The Radical Party of Oleh Liashko (Ukrainian: Радикальна Партія Олега Ляшка, romanized: Radykal'na partiia Oleha Liashka, RPOL)[1] and formerly known as the Ukrainian Radical-Democratic Party (Ukrainian: Українська демократично-радикальна партія), is a political party in Ukraine[9] that was registered in September 2010.[1] It was primarily known for its radical populism, especially in the 2014 Ukrainian parliamentary election when it gained its largest support.[10]
The logo of the Ukrainian Radical-Democratic Party
The party was established at the founding congress in Mykolaiv on 18 August 2010 and was then named the Ukrainian Radical-Democratic Party.[15] Under this name, it was registered with the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on 28 September 2010.[1][15] At the time, the party was led by Vladyslav Telipko.[15]
Radical Party of Oleh Liashko
During its third party congress on 8 August 2011, Oleh Liashko was elected the new party leader.[15] The same day, the party changed its name to the Radical Party of Oleh Liashko.[16]
According to political scientist Tadeusz A. Olszański, in mid-September 2014 the party was "a typical one-man party, centred around Oleh Liashko; its real organisational potential remains a mystery".[20] At the 2014 Ukrainian parliamentary election, the party's list was led by Liashko, with Serhii Melnychuk, commander of the Aidar Battalion, in third place, singer Zlata Ognevich in fourth place and Yurii Shukhevych, son of the military leader of the Ukrainian Insurgent ArmyRoman Shukhevych, in fifth place.[21] At the election, the party won 22 seats.[13] It received support from rural and regional voters who had previously supported Fatherland.[22]
On 21 November 2014, the party became a member of the coalition supporting the second Yatsenyuk government and sent one minister into this government.[23][24]
On 3 June 2015, the parliament stripped the party's MP Serhii Melnychuk of his parliamentary prosecutorial immunity rights as he was accused of forming a criminal gang, abductings and threatening people.[25]
The Radical Party left the second Yatsenyuk government coalition on 1 September 2015 in protest over a vote in parliament involving a change to the Ukrainian Constitution that would lead to decentralization and greater powers for areas held by pro-Russian separatists.[26] According to party leader Liashko, the party "can't stay in the coalition after anti-Ukrainian changes to the constitution, initiated by the president, were approved against the will of three parties of the coalition".[26] He was referring to his own party, Self Reliance and Fatherland.[27]
In the 2020 Ukrainian local elections 535 people won seats in local councils on behalf of the party, that is about 1.62% of the available seats.[29]
Ideology and stances
Observers had defined the party as left-wing,[30][31][32][33][34] with some also describing it as right-wing,[35][36] or far-right.[37][38] However, political scientists such as Luke March,[39] Mattia Zulianello,[40] Paul Chaisty as well as Stephen Whitefield classify the party as left-wing,[41] and the 2017 Oxford Handbook of Populism also describes the party as left-wing.[42] The Razumkov Centre also classifies the Radical Party as one with a "clearly leftist profile".[43] Regarding the concerns of the Radical Party's hardline nationalist rhetoric, political analyst Georgy Chizhov argues: "Lyashko can hardly be considered a true nationalist; he does not go deep into the jungle of ideology and completely emasculates the essence of his appeals as glorious traditions of the past."[44] The Radical Party is centered on Liashko, who is known for his populism and highly combative behavior. The party advocates a number of traditional left-wing positions on economics[45][46][47] such as lower salary taxes, a ban on agricultural land sale and eliminating the illegal land market, a tenfold increase in budget spending on health and setting up primary health centres in every village[48] and mixes them with strong nationalist sentiments.[49]Anton Shekhovtsov of University College London considers Liashko's party to be similar to populist and nationalist.[50] A similar view is shared by political scientist Mattia Zulianello.[51] Political scientist Tadeusz A. Olszański described the party as liberal-nationalist, pro-European and populist.[52]
Liashko and his party combine radically left-wing economical stances with authoritarian and nationalist outlook on society. The party promotes the concept of a state as an active, authoritarian regulator of both the society and economy. The party supports extensive social welfare, protectionism as a way to support domestic industries, generous agricultural grants and implementation of state control on prices. One of the iconic proposals of the party is for the state to pay at least 5.000 hryvnias to every farmer for every cow owned, and to compensate 50% of farming equipment cost.[53] The ideological foundation of the party was described as left social populism with paternalistic qualities; in its program, the party asserts" “The purpose of the Radical Party – a society of equal opportunities and welfare.” Similarly, the party also states the “protection of the disadvantaged” as its overarching goal.[54]
