Polish arms sales to Republican Spain took place between September 1936 and February 1939. Politically Poland did not support any of the Spanish Civil War sides, though over time the Warsaw government increasingly tended to favor the Nationalists; sales to the Republicans were motivated exclusively by economic interest. Since Poland was bound by non-intervention obligations, Polish governmental officials and the military disguised sales as commercial transactions mediated by international brokers and targeting customers in various countries, principally in Latin America; there are 54 shipments from Danzig and Gdynia identified. Most hardware were obsolete and worn-out second-rate weapons, though there were also some modern arms delivered; all were 20-30% overpriced. Polish sales amounted to $40m and constituted some 5-7% of overall Republican military spendings, though in terms of quantity certain categories of weaponry, like machine-guns, might have accounted for 50% of all arms delivered. After the USSR, Poland was the second largest arms supplier for the Republic. After the USSR, Italy and Germany, Poland was the 4th largest arms supplier to the war-engulfed Spain.
Prior to outbreak of the Spanish Civil War there was very little interaction - either in terms of conflict or co-operation - between Spain and Poland. Both countries operated in entirely different geo-political zones and their interests did not coincide. Mutual relations were reduced to very meager trade exchange[1] (in both cases below 0,5% of the overall foreign trade volume),[2] diplomatic maneuvers within the League of Nations (competition for permanent seat in the Council led to Spanish temporary withdrawal from the organization; other issues included the question of Tangier in case of Spain or the question of national minorities in case of Poland),[3] and typical consular problems (e.g. properties of Spanish aristocrats in Poland[4] or demi-world of Polish shady traders and prostitutes, mostly of Jewish origin, resident in Catalonia).[5] Both states maintained their diplomatic representations in respective capitals, though not at the embassy level.[6] Internal political developments in either Spain or Poland were duly acknowledged; fall of liberal democracy, Primo dictatorship and arrival of the Second Republic did not cause any particular reaction in Warsaw; similarly Piłsudski's coup and further increasingly authoritarian evolution of the dictatorship did not trigger any response in Madrid. In the early 1930s the Polish trading conglomerate SEPEWE, made of companies from the arms industry and controlled by the Polish general staff,[7] a number of times approached the Spanish army and police offering tankettes, hand grenades, training aircraft and communication equipment,[8] but it kept losing to foreign competitors, who usually operated their own manufacturing facilities in Spain.[9]
One of two fundamental principles of the Polish interwar diplomacy – apart from remaining equidistant towards Germany and the USSR - was cultivating the political-military alliance with France, the only reliable Polish ally. Hence, in cases where no specific Polish interest was at stake, Warsaw tended to side with Paris. When France embarked on the non-intervention policy towards the Spanish Civil War, Poland soon followed suit,[10] though in some specific and usually minor issues the Polish diplomacy might have sided with Italy, considered a rather friendly country.[11] In general terms Poland calculated that co-operation between Britain, France, Italy and Germany in enforcement of non-intervention was highly desirable, since it worked towards political stability on the continent.[12]
No specific potential political gains to be achieved in Spain have been identified by the Poles and it has been decided that in principle, Warsaw should stick to neutrality and refrain from supporting any of the warring sides. In terms of problems the Poles were gradually getting concerned about the growing Soviet influence in Spain, which triggered some anti-Soviet Polish votes at the Non-Intervention Committee. The German engagement caused much less anxiety, though some Polish diplomats had misgivings about France being potentially surrounded by 3 hostile neighbors.[13] Earlier Polish historiography speculated that these concerns might have triggered secret arms sales to the Republic,[14] but this theory is no longer maintained. Some Polish decision-makers believed that as long as Germany and the USSR were engaged in Spain they were unlikely to embark on aggressive policy in Eastern Europe, but there is no evidence that such speculations shaped the official Polish stand.[15]
The Republic continuously maintained official diplomatic relations with Poland. The pre-war Spanish minister in Warsaw[16] and its first secretary sided with the rebels; following 7 months when the second secretary was in charge, since March 1937 the mission was taken over by 3 successive envoys acting as charge d’affaires.[17] The Polish minister in Madrid[18] in late 1936 set his residence in Saint-Jean-de-Luz, like most of the diplomatic corps did. He refused invitation to settle in Valencia and until the end of the conflict operated from France, last visiting the Republican territory in late 1937. The Madrid mission was headed by chargé d'affaires, who became the key interface between the republican Foreign Ministry and the Polish diplomacy.[19] Poland ceased to recognize Republican Spain in mid-February 1939; the Madrid mission was closed and evacuated in few days.
The Cabanellas’ message to Warsaw which notified emergence of Junta Nacional was ignored by the Polish diplomacy.[20] Since October 1936 the former second secretary of Spanish diplomatic representation in Budapest[21] started to act as unofficial Nationalists’ representative in Warsaw; he had access to lower-level officials of Ministry of Foreign Affairs[22] and enjoyed increasingly favorable treatment. In Nationalist Spain initially the Polish mission in Lisbon maintained sporadic contacts with the Burgos administration. Since mid-1937 its employee[23] became the first unofficial Polish representative, resident mostly in San Sebastián; also the Polish minister with the republican government became increasingly engaged in parallel contacts with the Nationalists. In October 1938 Poland recognized Nationalist Spain de facto,[24] and in February 1939 de iure.
