The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict[f] is an ethnic and territorial conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh, inhabited mostly by ethnic Armenians, and seven surrounding districts, inhabited mostly by Azerbaijanis until their expulsion during the 1990s. The Nagorno-Karabakh region is entirely claimed by and partially de facto controlled by the breakawayRepublic of Artsakh, but is recognized internationally as part of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan controls the remainder of the Nagorno-Karabakh region as well as the seven surrounding districts.
The conflict has its origins in the early 20th century, but the present conflict began in 1988, when the Karabakh Armenians demanded the transfer of the region from Soviet Azerbaijan to Soviet Armenia. The conflict escalated into a full-scale war in the early 1990s following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The First Nagorno-Karabakh War led to tens of thousands of casualties. The war was won by Armenia, which subsequently occupied regions around Soviet-era Nagorno-Karabakh. Ethnic Azerbaijanis were expelled from the Armenian-controlled areas, while ethnic Armenians were expelled from Azerbaijan. The ceasefire ending the first war, signed in 1994 in Bishkek, was followed by two decades of relative stability, which significantly deteriorated in the 2010s. A four-day escalation in April 2016 resulted in hundreds of casualties but only minor changes to the front line.
In late 2020, the large-scale Second Nagorno-Karabakh War resulted in thousands of casualties and a significant Azerbaijani victory. An armistice was established by a tripartite ceasefire agreement on November 10, resulting in Azerbaijan regaining all of the occupied territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh as well as capturing one-third of Nagorno-Karabakh itself.[53]Ceasefire violations in Nagorno-Karabakh and on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border have continued following the 2020 war, with intermittent but ongoing casualties.
Since the 2020 war, Azerbaijan has rescinded its offer of special status or autonomy to its indigenous Armenian residents and instead insists on their "integration" into Azerbaijan.[54][55] International mediators and human rights organizations emphasize self-determination for the local Armenian population[56][57][58][59] and do not believe that Artsakh Armenians can live safely under the regime of Azerbaijani President Aliyev.[60][61][62][63][64][65] Since December 2022, Azerbaijan has blockaded the Republic of Artsakh from the outside world, in violation of the 2020 ceasefire agreement and international legal rulings.
Following the breakup of the Russian Empire, the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh formed an unrecognised polity known as the Karabakh Council in 1918. Due to Azerbaijani–British pressure, the Karabakh Council in August 1919 was forced to provisionally recognise the authority of Azerbaijan, pending the Paris Peace Conference's adjudication of the international borders of the republics within the South Caucasus.[66] As the peace conference was inconclusive regarding Nagorno-Karabakh, the Azerbaijani governor-general Khosrov bey Sultanov, issued an ultimatum to the Armenians of Karabakh in early 1920, stipulating their acceptance of permanent inclusion into Azerbaijan. Leaders associated with the Republic of Mountainous Armenia and the Dashnak Party attempted to organize a rebellion against Azerbaijani rule, which failed and led to the massacre and displacement of Shusha's Armenian population.[67][g] By 1921, Soviet authorities were in control of Nagorno-Karabakh who decided on the formation of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) within Soviet Azerbaijan.[69]
In 1964, the Armenians of Karabakh sent a letter to leader of the USSR, Nikita Khrushchev, complaining about Azerbaijan's economic management of the region. They also requested that the NKAO and adjacent regions where the Armenian population is approximately 90% be reincorporated into the Armenian SSR or integrated into the RSFSR.[70] The conflict continued to simmer under the surface until Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms.
Amid the gradual dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1988–89, ethnic tensions between Armenians and Azerbaijanis exploded in the Nagorno-Karabakh region. According to the 1979 Soviet census, 160,841 Azeris lived in Armenia and 352,410 Armenians lived in Azerbaijan outside of Nagorno-Karabakh.[71] The 1989 Soviet census showed a decline of those minorities to 84,860 Azeris in Armenia and 245,045 Armenians in Azerbaijan outside of Nagorno-Karabakh.[71] De Waal writes that in the mid-1980s, there were approximately 350,000 Armenians in Azerbaijan outside of Nagorno-Karabakh, and 200,000 Azerbaijanis in Armenia.[72]
According to Stuart Kaufman, a professor of political science and international relations,[73] and Thomas de Waal, the first instance of violence in the conflict occurred in October 1987 when an Azerbaijani official "punished" the Armenian-populated village of Chardakhly (present-day Çardaqlı) with a raid for protesting against the appointment of a new collective-farm director.[72] During the raid, the village's women, children, and elderly were beaten up.[74] In his 2003 book Black Garden, Thomas de Waal speculated that "[p]ossibly in reaction to such incidents", Azerbaijanis in Armenia (specifically in the districts of Ghapan and Meghri) were in November 1987 driven out of their homes, arriving at Baku in two freight cars.[75] A number of Armenian scholars and investigative journalists, however, have scrutinized these alleged incidents and argued that, outside the claims made by Azerbaijani officials, there is no evidence, archival or otherwise, to corroborate such instances of mass violence taking place, at least prior to February 1988.[76][77]
The First Nagorno-Karabakh War, also known as the Artsakh Liberation War in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, was an armed conflict that took place in the late 1980s to May 1994, in the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh in southwestern Azerbaijan, between the majority ethnic Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh backed by the Republic of Armenia, and the Republic of Azerbaijan. As the war progressed, Armenia and Azerbaijan, both former Soviet Republics, entangled themselves in a protracted, undeclared war in the mountainous heights of Karabakh as Azerbaijan attempted to curb the secessionist movement in Nagorno-Karabakh.
On February 20, 1988, the enclave's parliament voted in favor of uniting with Armenia.[78] The demand to unify with Armenia, which began anew in 1988, began in a relatively peaceful manner. As the Soviet Union's dissolution neared, the tensions gradually grew into an increasingly violent conflict between ethnic Armenians and ethnic Azerbaijanis. Both sides made claims of ethnic cleansing and pogroms conducted by the other.[79][80]
Photos of fallen Armenian soldiers in Stepanakert, Nagorno Karabakh
The circumstances of the dissolution of the Soviet Union facilitated an Armenian separatist movement in Soviet Azerbaijan. The declaration of secession from Azerbaijan was the final result of a territorial conflict regarding the land.[81] As Azerbaijan declared its independence from the Soviet Union and removed the powers held by the enclave's government, the Armenian majority voted to secede from Azerbaijan. The referendum held in 1991 was boycotted by the Azerbaijani population and had an electorate turnout of 82.1%, of which 99.9% voted in favor of independence.[53][66] The referendum resulted in the unrecognizedRepublic of Nagorno-Karabakh.[82]
Full-scale fighting erupted in the late winter of 1992. International mediation by several groups, including the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), failed to bring resolution. In the spring of 1993, Armenian forces captured territory outside the enclave itself, threatening to catalyze the involvement of other countries in the region.[83] By the end of the war in 1994, the Armenians were in full control of most of the enclave and also held and currently control approximately 9% of Azerbaijan's territory outside the enclave.[84] As many as 230,000 Armenians from Azerbaijan and 800,000 Azerbaijanis from Armenia and Karabakh have been displaced as a result of the conflict, essentially cleansing Armenia and Karabakh from Azerbaijanis and Azerbaijan of Armenians.[85] A Russian-brokered ceasefire was signed in May 1994, leading to diplomatic mediation.[86]
Border clashes (2008–2020)
The situation in the area after the 1994 ceasefire
The 2008 Mardakert clashes began on 4 March after the 2008 Armenian election protests, resulting in several score wounded and killed, with both sides declaring victory.[87][88] It was the heaviest fighting between ethnic Armenian and Azerbaijani forces since the 1994 ceasefire after the First Nagorno-Karabakh War.[87][88] Following the incident, on March 14 the United Nations General Assembly by a recorded vote of 39 in favour to 7 against adopted Resolution 62/243, demanding the immediate withdrawal of all Armenian forces from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan.[89] The 2010 Nagorno-Karabakh clash was a scattered exchange of gunfire that took place on February 18 on the line of contact dividing Azerbaijani and the Karabakh Armenian military forces. As a result, three Azerbaijani soldiers were killed and one wounded.[90] The 2010 Mardakert clashes were the deadliest for Armenian forces since the 2008 violence.[91] Between 2008 and 2010, 74 soldiers were killed on both sides.[92]
In late April 2011, border clashes left three Nagorno-Karabakh soldiers dead,[93] while on 5 October, two Azerbaijani and one Armenian soldier were killed.[94] In all during the year, 10 Armenian soldiers were killed.[95] The following year, continued border clashes between the armed forces of Armenia and Azerbaijan took place from late April through early June. The clashes resulted in the deaths of five Azerbaijani and four Armenian soldiers. In all during 2012, 19 Azerbaijani and 14 Armenian soldiers were killed.[96] Another report put the number of Azerbaijani dead at 20.[97] Throughout 2013, 12 Azerbaijani and 7 Armenian soldiers were killed in border clashes.[96]
In 2014, several border clashes erupted.[98][99] By August, 27 Azerbaijani soldiers had died since the start of the year.[100] On November 12, 2014, the Azerbaijani armed forces shot down a Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Army Mil Mi-24 helicopter over Karabakh's Agdam district.[101] With the crash, 2014 became the deadliest year for Armenian forces since the 1994 ceasefire agreement, with 27 soldiers killed.[102] Six Armenian civilians also died in 2014, while by the end of the year the number of Azerbaijanis killed rose to 39 (37 soldiers and 2 civilians).[97] In 2015, 42 Armenian soldiers and 5 civilians were killed as border clashes continued.[103] In addition, at least 64 Azerbaijani soldiers also died, according to Armenian sources.[104][105]
Over the years, Azerbaijan had been growing impatient with the status quo. In this regard, propelled by oil and gas windfall, the country embarked in a military build-up. In 2015 alone, Baku spent USD $3 billion on its military, more than Armenia's entire national budget.[106]
In early 2016, the most serious clashes until the 2020 war occurred (the 2016 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict). Between 1 and 5 April 2016, heavy fighting along the Nagorno-Karabakh frontline left 88 Armenian and 31–92 Azerbaijani soldiers dead. One Armenian and three Azerbaijani soldiers were also missing. In addition, 10 civilians (six Azerbaijani and four Armenian) were also killed.[107][108] During the clashes, an Azerbaijani military helicopter and 13 unmanned drones were shot down and an Azerbaijani tank was destroyed, while Nagorno-Karabakh lost 14 tanks.[109][110][111]
A truck with the slogan "Karabakh is Azerbaijan" at the Baku Victory Parade on 10 December 2020. The parade was held in honor of the Azeri victory in the 2020 conflict.
