration of Karabakh with Azerbaijan. [...] Minsk's pro-Azerbaijani position therefore is natural.
Belarus has explicitly supported Azerbaijan's territorial integrity in joint statements
"Azerbaijani, Belarus presidents made press statements". en.president.az. President of the Republic of Azerbaijan. 19 November 2018. Archived from the original on 11 August 2020. The Joint Statement explicitly states that this conflict must be resolved in accordance with the norms of international law, within the framework of territorial integrity and the inviolability of the borders of Azerbaijan and in accordance with relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council.
Riad al-Malki: "Palestine Supports Azerbaijan's Stance on Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, Foreign Minister". azertag.az. Azerbaijan State News Agency. 29 October 2009. Archived from the original on 12 August 2020. “We have always declared that territories under Armenian occupation belong to Azerbaijan”, al-Malki underscored. The foreign minister said Palestine wants peaceful resolution of the conflict and liberation of occupied lands of Azerbaijan. “We call on the international community to exert pressure on Armenia in order to achieve peace”, Al-Malki stressed.
^Khalifa-zadeh, Mahir (2012). "Israel and Azerbaijan: To Counteract Iran"(PDF). Central Asia and the Caucasus. Institute for Central Asian and Caucasian Studies. 13 (3): 76. Israel has repeatedly declared that Tel Aviv supports Azerbaijan's territorial integrity.
^"Azerbaijan Withdraws Draft Karabakh Resolution From UN". rferl.org. RFE/RL. September 10, 2010. Archived from the original on 12 August 2020. The U.S., Russia, and France had opposed a similar resolution which Baku managed to push through the UN assembly in March 2008. It was backed by 39 countries, most of them Islamic.
^Rahimov, Rahim (July 22, 2020). "Armenian-Azerbaijani Border Clashes: The Russian Dimension and Beyond". jamestown.org. Jamestown Foundation. Archived from the original on 11 August 2020. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev had lambasted the Minsk Group co-chairs (Russia, France and the United States) in an unusually explicit manner for what he described as their ineffectiveness and alleged pro-Armenian bias (President.az, July 6).
^Cornell, Svante E. (Summer 1997). "Undeclared War: The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Reconsidered"(PDF). Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies. XX (4): 23. Archived from the original(PDF) on 2020-08-11. As a result, three of the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council are more or less biased towards Armenia in the conflict (including France, where a substantial Armenian minority exists, which has always been politically active.)
^Cornell, Svante E. (Summer 1997). "Undeclared War: The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Reconsidered"(PDF). Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies. XX (4): 23. Archived from the original(PDF) on 2020-08-11. As a result, three of the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council are more or less biased towards Armenia in the conflict (including France, where a substantial Armenian minority exists, which has always been politically active.)
Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh)[a]
Armenia[b]
Soviet Union (1988–1991)[d]
Turkey (2020) (alleged by Armenia)[7][8][9] 
Artsakh Defence Army
Azerbaijani Armed Forces