The republican administration immediately realized that they might face shortage of arms when confronting the military rebellion. The prime minister José Giral turned to the French government requesting arms sales already on July 20, 1936.[25] However, the cabinet of Leon Blum soon adopted the non-intervention policy and imports of French materiel became highly uncertain. The Republicans tried to pull as many strings as possible when looking for alternatives,[26] and on July 25 they turned to the Soviet embassy in Paris.[27] On July 29 latest[28] the government approached the Polish diplomatic mission in Madrid requesting sales of Polish aircraft; the Spaniards were prepared to pay any price, but required immediate delivery, which triggered the negative response.[29] On August 13 colonel Alfredo de Sanjuán arrived in Warsaw seeking massive arms purchases;[30] it is unclear whether he represented the Catalan autonomous government or the general staff.[31] Sanjuán suggested to SEPEWE that in view of French declarations, transaction be organised as fictitious sales to Uruguay, but for unclear reason his mission produced no results.[32] Another aviator, colonel Luis Riaño Herrero,[33] arrived in Warsaw on August 18 as official envoy of the Giral government; he requested sales of aircraft, but SEPEWE turned him down.[34] There is no confirmed information on further direct Spanish-Polish talks[35] and mechanics of the Polish decision-making process, which was taking place in late August 1936, is not reconstructed. Already on August 22 it was known that a Mexican ship would shortly call at Danzig to load Polish arms;[36] on August 27 Poland officially joined the non-intervention agreement,[37] and on September 9 the first shipment of Polish arms set off. It is not clear whether Polish decision-makers consciously decided to play a double game or whether both decisions were taken independently by the diplomacy and the military, though MFA was soon involved.[38]
The entire order-to-cash process has not been fully reconstructed and apart from contacts in July and August 1936, no other direct arms dealings between two countries are identified. From September 1936 onwards all contacts were executed via intermediaries. It is not clear which unit of the Spanish republican administration or who personally was co-ordinating the process, though it seems the embassy in Paris was heavily involved.[39] None of the sources consulted clarifies the mechanics of financial settlements between the Spanish government and the companies acting as brokers, especially whether payments were made in advance or on delivery. The brokers were usually established international arms traders: Handelmaatschappij S. Gokkes (Netherlands), Etablissements Alexandre Klaguine, Etablissements Edgar Brandt (France), Edgar Grimard (Belgium), Willy Daugs und Cie., Navigation Josef Veltjens KG, Matthias Rohde Frachtkontor (Germany) and other.[40] Their partner in Poland was SEPEWE, and mostly its deputy director Kazimierz Zarębski;[41] he operated with much autonomy, though the syndicate co-ordinated its dealings with the Polish military and the MFA. In case of the former the units which provided supervision were Section I (organization and logistics) and Section II (intelligence and counter-intelligence) of the General Staff. In case of the latter because of sensitive nature of the deal at times deputy minister or even the minister of foreign affairs Józef Beck intervened personally.[42] Payments were usually made to SEPEWE accounts via established French banks. Some dealings were executed beyond SEPEWE with smaller Polish traders, e.g. a London-based entrepreneur Stefan Czarnecki[43] set up Towarzystwo dla Handlu i Przemysłu Surowcowego and even became the honorary consul of Nicaragua, a move which facilitated his arms trade with both the Nationalists and the Republicans.[44] However, he traded mostly in Czechoslovak and Austrian weapons and his trade volume was insignificant compared to this of SEPEWE.[45]
All transport went by sea. There are 54 naval shipments from Poland to Republican Spain identified;[46] the first ship set off on September 9, 1936 (some 3 weeks before the first Soviet shipment set off),[47] and the last one around February 9, 1939.[48] 12 shipments took place in 1936, 27 in 1937, 14 in 1938 and 1 in 1939. The entire maritime route usually took around a week to Atlantic ports and 2 weeks to Mediterranean ones.[49] Initially 8 ships were loaded in the extraterritorial Polish military depot at Westerplatte, in the Free City of Danzig; all the remaining ones departed from Gdynia. Officially they were directed mostly to customers in Uruguay (12 cases identified), Mexico (7), Greece (6) and France (5), though also in few cases to China, Germany or Haiti; in some 20 cases the official destination has not been identified by scholars. Official documentation confirming orders from representatives of fake target countries was obtained by brokers, usually by means of corruption – especially that also honorary consuls were entitled to issue certificates[50] – or forgery.[51] In some cases there were Soviet agents involved when providing false cover.[52] Most ships were registered in Panama (20), some in the Netherlands, Greece and France, and few in Norway, Germany, Latvia, Estonia or Yugoslavia. Almost all ships made it to their port of destination; until the spring of 1937 they were mostly Santander and Bilbao, afterwards the Levantine (Barcelona, Alicante, Valencia, Cartagena)[53] or French ports, especially Honfleur.[54] In 2 cases ships were seized by the Nationalist navy; in 1 case the captain was bribed by the Nationalists.[55] To maintain secrecy at one stage the Poles considered re-routing the transport by rail to the Romanian port of Constanța, but the plan has been eventually dropped.[56]
There is no complete and reliable information on arms sold by Poland; official Polish documentation was partially lost during World War Two and detailed data is reconstructed on basis of fragmentary archives, Nationalist intelligence reports, private accounts and some Spanish republican papers. All sources agree, however, that the arms sold were mostly obsolete; they were seized or acquired by the Polish army from Bolshevik, Russian, Austro-Hungarian or French armed forces in 1918–1920, and withdrawn from service as the Polish army was getting modernized. The Polish supplies to Republican Spain included:[57] 95 tanks (Renault FT 17),[58] 300 guns and howitzers (Schneider, Krupp-Putilov, Bergson, Škoda), 500 mortars (Brandt Mle 27/31, Stokes 81 mm and other types), 15,000 machine guns (Bergmann LMG, Browning BAR, Chauchat, Colt, Polish-made CKM wz. 30, Lewis LMG, Maxim-Spandau, Polish-designed PWU, Schwarzlose, Vickers),[59] 200,000 rifles (Enfield .303, Mauser 29, 88 and 98, Mannlicher 88/80, 90 and 95, Mosin-Nagant, Lebel 8 mm, Berthier 07/15 and 16 and other),[60] 1,5m hand grenades (mostly Polish-made wz. 31),[61] 0.8m artillery rounds (various types), 180m rifle cartridges (various types),[62] 1,800 tons of gunpowder, 230 tons of TNT,[63] 75 tons of aerial bombs, plus some quantities of bayonets, torpedoes and land mines. Shipments included also spare parts and components, especially for artillery pieces. Apart from arms, Poles were selling also uniforms, helmets, shoes, gas masks, optical equipment, leather products, blankets and other accessories. According to some sources, the Poles sold also some 40 aircraft (PWS-10 and RWD-13),[64] but this figure is disputed; others claim that they were either Czechoslovak machines in transit across Poland, or that the planes were intended for the Nationalists.[65]
Opinion about poor quality of arms from Poland was popular in the republican zone, and some correspondents noted that “fascist Poland” was even suspected of deliberately selling defective hardware.[66] Historiographic works usually also underline that SEPEWE weapons were second-rate materiel up to the point of having been unusable altogether.[67] The opinion pointing to inferior or even substandard quality is upheld by Polish scholars, though it is applied more cautiously to most or at least many products delivered. They underline that arms sold were in vast majority unwanted by the Polish army and remained in warehouses, at times for many years. Most were withdrawn from service as obsolete and unfit for modern warfare; produced at times in the late 19th century and acquired by the Poles some 20 years earlier, they had been phased out as the Polish army was getting modernized.[68] They were largely worn out, and poor maintenance contributed to their low quality. Some were new products, but refused by the army as unreliable, non-standard, incomplete or even faulty.[69]
There are scholars who claim that opinion about poor quality is at least overemphasized. They maintain that 30-year-old weapons are common in technology-dependent armies of today, especially that most arms sold by Poland were unsophisticated categories like rifles or hand grenades. It is noted that technical incompetence in militia-dominated Republican troops combined with corruption,[70] poor logistics and makeshift maintenance services often prevented effective usage of arms, and that the Nationalists extensively used seized and aged Polish imports, like the Chauchat submachine guns.[71] Some products were state-of-the-art weaponry; the Browning BAR machine guns seized by the Germans in September 1939 were used by Wehrmacht until 1945.[72] Finally, it is claimed that alleged poor quality was used as easy excuse for poor Republican military performance.[73]
Poland joined the non-intervention declaration[74] and sales of materiel to Spain was incompatible with Polish obligations.[75] However, there is no information on Polish trade having been subject of discussions at the Non-Intervention Committee or during official bilateral contacts. This was so despite the fact that sales ceased to be a secret already in late 1936, e.g. Polish representatives in Rome were informally approached by Italian military in this regard.[76] Also international press, e.g. the Dutch De Telegraaf, published similar information.[77] The Nationalists had very detailed information about Polish shipments;[78] its source is unclear.[79] Over time they were becoming increasingly bold over supplies to the Republicans. Polish unofficial representatives and military envoys in the Nationalist zone were treated to decreasingly polite complaints and some facilities were denied to them on the ground of Polish supplies to “the Reds”. Also the Nationalist representative in Warsaw kept making representations to the MFA;[80] however, as in bilateral relations the primary Nationalist objective was diplomatic recognition, they could have not afforded more decisive stand.[81] The routine Polish reply was that the country maintained its non-intervention obligations, and that once the ship left Gdynia, responsibility for cargo was with the trading company.[82] Eventually the foreign minister Beck concluded that further sales to the Republic would irreparably damage future relations with the Franco regime and in the summer of 1938 he demanded from SEPEWE that the supplies be terminated.[83] Exact decision-making process has not been reconstructed, but it seems that the military enjoyed more weight than MFA; sales continued and the last ship departed Gdynia 7 days prior to Polish de iure recognition of Nationalist Spain.