Large-scale fighting began on the morning of 27 September, with an Azerbaijani offensive[116][117] along the line of contact established in the aftermath of the first war. Clashes were particularly intense in the less mountainous districts of southern Nagorno-Karabakh.[118] On the same day, Azerbaijan's Parliament declared a martial law and established curfews in several cities and regions following the clashes.[119] Turkey provided military support to Azerbaijan, although the extent of this support has been disputed.[116][120]
The war was marked by the deployment of drones, sensors, long-range heavy artillery[121] and missile strikes, as well as by state propaganda and the use of official social media accounts in online information warfare.[122] In particular, Azerbaijan's widespread use of drones was seen as crucial in determining the conflict's outcome.[123] Numerous countries and the United Nations strongly condemned the fighting and called on both sides to de-escalate tensions and resume meaningful negotiations.[124] Three ceasefires brokered by Russia, France, and the United States failed to stop the conflict.[125]
Casualties were high,[134] officially in the low thousands.[135] According to official figures released by the belligerents, Armenia and Artsakh lost 3,825 troops,[136] with 187 servicemen missing in action,[137] while Azerbaijan claimed 2,906 of their troops were killed, with 6 missing in action.[138] The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported the deaths of 541 Syrian fighters or mercenaries fighting for Azerbaijan.[139] However, it was noted that the sides downplayed the number of their own casualties and exaggerated the numbers of enemy casualties and injuries.[140]
The total number of reported civilian fatalities on both sides was at least 185; the whereabouts of 21 Armenian civilians remain unknown. Civilian areas, including major cities, were hit, particularly Stepanakert, Martuni, Martakert, Shushi in the Republic of Artsakh and Ganja, Barda and Tartar in Azerbaijan, with many buildings and homes destroyed.[141][142][143]
Following the end of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, Azerbaijan has made numerous incursions into Armenian territory.[155] and has regularly violated the ceasefire agreement, provoking cross-border fights with Armenia.[156][157][158][159] In order to strengthen the border against Azerbaijan's military incursions, Armenia allocated additional defense areas to border guards of the Russian Federal Security Service.[160][161]
The crisis escalated in July 2021, with clashes taking place on the Armenia–Nakhchivan border, and in November 2021 in the Gegharkunik–Kalbajar area.[157] In August 2021, Azerbaijani forces blockaded southern Armenia (Syunik) by closing the main north-south highway which interrupted all international transit with Iran and forced Armenia to develop alternative roads.[162][163][164][165]
Although the mission has been condemned by Azerbaijan and Russia, the EU has sent a CSDPcivilian monitoring mission to Armenia to contribute to stability along the border and deter offensives by Azerbaijan.[166][167][168][169] The president of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, has made numerous threats to Armenia, making statements such as "Armenia must accept our conditions" if Armenians wish to "live comfortably on an area of 29,000 square kilometers," and "they must not forget that Armenian villages are visible from here."[170][171][172][173][174]
The largest escalation occurred in September 2022, when Azerbaijan initiated its largest attack on the Republic of Armenia in the history of the conflict between the two countries.[175][176][177][178] Since Azerbaijan's offensives, Armenia's borders with Azerbaijan have become militarized which has disrupted the livelihoods of residents in border communities: residents have been targeted and can no longer access farmlands, schools, water resources, relatives, or religious sites.[179][180][181][182] Fearing for their safety, many Armenian villagers have moved away permanently.[183][184][185]
Armenia has unsuccessfully requested that the Collective Security Treaty Organisation and Russia independently intervene due to Azerbaijan's military incursions in May 2021 and September 2022. The CSTO and Russia declined to provide assistance both times.[186][187]
Blockade of the Republic of Artsakh (2022-present)
On 12 December 2022, under the guise of "environmental protests", Azerbaijan launched an illegal blockade of the Republic of Artsakh, which is ongoing.[188][189][190][191][192][193] The Azerbaijani government sent citizens claiming to be "eco-activists" to block the Lachin corridor, the only road connecting Artsakh to Armenia and to the outside world.[194][195][188][196][197] Civil servants, disguised military personnel, members of pro-government NGOs, and youth organisations were among the so-called "eco-activists."[198] Only Azerbaijani journalists from state or pro-government media are permitted past checkpoints into the region.[199][200][201][202]
The blockade continues to have severe consequences for the population: importation of food, fuel, and medicine is blocked, and the 120,000 residents of the region are trapped, creating a humanitarian crisis.[214][215][216][217][218][219] Shortages of food, medicine, and electricity are widespread[220][221][222] with emergency reserves being rationed,[223] alongside massive unemployment[224][225] and school closures.[226][227]
During the blockade, Azerbaijan has deliberately damaged or cut various critical civilian infrastructure which supplies Artsakh: including gas, electricity, and Internet.[228][229][230][231][232][233] The region has been without gas since March 22, 2023 [234][235] and Artsakh authorities have resorted to daily 6-hour blackouts in order to ration the limited local electricity production, since Azerbaijan has prevented repair of a damaged supply line.[236][237][238]
Azerbaijani President Aliyev has said that "Armenians living in Karabakh must either accept Azerbaijani citizenship or look for another place to live" and has threatened military action if the Artsakh government does not disband.[239][42]
An estimated 28,000–38,000 people were killed between 1988 and 1994.[250]
Armenian military fatalities were reported to be between 5,856[251] and 6,000,[249] while 1,264 Armenian civilians were also killed.[251] Another 196 Armenian soldiers[251] and 400 civilians were missing.[252] According to the Union of Relatives of the Artsakh War Missing in Action Soldiers, as of 2014, 239 Karabakhi soldiers remain officially unaccounted for.[253]
Azerbaijan stated 11,557 of its soldiers were killed,[254] while Western and Russian estimates of dead combatants on the Azerbaijani side were 25,000–30,000.[249][255][251] 4,210 Azerbaijani soldiers[252] and 749 civilians were also missing.[252] The total number of Azerbaijani civilians killed in the conflict is unknown, although 167–763 were killed on one day in 1992 by the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh's forces.[256]
1994–2019
Although no precise casualty figures exist, between 1994 and 2009, as many as 3,000 people, mostly soldiers, had been killed, according to most observers.[45] In 2008, the fighting became more intense and frequent.[257] With 72 deaths in 2014, the year became the bloodiest since the war had ended.[97] Two years later, between 1 and 5 April 2016, heavy fighting along the Nagorno-Karabakh front left 91 Armenian (11 non-combat)[258][107] and 94 Azerbaijani soldiers dead, with two missing.[108] In addition, 15 civilians (nine Armenians and six Azerbaijanis) were killed.[259][260]
Azerbaijan stated 398 of its soldiers and 31 civilians were killed between 1994 and up to September 2020, right before the start of the 2020 conflict.[261] In comparison, the Caspian Defense Studies Institute NGO reported 1,008 Azerbaijani soldiers and more than 90 civilians were killed between 1994 and 2016.[262]
In the two-month 2020 fighting, thousands were killed, primarily soldiers, but also almost two hundred civilians.[273]
Between January and September 2020, 16 Azerbaijani[274] and 8 Armenian soldiers,[275] as well as an Azerbaijani civilian, were killed in sporadic clashes.[276] On 27 September 2020, a new large-scale war erupted that lasted until 10 November. According to Azerbaijan, the fighting left 2,906 Azerbaijani soldiers[277] and 100 civilians dead,[278] while six servicemen were still missing.[279] Armenian authorities stated the fighting had left 3,825 Armenian soldiers[280] and 85 civilians dead,[281] while 187 servicemen and 21 civilians were still missing.[282] Additionally, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights documented the deaths of 541 Syrian mercenaries fighting for Azerbaijan.[283] Two Russian soldiers were also killed when their helicopter was shot down by Azerbaijan by accident while flying in Armenian airspace near the border.[284] In addition, a 13-year-old Russian citizen was killed during an Armenian missile strike on the city of Ganja.[285]
Following the end of the war, eleven more Azerbaijani soldiers, six Azerbaijani civilians and one Russian peacekeeper were killed in clashes and landmine explosions in the region by the end of the year.[286][287][288][289]
2021–present
Twelve Azerbaijani civilians[290] and two soldiers were killed in 2021, by landmine explosions.[291][292][293] Seventeen Armenian[294] and ten Azerbaijani soldiers were also killed in shoot-outs in the border area,[295][296][297][298] while 38 Armenian soldiers were captured.[299][300] Twenty-eight of the captured Armenian soldiers were subsequently released.[301][302]
In 2022, three Armenian soldiers were killed and 14 wounded in an attack by Azerbaijani drones in Nagorno-Karabakh on 25 March.[303]
Russia is officially neutral and has sought to play the role of a mediator.[304][305][306] In its official statements, Russia calls for a peaceful settlement and restraint during skirmishes.[307] British journalist Thomas de Waal has argued that there is an Azerbaijani narrative that Russia has "consistently supported the Armenian side." According to de Waal, Russia "has more supported the Armenian side," but there have been various "different Russian actors at different times supporting both sides in this conflict." He argues that President Boris Yeltsin did not "want to see the Armenian side be defeated, but he also didn't want to supply them with too many weapons." De Waal concluded in 2012 that "Russia [is] playing both sides", but "ultimately more in the Armenian side."[308] Other commentators have argued that Russia plays both sides in the conflict.[309][310]Svante Cornell argued in 2018 that Russia "had been playing both sides of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict to gain maximum control over both, a policy that continues to this day."[311]
During the first Nagorno-Karabakh War, Russia was widely viewed as supporting the Armenian position due it providing Armenia with military assistance, including arms and indirect logistical support.[312][2] Russia supplied around $1 billion worth of weapons and, thus, "made a vital contribution to the Armenian victory."[1] According to de Waal, "greater Russian support for the Armenians" was one of the main factors behind the Armenian victory.[313] De Waal notes, "Yet it is not entirely clear how this support for the Armenians was translated on to the battlefield; to complicate things further, the Russians also gave some assistance to Azerbaijan."[314]
Following the first Nagorno-Karabakh War and up until 2022, Russia was Armenia's main arms supplier and the two countries are military allies.[315][316] Russia is sometimes described as Armenia's supporter in the conflict,[317][318] however, this view is widely challenged as Russia extensively sells arms to Azerbaijan.[50][319][320][321] Also, in February 2022, Aliyev and Putin signed a "Declaration of Allied Interaction" which elevated military ties between their countries and affirms "mutual respect for ... [the] territorial integrity and inviolability of the borders of the two countries" and obliges Azerbaijan and Russia to "refrain from any actions, including those carried out through third states, directed against each other."[322][323] The agreement also has provisions for joint military operations and assistance between Russian and Azerbaijan, including personnel training and production, maintenance, repair, and modernization of military equipment.[324] However, up until 2022 Armenia purchased Russian weaponry at a discount, while Azerbaijan pays the full price.[325] In 2022, Russia suspended arms delivery to Armenia.[326][327]
Turkey is widely considered Azerbaijan's main supporter in the conflict.[328][329][330] Svante Cornell wrote in 1998 that Turkey is the "only country that constantly expressed its support for Azerbaijan."[331] It provided Azerbaijan "active military help" during the war.[332] Turkey also supports Azerbaijan diplomatically.[333][334] Turkish and Azerbaijani armed forces cooperate extensively[335] and regularly hold military exercises.[336][337] Azerbaijan has also bought weapons from Turkey.[338]
