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This article seems like a needless separation of information that belongs on the 2020 Nagorno-Karabagh article -- This information hardly warrants an article of its own, at least not in the current form where the majority of text is simply just a point by point retelling of the points agreed upon. Eik Corell (talk) 12:12, 10 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

KeepIt is a very important and historical agreement (not like the previous flimsy cease-fires) so it should be kept.Polmas (talk) 12:15, 10 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

A ceasefire agreement that has ended a war (and may potentially induce to end a 30 year old conflict), that is going to change a lot the politics of Armenia and Azerbajan and the whole Caucasus in general and which may provoke the first major territorial change in many years looks pretty notable to me. Also, the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war article is already too long and crowded. Super Ψ Dro 12:22, 10 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

I was just about to comment that the naming of the article was what threw me off initially, i.e that these weren't really established in the same way as the Bishkek Protocol, but I just noticed the new name and it all seems a little better now. Eik Corell (talk) 12:32, 10 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Since we have established a consensus for notability, I am removing the notability tag. Polmas (talk) 12:47, 10 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

The article says that "The Republic of Armenia will return to Azerbaijan the Kelbajar rayon by November 15th 2020". However, the map in this article only includes the western part of the Kalbajar District in hatched colors (to be returned to Azerbaijan), while it depicts the eastern part (the part that was part of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast) in light green (hosting Russian peacekeeping force). Which one is correct? --67.160.159.188 (talk) 02:55, 11 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Cordyceps-Zombie Hi, I've removed the map as the details about control are not known yet. The only thing we know is withdrawal from 3 surrounding districts. The actual military control of Azerbaijan is also unknown, therefore we need to wait until the details are cleared and an official map is provided. — CuriousGolden (T·C) 08:51, 11 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Russian Ministry of Defense published map of deployment of observation points at Karabakh. This map could be used in the article and for updating the war map. https://t.me/SputnikArmenia/10137

According to the armistice "the parties stop at the positions they occupy." And according to the map part of the Karabakh south to the Shushi is ceded to Azeris. This implies that Azerbaijan had control over those area. --Yakamoz51 (talk) 14:23, 11 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Oppose Sputnik is not a reliable source. --► Sincerely: SolaVirum 23:16, 11 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

I have created a map of the agreement, 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire map.svg. As with all war-time maps it is based on the best available information, and will evolve with the situation. @CuriousGolden removed the map, stating that "[we must] wait until an official map is released". My opinion would be that it should go in the article, possibly with a disclaimer. Any other opinions? Mapeh (talk) 18:08, 11 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Hello, details of the peace deal are not known yet. Also, your map shows the Azerbaijani gains to Shusha as a one long road, while the official maps released by Russia show that all of the southern half is controlled by Azerbaijan. — CuriousGolden (T·C) 18:15, 11 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

I based it on the map in the main article on the war (QarabaghWarMap(2020).svg), but can obviously be updated just as that map was. Mapeh (talk) 18:27, 11 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

@CuriousGolden: details of the peace deal are not known yet - they are right in the article, points 1 to 9. TerraCyprus (talk) 02:33, 12 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

I too made a map ;-) Which more covers the hole area and I hope is more in line with the actual text of the ceasefire statement. I also included where the information is unclear. --Don-kun (talk) 21:50, 11 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Wait for official boundaries by either governments. As of now, many publications provide significantly different maps. --► Sincerely: SolaVirum 23:14, 11 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

The maps are in the section for Terms of agreement, no need to wait. TerraCyprus (talk) 02:32, 12 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

And there is another map: "Staged map of border changes in Karabakh as per 2020 Armenia- Azerbaijan Agreement.png", @Don-kun: in your map, the unblocked transport arrow should better go to the south, not? TerraCyprus (talk) 02:44, 12 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

The third map has quite flawed borders, compare to the first two which use the same more detailed sources. No, the unblocked arrow should not (necessarily) go south. The agreement does not mention where the link(s) should be, neither that its only one. Even building new ones is part of the agreement, so it could literally be everywhere in Armenia (topography aside). That's why I choose to put the arrow in the middle. --Don-kun (talk) 05:50, 12 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

All of the maps here have a lot of mistakes in them. The control of Shusha isn't a long snake-like control (per Russia's official map), which makes the 2 maps here immediately wrong. The map with caption "other map" shows remaining parts of Zangilan and Qubadli Districts as Russian peacekeeper control, which again is also wrong. I have removed the maps from the article until a correct map is made. — CuriousGolden (T·C) 07:40, 12 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