For the Republican army in terms of some categories Polish arms came in much smaller quantity compared to Soviet deliveries: tanks,[84] rifle cartridges[85] or artillery shells[86] made some 20-25% of the Soviet ones. For some types of equipment like artillery pieces[87] or rifles[88] the ratio was closer to 50%, for some (machine guns) equal,[89] and for some – like hand grenades[90] or explosives[91] – the Polish deliveries exceeded the Soviet ones. However, arms delivered from Poland were often of lower quality, e.g. tanks were obsolete French models from the First World War,[92] while the Soviets delivered mainstream T-26[93] or even innovative BT-series[94] machines. Also artillery pieces, machine guns or rifles sold by Poland were mostly of pre-war Austrian, French or Russian production, though the Soviets similarly seized the opportunity to clear their depots from obsolete pre-war stocks[95] and overpriced even more, by 30-40%.[96] Spanish complaints about quality of Polish weapons were commonplace and at times they bordered charges of sabotage.[97] Moreover, the vast array of models sold (especially artillery, machine-guns and rifles) produced logistics problems in terms of spare parts and shells/cartridges.
For the Polish military the supplies to Spain proved an excellent deal, as with some exceptions, the army cleared its warehouses of unwanted hardware and sold it at prices appropriate rather for modern weapons.[98] Sales of weaponry freshly off production lines had minor adverse effect on deliveries to the Polish army, which still badly needed further re-armament into newer equipment. The issue was discussed by the General Staff and its experts concluded that the financial gain resulting was worth some delay in domectic supplies.[99]
For SEPEWE, a syndicate which before 1936 struggled to sell arms and targeted underdeveloped countries like Romania or Turkey, sales to Republican Spain was excellent business. Obsolete or poor quality hardware, for years gathering dust in military warehouses, were sold highly above the market price.[100] They produced 200m zlotys ($40m)[101]proceeds compared to the total of around 300m złoty registered during the entire interwar period,[102] though income reported was only around 7% of the proceeds.[103] Given worth of total Polish annual exports in the late 1930s hovered around 1,100m zlotys,[104] arms sales for the Republic constituted some 6% of overall Polish exports for the period of 1936–1938.[105] Some authors speculate that individual Polish decision-makers might have benefitted from the process personally.[106] In case of some smaller arms merchants their intermediary role elevated them to significant players on the market.[107] For the Republic Poland turned either the second[108] or the third[109] largest arms supplier; until today it is not clear what was the size of French exports, though given France was the principal architect of non-intervention policy it is unlikely that its sales exceeded the Polish ones. As overall republican foreign military spendings are estimated at some $0.6-0.8bn[110] and as the Soviets received some 85-90% of this sum, the Poles received some 5-7% of all money spent by the Republic. In terms of overall international military assistance to both warring parties of the Spanish Civil War, Poland (which sold some weapons also to the Nationalists[111]) ranked 4th after the USSR ($500m to $800m),[112] Italy ($430m)[113] and Germany ($240m),[114] ahead of Greece ($25m?),[115] France ($3m?),[116] Mexico ($2m?),[117] Austria, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Paraguay and other countries.
In the Nationalist press notes about Polish sales to the Republicans were rather rare and there was definitely no organized media campaign against Poland. It was so especially that until mid-1937 various press titles followed fate of hundreds of Spaniards who sought shelter in Polish diplomatic missions in Madrid, were evacuated by Polish ships and eventually made it from Poland to the Nationalist zone.[118] However, among the military and even lower administration Polish sales to the Republic were common knowledge; combined with information on Polish International Brigades volunteers they contributed to increasingly negative vision of Poland, which despite its Catholic zeal supported “the red hordes”. In a grand exposition of arms seized from the Republicans, organized in Gran Kursaal in San Sebastián, the Polish section included 18 types of armament.[119]
In the Republican zone information on Polish arms sales was missing, not clear whether resulting from secrecy in order not to endanger breach of non-intervention agreement. However, worth of Soviet aid was often overstated and the USSR was hailed in grandiose propaganda terms as a great friendly country, and even much smaller Mexican military assistance was acknowledged with great fanfare.[120] Various party press titles used to lambast Poland as a fascist dictatorial state.[121] Polish diplomatic mission and its representatives were a few times assaulted, while the Polish honorary consul in Valencia, Vicente Noguera Bonora, was killed by the Republican militia when performing his official tasks.[122] Over time opinions about poor quality of Polish arms became popular, fueling various rumors and hostility towards Poland.[123]
There was scarce long-term impact of the Polish sales. Repeated Nationalist protests did not translate into tension between Francoist Spain and Poland, and during 6 months between April and September 1939 mutual relations remained very good if not excellent; despite Nazi pressure, the Polish legation in Madrid was closed fairly late and permitted to operate unofficially, while after World War Two the Franco administration maintained official diplomatic relations with the Polish government-in-exile.[124] The Communist administration in Warsaw periodically exploited propagandawise the Polish contribution to International Brigades fighting “international fascism”, but it maintained blackout on semi-official arms sales of the pre-war government, often also dubbed a “fascist clique”;[125] if mentioned, they were presented as dirty business of few greedy swindlers.[126] In consequence, Polish arms sales went into almost total oblivion; they were treated in few limited-circulation scientific works in the 1980s.[127] After the fall of Soviet rule the subject earned few articles[128] and was extensively treated in two major works,[129] but in general the episode remains unknown to the wide public.
Also in Spain Polish arms sales remain a rather obscure subject.[130] Though it has been treated in some specialized periodicals,[131] with few exceptions[132] most wide-circulation works and historiographic studies on the Spanish Civil War usually ignore,[133] obscure[134] or play down[135] the Polish engagement, though in some cases much smaller supplies from Mexico are noted.[136] The same applies to wide public discourse in present-day Spain.[137] However, in 2021 so far the most voluminous study on the issue has appeared, published by the military historian Lucas Molina Franco; it offers a rather critical revision of prevailing views on Polish arms and challenges opinions on unscrupulous and cynical Polish approach, grounded in works of Howson and Viñas.[138] In international historiography Republican purchases of Polish arms might be ignored,[139] reduced to brief mention,[140] or treated in a separate paragraph.[141]
Comparison of proportions between Soviet and Polish aid in terms of 1) equipment delivered and 2) total cost for the Republicans reveals a glaring mis-match. Except aircraft and armored cars, in no specific category (assuming highest estimates for Soviet deliveries and lowest estimates for Polish deliveries) Polish supplies amounted to less than 18% of the Soviet ones, in some categories they amounted to some 40%, and in some to 120% or even 300%. However, the Polish aid cost the Republicans at most 10% and at least 5% of the Soviet aid.