Turkey closed its border with Armenia in April 1993 after Armenian forces captured Kalbajar.[339] Prior to that, the border was only open "on demand and only for transferring the humanitarian aid (mainly wheat delivery) to Armenia and for the operation of the weekly Kars-Gyumri train, which had been crossing the Turkish-Armenian border since the days of the Soviet Union."[340] Turkey has repeatedly refused to normalize and establish diplomatic relations with Armenia in solidarity with Azerbaijan over Karabakh.[341][342] Turkey and Azerbaijan signed the "Shusha Declaration" in Shusha, a city that Azerbaijan captured during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War.[343][344][345] The declaration reaffirmed the military and economic cooperation between the countries and Turkish President Erdogan said the opening of a Turkish consulate in Shusha "would be a message to the world and especially to Armenia."[346]
Iran
Iran is officially neutral and has sought to play the role of a mediator,[347] most notably in 1992. In its official statements, Iran calls for a peaceful settlement[348] and restraint during skirmishes.[349] At the same time, Iranian officials have repeatedly reaffirmed their support for Azerbaijan's territorial integrity.[h] Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated in 2020 that "While respecting the territorial integrity of the Azerbaijan Republic, Iran is fundamentally opposed to any move that would fuel conflict between the two neighbouring countries of the Azerbaijan Republic and Armenia."[355]
During the war, "Iran was domestically torn in devising a policy", but de facto "pursued a policy that combined official neutrality with growing support for Armenia," according to Svante Cornell.[356] Cornell argues that Iran has "pursued policies in the conflict inclined towards Armenia."[331] However, Iran's tacit support for the Armenian side[357][358][359] was limited to economic cooperation.[360][361]Terhi Hakala noted in 1998 that "as a geopolitical counter-weight to Turkey, Iran has strongly supported Armenia, especially by alleviating the effects of the Turkish blockade."[362] Cornell notes that during the war, Iran served as Armenia's "main purveyor of electricity and goods, and once the Armenian conquest of Karabakh had been completed, Iranian trucks began to supply most of the secessionist enclave's needs."[356] According to Bahruz Balayev, "Iran supported the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and gave some humanitarian aid to the [Azerbaijani] refugees, but in the meantime widely cooperates with Armenia and even Karabakh Armenian authorities."[363]Brenda Shaffer wrote that "Iran's cooperation with Armenia and its tacit support in the conflict with Azerbaijan over Karabagh strengthened Yerevan's actual and perceived power and consequently may have lessened its sense of urgency to resolve the conflict."[364]
In 2013, Mohsen Rezaee, who was commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) during the war, claimed that he "personally issued an order [...] for the Republic of Azerbaijan army to be equipped appropriately and for it to receive the necessary training." Rezaee added that "Many Iranians died in the Karabakh War. In addition to the wounded, who were transported to [Iran], many of the Iranian martyrs of the Karabakh War are buried in Baku."[365] In 2011, Hassan Ameli, a leading Iranian cleric, claimed that Iran provided Azerbaijan with arms and helped Afghan mujaheddin move to Azerbaijan.[366][367] The Iranian embassy in Armenia stated that they would not like unreliable information to affect friendly Armenian-Iranian relations: "We do not exclude the possibility that there are forces, which aim to create hindrances for our friendly relations."[368] In October 2020, several protests erupted in Iranian cities, including the capital Tehran and Tabriz, in support of Azerbaijan,[369][370] with many Iranian Azerbaijanis chanting pro-Azerbaijan slogans and protesting Iran's alleged arms support to Armenia via the Nordooz border crossing.[371]
Thomas Ambrosio suggested in 2000 that the US "supported Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, but enacted policies that effectively supported Armenia's irredentist policies."[372]Sergo Mikoyan argued in 1998 that the US response to the conflict has been "inconsistent, pulled in different directions by the legislative and executive branches of power." Congress was under the influence of the Armenian lobby, while the executive branch (the White House and the State Department) pursued a pro-Azerbaijani policy, which "reflects Turkish influence and the interests of oil companies."[373]Richard C. Longworth and Argam DerHartunian expressed similar views.[374][375]
Congress's pro-Armenian position was expressed in passing the Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act in 1992, which banned any assistance to Azerbaijan. It was effectively amended by the Senate in 2001 and waived by President George W. Bush starting from 2002.[376] The US provides military aid to both countries. Between 2005 and 2016 Azerbaijan received $8.5 million for counternarcotics assistance and $11.5 million for counterterrorism aid. In the same period, Armenia received only $41,000 for counternarcotics assistance and none for counterterrorism aid. According to EurasiaNet, "Much of the money for Azerbaijan has been targeted toward naval forces, to reduce the risk that it could be used against Armenia."[377] The Trump administration greatly increased the US military aid to Azerbaijan to around $100 million in fiscal years 2018–19, compared to less than $3 million in a year in FY 2016–17. The US aid is primarily "offered in the context of U.S. policy to increase pressure on Iran and focuses on Azerbaijan's Iranian border, but it also has implications for Armenia," according to Emil Sanamyan. In FY 2018, Armenia received $4.2 million in U.S. security assistance.[378]
The US has also provided humanitarian aid to Artsakh (some $36 million between 1998 and 2010),[379] including for demining.[380] The humanitarian aid has been criticized by Azerbaijan for legitimizing the "illegal regime in the occupied lands and damages the reputation of the US as a neutral mediator."[381]
Arms suppliers
In 1992, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) "requested its participating states to impose an embargo on arms deliveries to forces engaged in combat in the Nagorno-Karabakh area." However, it is a "voluntary multilateral arms embargo, and a number of OSCE participating states have supplied arms to Armenia and Azerbaijan since 1992."[382] The UN Security Council Resolution 85, passed in July 1993, called on states to "refrain from the supply of any weapons and munitions which might lead to an intensification of the conflict or the continued occupation of territory." According to SIPRI, "since 2002, the UN Security Council has no longer listed that it is 'actively seized of the matter'. As such, since 2002, it is assumed that the non-mandatory UN embargo is no longer active."[383]
Several foreign groups fought on both sides in the intense period of fighting in 1992–94. According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), both sides used mercenaries during the war, namely "Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian mercenaries or rogue units of the Soviet/Russian Army have fought on both sides."[407]
Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan made extensive use of mercenary pilots. According to HRW, "Most informed observers believe that mercenaries pilot most of Azerbaijan's air force."[408]
Several foreign groups fought on the Azerbaijani side: Chechen militants, Afghan mujahideen,[409] members of the Turkish nationalist Grey Wolves,[410] and the Ukrainian nationalist and neo-fascist UNA-UNSO.[411] The Chechen fighters in Karabakh were led by Shamil Basayev, who later became Prime Minister of Ichkeria (Chechnya), and Salman Raduyev.[412] Basayev famously participated in the battle of Shusha in 1992.[412][413] Saudi-born Ibn al-Khattab may have also joined them.[414] The Afghan mujahideen were mostly affiliated with the Hezb-e Islami, led by Afghan Prime Minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.[415][416] According to HRW, they were "clearly not motivated by religious or ideological reasons" and were, thus, mercenaries.[416] The recruitment of Afghan mujahideen, reportedly handled by paramilitary police chief Rovshan Javadov, was denied by Azerbaijani authorities.[416][417] They first arrived to Azerbaijan in fall 1993 and numbered anywhere between 1,500 and 2,500[416] or 1,000 and 3,000.[418] Armenia alleged that they were paid for by Saudi Arabia.[415] Afghan mujahideen constituted the most considerable influx of foreign fighters during the war.[418] Some 200 Grey Wolves were still present in the conflict zone as of September 1994 and were engaged in training Azerbaijani units.[419]
Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh Republic) has received diplomatic recognition[429] and diplomatic support, especially during the 2016 clashes, from three partially recognized states: Abkhazia,[i][430][431] South Ossetia,[j][432] and Transnistria.[k][433]
During the war, Greece adopted a pro-Armenian position[434] and supported it in international forums.[435][360] During the April 2016 and July 2020 clashes, Cyprus condemned Azerbaijan for violating the ceasefire.[436][437]
Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan reportedly told the Greek ambassador in 1993 that France and Russia were Armenia's only allies at the time.[438] According to a US State Department cable released in 2020, the French ambassador to the UN, Jean-Bernard Mérimée, succeeded in changing the wording of the UNSC Resolution 822 to state that it was "local Armenian forces", not "Armenian forces" that occupied Kalbajar. He also suggested treating the Armenian capture of Kalbajar not under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (an act of aggression), but Chapter VI (a dispute that should be settled peacefully).[439]
Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan has received explicit diplomatic support in the conflict from several countries and international organizations. Azerbaijan's strongest diplomatic supporters are Turkey and Pakistan,[440][441] which is the only UN member state not to have recognized Armenia's independence in support for Azerbaijan.[442] Turkish-backed unrecognized Northern Cyprus (Turkish Cyprus) also supports Azerbaijan.[443] The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)[444] and the Turkic Council[445] have repeatedly supported the Azerbaijani position. Some member states of these organizations, namely Uzbekistan[446] and Saudi Arabia[447] have voiced support for Azerbaijan's position on their own repeatedly. Lebanon, on the other hand, has not supported OIC's pro-Azerbaijani resolutions.[448]
Azerbaijan has received diplomatic support, namely for its territorial integrity, from three post-Soviet states that have territorial disputes: Ukraine,[449] Georgia,[450] and Moldova.[451] These three countries and Azerbaijan form the GUAM organization and support the Azerbaijani position in the format as well.[452] Serbia, with its own territorial dispute over Kosovo, also explicitly supports Azerbaijan's territorial integrity.[453][454][455]
On March 14, 2008, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution which "reaffirmed Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, expressing support for that country's internationally recognized borders and demanding the immediate withdrawal of all Armenian forces from all occupied territories there." It was adopted by a vote of 39 in favor to 7 against, while most countries either abstained or were absent. It was backed mostly by Muslim states[462][463] (31 were members of the OIC).[l] Non-Muslim states that supported the resolution included three post-Soviet states: Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, and five other nations: Cambodia, Colombia, Myanmar, Serbia, and Tuvalu. Thus, it was supported by seven OSCE members;[m] one NATO member (Turkey) and no EU member state.[464]
It was opposed by Angola, Armenia, France, India, Russia, United States, Vanuatu.[464] The OSCE Minsk Group co-chair countries (France, US, Russia) voted against the resolution. They argued that it "selectively propagates only certain of [the basic] principles to the exclusion of others, without considering the Co-Chairs' proposal in its balanced entirety." The co-chair countries called it a unilateral resolution, which "threatens to undermine the peace process," but reaffirmed their "support for the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, and thus do not recognize the independence of NK."[465]
Major ceasefire agreements and international mediation
Two major armistices occurred upon following the First and Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. Both ceasefires were brokered by Russia, with the first also being mediated by the OSCE Minsk Group (Russia, US, France). The 1994 Bishkek Protocol called for both sides to cease hostilities and engage in dialogue aimed at demilitarization of the region, return of refugees, and the creation of a CIS peacekeeping force.[466][467][468] As per the 2020 tripartite agreement, Armenia returned all territory it had occupied around Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan retained control over one-third of Nagorno-Karabakh proper that it captured. The 2020 agreement gave Russian peacekeepers a temporary but renewable mandate to the region.