No, the part of Zangilan and Qubadli is not wrong. Its exacly what the agreement is saying: contact line of november 9th is monitored by Russian peacekeepers and no further mentioning of both districts. One might disagree where the contact line exacly is, but its pretty clear that there is a contact line through both of these districts. --Don-kun (talk) 08:22, 12 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Agreement has not said anything about Qubadli and Zangilan having Russian peacekeepers. The peacekeepers are meant to be deployed in non-Azerbaijani controlled Nagorno-Karabakh. In fact in the Russian government map, most of it is shown under Azerbaijani control and rest is shown to be given away to Azerbaijan. Therefore, it's wrong. These things are exactly why I'm saying we need to wait for some time to know the details. — CuriousGolden (T·C) 10:35, 12 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

To be honest, I think we're getting to the point where this is just a bit disruptive. Look, Solavirum and CuriousGolden, I've worked with you both a fair bit on this topic now, and I know you're acting in good faith here, but the BBC has published an almost identical map to the ones we have here, and Golden's point above, peacekeepers are meant to be deployed in non-Azerbaijani controlled Nagorno-Karabakh is precisely why it is accurate to show the areas of the former NKAO remaining still under Armenian control, remaining under Armenian control. It seems that we're misguidedly holding off on including a map with the hope that there'll be a reinterpretation of what the parties stop at the current territorial positions they occupy means. I'm going to re-add the map by Mapeh, which looks excellent to me, as we should follow the RS (BBC) on this until we see other reliable sources saying otherwise. Jr8825 • Talk 10:56, 12 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

@Jr8825: My problem wasn't with who controls what. I had problems with the 3 specific maps here which I pointed out in my latest comments. — CuriousGolden (T·C) 10:59, 12 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Your problems are based on your interpretation of the treaty, so are ultimately WP:OR. We have an authoritative source to go from here, echoing the maps we have. Jr8825 • Talk 11:03, 12 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

We need to base the maps based on the only official map source we have available right now. Which is the Russia government peacekeeper map. I didn't know making up a map completely based on the mapmaker's assumptions was allowed? The map should display the available information and not touch on subjects not known to the public yet. — CuriousGolden (T·C) 11:12, 12 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Unfortunately, this isn't how Wikipedia's policy works. We follow reliable secondary sources, of which the BBC is one, and we prioritise these over primary sources (see WP:RSPRIMARY) in order to avoid original research and interpretive issues, precisely as we are having here. Unless you can point to a policy objection that I'm not seeing, I'll go ahead and add the maps shortly. Jr8825 • Talk 11:24, 12 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Russian Ministry of Defense already published maps of deployment of observation points and borders at Karabakh. Those maps could be used in the article and for updating the war map. https://caucasus.liveuamap.com/en/2020/11-november-russian-ministry-of-defense-published-map-of --31.145.12.106 (talk) 11:28, 12 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

The Russian map has an obvious contradiction to the text of the statement: Agdam in the map stays under Armenian control. But their map of the contact line is mostly similar to my map :) Also, CuriousGolden, I did not make *any* asumptions in my map. It is purely what the text of the agreement says. You are the one making asumptions. And many of the other maps too, ignoring the uncertainties. --Don-kun (talk) 11:37, 12 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

If we're using any of the maps here, then Mapeh's map seems the most correct. — CuriousGolden (T·C) 11:47, 12 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

The same Russian MOD maps on different news websites also. please check them and I hope they help.

https://news.am/eng/news/612714.html https://caucasus.liveuamap.com/ https://niqnaq.wordpress.com/ https://www.ft.com/content/c9dab829-3b4a-4464-a0c3-4d5c51aa1b0e https://cybershafarat.com/2020/11/11/the-russian-view-peacekeepers-in-karabakh/ https://cybershafarat.com/2020/11/10/nagorno-karabakh-region-agreement-map/--31.145.12.106 (talk) 11:55, 12 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Don-kun's map marks the area of Kalbajar with the former NKAO as 'unclear', as it's not explicit (in the English translation at least) whether the treaty refers to entirety of Kalbajar District or just the area outside of the former NKAO (roughly Artsakh's Shahumyan Province). Given that a chunk of Artsakh's Martakert Province is not mentioned anywhere, this area is to remain under Armenian control, so the main interpretative element of Mapeh's map is the decision to mark the area of all of Martakert Province as remaining under Armenian control. However, this is corroborated by the BBC's map which is why it's acceptable and the most reliably sourced map we currently have. Jr8825 • Talk 11:59, 12 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Would also like to point out that if we're using Mapeh's map, then names should be changed to WP:COMMONNAME (e.g. Shushi to Shusha, Karvachar to Kalbajar, Kovsakan to Zangilan, Berdzor to Lachin, Akari to Hakari). — CuriousGolden (T·C) 12:04, 12 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