The party has promised to purify the country of oligarchs "with a pitchfork".[55] It has proposed higher taxes on products manufactured by oligarchs and a crisis tax on the latter.[48] The party was described as presenting "left-wing, anti-oligarch economic policies previously associated with the Communist Party"; the similarity with the banned Communist Party is also similar because of the Radical Party's oppositional stance towards EU integration. Paul Chaisty and Stephen Whitefield noted that the party "took the same position as voters of right-wing and nationalist parties on the question of EU integration, suggesting no significant realignment of Communist voters in the East".[41]
Amongst the proposals of the party is to ban Russophile parties such as the Communist Party of Ukraine and the Party of Regions.[56] Despite its anti-Russian positions, the party also supports localism and regional decentralization, arguing for the need to extend the authority of local governments.[57]
Party leader Liashko had stressed in May 2011 he had nothing against sexual minorities.[58] In a September 2015 interview with Ukrayinska Pravda, he stated that being an LGBT person "is the choice of each individual. I can not condemn".[59]
Polish observers compared the Radical Party of Olesh Liashko to Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland (Polish: Samoobrona Rzeczpospolitej Polski).[60] Samoobrona is a far-left[61] Polish political party that was described as radical,[62] left-wing populist,[63] and agrarian socialist.[64] Two parties share many similarities, such as their staunchly nationalist, agrarian and left-wing populists positions, as well as controversial forms of protest.[60]
Chopa, Viktor (19 July 2017). "Parliamentary elections in Ukraine: single-party majority and other options". Ukrinform. Kyiv. The Radical Party with its left-wing and populist deviation, which has already tired the voters out, faces serious problems. Taking into account Liashko's rating of 5.48% in the presidential election, only the commitment of stable voters to this particular political figure can save all the "radicals" from political non-existence.
Chaisty, Paul; Whitefield, Stephen (2018). "Critical Election or Frozen Cleavages? How Voters Chose Parties in the 2014 Ukrainian Parliamentary Election". Electoral Studies. 56 (1): 162. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2018.08.009. Neither the emergence of a leftist populist party, the Radical Party, which sought to appeal to nationalist voters.
Chaisty, Paul; Whitefield, Stephen (2018). "Critical Election or Frozen Cleavages? How Voters Chose Parties in the 2014 Ukrainian Parliamentary Election". Electoral Studies. 56 (1): 162. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2018.08.009. Neither the emergence of a leftist populist party, the Radical Party, which sought to appeal to nationalist voters.
Rachok, Anatoliy (2018). Yuriy Yakymenko; Valeriya Klymenko; Hanna Pashkova (eds.). "Ukraine on the Eve of the Election Year: Public Demand, Positions of Political Actors, Outline of the New Government (Analytical Report by the Razumkov Centre)"(PDF). National Security & Defence. 3–4 (175–176). Razumkov Centre: 91. The analysis of party programmes in terms of their socio-economic policy made it possible to identify the following parties that may enter the new Parliament: four clearly leftist parties (the Radical Party, For Life, the Opposition Bloc and "Batkivshchyna"), one left-ofcentre ("Svoboda"), one conditionally centrist (Servant of the People) and three right-of-centre parties (the Civic Position, "Samopomich" Union, and Petro Poroshenko Bloc).
Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser; Paul Taggart; Paulina Ochoa Espejo; Pierre Ostiguy (26 October 2017). The Oxford Handbook of Populism. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford University Press. p. 291. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198803560.001.0001. ISBN9780192525376. A feature of the post-Soviet landscape is that radical left-wing quasi-populist forces have been as prevalent (perhaps more so) than those of the right. This is unsurprising, since across Europe, the post-Soviet radical left has become more populist, acting no longer as the vanguard of a (now diminished) proletariat but as the vox populi (e.g. March, 2011). Whereas many left-wing parties retain a strong socialist ideological core, there are other social populists whose populism has become a more systematic element of their ideological appeal. Lyashko (who came third in the 2014 presidential elections) represents a less ideological, but more incendiary, macho, and media-astute populism akin to a "radio shock jock" (e.g. Kozloff, 2015). He supports a folksy, peasant-based populism focusing on anti-corruption and higher taxes on the oligarchs.
Zulianello, Mattia (2020). "Varieties of Populist Parties and Party Systems in Europe: From State-of-the-Art to the Application of a Novel Classification Scheme to 66 Parties in 33 Countries". Government and Opposition. 55 (2): 6. doi:10.1017/gov.2019.21. hdl:11368/3001222. ISSN1477-7053. - Listed as "Left-wing/national-social".
