Nariman joined the Bar as an advocate in 1979.[10]Times of India placed him among top ten lawyers of his time.[11] After his year at Harvard, he practised maritime law in New York at Haight, Gardner, Poor & Havens for a year.[2][12]
He has been practising law for the last 30 years and has more than 500 reported Supreme Court judgments to his credit.[citation needed] He is an expert in Comparative Constitutional Law and Civil Law. He has argued numerous cases, including the constitutional bench judgments of P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra[14] and State of Punjab v. Devans Modern Breweries Ltd.[15]
In a case he argued, Enercon (India) Ltd. v. Enercon GMBH, Civil Appeal No. 2086 of 2014, Nariman has clarified the arbitration law on the seat/venue dichotomy. Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. Scotch Whisky Assn., (2008) 10 SCC 723 is a landmark case in trademark law wherein the arguments of Nariman that the class of buyer may be relevant to the determination of a passing off action and it is not always the test of the prudent man which would apply was accepted.
After being at the post of Solicitor General of India for eighteen months, Nariman resigned on 4 February 2013. The reason for this is not known though it was said that he shared a poor rapport with the Law Minister Ashwani Kumar[18][19]
Supreme Court of India
Nariman was elevated as a judge of the Supreme Court on 7 July 2014. He was the fifth Supreme Court judge to be elevated directly from the Bar. He reached the retirement age of 65 on 12 August 2021.[20]
Publications
In November 2016, Nariman's book on the Zoroastrian religion, The Inner Fire, was released. The book is an analysis of the Gathas.[21]
Nariman and Jasti Chelameswar formed the two judge bench of the Supreme Court of India which struck down a controversial law which gave Indian police the power to arrest anyone accused of posting emails or other electronic messages which "causes annoyance or inconvenience". The judges held Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, which made such offenses punishable up to three years imprisonment, to be unconstitutional. The judgement was authored by Nariman.[22][23][24][25][26] According to Nariman and Chelameswar, several terms in the law they were striking down were "open-ended, undefined and vague" which made them nebulous in nature. According to the judges: "What may be offensive to one may not be offensive to another. What may cause annoyance or inconvenience to one may not cause annoyance or inconvenience to another."[26]
In their judgement, the judges clarified that a distinction needs to be made between discussion, advocacy, and incitement. Any discussion, or advocacy of even an unpopular cause cannot be restricted, and it is only when such discussion or advocacy reaches the level of incitement whereby it causes public disorder or affects the security of the state can it be curbed.[24][25][26]
The judgement has been welcomed for defending the Indian Constitution's ideals of tolerance and the constitutional provisions of free speech.[27][28] It has been pointed out that the controversial law struck down by Nariman and Chelameswar had gained notoriety after many people in India started getting arrested for seemingly innocuous reasons on the ground that they had violated the now scrapped law.[25][27][28][29]
In a landmark judgement, a five-judge bench struck down instantaneous triple talaq by 3–2 majority and termed it void, illegal and unconstitutional. While Justice Kurian Joseph, Justice Nariman and Justice U. U. Lalit struck down the practice; Chief Justice JS Khehar and Justice S. Abdul Nazeer asked parliament to make a law in this regard.[30] Justice Nariman's judgement was against the practice of Triple Talaq where he stated "Triple Talaq is a disapproved form of divorce. Even the Hanafi law says triple talaq is sinful. 1937 Act recognizes triple talaq and therefore does not violate Article 13. It is not possible for the court to fold his hands when petitioners come to court.[31] Practice of triple talaq is bad and can be tested as legislation.[31]"
Justice Nariman, along with Justice DY Chandrachud, delivered a dissent in Kantaru Rajeevaru v. Indian Young Lawyers Association.[32] He held that the decision of five judges in the Sabarimala case which held that women of the ages of ten and fifty shall not be denied entry to the Sabarimala temple is not a fit case for the exercise of review jurisdiction as the judgment does not suffer from an error apparent on the face of record. The dissent observed that the executive is under a constitutional obligation to implement the decisions of the Supreme Court even if they were not parties before them.[33][34] Justice Nariman observed:
Bona fide criticism of a judgment, albeit of the highest court of the land, is certainly permissible, but thwarting, or encouraging persons to thwart, the directions or orders of the highest court cannot be countenanced in our Constitutional scheme of things.