This is a good point. Ideally we should have both the Armenian and Azerbaijani transliterations for each of these places to please everyone. Is this possible @Mapeh:? Jr8825 • Talk 12:08, 12 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Hi @Jr8825 and CuriousGolden:, I have uploaded a new map. All place-names in disputed areas are now bilingual (monolingual elsewhere), and there is also the former border of the NKAO (including claimed Shahumyan) for context. Mapeh (talk) 14:13, 12 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Hi, great, but there are some mistakes. You've marked Shahumyan as part of NK, which it isn't. You haven't marked Madagiz as AZ-controlled and I'm not a very big fan of one language's names being bigger and more visible than the other. — CuriousGolden (T·C) 14:30, 12 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Correcting the former NKAO border and adding a label for Magadiz are good suggestions. As for the names, they are the same size and well, both languages can't be on top. I personally think the italics helps emphasise the Azeri equally. Jr8825 • Talk 14:40, 12 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

My concern wasn't the text's placement or it being italic. The Azeri names are visibly smaller than Armenian names (obvious example in Kalbajar name). Also, I suggest not putting same thing twice if the names are same in both languages (e.g. Hadrut). — CuriousGolden (T·C) 14:50, 12 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

To be honest, the font looks exactly the same size to me. Can you confirm this Mapeh? I quite like the duplicate identical names as it adds consistency, but don't feel particularly strongly about this. Looking again at Magadiz, it's not that the label is missing but that the area controlled by Azerbaijani seems to be a little incorrect – can it be tweaked so that it matches File:QarabaghWarMap(2020).svg and encompasses Magadiz? I've checked and we do have a secondary source (TASS) confirming it came under Azeri control. Also, is it possible to slightly increase the size of all the labels, as they're a bit smaller than the original version? Jr8825 • Talk 15:07, 12 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

I want to point out the problems with the map of Mapeh as I view them: a) Zengilan and Qubadli are not mentioned and they are not part of Lachin. This is an interpretation or even an error. b) We dont know the extention of Kalbajar, thus chosing one of the possible district borders is a interpretation. c) (at least in the caption) No 'corridor' to Nakhchivan is mentioned in the statement nor where it would be. It mentions just transport in general and does not specify, thus a map should not show anything more specific or a interpretation of this clause. d) The Lachin-corridor should go up to Stepanakert, as it is mentioned in that way (in connection with the new road around Shush*) in the statement. e) At least in my opinion it is an interpretation to make any statements about the remaining, not mentioned areas. It may be the logical conclusion, but the agreement does not say the areas on both sides of the front stay under control of Azerbajan or Artsakh. When the aim of the map is to show the content of the agreement, it should not show anything not in the agreement. (at least if it can be understood as part of the agreement, not talking about general topography here)

About the NKAO+Shahumyan border: An alternative to switch to the NKAO border is to leave this in and change the caption to "border of declaration of independence in 1991" which would be correct. --Don-kun (talk) 16:44, 12 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Hi @CuriousGolden, Jr8825, and Don-kun:. Here are my replies to your various comments:

• The place names are the same size for both languages, 3,5px. In an effort to be fair, one goes first (Armenian), the other get extra emphasis (italics, Azerbaijani). I will make the labels bigger. I put both languages even when they are the same so to not have to chose between the Armenian and Azeri fonts.
• Since 1992 the NKAO has claimed Shahumyan, hence it's inclusion in it's theoretical Artsakh-point-of-view boundaries. This was obviously never recognized by Azerbaijan, like many other elements on the map (Armenian place names as well are not official for example).
• I will adjust the Azeri-conquered zone in both the North and the South according to errors spotted compared with QarabaghWarMap(2020).svg.
• I will extend the Russian-guarded corridor to Stepanakert/Khankendi. The agreement doesn't specifically say to Stepanakert/Khankendi, but since it mentions Shushi, this can be inferred.
• All sources do not include the NKAO part of Karvachar/Kalbajar district in the zone to be transfered by 15 November, so I think there isn't any issue with this.
• The arrow of point 9 (Nakhchivan-Rest of Azeribajan transport links) could go anywhere in Armenia, including the Sout where it already is. It is a purpusfully vague arrow to show this as-yet undefined situation.
• I don"t exactly understand point e @Don-kun:, could you explain it in a different way ?