The difference in proportion is due to different reasons: 1) Soviet equipment was generally newer and hence more costly; 2) the Soviets overpriced even more than the Poles; 3) while Poles delivered probably no aircraft, all Soviet planes might have cost even $50m.[144] However, with all the above factored in, the cost of Soviet weaponry and equipment would have been in the neighborhood of $300m at most, while the actual amount charged by the Soviets and paid by the Republic was between $600m and $800m.
The difference still unaccounted for resulted from one more factor: the Soviets were billing for every single cost conceivably connected with their involvement in the Spanish Civil War. It consisted of salaries and expenses of personnel sent to Spain (and their dependents, including vacations back in the USSR, and including personnel who never left the USSR, like intelligence people), transportation (charged extra and from the very first step in the Soviet Union), construction of military facilities (in Spain and in the USSR), and training of Spanish military (mostly pilots and tank crewmen) in the USSR. These categories are at times ignored, especially that the Republican media usually gave the impression that the Soviet assistance was provided free of charge.[145]
^Dawid Kabaciński, Polsko–hiszpańskie kontakty gospodarcze w okresie międzywojennym, [in:] Przegląd Historyczny CI/4 (2010), pp. 651-662
^Spanish-Polish trade volume in 1932–1935 averaged 3,3m zlotys ($0.6m) annually (2,5m zlotys 1932, 3,0m in 1933, 2,4m in 1934 and 5,4m in 1935), Jan Stanisław Ciechanowski, Podwójna gra. Rzeczpospolita wobec hiszpańskiej wojny domowej 1936–1939, Warszawa 2014, ISBN9788311137615, p. 145
^Pablo de Azcaraté was longtime official and then head of the Minorities Secretariat; for detailed discussion see Xosé Manoel Nuñez Seixas, Entre Ginebra y Berlín. La cuestión de las minorías nacionales y la política internacional en Europa: 1914–1939, Madrid 2001, ISBN9788446009634
^e.g. Karl Stephan Habsburg, owner of numerous estates in southern Poland, was brother to Maria Christina, queen-regent and mother of Alfonso XIII, Ciechanowski 2014, p. 38. María de los Dolores of Bourbon-Two Sicilies was married to a Polish aristocrat August Józef Czartoryski
^the official SEPEWE representative in Spain was the retired general staff colonel, José Doménech Vidal. In early days of the civil war he sought shelter in the Polish legacy in Madrid. Between April and September 1939 he again acted as the SEPEWE representative; since he clearly sided with the Nationalists, it is unlikely he was involved in arms trade with the Republic, Ciechanowski 2014, pp. 469-470
^Marek Piotr Deszczyński, Eksport polskiego sprzętu wojskowego do Hiszpanii podczas wojny domowej 1936–1939, [in:] Kwartalnik Historyczny CIV/1 (1997), p. 48
^Polish policy towards the war in Spain discussed in general in Ciechanowski 2014, pp. 120-142
^"Tym też - jak się zdaje - należy tłumaczyć potajemne dostawy broni dla armii republikańskiej przekazywane za pośrednictwem II Oddziału Sztabu Generalnego", Józef Buszko, Historia Polski vol. 4, Warszawa 1984, ISBN 8301037326, p. 328
^review of Polish intelligence reports and speculations within the official Polish structures, including Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the army General Staff, in Ciechanowski 2014, pp. 298-456
^the mission was headed by the second secretary until in March 1937 Marian Ruiz-Funes García arrived as chargé d'affaires. In June he was transferred to Brussels and the mission was assumed by Manuel Martínez Pedroso y Macías, who in July 1938 left for Moscow. At this point the representation was taken over by José Medina Echevarría (1903–1977; he was professor of law in Murcia and deputy to the Cortes; after the war he resided in Mexico, Colombia and Chile, where he passed away) he acted as deputy during the tenure of both his predecessors
^Marian Szumlakowski (1893–1961) was a career diplomat, in 1927–1933 effectively second in command in the MFA. In Nationalist/Francoist Spain he was extremely respected as the one who co-ordinated first sheltering and then evacuating some 400 refugees, seeking asylum in Polish missions in republican Madrid. Official Polish representative to Francoist Spain until the exile government was refused recognition
^Leopold Koziebrodzki (1909–1999, at times referred as Leopold Bolesta Koziebrodzki; he remained in diplomatic service of the exiled Polish government and passed away in the United States), later Mieczysław Skolimowski (1886-?, also "Skólimowski"; in diplomatic service he was employed in Brasil, France, Portugal and elsewhere; his later fate is unknown)
^Juan Serrat y Valera (1905–1978) was son of Francisco Serrat y Bonastre; he spent all his life in diplomacy, since 1929 in the royal service, in 1931–1936 in the republican one, and after 1936 as representative of the Francoist Spain
^normally the Spanish affairs were handled by Witold Kozłowski, head of the one-man section in MFA, Ciechanowski 2014, p. 494
^Bohdan Szmejko (1900–1977); other sources prefer the "Szmejka" spelling. Before 1936 he was a low-level official in Lisbon; after 1939 he remained in diplomatic service of the Polish government in exile, mostly in Latin America. Did not return to communist Poland
^Since late 1937 the Nationalist diplomacy insisted on de iure recognition, and in the spring of 1938 Poland was leaning towards granting it; the Ebro offensive put these plans on hold
^Francisco J. Romero Salvadó, Historical Dictionary of the Spanish Civil War, London 2013, ISBN9780810857841, p. 132
^Stanley G. Payne, The Spanish Civil War, the Soviet Union, and Communism, New Haven/London 2011, ISBN9780300178326, p. 125
^he declared interest in purchase of 10 TK-3 tankettes, 500 light and 500 heavy machine guns, 8m cartridges and 20,000 hand grenades, Ciechanowski 2014, p. 473
^he presented credentials issued by the Barcelona delegature of the Spanish MFA, Ciechanowski 2014, p. 473. The Spanish scholar claims he represented Generalitat, Lucas Molina Franco, Exportación de armas ligeras polacas en la Guerra Civil española, [in:] Academia de las Ciencias y las Armas Militares 2021, p 4
^Luis Riaño Herrero (1881–1942) was president's ADC during the Republic; in 1936 was commander of the Cuatro Vientos air base. He spent the war mostly as head of aviation instruction in Levante. After the war on exile, died in Mexico
^SEPEWE managers declared that they were able to deliver aircraft in mid-1937 earliest. Contemporary scholars suggests that this might have been correct, but he claims also that probably SEPEWE people consulted the Foreign Ministry and turned the Spaniards down because of political risks involved, Ciechanowski 2014, p. 475
^e.g. in October 1937 intelligence of the Italian CTV in Spain intercepted and decrypted the message reportedly sent by the Giral government to the Republican envoy in Warsaw; the message requested enquiry re purchase of explosives in one of the Cracow plants, Ciechanowski 2014, p. 546