Following the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, both Russia and the European Union have increased their presence in Armenia along the border with Azerbaijan in order to improve stability of the border and deter offensives from Azerbaijan.[469][470] Upon Armenia's request, Russia's Federal Security Service expanded its patrols within Armenia and the EU contributed a civilian monitoring mission. However, while both entities have deterred the possibility of full-scale warfare, they have been unable to fully prevent Azerbaijan's goals.[471]
Russia and the European Union have criticized each other's presence within Armenia. The European Union encouraged Armenia to seek alternative security alliances given "Russia's alleged readiness to guarantee the security of Armenia has proven to be non-existent."[472] Russia, in turn, criticized the EU and Armenia for implementing the civilian monitoring in Armenia and claims it is an effort by the West to diminish Russia's power in the region.[473][474]
Bishkek Protocol
A Russian-brokered ceasefire was signed in May 1994 and peace talks, mediated by the OSCE Minsk Group (Russia, US, France) have been held ever since by Armenia and Azerbaijan.[86] Azerbaijan has repeatedly accused the Minsk Group (Russia, US, France) of being pro-Armenian.[475][476][477] In 1996, when France was chosen by the OSCE to co-chair the Minsk Group, Azerbaijan asked the OSCE to reconsider the decision because France was perceived by Azerbaijan as pro-Armenian.[478] Svante Cornell argued in 1997 that France, the US and Russia are "more or less biased towards Armenia in the conflict."[479][480] In 2018 Azerbaijan accused the US and France of bias for allowing Bako Sahakyan, the then president of Artsakh, to visit their countries.[481][482]
2020 Ceasefire
On 9 November 2020, Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a ceasefire under mediation from Russia, with the Republic of Artsakh also agreeing to end hostilities.[483] According to the agreement, both sides retained control of the positions they held at midnight. Armenia returned the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh that it had occupied since the 1990s. Azerbaijan also retained control over one-third of Nagorno-Karabakh proper that it had captured during the war: including Shusha and Hadrut.[484][485][486][487] In total, the Armenian side lost roughly 75% of the territories in and around Nagorno-Karabakh that it controlled prior to the war.[488] Until 2020, an independent Azerbaijan had never exercised de facto control over the region.[489][490][491][492][493][494]
Approximately 2,000 Russian soldiers were deployed as peacekeeping forces around Nagorno-Karabakh with a mandate of at least five years. The peacekeepers were also given mandate over the Lachin corridor which following remains the only passage between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. The alternative Vardenis–Martakert route has been closed by Azerbaijan since it took control of the Dadivank-Sotk section (in Kalbajar) during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War (2020).[495][496]
The political status of Nagorno-Karabakh has remained unresolved since its declaration of independence from the Soviet Union in 1991.[497][498] Within the Soviet Union, the region was an ethnic Armenianautonomous oblast of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic. Since 1994, the United Nations Security Council, OSCE Minsk Group, and other bodies made various statements and proposed dialogue initiatives; none of them successful. The Republic of Artsakh is not recognized by any country, including Armenia, although international mediators and human rights organizations have emphasized self-determination for the local Armenian population, both as an internationally recognized right but also as a form of genocide prevention.[499][500][501][502]
Since the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, Azerbaijan has rescinded its offer of special status or autonomy to its indigenous Armenian residents and instead insists on their "integration" into Azerbaijan.[503][504] In 2023, Azerbaijani President Aliyev said that Armenian residents of Nagorno-Karabakh must be "reintegrated" as "normal citizen[s] of Azerbaijan" and that "the [special] status [for Armenians] went to hell. It failed; it was shattered to smithereens. It is not and will not be there. As long as I am president, there will be no status."[505] Aliyev also threatened military action if the Artsakh government does not disband.[506][507]
Political analyst Eric Hacopian has said that "[Expecting Armenians to submit to the rule of a nationalistic and undemocratic Azeri government] is the equivalent of asking 100,000 Israelis to live under Hamas."[524] Caucuses expert, Laurence Broers wrote "the blockade [of Nagorno-Karabakh] renders irrelevant any talk of the civil integration of Karabakh Armenians. It vindicates the worst fears of the Karabakh Armenian population."[525] If Azerbaijan takes control over the region, political analysts predict that Azerbaijan will arbitrarily detain and torture civilians, under the pretext of their association with the Artsakh government or with previous wars.[526] At least two incidents of Azerbaijani forces abducting Armenian residents around Azerbaijan's military checkpoint have been confirmed.[527][528][529]
^"Throughout the Soviet period, Moscow supported the Azerbaijani authorities against Armenian secessionists."[1] "Until the dissolution of the USSR, the Soviet authorities sided, in general, with Azerbaijan. [...] Soviet troops sent to the conflict area [...] on numerous occasions, took the side of the Azerbaijani forces to 'punish' the Armenians for raising the NK issue."[2] "Soviet troops have been in Nagorno-Karabakh for 2 1/2 years [...] The troops support armed Azerbaijani militias who have imposed a blockade of the region..."[3] Soviet troops directly intervened during Operation Ring in April–May 1991 on the Azerbaijani side.[4][5] It was essentially a "combined Soviet-Azerbaijan operation."[6]
^Armenia: 44,800 active servicemen (2019, IISS)[34] Artsakh: 18,000–20,000 active servicemen (2008, ARAG)[35]
^Also called the Karabakh conflict,[49]Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict,[50] or Armenian–Azerbaijani conflict. Usually referred to as the Artsakh conflict in Armenia[51] and the Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in Azerbaijan.[52]
^According to the Caucasian Calendar for 1917, in 1916 Shusha had an Armenian population of 23,396, forming 53.3% of the city's population.[68]
^The political status of Abkhazia is disputed. Having unilaterally declared independence from Georgia in 1992, Abkhazia is formally recognised as an independent state by 5 UN member states (two other states previously recognised it but then withdrew their recognition), while the remainder of the international community recognizes it as as de jure Georgian territory. Georgia continues to claim the area as its own territory, designating it as Russian-occupied territory.
^South Ossetia's status is disputed. It considers itself to be an independent state, but this is recognised by only a few other countries. The Georgian government and most of the world's other states consider South Ossetia de jure a part of Georgia's territory.
^Transnistria's political status is disputed. It considers itself to be an independent state, but this is not recognised by any UN member state. The Moldovan government and the international community consider Transnistria a part of Moldova's territory.
^Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brunei, Comoros, Djibouti, Gambia, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Yemen.
^Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Serbia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uzbekistan
^Cornell, Svante E. (1999). "The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict"(PDF). Report no. 46, Department of East European Studies. Uppsala University. p. 26. Sporadic clashes became frequent by the first months of 1991, with an ever-increasing organization of paramilitary forces on the Armenian side, whereas Azerbaijan still relied on the support of Moscow. [...] In response to this development, a joint Soviet and Azerbaijani military and police operation directed from Moscow was initiated in these areas during the Spring and Summer of 1991.
^Kramer, Andrew E. (29 January 2021). "Armenia and Azerbaijan: What Sparked War and Will Peace Prevail?". The New York Times. Retrieved 4 March 2021. Armenia has said that Turkey was directly involved in the fighting in and around Nagorno-Karabakh, and that a Turkish F-16 fighter shot down an Armenian jet. Turkey denied those accusations.
^Tsvetkova, Maria; Auyezov, Olzhas (9 November 2020). "Analysis: Russia and Turkey keep powder dry in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict". Reuters. Retrieved 4 March 2021. Turkey's support for Azerbaijan has been vital, and Azerbaijan's superior weaponry and battlefield advances have reduced its incentive to reach a lasting peace deal. Ankara denies its troops are involved in fighting but Aliyev has acknowledged some Turkish F-16 fighter jets remained in Azerbaijan after a military drill this summer, and there are reports of Russian and Turkish drones being used by both sides.
^Rudolph, Joseph Russell, ed. (2003). Encyclopedia of Modern Ethnic Conflicts. Greenwood Press. p. 208. ISBN978-0313313813. When the Soviet Union broke up in 1991 [...] the Karabakh conflict escalated further, from guerrilla warfare to full-scale conventional combat.
^Hauer, Neil (October 9, 2020). "Caucasus war a result of US retreat from the world". Asia Times. The past two weeks have provided one of the starkest examples of the consequences of this: the re-eruption of full-scale war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh.
^Tchilingirian, Hratch (1999). "Nagorno Karabagh: Transition and the elite". Central Asian Survey. 18 (4): 450. doi:10.1080/713656168. As characterized by Karabagh's defence minister, the current post-war situation in the region is 'a cold war between Azerbaijan and Karabagh'.
^Mutschler, Max; Bales, Marius (February 2020). "Global Militarisation Index 2019"(PDF). Bonn International Center for Conversion. p. 2. ISSN2521-7844. The unresolved secessionist conflict between Armenia (position 3) and Azerbaijan (position 10) over the Nagorno-Karabakh region continues to keep militarisation in the South Caucasus at a very high level.
Mulcaire, Jack (9 April 2015). "Face Off: The Coming War between Armenia and Azerbaijan". The National Interest. Archived from the original on 3 January 2017. Retrieved 14 December 2016. The mostly Armenian population of the disputed region now lives under the control of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, a micronation that is supported by Armenia and is effectively part of that country.
Cornell, Svante (2011). Azerbaijan Since Independence. New York: M.E. Sharpe. p. 135. ISBN978-0-7656-3004-9. Following the war, the territories that fell under Armenian control, in particular Mountainous Karabakh itself, were slowly integrated into Armenia. Officially, Karabakh and Armenia remain separate political entities, but for most practical matters the two entities are unified."
^ abChorbajian, Levon; Patrick Donabedian; Claude Mutafian (1994). The Caucasian Knot: The History and Geopolitics of Nagorno-Karabagh. London: Zed Books. pp. 13–18. ISBN1856492885. Unless otherwise stated, the statistics cited by the authors is from data compiled by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in its annual The Military Balance, published in 1993. Reference to these statistics can be found on pages 68–69 and 71–73 of the report.
^ ab"Armenia and Azerbaijan: Preventing War"(PDF). Europe Briefing N°60. International Crisis Group. 8 February 2011. p. 3. Archived from the original(PDF) on 20 May 2016. There are no exact casualty figures since 1994, but most observers agree that as many as 3,000 people, mostly soldiers, have died. Crisis Group phone interview, Jasur Sumerinli, military expert, August 2009.
^Rezvani, Babak (2014). Conflict and Peace in Central Eurasia: Towards Explanations and Understandings. Brill. p. 159. ISBN978-9004276369. The Karabakh conflict is an ethno-territorial conflict....
^Vock, Ido (2023-06-08). "Fear and loathing in Armenia". New Statesman. Retrieved 2023-06-09. President Aliyev told Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians to 'obey the laws of Azerbaijan [and] be a loyal and normal citizen of Azerbaijan'. He threatened that if the territory's separatist institutions were not dissolved, Azerbaijan would dissolve them by force and rejected the prospect of international protections for ethnic Armenians.
^"Kennan Cable No. 81: What's at Stake in Nagorno-Karabakh: U.S. Interests and the Risk of Ethnic Cleansing | Wilson Center". www.wilsoncenter.org. Archived from the original on 2023-04-04. Retrieved 2023-04-04. For nearly 30 years, they built a self-proclaimed independent republic with democratic elections, a free press, and a range of public institutions. Officially, it remained within the territorial boundaries of Azerbaijan, unrecognized by any foreign country, though international mediators made reference to the right of self-determination for local Armenians as part of ongoing peace talks.
^"A Peace to End All Peace? Statement on the International Actors Sponsoring So-Called Peace Negotiations Between Armenia and Azerbaijan". Lemkin Institute for Genocide Prevention. 2023-05-23. Archived from the original on 2023-05-31. Retrieved 2023-06-09. The Lemkin Institute believes that, given the circumstances, the self-determination of the people of Artsakh is a form of genocide prevention in addition to a right recognized by the Charter of the United Nations and several human rights treaties and declarations, which has become part of international jus cogens. Self-determination is further a recognized right of all peoples under oppressive colonial regimes.
^Hauer, Neil (2023-07-31). "Karabakh blockade reaches critical point as food supplies run low". www.intellinews.com. Retrieved 2023-08-01. With Azerbaijan now starving the 120,000 people it claims are its citizens, many observers now agree that the idea that Karabakh Armenians can live safely in Ilham Aliyev's Azerbaijan is hardly credible.
^Hauer, Neil (2023-07-31). "Karabakh blockade reaches critical point as food supplies run low". www.intellinews.com. Retrieved 2023-08-01. Khachatryan's detention confirms the fears of many Karabakh Armenians that, if Azerbaijan assumes control over Karabakh, it will detain (and torture) them arbitrarily, using their participation in one or more of the wars as justification. This criteria extends to nearly every male resident of the small enclave. "Arrests with linkages to the past wars, local army or the [Karabakh] government …would quality almost all local men for detentions," wrote Olesya Vartanyan, International Crisis Group's senior analyst for the South Caucasus. The detainees can expect torture or worse, as the Armenian prisoners of war following the 2020 war conflict experienced.