Sychova, Viktoriia (2019). "Soviet archetype in interaction authorities fnd political opposition as threat to national security of Ukraine". Public management. 18 (3): 454. doi:10.32689/2617-2224-2019-18-3-444-460. Thus, the representative of the left forces, the leader of the Radical Party Oleg Lyashko, positioning himself as a "people's" president, in essence, hinted at the establishment of an authoritarian regime: "Lyashko will be in Ukraine like Lukashenka in Belarus. Everyone will fly like a thorny broom".
^March, Luke (2017). Populism in Post-Soviet States. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 214–231. ISBN0198803567.
^Zulianello, Mattia (2020). "Varieties of Populist Parties and Party Systems in Europe: From State-of-the-Art to the Application of a Novel Classification Scheme to 66 Parties in 33 Countries". Government and Opposition. 55 (2): 6. doi:10.1017/gov.2019.21. hdl:11368/3001222. ISSN1477-7053. - Listed as "Left-wing/national-social".
^ abChaisty, Paul; Whitefield, Stephen (2018). "Critical Election or Frozen Cleavages? How Voters Chose Parties in the 2014 Ukrainian Parliamentary Election". Electoral Studies. 56 (1): 158–169. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2018.08.009.
^Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser; Paul Taggart; Paulina Ochoa Espejo; Pierre Ostiguy (26 October 2017). The Oxford Handbook of Populism. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford University Press. p. 291. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198803560.001.0001. ISBN9780192525376. A feature of the post-Soviet landscape is that radical left-wing quasi-populist forces have been as prevalent (perhaps more so) than those of the right. This is unsurprising, since across Europe, the post-Soviet radical left has become more populist, acting no longer as the vanguard of a (now diminished) proletariat but as the vox populi (e.g. March, 2011). Whereas many left-wing parties retain a strong socialist ideological core, there are other social populists whose populism has become a more systematic element of their ideological appeal. Lyashko (who came third in the 2014 presidential elections) represents a less ideological, but more incendiary, macho, and media-astute populism akin to a "radio shock jock" (e.g. Kozloff, 2015). He supports a folksy, peasant-based populism focusing on anti-corruption and higher taxes on the oligarchs.
^Rachok, Anatoliy (2018). Yuriy Yakymenko; Valeriya Klymenko; Hanna Pashkova (eds.). "Ukraine on the Eve of the Election Year: Public Demand, Positions of Political Actors, Outline of the New Government (Analytical Report by the Razumkov Centre)"(PDF). National Security & Defence. 3–4 (175–176). Razumkov Centre: 91. The analysis of party programmes in terms of their socio-economic policy made it possible to identify the following parties that may enter the new Parliament: four clearly leftist parties (the Radical Party, For Life, the Opposition Bloc and "Batkivshchyna"), one left-ofcentre ("Svoboda"), one conditionally centrist (Servant of the People) and three right-of-centre parties (the Civic Position, "Samopomich" Union, and Petro Poroshenko Bloc).
^Chizhov, Georgy (2018). Claudia Crawford; Boris Makarenko; Nikolay Petrov (eds.). Populism as a Common Challenge. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. ISBN978-5-8243-2210-1.
^Kuzyshyn, Andrii; Poplavska, Inna (2022). "Peculiarities of Ukraine's population's political identity through the prism of results of electoral preferences". Journal of Geography, Politics and Society. 12 (1): 34-43.
^ abMucha, Wojciech. Krew i ziemia. O ukraińskiej rewolucji (in Polish). Fronda. p. 171. ISBN978-83-64095-58-0.
^Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser; Paul Taggart; Paulina Ochoa Espejo; Pierre Ostiguy (26 October 2017). The Oxford Handbook of Populism. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford University Press. p. 193. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198803560.001.0001. ISBN9780192525376.
^Aleksandra Galasińska; Dariusz Galasiński (2010). The Post-Communist Condition: Public and Private Discourses of Transformation. John Benjamins Publishing Company. p. 105. ISBN978-9027206282.
^Gerrit Voerman[in Dutch]; Dirk Strijker; Ida Terluin (2015). "Contemporary Populism, the Agrarian and the Rural in Central Eastern and Western Europe". In Sarah de Lange[in Dutch] (ed.). Rural Protest Groups and Populist Political Parties. Wageningen Academic Publishers. p. 172. doi:10.3920/978-90-8686-807-0. ISBN9789086862597.
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