^the Polish scholar failed to reconstruct the decision-making process. However, he found that when talking to Riaño Herrero, SEPEWE consulted their response with the MFA and the General Staff, Ciechanowski 2014, pp. 474-475. It also seems that the Poles from the onset realized that sales were incompatible with non-intervention obligations, as the very first shipment was already disguised as sales to Mexico, Ciechanowski 2014, p. 605
^Ciechanowski 2014, pp. 475-476. Other companies were Gustav Genschow, Momag, Ludwig Bing, Michael Sajovitz, SADEA, Maurice Augsbourg, Waffen und Munition, Hüpeden, N. V. Hunzedal, West Export, Papadopoulos and Daugs, Dawid Kabaciński, Wojsko Polskie wobec wojny domowej w Hiszpanii: wybrane zagadnienia, [in:] Przegląd Historyczno-Wojskowy 14/3 (2013), p. 55
^Kazimierz Zarębski (?-after 1965) was a retired army colonel when he became deputy CEO of SEPEWE. He died on exile. The director of SEPEWE was Władysław Sokołowski, though most dealings were negotiated and finalised by Zarębski; also Sokołowski was a retired officer, Ciechanowski 2014, p. 466
^normally Spanish issues were handled by Witold Kozłowski, the only official who manned the South-Western Section of Political-Economic Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ciechanowski 2014, see picture 16 after page 320, also p. 525
^Stefan Czarnecki (1904–1977) excelled in legally dubious trade enterprises; he later posed as "comte" and as such is buried in Paris. Other private dealers were Stefan Katelbach and Alfred Jurzykowski, Molina Franco 2021, p. 5
^at least some if not most Czechoslovak and Austrian arms sold to Spain were transported by rail across Poland and shipped from Gdynia, see on Czarnecki in detail see Deszczyński 1997, p. 51
^detailed information with dates, ship names, cargo and other information in Ciechanowski 2014, pp. 605-644. The list of ships is probably not complete and should be treated as the minimum identified. Some other sources list ships departing from Gdynia with arms for Spain but unaccounted for by Ciechanowski, e.g. a Latvian vessel Tiiu reportedly called at Honfleur, see Pierre Salmon, Un trafic à la frontière du légal: le transit d’armes polonaises destinées aux républicains espagnols par le port de Honfleur (1937–1938), [in:] Annales de Normandie 68/1 (2018), pp. 153-171, or a Bjornoy reportedly carried SEPEWE rifles when arrived at a Republican port in October 1936, see Fusiles y mosquetones de la infantería republicana, [in:] Sociedad Benéfica de Historiadores Aficionados y Creadores service
^first confirmed Soviet shipment took place aboard Komsomolets, which set off from Odessa on October 4, 1936. However, on the same day first Soviet weapons arrived at one of Spanish Levantine ports, Payne 1997, p. 153. Some authors speculat that the ship which transported them was Campeche, which set off from Feodosia on one of the very last days of September 1936. First Polish deliveries were provided also ahead of first Mexican shipments; of these, the first known is the one which set from Antwerp on September 25, 1936, El Pais 29.05.2005, available here
^# of shipments by quarter is as follows: 1936Q3:2, 1936Q4:10, 1937Q1:11, 1937Q2:6, 1937Q3:6, 1937Q4:4, 1938Q1:5, 1938Q2:6, 1938Q3:2, 1938Q4:1, 1939Q1:1, Ciechanowski 2014, pp. 605-644
^e.g. Poublazanec set off from Gdynia on August 20, 1937, and arrived in Honfleur on August 27. Virginia left Gdynia on April 4, 1938, and called at Honfleur on April 10. Dates in Ciechanowski 2014, pp. 630 and 640, and in Salmon 2018, p. 170
^in some cases even the Polish MFA were embarrassed by overtly brazen activity of some Polish citizens acting as honorary consuls, for Uruguay see Ciechanowski 2014, p. 497
^e.g. in October 1936 two Soviet agents, Leulein and Rosenfeld, were allegedly engaged in organizing shipping aboard a Greek steamer Sylvia, Ciechanowski 2014, p. 607. It is not clear whether the Polish intelligence were aware of the NKVD engagement and whether they tolerated Soviet involvement. The trading company of Daniel Wolff, based in the Hague, was probably entirely controlled by NKVD and its resident, Криви́цкий, Ciechanowski 2014, pp. 519-520
^it was the case of Sylvia, the ship operating under the Greek flag and commanded by a Greek captain. The seizure proved enormously profitable, as the ship reportedly carried some 8,500 machine guns, almost half of all machine-guns sold by Poland, Molina Franco 2021, p. 7
^reportedly the Nationalists intervened in Bucharest and the Romanian authorities agreed to mount difficulties, Ciechanowski 2014, p. 504
^all categories quoted after Deszczyński 1997, p. 58. Detailed though fragmentary info with breakdown into particular shipments in the annex by Ciechanowski 2014, pp. 605-644. In case other authors suggest different figures, they are provided in footnotes against specific categories
^many authors suggest much smaller figures. One scholar notes cautiously that there were at least 16 tanks sold, Alberto Gómez Trujillo, Armas polacas en la Guerra Civil Española, [in:] Defensa Aviación service 2017, available here. Another one opts definitely for 16, Alexander Clifford, The People's Army in the Spanish Civil War: A Military History of the Republic and International Brigades 1936–1939, London 2020, ISBN 9781526760951, p. 28, and another one claims 19, E. R. Hooton, Spain in Arms: A Military History of the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939, Oxford 2019, ISBN 9781612006383, p. 104, thought it is not clear whether the figure applies only to deliveries to the Northern enclave. One scholar prefers to note "considerable number", Charles J Esdaile, The Spanish Civil War: A Military History, London 2018, ISBN 9780429859298. Another study claims that "Republican Army of the North" operated "around 30" of FT-17s, bought in Poland, Jose María Mata, Lucas Molina, José María Manrique, German Military Vehicles in the Spanish Civil War: A Comprehensive Study of the Deployment of German Military Vehicles on the Eve of WW2, London 2020, ISBN 9781473878853, see capture on non-paginated illustration insert. A Spanish historical association claims 48 tanks delivered to the North, but unclear whether all from Poland or also including machines from France, Asociación Sancho de Beurko, La República compra tanques en Polonia. El Renault FT-17 an la campaña del norte (1937), [in:] El Diario 13.03.2020, available here. A recent monographic study on FT-17 in Spain claims that "En la guerra civil española el gobierno republicano adquiere en Polonia 64 carros Renault FT-17", which does not necessarily mean that all 64 have been delivered, see Molina Franco 2020 [marketing information], available hereAt various amateur sites one might find all other sorts of estimates, e.g. that "El total de carros FT 17 comprados por los repúblicanos fue de 64 unidades, casi la mitad eran de construcción original francesa, otros de fabricación polaca", see MiniaturasJM service, available here