^"A Peace to End All Peace? Statement on the International Actors Sponsoring So-Called Peace Negotiations Between Armenia and Azerbaijan". Lemkin Institute for Genocide Prevention. 2023-05-23. Archived from the original on 2023-05-31. Retrieved 2023-06-09. The Lemkin Institute believes that, given the circumstances, the self-determination of the people of Artsakh is a form of genocide prevention in addition to a right recognized by the Charter of the United Nations and several human rights treaties and declarations, which has become part of international jus cogens. Self-determination is further a recognized right of all peoples under oppressive colonial regimes.
^Hovannisian, Richard G. (1996). The Republic of Armenia: From London to Sèvres, February–August 1920. Berkeley: University of California Press. pp. 140–52.
^Кавказский календарь на 1917 год [Caucasian calendar for 1917] (in Russian) (72nd ed.). Tiflis: Tipografiya kantselyarii Ye.I.V. na Kavkaze, kazenny dom. 1917. pp. 190–197. Archived from the original on 4 November 2021.
^"Q&A with Arsène Saparov: No Evidence that Stalin 'Gave' Karabakh to Azerbaijan". armenian.usc.edu. 10 December 2018. Of all the documents I have seen, there is no direct evidence of Stalin doing or saying something in those 12 days in the summer of 1921 that [resulted in this decision on Karabakh]. A lot of people just assume that since Stalin was an evil person, it would be typical of someone evil to take a decision like that.
^"Nagorno Karabakh's Petition to Prime Minister Nikita Khrushchev: 19 May, 1964". ANI Armenian Research Center. 29 May 2017. Archived from the original on 18 October 2022. Retrieved 16 November 2022. In 1923, within the territorial borders of Azerbaijan, Mountainous Karabakh was given autonomy, and the regions of Shamkhar, Khanlar, Dashkesan and Shahumian, where the Armenian population is predominant (approximately 90 per cent), were directly incorporated into the Azerbaijan SSR. Thus, the Armenians of Karabagh were cut off from the Armenian SSR and Mountainous Karabakh Autonomous Republic failed to include all Armenian regions. The rights of the autonomous region were gradually curtailed and presently are almost entirely abrogated. The Armenian population of the Azerbaijani SSR has been subjected to chauvinistic policies creating extremely unfavorable conditions of life.
^Four UN Security Council resolutions, passed in 1993, called for the withdrawal of Armenian forces from the regions falling outside the borders of the former NKAO.
^Using numbers provided by journalist Thomas de Waal for the area of each rayon, as well as the area of the Nagorno-Karabakh Oblast and the total area of Azerbaijan are (in km2):
1,936, Kelbajar;
1,835, Lachin;
802, Kubatly;
1,050, Jebrail;
707, Zangelan;
842, Aghdam;
462, Fizuli;
75, exclaves;
totaling 7,709 km2 (2,976 sq mi) or 8.9%: De Waal. Black Garden, p. 286.
^ abKofman, Michael (2 October 2020). "Armenia–Azerbaijan War: Military Dimensions of the Conflict". russiamatters.org. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Archived from the original on 5 October 2020. Retrieved 3 October 2020. On 27 September 2020, Azerbaijan launched a military offensive, resulting in fighting that spans much of the line of contact in the breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh...((cite web)): CS1 maint: bot: original URL status unknown (link)
^Kucera, Joshua (29 September 2020). "As fighting rages, what is Azerbaijan's goal?". eurasianet.org. Archived from the original on 4 October 2020. Retrieved 29 September 2020. The Azerbaijani offensive against Armenian forces is its most ambitious since the war between the two sides formally ended in 1994.
^Jones, Dorian (28 September 2020). "Turkey Vows Support for Azerbaijan in Escalating Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict". Voice of America. Archived from the original on 1 October 2020. Retrieved 28 September 2020. 'Turkey is already supporting Azerbaijan militarily, technical assistance and arms sales, providing critical military support, especially in terms of armed drones and technical expertise', said Turkish analyst Ilhan Uzgel.((cite news)): CS1 maint: bot: original URL status unknown (link)
^On 21 October 2021, the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Azerbaijan published a list of dead servicemen. It said 2,908 people were killed during the war, with another 6 missing in action,[1] although at least two of the soldiers named were killed after the conflict ended,[2][3] leaving a total of 2,906 servicemen confirmed killed in the war.
^Khudoyan, Knar (19 October 2022). "Will Armenia and Azerbaijan reach a peace deal?". openDemocracy. Retrieved 2023-04-22. Azerbaijan has now occupied roughly 50 square kilometres of Armenian territory since the 2020 conflict.
^"Armenia's Defense Ministry Concealed Azerbaijani Advances Near Syunik Village". CIVILNET. 2022-03-31. Retrieved 2023-06-06. A #CivilNetCheck visual investigation confirmed, through the study of satellite imagery, that the new road leading to the Azerbaijani positions was built last May. This means that the advance by the Azerbaijani troops into Armenia was concealed from the public for nearly a year.
^Badalian, Susan (2023-04-03). "Azeri Troops Hold On To 'Newly Occupied Armenian Territory'". «Ազատ Եվրոպա/Ազատություն» ռադիոկայան (in Armenian). Retrieved 2023-06-12. Local government officials and farmers said Tegh lost a large part of its agricultural land and pastures. Some of them said that the Azerbaijani military made bigger territorial gains than is admitted by official Yerevan.
^"Russia once again alleges ceasefire violation by Azerbaijan". KarabakhSpace.eu. Retrieved 2023-06-02. This is now the second time ever that Moscow has accused Azerbaijan of violating the ceasefire, after it called out Baku for its actions on 26 March.
^Chair of the Delegation for relations with the South Caucasus, MEP Marina Kaljurand, the European Parliament's Standing Rapporteur on Armenia, MEP Andrey Kovatchev, and the European Parliament's Standing Rapporteur on Azerbaijan, MEP Željana Zovko (17 November 2021). "Statement on the escalation on the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the Nagorno- Karabakh conflict"(PDF). europarl.europa.eu. Archived(PDF) from the original on 17 November 2021. Retrieved 21 November 2021.((cite web)): CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
^"Aliyev offers 'amnesty' to Stepanakert authorities if they dissolve government and parliament". OC Media. 2023-05-29. Retrieved 2023-06-02. 'Whatever will happen there, the border will be where we say it should be. They [the Armenians] know that we can do it. No one will help them, not the retired French policemen from Europe, not others, not anyone else', said Aliyev, apparently referring to the EU Monitoring Mission in Armenia.
^Bedevian, Astghik (2023-03-29). "Baku Slams Head Of EU Monitoring Mission In Armenia". «Ազատ Եվրոպա/Ազատություն» ռադիոկայան (in Armenian). Retrieved 2023-06-13. 'Many Armenians believe there will be a spring offensive by Azerbaijan. If this doesn't happen, our mission is already a success,' Markus Ritter, the German head of the monitoring mission, told Germany's Deutsche Welle broadcaster this week.
^Stepanian, Ruzanna (2023-05-29). "Aliyev Again Threatens Armenia, Karabakh". «Ազատ Եվրոպա/Ազատություն» ռադիոկայան (in Armenian). Retrieved 2023-06-13. Aliyev said on Sunday that apart from recognizing Azerbaijani sovereignty over Karabakh Yerevan must also meet a number of other conditions set by Azerbaijan. That includes delimiting the Armenian-Azerbaijani border on Baku's terms and opening a corridor to the Nakhichevan exclave, he said. 'They must not forget that Armenian villages are visible from here,' he added during a visit to the border town of Lachin.
^"Aliyev, a Challenge to Armenian Sovereignty and the Rules-Based World Order". Journal on World Affairs, UCLA. 2022-09-21. Retrieved 2023-06-14. It is enough to look at the continuous pattern of diverse threats, ranging from military to economic, made by the Aliyev regime to understand who the aggressor is and what the goals are. For example, Aliyev recently threatened full-scale war with Armenia if the country tries to pursue any international discussions or negotiations about the status of Nagorno-Karabakh and the thousands of Armenians who still live in their indigenous lands under the protection of the Russian peacekeeping force.
^Sukiasyan, Narek (2022-09-15). "Armenia is under attack". www.ips-journal.eu. Retrieved 2023-04-25. At midnight on Tuesday Azerbaijan launched the largest attack on the Republic of Armenia (unrelated to the line of contact of Nagorno Karabakh) in the entire history of the conflict between these two countries.
^Reichardt, Adam (2022-09-20). "What's behind the new round of clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan". New Eastern Europe. Retrieved 2023-05-02. The September clashes were the most serious armed incident between Armenia and Azerbaijan since the 2020 Karabakh war...however, this time the clashes took place along their shared southern border (not the contested region).
^Kucera, Joshua (2022-09-14). "Fighting continues on Armenia-Azerbaijan border". Eurasianet. It is the first time that Azerbaijan has struck targets in large numbers inside Armenian territory; most fighting between the two sides has previously taken place in and around Nagorno-Karabakh, internationally recognized as Azerbaijani territory.
^"Treading a Tightrope on the Armenian Border: Reviewing the First Two Months of the EU's New Mission in the South Caucasus". Caucasus Watch. 2023-04-25. Retrieved 2023-06-15. Unrecognised, undemarcated or otherwise contested borderlines are used as instruments by Russian and Azerbaijani forces, respectively, to destabilise, create 'new realities', and enforce concessions. Everyday livelihoods in the conflict zones are violently disrupted as a result: villagers can no longer safely access farmlands, schools, water resources, relatives or religious sites.
^Von Joeden-Forgey, Elisa; Victoria Massimino, Irene (May 6, 2023). "Country Visit". Lemkin Institute for Genocide Prevention. Retrieved 2023-05-23. Azeri soldiers routinely fire on Armenian farmers as they tend to their crops, disrupting their daily lives.
^Toal, Gerard; Seferian, Nareg (Nov 25, 2022). "Suddenly a borderland: The new borderization between Armenia and Azerbaijan". Eurasianet. All along Armenia's newly militarized eastern border, fearful villagers have stopped using some land that they had previously employed for cultivation or pasture. Incidents of shooting and cattle rustling have become common over the past two years, some resolved through Russian mediation, some not.
^Kucera, Joshua (Jul 2, 2021). "In southern Armenia, warily sizing up the new neighbors". Eurasianet. For the Armenians who live in the border regions, the effects have been manifold. They have lost access to farmland or pastures they used to use; many have sold, slaughtered, or relocated livestock as a result. Some human residents have moved away, as well, fearing for the future here.
^Forestier-Walker, Robin. "Armenia and Azerbaijan's new-old border war". www.aljazeera.com. Retrieved 2023-05-24. ...the border areas between Armenia's Syunik and Gegharkunik provinces, and Azerbaijan's newly established East Zangezur region have become militarised front lines.
^Smeltzer, Mike (2023-05-24). "War Deepens a Regional Divide". Freedom House. Retrieved 2023-05-25. [Azerbaijan] launched a major incursion into the Republic of Armenia in 2022, and in early 2023 it [Azerbaijan] further isolated the ethnic Armenians who remained in Nagorno-Karabakh by blocking a crucial road link under the guise of "environmental protests".
