Pierre Michel Sprey (November 22, 1937 – August 5, 2021) was a record producer and defense analyst. Working with John Boyd and Thomas P. Christie at the Pentagon, he was associated with the self-dubbed 'Fighter Mafia', which advocated the use of energy–maneuverability theory in fighter jet design. Sprey claimed to be involved in the design of several military jets, including the F-16, A-10, and F-22. Notably, he was once a harsh critic of the F-22, despite later claiming to have designed it. Claims of his involvement in the design of these Aircraft are considered by many to be dubious.[2]
Sprey was born in Nice, France, in 1936 to Jewish parents[3][4][5] and raised in New York, U.S.[6] Sprey was admitted to Yale University at the age of fifteen and graduated four years later with a double major in French literature and mechanical engineering.[7] He later continued his education at Cornell University where he studied mathematical statistics and operations research. He subsequently worked at Grumman Aircraft as a consulting statistician[5] on space and commercial transportation projects. From 1966 to 1970 he was a special assistant at the Office of the Secretary of Defense.[8]
During the 1960s, Pierre Sprey was associated with a group of defense analysts who called themselves the "Fighter Mafia". He was a statistician working for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis. The Fighter Mafia worked behind the scenes in the late 1960s to advocate a lightweight fighter as an alternative to the McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle.[9]
The Fighter Mafia strongly believed that an ideal fighter should not include any of the sophisticated radar and missile systems or rudimentary ground-attack capability that found their way into the F-15. Their goal, based on energy–maneuverability theory, was a small, low-drag, low-weight, pure fighter with no bomb racks – similar to those found in the early-World War II designs. The Fighter Mafia claims it influenced the design requirements of the highly successful General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcon, although they were not happy with design changes made to the YF-16 as it became a costlier multi-role fighter rather than the lighter air-to-air specialist they originally envisioned.[10][11] Sprey continued to be critical of the F-15 fighter.[12][13][14]
Sprey left the Pentagon in 1971. He and Colonel John Boyd worked with others in the Pentagon and Congress toward military reform, helping gain passage of military reform legislation in the early 1980s.[15]
Claimed role in A-X (YA-9 and A-10 Thunderbolt II) concept design
Sprey claimed that, while working as an analyst for the OSD, he was recruited by Colonel Avery Kay to help with the concept formulation of the A-X.[16] Sprey would play a role in formulating the A-X Concept Formulation Package describing the flight characteristics and capabilities of the plane.[17] Sprey helped adapt the experience and practical knowledge of German WW2 ace Hans-Ulrich Rudel with the theoretical approach of German WW2 aerospace engineer Hans Multhopp to the Vietnam War experience of the A-1 pilots also working in the concept formulation group. Sprey was an advocate for the A-X carrying a large caliber gun.
Only Pierre Sprey and his close friends (often referred to as the "reformers" or "fighter plane mafia") claim that Pierre Sprey was involved in the design and production of the A-10, along with various other fighter and attack aircraft. There is no documentation from either the United States Air Force or Fairchild Republic that he worked on the A-X program as anything other than a statistician. The actual designer of the A-10 was Alexander Kartveli.
While the final A-10 design was fairly close to Sprey's vision as a dedicated close air support plane, Sprey instead promoted his "Blitzfighter" concept that would be even more minimalist.[18] Sprey argued that bombs and missiles would be less effective in the CAS role than just a 30 mm cannon. This is in contrast to the actual uses of the A-10 in combat, where bombs were found to be very effective. The Blitzfighter was also supposed to weigh less than the A-10, mainly by having its gun as the only weapon. There is not much evidence that Sprey actually took part in the design of the A-10, but Sprey insists that he did.
Criticism of the F-35 and A-10 divestment
Sprey was a frequent critic of the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II program. He argued, paralleling his earlier arguments against the F-15, that despite its high cost, the F-35 is less agile than the F-16. Sprey argued that compared to the F-16 or A-10 (in both of whose operational roles it is marketed to operate), the F-35 was overweight and dangerous, stating "It's as if Detroit suddenly put out a car with lighter fluid in the radiator and gasoline in the hydraulic brake lines: that's how unsafe this plane is..." and "full of bugs".[19]
He claimed that in the close air support (CAS) role, the F-35 is a poor replacement for the A-10 as it flies too fast for pilots to spot targets by eye and lacks maneuverability at low speeds.[20] He said it lacks the necessary radios,[21] cannot survive small arms fire (or anti-aircraft guns) and has poor loiter time.[22] Sprey claimed that close air support should be the Air Force's most important mission and that the USAF has been trying to retire the A-10 for years simply because it does not want the CAS mission.[23]
Sprey recorded music through his own label, Mapleshade Records, and sold high-end audiophile equipment. His recording with the Addicts Rehabilitation Center (ARC) Choir singing "Walk With Me" appears in Kanye West's 2004 hit "Jesus Walks". Sprey said he earned enough royalties from the West song "to support 30 of my money-losing jazz albums."[6]
Sprey's recording techniques were highly unconventional, aiming for accurate reproduction of live music rather than manipulating sounds (e.g. with equalizers, pitch correction, etc.).[citation needed]
Death
Sprey died on August 5, 2021, of an apparent heart attack.[29][1]
^Rogoway, Tyler (June 20, 2014). "Pierre Sprey's Anti-F-35 Diatribe Is Half Brilliant And Half Bullshit". Foxtrot Alpha. Retrieved September 7, 2017. ...to think that the F-15 is a loser even after four decades of incredible success, not to mention the fact that it has never been bested in air-to-air combat and retains a kill ration of 105.5 to 0. This denial of clear historical reality is a startling indication that Mr. Sprey may be living in the 1970s when it comes to air-combat doctrine, or maybe he simply does not want to admit that his stripped down, all super-maneuverable light-weight visual fighters or nothing initiative was not the right path for America's air combat forces after all.
^Clark, Geoffrey (August 28, 2017). "F-35 Lightning II - Mystics & Statistics". Dupuy Institute. Retrieved September 7, 2017. "Surprise is the first because, in every air war since WWI, somewhere between 65% and 85% of all fighters shot down were unaware of their attacker." Sprey mentions that the F-16 is superior to the F-15 due to the smaller size, and that fact that it smokes much less, both aspects that are clearly within-visual range (WVR) combat considerations. Further, his discussion of beyond visual range (BVR) combat is dismissive.
^Grier, Peter (August 2010). "USAF's Indispensable 'Failures'"(PDF). Air Force Magazine. Retrieved September 7, 2017. In 1981, Sprey wrote an airpower section in a book issued by the Heritage Foundation which questioned the F-15's effectiveness. The F-15 was larger and more visible than its predecessor the F-4, wrote Sprey, making it vulnerable in daylight close-in dogfighting. He claimed the Eagle was too dependent on radar guided missiles, which "are not likely to be more effective than those used in Vietnam."
^"Pierre Sprey". Project On Government Oversight. Retrieved September 7, 2017.
^"DTIC ADA160458: Antitank Warfare Seminar Held in Washington, DC on 14-15 October 1976". October 1976. Retrieved August 17, 2022 – via Archive.org. Mr. Sprey was formerly in the group that is now called ASD/PA&E and he was very active in the formulation stage of the A-10. He was the man that introduced me to the work of Col. Rudel back when I was (ineligible) for the A-10 program from the concept formulation viewpoint...