^another author claims there were 17,700 machine guns sold, divided into light machine-guns (12,800) and heavy (4,900), most popular being Chauchat (8,650), Colt wz. 14 (2,200), Maxim-Spandau wz. 10/28 (1,850), Bergman (1,500), Browning BAR (1,100) and Maxim-Spandau wz. 08/15 (1,100), Molina Franco 2021, pp. 8-9. For the figure of 11,000 machine guns see Francisco J. Romero Salvadó, The Spanish Civil War: Origins, Course and Outcomes, London 2005, ISBN9780230203051 p. 91. Another scholars advances the figure of 8,718, Charles J. Esdaile, The Spanish Civil War: A Military History, London 2018, ISBN 9780429859298, Appendix 8, but the sum of detailed figures for specific models as listed in Appendix 9 is 11,236 (Chauchat 8,690, Bergmann MG15 1,481, Browning wz. 28 525, Lewis Mark 1 400, and other)
^another author opts for some 150,000, see Molina Franco 2021. Some claim 111,000, see Gomez Trujillo 2017, 100,000, see Roméro Salvado 2005, p. 91, or 104,430, see Esdaile 2018, Appendix 8; according to him, most popular types were Mauser 29 (25,100), Berthier 07 (22,519), Mannlicher M1888 (12,500) and Lebel M1886 (8,000). A service of amateur Spanish historians lists identified Polish deliveries (with many other Polish deliveries with no number provided) which total at 125,000 rifles, mostly Berthier (37,000), Mannlicher (27,000), Enfield (26,000) and Mauser (25,000), see SBHAC website
^another author claims more than 2m hand grenades, Ciechanowski 2014, p. 480
^one scholar claims rather 210m cartridges, divided mostly into 2 types, 97m of 7,92x57 (Mauser), and 98m of 8x50 (Berthier, Mannlicher and Chauchat). Far minor quantities were 6.5m of 7,62x54 (mostly for Colt machine guns), and 7m of 7,69 (some types of machine guns, mostly Lewis), see Molina Franco 2001
^some authors claim that Honfleur only handled 950 tons of Polish TNT, Salmon 2018
^see breakdown by Ciechanowski, and in particular shipments numbered 11 and 12, p. 611
^a Polish press correspondent in Republican Spain, Ksawery Pruszyński, rather sympathetic to the republican cause, in his account a few times mentioned hostility he faced when his republican interlocutors found he was Polish, hostility based on widespread opinion on poor quality of Polish arms, see Ksawery Pruszyński, W czerwonej Hiszpanii, Warszawa 1937
^the issue is pressed in Gerald Howson, Arms for Spain, London 1997, ISBN9780312241773, pp. 259-277. Similar opinion is advanced by the Spanish scholar, who even suggests that with Polish arms of little use, the Republic had to turn to the USSR, Ángel Viñas, Las armas y el oro. Palancas de la guerra, mitos del franquismo, Barcelona 2013, ISBN9788494100833
^some authors claim that initially Poland was selling old stocks, and later switched to modern arms, see Deszczyński 1997, p. 49. Exactly the opposite opinion by another author, who claims that as part of the marketing exercise, initially the Poles were selling quality hardware, Ciechanowski 2014, p. 479
^a Polish author claims that either the Polish vendors or international brokers soon realized decision-making chaos and lack of quality controls on the republican side, and they consciously took advantage of it, Ciechanowski 2014, p. 481. Comments on impact of corruption among republican decision-makers on Polish arms purchases in Miguel Ángel Ordoñez, Dos siglos de bribones y algún malandrín: Crónica de la corrupción en España desde el SXIX a la actualidad, Madrid 2014, ISBN9788441434387, p. 312
^Molina Franco 2001. See also [machine gun] “era un arma moderna y de excelente factura”, [hand grenade] “incorporaba una segura espoleta B3 de retardo pirotécnico de gran calidad, que fue copiada en modelos posteriores fabricados por el bando republicano”, “éste excelente fusil”, Gomez Trujillo 2017
^thesis advanced by Pio Moa, Los Mitos de la Guerra civil, Madrid 2006, ISBN9788497341875, esp. the chapter Intervención y No intervención
^Ciechanowski 2014, p. 55. The Polish ambassador in London regularly took part in sittings of the Non-Intervention Committee, Ciechanowski 2014, p. 57
^some Polish authors claim that technically, Poland did not breach their obligations, as they were conditioned by other countries also abstaining from selling arms to Spain, Ciechanowski 2014, p. 548
^though the Italians did not seem perplexed or worried. It also seems that the Nazi Germany tolerated Polish transit for the Republic, Deszczyński 1997, p. 53
^reports delivered by the Nationalist representative in Warsaw Serrat to Burgos or documents he presented at the Polish MFA specified number of boxes loaded, their origin, often also their content and description of specific weapons inside
^Serrat's reports were at times wired via Berlin, see Ciechanowski 2014, which gives rise to speculation that it was the Nazi intelligence in Gdynia (or actually, Nazi officials in the Free City of Danzig) which provided the data
^at one point in 1938 the Nationalist administration seriously considered retaliatory measures against Poland, e.g. in terms of severing any present and future trade relations. It was the foreign minister Jordana who intervened and the plans were shelved, Ciechanowski 2014, p. 523
^Deszczyński 1997, p. 55, Ciechanowski 2014, p. 525
^95 Polish vs 350 Soviet tanks, Polish figures from Deszczyński 1997, p. 54, Soviet figures from Payne 2011, p. 156; also following data is sourced by Deszczyński and Payne
^both the Poles and the Soviets were contracted and paid for some 15,000 pieces each, though large part of the Polish shipment was intercepted by the Nationalists and has never reached its intended recipients
^Renault FT-17 was the first modern tank ever built, rolled out by the French during last years of World War One. It was used successfully in many wars of the early 1920s, including the Polish-Soviet one of 1919–1920; by the late 1930s it was already obsolete, though not unusable
^T-26 were based on the original Vickers design and their parameters (some 10 tons weight, 45mm gun, 15mm front armor) were common for many tanks of this period, like the Czechoslovak LT 38, Polish TP-7, French FCM 36, or – with exception of the armament – also the German Panzer Mk. II
^BT, including the Spain-exported BT-5, were built on the innovative Christie chassis, which enabled on-tracks and off-tracks mobility; no other army of the world operated similar machines
^Frank Miranda, Foreign Rifles of the Spanish Republic, 1936–1939, [in:] Surplused service 2020, available here
^according to Howson, referred after Payne 2011, p. 157. However, other authors claim otherwise and note that the obsolete FT-17 tank was sold by the Poles $35,000 apiece, while for the modern T-26 tank the Soviets charged only $21,500, Clifford 2020, p. 28
^first-hand account by Pruszyński 1937, historiographic approach in Howson 1997, Viñas 2013. See also Ciechanowski 2014, p. 481