^"Red Flag Alert for Genocide - Azerbaijan Update 6". Lemkin Institute. Retrieved 2023-05-26. The so-called "environmentalists" who have blocked the Lachin corridor have shown themselves to be little interested in environmentalism. They chant "Karabakh is Azerbaijan" and carry signs supporting Aliyev and the Azerbaijani military....This is all a far cry from what one would see at an environmental protest.
^Gavin, Gabriel (2022-12-13). "Nagorno-Karabakh: protestors cause crisis in Russia's backyard". Reaction. Retrieved 2022-12-27. Tom de Waal, a senior fellow at Carnegie Europe and author of several books about the conflict, has claimed that the environmental protestors are akin to the "Little Green Men" used by Russia to occupy Crimea in 2014 while denying it was invading.
^Górecki, Wojciech; Strachota, Krzysztof (2023-03-06). "The undeclared war. A new phase of the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict". OSW Centre for Eastern Studies. Retrieved 2023-06-14. Although this venture is being spearheaded by alleged environmental activists demanding permission to monitor Karabakh's rare metal deposits...it would be impossible to carry out such an action in Azerbaijan without the cooperation of the authorities.
^"Implementation of the common foreign and security policy – annual report 2022: Motion for a resolution Paragraph 80 a (new)"(PDF). European Parliament. 2023-01-11. The European Parliament adopted the Implementation of the common foreign and security policy – annual report 2022 resolution on January 18. The plenary session also adopted an amendment, saying the European parliament "strongly denounces Azerbaijan's illegal blockade of the Lachin corridor, in violation of the trilateral statement of 9 November 2020, as it threatens to precipitate an intentional humanitarian crisis for the people of NagornoKarabakh; demands that the Azerbaijani authorities restore freedom of movement through the Lachin corridor with immediate effect."
^Badalian, Susan; Sahakian, Nane (2023-06-16). "Relief Supplies To Karabakh Blocked By Baku". «Ազատ Եվրոպա/Ազատություն» ռադիոկայան (in Armenian). Retrieved 2023-06-17. Azerbaijan did not allow relief supplies to and medical evacuations from Nagorno-Karabakh [Artsakh] for the second consecutive day on Friday, aggravating a humanitarian crisis in the Armenian-populated region effectively cut off from the outside world since December [2022].
^"Europe watches on as humanitarian crisis unfolds in Nagorno-Karabakh". 7 January 2023. According to Tom de Waal, a senior fellow at Carnegie Europe and author of several books on the conflict, the demonstrators had 'evidently been sent there by the government in Baku,' likening them to the 'little green men' Russia dispatched to occupy Crimea in 2014, all the while denying it had invaded.
^"Lachin Corridor and Nagorno-Karabakh - Hansard - UK Parliament". The report shows that they are clearly 'representatives of Azerbaijani non-governmental organizations, which are directly and exclusively financed by the Azerbaijani government, or the Heydar Aliyev Foundation headed by the first vice president and first lady of Azerbaijan. Furthermore, evidence has been registered that representatives of the Azerbaijani special services are also amongst the alleged "environmental activists" who are currently blocking the only lifeline' for Nagorno-Karabakh.
^"Who really are Azerbaijan's 'environmental activists' blockading Karabakh?". CIVILNET. 2022-12-14. Retrieved 2023-06-20. The "activists" who have been keeping Karabakh under blockade for three consecutive days now have "interesting" identities, but not for any environmental protection activities. In fact, they represent organizations that have very clear connections with the Azerbaijani government and are financed, at least in part, by the state.
^"Müstəqil jurnalistlər Şuşa-Xankəndi yolundakı aksiyaya buraxılmadı" [Independent journalists were not allowed to participate in the action on the Shusha-Khankendi road]. MEYDAN.TV (in Azerbaijani). 2022-12-14. Retrieved 2023-03-15. On December 14, Meydan TV employees Aytaj Tapdığ, Khayala Aghayeva and independent journalist Teymur Karimov were detained by civilians and black masked men while going to prepare a report from the Shusha-Khankendi road...The journalists say that before they were returned, their cameras were confiscated and their footage was deleted.
^ ab"Treading a Tightrope on the Armenian Border: Reviewing the First Two Months of the EU's New Mission in the South Caucasus". Caucasus Watch. 2023-04-25. Retrieved 2023-06-12. The following week saw a reconfiguration of road links and military positions in the Lachin Corridor, with Azerbaijani forces constructing a new military post, taking control of strategic heights, ignoring Russian calls to return to their original locations, and seizing land in Armenia around the new road leading from the villages of Tegh and Kornidzor towards Karabakh.
^ abAvetisyan, Ani; Aghayev, Ismi (2023-03-26). "Azerbaijan 'breaches line of contact' seizing positions in Nagorno-Karabakh". OC Media. Retrieved 2023-03-28. The Russian Defence Ministry said Azerbaijani troops had 'breached' the line of contact in violation of the 9 November ceasefire agreement, which brought an end to the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. They said Azerbaijani forces had taken up new positions near Shusha.
^ abStepanian, Ruzanna (2023-03-27). "Bypass Road In Karabakh Not Used After Azeri Advance". «Ազատ Եվրոպա/Ազատություն» ռադիոկայան (in Armenian). Retrieved 2023-03-28. Azerbaijani forces continued to occupy on Monday a strategic hill near the Lachin corridor seized by them at the weekend, further complicating Nagorno-Karabakh's communication with Armenia and the outside world...the high ground occupied by Azerbaijani soldiers overlooks the barely passable bypass road leading to the Armenian border.
^Khulian, Artak; Stepanian, Ruzanna (2023-03-31). "Armenian Government Blamed For Fresh Azeri Territorial Gains". «Ազատ Եվրոպա/Ազատություն» ռադիոկայան (in Armenian). Retrieved 2023-06-14. Azerbaijani troops redeployed on Thursday morning to more parts of the Lachin district adjacent to the Armenian border, blocking the old [Lachin] corridor section.
^"Azerbaijani 'eco-protest' ends after checkpoint installed on Lachin Corridor". OC Media. 2023-04-28. Retrieved 2023-04-28. The Azerbaijani 'eco-activists' blocking the Lachin Corridor near Shusha (Shushi) have suspended their action following the installation of an Azerbaijani border checkpoint on the corridor. According to identical articles published across Azerbaijani state and pro-government news websites on Friday afternoon, the eco-activists said they were 'very happy with the establishment of a border control mechanism', which they reportedly said would 'ensur[e] transparency, rule of law and safety of traffic on the road'.
^Loe, Catherine (2023-04-27). "Azerbaijan sets up checkpoints on the Lachin corridor". Economist Intelligence Unit. Retrieved 2023-05-03. The move [installation of a checkpoint] has increased the blockade of Nagorny Karabakh...A checkpoint on the border would give Azerbaijan the ability to stop any cars travelling between Armenia and Nagorny Karabakh.
^Gray, Sébastien (2023-03-26). "Azerbaijan Makes Advances in Artsakh, Violating Ceasefire". Atlas News. Retrieved 2023-03-31. Russian peacekeepers have been notified of the latest incident, and have stated they are presently in talks with Azerbaijan to withdraw from the area, and "stop engineering work" that Azerbaijan began after taking the position.
^Korah, Susan (2023-05-18). "Time for Canada to step up in the South Caucasus". Open Canada. Retrieved 2023-05-19. While they [the "eco-activists"] have since departed, a new corridor checkpoint guarded by Azeri soldiers continues to restrict the movement of people and goods.
^"June Alerts and May Trends 2023". www.crisisgroup.org. 2023-05-31. Retrieved 2023-06-19. Checkpoint on Lachin corridor faced fierce opposition amid humanitarian crisis....Azerbaijani military consolidated [the] blockade, however, leading to even fewer crossings and reduced transportation of goods.
^"New Troubles in Nagorno-Karabakh: Understanding the Lachin Corridor Crisis". www.crisisgroup.org. 2023-05-22. Retrieved 2023-05-23. While travellers were already few due to the blockade, the ICRC reports that its ability to get people across has been curtailed [since the installation of the checkpoint], leaving only the Russian peacekeepers to facilitate trips to Armenia for medical care.
^"Uncertainty plagues Nagorno-Karabakh students pursuing higher education". CIVILNET. 2023-06-20. Retrieved 2023-06-20. When Azerbaijan's blockade began, kindergartens and schools were among the first institutions to be shut down due to gas supply cuts and shortages, depriving students across dozens of schools of the right to education. Since then, the operations of nearly every educational institution in Nagorno-Karabakh, including NGOs with branches in Stepanakert and across the region, have been deeply disturbed by the blockade.
^"Azerbaijan's Blockade of 120,000 Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh and its Humanitarian Crisis". Center for Truth and Justice. 2022-12-22. Retrieved 2023-01-27. Education: The outcome of all this has led to the closure of all the schools. 30,000 kindergarten to 12th-grade students are being deprived of education. College students are unable to complete their year-end final exams, thus affecting their higher education plans and graduation.
^"Ensuring free and safe access through the Lachin Corridor". Council of Europe - Parliamentary Assembly. 2023-06-20. p. Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons. PDF. [the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe]...is extremely worried by events...which culminated on 12 December 2022 with the interruption of the free and safe passage through the Lachin corridor and the subsequent deliberate cutting of electricity and gas supplies to the region... [The Assembly]...urges Azerbaijan to restore electricity and gas supplies without delay or impediment.
^KOULOGLOU, Fabio Massimo CASTALDO, Adam BIELAN, Carlo FIDANZA, Charlie WEIMERS, Angel DZHAMBAZKI, Assita KANKO, Joachim Stanisław BRUDZIŃSKI, Elżbieta KRUK, Anna ZALEWSKA, Eugen JURZYCA, Bert-Jan RUISSEN, Emmanouil FRAGKOS, Robert HAJŠEL, Evin INCIR, Marina KALJURAND, Pedro MARQUES, Isabel SANTOS, Frédérique RIES, Nicolae ŞTEFĂNUȚĂ, Izaskun BILBAO BARANDICA, Michal ŠIMEČKA, Dita CHARANZOVÁ, Petras AUŠTREVIČIUS, Javier NART, Urmas PAET, Hilde VAUTMANS, Ramona STRUGARIU, Karin KARLSBRO, Svenja HAHN, Klemen GROŠELJ, Olivier CHASTEL, Nathalie LOISEAU, Bernard GUETTA, Karen MELCHIOR, Katalin CSEH, Vlad GHEORGHE, Viola VON CRAMON-TAUBADEL, Stelios. "JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the humanitarian consequences of the blockade in Nagorno-Karabakh | RC-B9-0075/2023 | European Parliament". www.europarl.europa.eu. Retrieved 2023-06-22. whereas this humanitarian crisis was further aggravated by Azerbaijan's disruption of the natural gas supply to Nagorno-Karabakh, which left houses, hospitals and schools without heating...[the European Parliament]...urges Azerbaijan to refrain from undermining the functioning of transport, energy and communication connections between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh in future.((cite web)): CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
^"Statement Condemning the Azerbaijani Blockade of the Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh)"(PDF). International Association of Genocide Scholars. 1 February 2023. The blockade and deliberate attacks on the critical infrastructure of Artsakh are a violation of Article 11.1, Right to Adequate Standard of Living and Article 12, The Right to Healthcare of International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
^"Red Flag Alert for Genocide - Azerbaijan - Update 5". Lemkin Institute. Retrieved 2023-05-04. By cutting access to necessary utilities, more than 120,000 civilians (including children and the elderly), hospitals, schools, universities, and kindergartens have been, deliberately, deprived of gas, heating, and hot water.