^Deszczyński 1997, p. 57. However, SEPEWE sales to Spain were revisited after 1939, when the London-based Polish government in exile launched criminal investigation related to supposed adverse affect of the sales on Polish military potential. Contemporary historian suggests it was rather means of settling the accounts between the pre-1939 opposition (which controlled the government in exile) and the Sanacja camp (which ruled until 1939 and was later stigmatized as responsible for disastrous defeat at hands of the Wehrmacht in September 1939), Ciechanowski 2014, p. 549
^30-40% according to Salmon 2017. Others claim the prices exceeded the market ones „at least” by 10-25%, Molina Franco 2001, p. 10
^Ciechanowski 2014, p. 557. Some scholars opt for $36m, Deszczyński 1997, p. 54. Another historian advances the figure of $60m, “los tratos de polacos supusieron para la República sesenta millones de dólares”, Ordoñez 2014, p. 312. One author writes that "the Poles overcharged to such an extent that although official figures show $24 million worth of sales to Spain, military officials estimated they had in fact made in excess of $200 million", Alexander Clifford, The People's Army in the Spanish Civil War: a Military History of the Republic and International Brigades, London/Philadelphia 2020, ISBN 9781526760951, p. 28
^Net profits recorded by SEPEWE are not clear. In the years of 1936–1938 net income after tax was reported by the syndicate as some 15m złoty, Ciechanowski 2014, p. 560. Given 90% of this sum was produced by sales to Spain, actual NIAT was only 7% of the proceeds (200m zlotys) recorded, the sum which does not support the thesis of extremely profitable business or extraordinarily high markup. Sure it is not clear what cost has been factored in and whether there was any hidden profit of the army reported as COGS in the SEPEWE P&L statement
^Mały Rocznik Statystyczny 1939, Warszawa 1939, p. 162
^official and public governmental statistics, fairly detailed, excluded Spain from tables with data on foreign trade of the late 1930s. All tables bear a footnote “bez Hiszpanii” [Spain excluded], see Mały Rocznik Statystyczny 1939Archived 2018-11-27 at the Wayback Machine, p. 163
^Kabaciński 2013, p. 53, Marek P. Deszczyński, Wojciech Mazur, Na krawędzi ryzyka. Eksport polskiego sprzętu wojskowego w okresie międzywojennym, Warszawa 2004, ISBN8388973983, pp. 135-136. Some authors suggest that the high governmental official Adam Koc might have pocketed some money, Ciechanowski 2014, p. 516
^this is the case of the company set up by Czarnecki, Ciechanowski 2014, p. 485
^Ciechanowski 2014, p. 456; the same opinion in Romero Salvadó 2005, p. 91, Miguel Ángel Ordoñez 2014, p. 312, Howson 1997, p. 111
^totals differ depending upon the author. One author claims that for the Republic the cost of waging the war was “some six hundred million dollars”, Julián Casanova, The Spanish Civil War, London 2017, ISBN9781350127586, p. 185, but in the same work he quotes also the figure of $714m as the price received for the Republican gold (not clear whether sold to the USSR only or in general), reportedly all spent on materiel, and calculated by Angel Viñas (p. 91). The American scholar claims that arms from the USSR only cost the Republic “in the neighborhood of $800 million”, Payne 2011, p. 158
^SEPEWE sales to the Nationalists amounted to 2,8m złoty, compared to almost 200m złoty worth of sales to the Republicans; there are 5 shipments identified, see positions numbered 11, 12, 15, 21, and 29, Ciechanowski 2014, pp. 611, 613, 618, 624
^some authors claim that “The cost to the Republic of Soviet weapons was in excess of 500 million US dollars”, Steve Earles, The Golden Labirynth, London 2009, ISBN9780953656493, p. 171. The British scholar quotes initial Soviet claims of $661m, Antony Beevor, The Battle for Spain, London 2012, ISBN9781780224534, see here. The Spanish historian notes “armas y alimentos, por un monto de 578 millónes de dólares”, Ramón Tamames, Breve Historia de la Guerra Civil Española, Barcelona 2011, ISBN9788466650359, see here. The American hispanist opts for “in the neighborhood of $800 million”, Payne 2011, p. 158
^“between 413 and 456 million dollars” - Casanova 2017, p. 92, $410m – Payne 2011, p. 158
^Casanova 2017, p. 92. Another scholar opts for $225m, Payne 2011, p. 158
^in 1937 only Greek sales amounted to $11m to the Republicans and $3m to the Nationalists. In late 1937 another contract worth around $10m was signed for cartridges, Sarah Elizabeth Inglis, Danza de la Muerte: Greek Arms Dealing in the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939 [MA thesis Simon Fraser University], Burnaby 2014, p. 63
^there is no information on overall worth of French military assistance to the Republic. In terms of weaponry, it is known that there were some 70 aircraft delivered from France (Esdaile 2018, Appendix 8); with average cost for a fighter plane of some $35,000 apiece (in the late 1920s a fully-equipped PW-9 cost between $30,015 and $31,654, Walker Hanlon, Taylor Jaworski, Spillover Effects of IP Protection in the Inter-War Aircraft Industry, Cambridge MA 2019, p. 6) all French aircraft delivered might have cost some $2.5m
^Beevor 2006, pp. 139–140. Others tend to hover around $1m, see $962,000 by Howson and $1.16m by Suarez, referred after Miguel Í. Campos, Los envíos de armamento desde Mexico a la República; una revisión historiográfica, [in:] REIB: Revista Electrónica Iberoamericana 11/2 (2017), pp. 12-29. In popular discourse there is also the figure of $3m in circulation, see El País 29.05.2005, available here
^notes in the Nationalist press at times provided names of individuals who via Poland made it from Republican Madrid to the Nationalist zone. As the Republican government agreed to their evacuation from Levantine ports only given they would remain in Poland until the end of the conflict, the notes compromised the Polish government. Also, some birth dates of numerous males were pushed back by the Polish legacy in Madrid to enable their evacuation (the Republican government introduced special restrictions for males in conscription age); once Nationalist press published their real age, the Polish diplomacy in Madrid was furtherly embarrassed. For discussion of refugees in Polish diplomatic premises and their further fate see Ciechanowski 2014, pp. 185-250
^Ronald Radosh, Mary R. Habeck, G. N. Sevostyanov, Spain Betrayed: The Soviet Union in the Spanish Civil War, Yale 2001, ISBN9780300089813, p. 163
^Ciechanowski 2014, p. 268. For samples see Ahora 29.11.1936, available here, La Libertad 29.11.1936, available here, La Voz 05.12.1937, here, El Sol 05.10.1937, available here
^on August 8, 1936 Noguera was asked by the Polish chargé d'affaires in Madrid to go to Marseille and help arrange evacuation of Polish citizend to France. Noguera decided to seize the opportunity and bring his wife and 3 children away from Spain. They were all detained in the Grao harbor by the PSOE militiamen; despite having produced all travel documents needed Noguera was killed, while his relatives were later released. The Polish legacy demanded investigation from the Republican MFA; it was promised, but produced no results, Ciechanowski 2014, pp. 228-234