^Hill, Nathaniel (2023-02-24). "Genocide Emergency: Azerbaijan's Blockade of Artsakh". genocidewatch. Retrieved 2023-05-08. Azerbaijan has repeatedly turned off the supply of natural gas and electricity to Artsakh, subjecting its people to freezing temperatures.
^amartikian (2023-05-04). "Consequences of the ongoing blockade in Nagorno-Karabakh". English Jamnews. Retrieved 2023-05-05. On May 3 group of NK residents set up tents on the road and announced an indefinite protest — "No to the ethnic cleansing of Artsakh". They demand the removal of the checkpoint.
^By 21 October 2021, the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Azerbaijan (MN) published a list of 2,908 servicemen who were confirmed killed during the war,[14] although at least two of the soldiers named were killed after the conflict ended,[15][16] leaving a total of 2,906 servicemen confirmed killed in the war.
^By 27 September 2021, 84 civilians were confirmed killed in the conflict, 80 of which died in the Republic of Artsakh and 4 were killed in Armenia.[17][18] Another 22 were still missing.[19] Subsequently, the number of civilians missing was updated to 21 by 21 March 2022,[20] bringing the total number of confirmed civilian fatalities to 85.
^18 civilians were killed by landmines between November 2020, and July 2021,[21] of which six died in 2020,[22] leaving a total of 12 reported killed in 2021.
^Benson, Brett V. (2012). Constructing International Security: Alliances, Deterrence, and Moral Hazard. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 67. ISBN978-1107027244.
^Buniatian, Heghine (February 28, 2019). "Armenia, Russia Sign More Arms Deals". azatutyun.am. RFE/RL. The military alliance with Russia entitles Armenia to buying Russian weapons at discounted prices. Moscow lent the Armenian government $200 million for such arms acquisitions in 2015.
^Bhutia, Sam (October 28, 2019). "Armenia-Azerbaijan: Who's the big defense spender?". EurasiaNet. Russia, one of the largest arms exporters in the world, sells weapons to both sides in the conflict – though Armenia, as a member of the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization, gets a discount.
^Balayev, Bahruz (2013). The Right to Self-Determination in the South Caucasus: Nagorno Karabakh in Context. Lexington Books. p. 70. ISBN978-0739178287.
^"Iran Report". rferl.org. RFE/RL. August 17, 2004. Archived from the original on 9 August 2020. Khatami said Iran is ready to contribute to a peaceful solution of the conflict. He added that Iran considers Nagorno-Karabakh part of Azerbaijan and that the use of force in settling international problems is "unacceptable."
^ abcDinu, Mihai-Ștefan (2010). "The ethnical-religious context of the armed conflicts from the Caucasus between 1990 and 2002". Strategic Impact. Bucharest: Romanian National Defence University "Carol I" Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies (4): 35. Archived from the original on 2013-09-21. However, Russia was not the only ally of Armenia, but also Greece and Iran, both with a long history of tense relations with Turkey. Greece supported Armenia both by delivering military and economic assistance and diplomatic representation by promoting Armenia's interests in the EU and NATO. Iran provided trade opportunities and an opening to the maritime space.
^Rudolph, Joseph Russell (2008). Hot Spot: North America and Europe. ABC-CLIO. pp. 185–186. ISBN978-0313336218. Iran supports Armenia [...] To be sure, the assistance provided to Armenia and Azerbaijan respectively by these neighboring states has been limited to diplomatic support and occasional economic favors.
^Balayev, Bahruz (2013). "Islamic Republic of Iran". The Right to Self-determination in the South Caucasus: Nagorno Karabakh in Context. Rowman & Littlefield. p. 69. ISBN978-0739178270.
^Vaserman, Arie; Ginat, Rami (1994). "National, Territorial or Religious Conflict? The Case of Nagorno‐Karabakh". Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 17 (4): 358. doi:10.1080/10576109408435961.. Original source: S. Mitin and M. Madza, "Russia with Armenia's Help Tries to Put Pressure on Azerbaijan" (an interview with Yagub Mamedov, the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan), Izvestiia, March 25, 1992, p. 2.
^Azadian, Edmond Y. (1999). History on the Move: Views, Interviews and Essays on Armenian Issues. Wayne State University Press. p. 173. ISBN978-0814329160. But as subsequent events evolved it became all too apparent that Ukraine has steadfastly stood behind Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict all along. ...it was reported from Stepanakert that Ukraine had shipped 40 tanks to Azerbaijan. Later that number was raised to 59. Ukraine had also supplied Azerbaijan with Mig-21 attack planes....
^Chorbajian, Levon; Mutafian, Claude; Donabedian, Patrick (1994). The Caucasian Knot: The History and Geopolitics of Nagorno-Karabagh. Zed Books. p. 34. ISBN978-1856492874. Alpaslan Turkesh, founder of the Turkish fascist Grey Wolves, acknowledged that his followers were fighting in Karabagh with Azerbaijani forces, though it was reported in late 1992 that they had returned to Turkey.((cite book)): CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
^In a 2010 interview, Mykola Karpyuk, a leader of the UNA-UNSO said that "many Ukrainians", including members of the organization fought on the Azerbaijani side. Baiyev, Bakhram (17 September 2010). "В случае войны мы окажем Баку посильную помощь". vesti.az (in Russian). Archived from the original on 18 September 2010.
^Khalilova, Konul (May 14, 2002). "Chechen Fighter's Death Reveals Conflicted Feelings in Azerbaijan". eurasianet.org. EurasiaNet. Archived from the original on 19 August 2020. Some say he joined the Chechen guerrillas fighting on Azerbaijan's side during the 1992–93 Nagorno-Karabakh war, though Ashurov and the Ministry of Defense's spokesman dismiss this idea.
^Center for Strategic and International Studies (1997). Brzezinski, Zbigniew; Sullivan, Paige (eds.). Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States: Documents, Data, and Analysis. M.E. Sharpe. p. 616. ISBN978-1563246371. It is also revealed that a new force of 200 armed members of the Grey Wolves organization has been dispatched from Turkey in preparation for a new Azeri offensive and to train units of the Azeri army.
^Blakkisrud, Helge; Kolstø, Pål (2012). "Dynamics of de facto statehood: the South Caucasian de facto states between secession and sovereignty". Southeast European and Black Sea Studies. 12 (2): 295. doi:10.1080/14683857.2012.686013. S2CID153522424. ...the three South Caucasian de facto states have mutually recognized each other, as well as being recognized by (unrecognized) Transnistria.
^"Telephone conversation with NKR Foreign Minister Karen Mirzoyan". mid.gospmr.org. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PMR. 4 April 2016. Archived from the original on 9 April 2016. The head of the Pridnestrovian diplomacy expressed compassion and support to the people of Artsakh in connection with the escalation of tension on the part of the Republic of Azerbaijan.
^Yiallourides, Christodoulos K.; Tsakonas, Panayotis J., eds. (2001). Greece and Turkey after the End of the Cold War. New York and Athens: Aristide D. Caratzas. p. 412. ISBN0892415649. Greece, on the other hand, had no particular reasons to shun Azerbaijan, but its historical friendship with the Armenian people, and shared concerns over Turkish aggression, naturally induced a pro-Armenian Greek policy.
^Leonidas Chrysanthopoulos, Ambassador of Greece to Armenia in 1993–94:
Chrysanthopoulos, Leonidas (2002). Caucasus Chronicles: Nation-building and Diplomacy in Armenia, 1993–1994. Gomidas Institute. ISBN978-1884630057.
p. 66: "I told him that they should be very careful on the Fizuli issue, because if it were to fall into Armenian hands, the international condemnation would be so strong that Greece would no longer be able to support Armenia in international forums and particularly in the European Union.
p. 68: "Greece was doing everything possible in all the other international forums to help Armenia and to bring peace to the troubled area.
^Leonidas Chrysanthopoulos, Ambassador of Greece to Armenia in 1993–94, wrote: "Ter-Petrossian [...] told me that at the moment Russia and France were the only allies of Armenia. Both countries had reacted in an effective way to Turkey within the United Nations Security Council and the CSCE, and they forced the United States to adopt a more objective position on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue." Chrysanthopoulos, Leonidas (2002). Caucasus Chronicles: Nation-building and Diplomacy in Armenia, 1993–1994. Gomidas Institute. pp. 67–68. ISBN978-1884630057.
"Узбекистан и Азербайджан наращивают сотрудничество [Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan are increasing cooperation]". old.president.uz (in Russian). Press Service of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan. 25 September 2010. Archived from the original on 9 August 2020. В этой связи позиция Республики Узбекистан по решению проблемы Нагорного Карабаха остается твердой и неизменной. Узбекистан открыто ее подтверждал при голосовании инициированных Азербайджаном соответствующих резолюций Генеральной Ассамблеи ООН в 2008 году. Узбекистан последовательно выступал и продолжает выступать за мирное, политическое решение нагорно-карабахского конфликта и при этом главным условием урегулирования считает обеспечение территориальной целостности и суверенитета Азербайджана.
"Joint press statements of Presidents of Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan". en.president.az. President of the Republic of Azerbaijan. 27 September 2010. Archived from the original on 23 November 2017. While describing Uzbekistan's position on the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, Islam Karimov said: [...] Uzbekistan considers the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan as one of the key preconditions for its settlement. I believe that this position is absolutely consistent with international standards, meets historical parallels. Uzbekistan's position on this issue remains unchanged: the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan is a sacred concept, and it must be followed in all solution options of this problem.
^Alrmizan, Mohammed (September 2019). "Azerbaijan and Saudi Arabia: Bilateral Opportunities in a Changing Middle East"(PDF). kfcris.com. King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies. p. 5. Archived from the original(PDF) on 9 August 2020. In this matter, the Saudis have backed the right of Azerbaijan in the United Nations General Assembly meetings and in the OIC, asserting its internationally recognized authority over Nagorno-Karabakh. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia does not have yet any level of official or even unofficial ties with Armenia. This is because the Saudis have tended to side with Azerbaijan, especially on this particular issue.
"Sauid Arabia Will Not Change Its Position on Nagorno-Karabakh Problem". azertag.az. Azerbaijan State News Agency. 14 July 2010. Archived from the original on 9 August 2020. ...Speaker of the Saudi Arabia's Shura Council Abdullah Bin Mohammed Bin Ibrahim Al-Sheikh told journalists here. He underlined Saudi Arabia supports all international organizations' decisions and resolutions supporting resolution of the conflict based on territorial integrity of Azerbaijan.
"Azerbaijan Report: February 28, 2003". rferl.org. RFE/RL. February 28, 2003. Archived from the original on 9 August 2020. Ali Hasan Jafarin, Saudi Arabia's ambassadors to Baku, said in an interview with the independent newspaper "525" that his country unanimously supports the Azerbaijani position on Nagorno-Karabakh in all international organizations and forums.
^Malysheva, Dina (2001). "The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh: its impact on security in the Caspian region". In Chufrin, Gennady (ed.). The Security of the Caspian Sea Region. Oxford University Press/Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. p. 264. ISBN0199250200. Because of its proximity to the Karabakh conflict zone, Georgia is vitally concerned with the settlement of the conflict. It is officially Azerbaijan's strategic partner, upholds the preservation of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and supports the latter in its conflict with Armenia on most contentious issues. [...] ...Georgia's obviously pro-Azerbaijan approach to the Karabakh problem...