^for first-hand account of a Pole in Republican Spain confronted with rumors related to supposed Polish sabotage and other mischief see Pruszyński 1937
^brief review in Bartłomiej Różycki, Polska Ludowa wobec Hiszpanii frankistowskiej i hiszpańskiej transformacji ustrojowej 1945–1977, Warszawa 2015, ISBN9788376297651, pp. 77-79
^also the international Communist propaganda ignored Polish arms sales, see e.g. “The Soviet Union, with Mexico, was almost alone in coming to the assistance of the Republic”, and the USSR was allegedly “ The only government willing to sell arms to Spain”, John Gates, The Story of an American Communist, London 1958, p. 45
^compare Wiesław Górnicki, Trzy skandale, Warszawa 1956
^Marian Zgórniak, Wojna domowa w Hiszpanii w oświetleniu polskiego rządowego piśmiennictwa politycznego i wojskowego 1936–1939, [in:] Studia Historyczne 3 (1983), pp. 442-459
^Deszczyński, Mazur 2004 (work targeting Polish arms sales in the interwar period in general), Ciechanowski 2014 (work targeting Polish-Spanish relations during the civil war in general)
^see “uno de los actores extranjeros más importantes y más desconocidos en la Guerra Civil española fue la Segunda República de Polonia, cuyas autoridades consintieron, desde el mes de agosto de 1936, el envío a ambos contendientes de material de guerra, incumpliendo flagrantemente el Acuerdo de No Intervención”, marketing information in Casadellibro service, available here, "Uno de los actores extranjeros más importantes y más desconocidos en la Guerra Civil española fue la Segunda República de Polonia", Molina Franco 2021
^compare a vastly popular set of essays by unorthodox historian, Pío Moa, Los mitos de la guerra civil, Madrid 2006, ISBN 9788497341875; Moa in detail discusses the question of allegedly poor-quality weapons sold to Republicans and claims this is mostly an excuse for military incompetence; he gives example of Chauchat machine guns from the Republic-bound ship and seized off the Andalusian coast by the Nationalists, but does not mention that the ship in question, Sylvia, set off from Gdynia. A synthetic work by equally militant but anti-revisionist historian, Julián Casanova, The Spanish Civil War, London 2017, ISBN9781350127586, contains an entire chapter titled Arms for the Republic, pp. 88-95; even Mexico and Czechoslovakia are mentioned, but Poland is not
^"Ante las dificultades puestas por el Gobierno polaco para embarcar material de guerra en tránsito procedente de Checoslovaquia, aunque no fue así para el material alemán, se embarcaron en el Sylvia (nuevo nombre de Hidalgo) 5.000 ametralladoras y veinte millones de cartuchos", Abdón Mateos, Gordón Ordás y la guerra de España desde México, [in:] Ángel Viñas (ed.), Al servicio de la República: diplomáticos y Guerra Civil, Madrid 2010, ISBN 9788492820290, p. 247. The author does not mention that machine guns listed and loaded into the Mexican vessel were purchased from Poland. The comment on Poles enabling German transit is puzzling, as (unlike in case of landlocked Czechoslovakia) there was no point in organizing German shipments to Spain via Poland
^compare “El Frente Popular recurrió al muy costoso mercado internacional de armas, en especial al de los países bálticos, Polonia y Checoslavaquia”, Javier Tusell, Historia de España en el siglo XX, vol. 2, Madrid 2007, ISBN9788430606306, p. 359. The author lists Poland on the same footing as Czechoslovakia and particularly the Baltic States (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia), which delivered minuscule quantities compared to Poland (and it is likely that the supplies in question were actually Polish supplies, as some shipments from Gdynia called at Riga or Tallinn on their route to Spain). Howson claims that "Aunque el SEPEWE vendió más armas a España después de septiembre de 1937 no se pudieron entregar muchas, pues no hay constancia de los barcos que las llevaron ni a dónde" and suggests there was little or nothing sold by SEPEWE after 1937. This claim was heavily criticed in Artemio Mortera Pérez, Armas para España...pese a Howson, [in:] Lucas Molina Franco (ed.), Treinta y seis relatos de la guerra del 36, Madrid 2006, ISBN 8496016684, pp. 61-80, but Mortera Pérez when listing shipments from Gdynia refers only to Czechoslovak or Austrian transit and does not mention Polish sales
^compare Andy Durgan, The Spanish Civil War, London 2007, ISBN9781137215093
^Lucas Molina Franco, Polonia y el tráfico de armas en la Guerra Civil española, Madrid 2021, ISBN9788417816568. See also Lucas Molina, Rafael Permuy, Importación de armas en la Guerra Civil española, Madrid 2016, ISBN9788416200443
^Stanley G. Payne, The Spanish Civil War, Cambridge 2012, ISBN9780521174701
^“arms were produced from Czechoslovakia, France, Poland, Holland and even Germany”, Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, London 2013, ISBN9780718192938, available here
^compare a very brief (180 pages) synthesis of the war, which nevertheless included entire paragraph on Poland: "Apart from the materiel that came direct from the Soviet Union, most of the armaments procured by the Republic through intermediaties came from Eastern Europe and, in practice, mainly from Poland. At first sight this is surprising, since not only was the military dictatorship there a signatory to the Non-Intervention agreement, it was also politically sympathetic to Franco. But selling to the Republic was too lucrative an opportunity to forgo – all the more especially as this allowed Poland to offload obsolete and defective stock, thereby raising revenue for its own crisis-ridden treasury and re-armament programme", Mary Vincent, The Spanish Civil War: A Very Short History, London 2005, ISBN 9780192803771, p. 89
^minimum and maximum estimates from Howson 1997, International Solidarity with the Spanish Republic (Moscow 1974) and История второй мировой войны, 1939-1945 (Moscow 1974), all referred after Payne 2011, p. 156
^minimum and maximum estimates from Deszczyński 1997, Roméro Salvado 2005, Ciechanowski 2014, Gómez Trujillo 2017, Esdaile 2018, Salmon 2018, Clifford 2020 and Molina Franco 2021
^in the mid-1930s the price tag for a fully equipped Polish PZL-11 fighter plane was some 170,000 zlotys ($35,000) apiece, Andrzej Glass, Tomasz Kopański, Tomasz Makowski, PZL P.11, vol. 1, Gdynia 1997, ISBN 8386208635, p. 20, Wojciech Mazur, PZL.11, Warszawa 2013, ISBN 9788377695562, p. 29. Average cost of WW1 military plane was $26,000, while in 1940 it stood at $93,000, Applied Military Economics. A Case Study in the American War Economy, vol. 1, Washington 1947, pp. 360, 363; in 1928 in the US a fully equipped Boeing PW-9 cost between $30,000 and $31,000, Hanlon, Jaworski 2019, p. 6
_-_Vertelom_(anciennement)_;_Ayios_Vartholomaios_(actuellement)_(environs)_-_M%C3%A9diath%C3%A8que_de_l%27architecture_et_du_patrimoine_-_APOR070335.jpg)
.jpg)
.jpg)
,_CEF,_with_M1895_Colt%E2%80%93Browning_machine_guns,_Prospect_Camp,_Bermuda,_in_1915.jpg)