Le Grix, Victor (February 2019). "A Positive Influence in the South Caucasus? Georgia's Potential as a Regional Stabilizer"(PDF). Policy Brief. Georgian Institute of Politics (15): 5. Due to its vital national interest, Georgia cannot support a self-determination policy. This is actually an important factor why on the international stage, Tbilisi officially calls for the respect of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity.
Zurabashvili, Tornike; Kapanadze, Sergi (12 April 2016). "Georgia: Fearing the worst from the Karabakh flare-up". ecfr.eu. European Council on Foreign Relations. Archived from the original on 19 May 2016. The declarations of support for each other's territorial integrity, have become a lasting tradition in Georgian-Azerbaijani diplomatic encounters, which is hardly any surprise from two countries that have similar territorial issues. While Georgia has supported Azerbaijan in the past, it opted not to this time.
"Georgia supports territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Azerbaijan". mfa.gov.ge. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia. Archived from the original on 24 July 2020. Georgia supports territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Azerbaijan within its internationally recognized borders and supports the peaceful settlement of conflict based on the principles and norms of international law.
"Minsk will not engage in conflicts in Post-Soviet space". Belarus in Focus. April 22, 2016. Archived from the original on 11 August 2020. Belarus has consistently supported peaceful reintegration of Karabakh with Azerbaijan. [...] Minsk's pro-Azerbaijani position therefore is natural.
Belarus has explicitly supported Azerbaijan's territorial integrity in joint statements
"Azerbaijani, Belarus presidents made press statements". en.president.az. President of the Republic of Azerbaijan. 19 November 2018. Archived from the original on 11 August 2020. The Joint Statement explicitly states that this conflict must be resolved in accordance with the norms of international law, within the framework of territorial integrity and the inviolability of the borders of Azerbaijan and in accordance with relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council.
Riad al-Malki: "Palestine Supports Azerbaijan's Stance on Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, Foreign Minister". azertag.az. Azerbaijan State News Agency. 29 October 2009. Archived from the original on 12 August 2020. "We have always declared that territories under Armenian occupation belong to Azerbaijan", al-Malki underscored. The foreign minister said Palestine wants peaceful resolution of the conflict and liberation of occupied lands of Azerbaijan. "We call on the international community to exert pressure on Armenia in order to achieve peace", Al-Malki stressed.
^Khalifa-zadeh, Mahir (2012). "Israel and Azerbaijan: To Counteract Iran"(PDF). Central Asia and the Caucasus. Institute for Central Asian and Caucasian Studies. 13 (3): 76. Israel has repeatedly declared that Tel Aviv supports Azerbaijan's territorial integrity.
^"Azerbaijan Withdraws Draft Karabakh Resolution From UN". rferl.org. RFE/RL. September 10, 2010. Archived from the original on 12 August 2020. The U.S., Russia, and France had opposed a similar resolution which Baku managed to push through the UN assembly in March 2008. It was backed by 39 countries, most of them Islamic.
^"Treading a Tightrope on the Armenian Border: Reviewing the First Two Months of the EU's New Mission in the South Caucasus". Caucasus Watch. 2023-04-25. Retrieved 2023-06-19. In an ironic twist, the unarmed European observers in Armenia and the armed Russian peacekeepers have begun to look alike, both preventing full-scale warfare but unable to fully contain Baku's ambitions. The 'Russian peacekeepers,' political scientist Nerses Kopalyan commented sharply, 'function more like an impotent observation mission than an armed contingent.'
^Kovatchev, Andrey. "Report on EU-Armenia relations | A9-0036/2023 | European Parliament". www.europarl.europa.eu. Retrieved 2023-03-18. Whereas Russia's alleged readiness to guarantee the security of Armenia has proven to be non-existent, as demonstrated by its lack of response to Azerbaijan's continuous attacks even in the light of Armenia's attempt to resort to the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO); [The European Parliament] Recalls that the clauses of the CSTO were not activated either during the 2020 war or in September 2022, despite Armenian requests; encourages Armenia, in order to ensure better protection of its sovereignty and territorial integrity, to consider the possibility of diversifying its partnerships and potential security alliances with its regional and Euro-Atlantic partners, as its long-standing reliance on Russia and its allies in the CSTO has proved insufficient.
^Rahimov, Rahim (July 22, 2020). "Armenian-Azerbaijani Border Clashes: The Russian Dimension and Beyond". jamestown.org. Jamestown Foundation. Archived from the original on 11 August 2020. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev had lambasted the Minsk Group co-chairs (Russia, France and the United States) in an unusually explicit manner for what he described as their ineffectiveness and alleged pro-Armenian bias (President.az, July 6).
^Cornell, Svante E. (Summer 1997). "Undeclared War: The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Reconsidered"(PDF). Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies. XX (4): 23. Archived from the original(PDF) on 2020-08-11. As a result, three of the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council are more or less biased towards Armenia in the conflict (including France, where a substantial Armenian minority exists, which has always been politically active.)
^"Violence and Politics in Armenia-Azerbaijan Relations". Baku Research Institute. Retrieved 2023-06-27. As a result of the 2020 war, however, Azerbaijan received all territories around Soviet-era Nagorno Karabakh that were occupied by Armenian forces during the first Karabakh war, plus the two regions of Nagorno Karabakh proper: Shushi/Shusha and Hadrut.
^Lynch, Ian J. (2020-11-18). "A cold winter for peace in Nagorno-Karabakh?". Ahval. Retrieved 2023-06-27. The new agreement allows Azerbaijan to keep the territory it took by force, including Shusha and Hadrut, within the historic boundaries of Nagorno-Karabakh. It also requires Armenian forces to turn over other territories they have occupied for the last 26 years, including the so-called Lachin corridor, which is Nagorno-Karabakh's primary link to Armenia proper.
^"Protection Monitoring Armenia Report #1"(PDF). United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The UN Refugee Agency. November–December 2020. Retrieved 5 January 2023. On 24th November 2020 the Martakert-Karvachar-Vardenis highway was closed; thus, the only operational route between NK and Armenia now is via the Lachin corridor.
^"Nagorno-Karabakh: The Volatile Core of the South Caucasus". 2023-03-04. Archived from the original on 2023-05-25. Retrieved 2023-06-09. The Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh is one of four frozen conflicts that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Legally recognized as a part of Azerbaijan, it declared independence in 1991 and then defended that independence in a war with Azerbaijan that lasted until 1994. While it enjoys no international recognition of sovereignty, Nagorno-Karabakh has been de facto independent since its declaration and has been supported militarily and economically by neighboring Armenia.
^"Conflicts in Transcaucasia". assembly.coe.int. Archived from the original on 2021-05-11. Retrieved 2023-06-09. At the end of 1991 the parties were in stark confrontation after Azerbaijan abolished Nagorno-Karabakh's autonomous status and the latter declared independence after the plebiscite-referendum of 10 December 1991.
^"Kennan Cable No. 81: What's at Stake in Nagorno-Karabakh: U.S. Interests and the Risk of Ethnic Cleansing | Wilson Center". www.wilsoncenter.org. Archived from the original on 2023-04-04. Retrieved 2023-04-04. For nearly 30 years, they built a self-proclaimed independent republic with democratic elections, a free press, and a range of public institutions. Officially, it remained within the territorial boundaries of Azerbaijan, unrecognized by any foreign country, though international mediators made reference to the right of self-determination for local Armenians as part of ongoing peace talks.
^"A Peace to End All Peace? Statement on the International Actors Sponsoring So-Called Peace Negotiations Between Armenia and Azerbaijan". Lemkin Institute for Genocide Prevention. 2023-05-23. Archived from the original on 2023-05-31. Retrieved 2023-06-09. The Lemkin Institute believes that, given the circumstances, the self-determination of the people of Artsakh is a form of genocide prevention in addition to a right recognized by the Charter of the United Nations and several human rights treaties and declarations, which has become part of international jus cogens. Self-determination is further a recognized right of all peoples under oppressive colonial regimes.
^Vock, Ido (2023-06-08). "Fear and loathing in Armenia". New Statesman. Retrieved 2023-06-09. President Aliyev told Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians to 'obey the laws of Azerbaijan [and] be a loyal and normal citizen of Azerbaijan'. He threatened that if the territory's separatist institutions were not dissolved, Azerbaijan would dissolve them by force and rejected the prospect of international protections for ethnic Armenians.
^"Azerbaijani president gives ultimatum to Karabakh authorities". Eurasianet. 2023-05-30. Archived from the original on 2023-06-29. Retrieved 2023-07-05. The president of Azerbaijan has delivered an ultimatum to de facto authorities in Nagorno Karabakh: disband your government or prepare for the consequences. He suggested Baku could easily end Armenian administration of the region through military action.
^"Kennan Cable No. 81: What's at Stake in Nagorno-Karabakh: U.S. Interests and the Risk of Ethnic Cleansing | Wilson Center". www.wilsoncenter.org. Retrieved 2023-04-04. The history of violence against Armenians in Azerbaijan, including the recent execution of Armenian prisoners of war and the sexual mutilation of female soldiers, give Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh little confidence in their safety...According to Freedom House, Azerbaijan's government "has worked to stifle public expressions of Talysh and Lezgin identity, among other targeted groups."
^Vock, Ido (2023-06-08). "Fear and loathing in Armenia". New Statesman. Retrieved 2023-06-09. Azerbaijan says the territory's inhabitants can live as Azerbaijani citizens under its sovereignty, but Armenians treat these claims with derision. 'Azerbaijani dissidents say even Azerbaijanis do not enjoy their constitutional rights,' Tigran Grigoryan, head of the Regional Centre for Democracy and Security, an Armenian think tank, told me. 'So how can Armenians expect to?'
^Hauer, Neil (2023-07-31). "Karabakh blockade reaches critical point as food supplies run low". www.intellinews.com. Retrieved 2023-08-01. Khachatryan's detention confirms the fears of many Karabakh Armenians that, if Azerbaijan assumes control over Karabakh, it will detain (and torture) them arbitrarily, using their participation in one or more of the wars as justification. This criteria extends to nearly every male resident of the small enclave. "Arrests with linkages to the past wars, local army or the [Karabakh] government …would quality almost all local men for detentions," wrote Olesya Vartanyan, International Crisis Group's senior analyst for the South Caucasus. The detainees can expect torture or worse, as the Armenian prisoners of war following the 2020 war conflict experienced.
^"A Peace to End All Peace? Statement on the International Actors Sponsoring So-Called Peace Negotiations Between Armenia and Azerbaijan". Lemkin Institute for Genocide Prevention. 2023-05-23. Archived from the original on 2023-05-31. Retrieved 2023-06-09. The Lemkin Institute believes that, given the circumstances, the self-determination of the people of Artsakh is a form of genocide prevention in addition to a right recognized by the Charter of the United Nations and several human rights treaties and declarations, which has become part of international jus cogens. Self-determination is further a recognized right of all peoples under oppressive colonial regimes.
^Hauer, Neil (2023-07-31). "Karabakh blockade reaches critical point as food supplies run low". www.intellinews.com. Retrieved 2023-08-01. Khachatryan's detention confirms the fears of many Karabakh Armenians that, if Azerbaijan assumes control over Karabakh, it will detain (and torture) them arbitrarily, using their participation in one or more of the wars as justification. This criteria extends to nearly every male resident of the small enclave. "Arrests with linkages to the past wars, local army or the [Karabakh] government …would quality almost all local men for detentions," wrote Olesya Vartanyan, International Crisis Group's senior analyst for the South Caucasus. The detainees can expect torture or worse, as the Armenian prisoners of war following the 2020 war conflict experienced.