It work on these changes now and upload a new map within an hour or two. Mapeh (talk) 17:29, 12 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Alright, all the points are good except one. Shaumyan Province was never part of Nagorno-Karabakh. Not everything Artsakh claims is/will be part of Nagorno-Karabakh. Also, I didn't quite understand. Are you going to colour road to Stepanakert (even road which is part of NK) in same colour as Lachin? Because that can be quite confusing. NK should be one colour and Lachin different since it's not part of NK. — CuriousGolden (T·C) 17:37, 12 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

@CuriousGolden: I can see the argument both ways for whether the former NKAO borders or borders claimed at independence should be shown, although I would personally prefer the former NKAO borders. @Don-kun: the BBC's map shows Zengilan and Qubadli as areas that Armenian troops are to withdraw from, in the same way that Mapeh's does. Jr8825 • Talk 19:48, 12 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

I'm fine with Shaumyan being shown there as long as it's different colour/border style than former NK borders to make a distinction. — CuriousGolden (T·C) 18:04, 12 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

• Shahumyan was part of the declaration of indipendence and was under control of NK during the war in 1992. So if you phrase the caption a bit different I think this is ok.
• I am not sure that you can trust the QarabaghWarMap(2020).svg either, I used different sources and many like the Russian map above point to that there is not that much left of NK south of the Lachin corridor.
• More to CuriousGolden: The road up to Stepanakert is the same in Lachin and in the former NKAO, the agreement does not state otherwise.
• The statement says Kalbajar, which could mean both possible extentions of the district. Everything else is a interpretation.
• The arrows could be positioned better, but the main point here is the text in the caption.
• Last point is difficult to explain. In the caption you write that some areas in the conflict zone "stay/remain under its control", be it AZ or AM. This is to be expected, but not in the agreement. This is why I used a gray hatching and a caption just saying there is no specification for this areas.
• About Zengilan and Qubadli: What the BBC shows on their map does not change the facts that both districts are not part of Lachin and are not mentioned in the agreement. Of course you can make a map with the same informations as the BBC. But then you have to take them in total and have to frame it as "agreement as depicted by the BBC" not as just a depictino of the agreement text that differs from that the map shows. --Don-kun (talk) 18:07, 12 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Shaumyan province was never accepted by the Soviet government (not just AzSSR, but USSR as a whole) as part of Nagorno-Karabakh. It doesn't become part of Nagorno-Karabakh when a separatist government says so. And about the road, I don't think part of NK needs to be shown differently because it falls onto the road. It doesn't really change anything. Reason Lachin corridor is shown in different colour is because it's not a part of NK that will be with Russian peacekeepers. — CuriousGolden (T·C) 18:14, 12 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Hi @CuriousGolden, Jr8825, and Don-kun:. I have uploaded a new map. To reply to the comments that were made while it was being made:

• As you say Golden, considering Russian patrols will be in the whole of Armenian-controlled Artsakh anyway, coloring the road red (signifying Russian patrols) in NKAO is redundant. I will reduce the road to just the Lachin corridor.
• As you suggested Don-kun, I'll move the arrows slightly so they are more visible.
• Concerning the borders of NKAO. According to Azerbaijan NKAO does not exist anymore. According to Artsakh it has included Shahumyan since 1992. A NKAO that does not include Shahumyan is not a point of view of anyone, so it wouldn't make sense I feel. The caption should state explicitly "NKAO as claimed by the Republic of Artsakh, not recognized by Azerbaijan" (or something along that line); I will change the caption on the image description page accordingly.
• No map linked to above shows the Karvachar/Kalbajar district to be transferred by 15 November as including parts of NKAO. I think there needs to be a certain realism here.

Mapeh (talk) 19:34, 12 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

You're implying that Shaumyan was not part of NK only according to Azerbaijan. Shaumyan was never part of NKAO during the Soviet times and the USSR government never approved Shaumyan as part of NK. Again, a separatist government claiming it does not change the fact that it was never part of the Nagorno-Karabakh region or Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. If you're keeping it, then caption should be "borders claimed by Artsakh", not "borders of NKAO". — CuriousGolden (T·C) 19:39, 12 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

I think the most accurate would be "Borders of NKAO as claimed by Artsakh". Mapeh (talk) 19:49, 12 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

How would that be accurate? "Borders claimed by Artsakh" is what it literally is. See the (QarabaghWarMap(2020).svg) and how it's written there. Borders of the actual NKAO doesn't change when a separatist government says so. — CuriousGolden (T·C) 19:53, 12 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

@Mapeh: the NKAO was the Soviet administrative division, defunct since 1991. Jr8825 • Talk 19:55, 12 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

@CuriousGolden: Artsakh also claimed territories outside of the former NKAO (Karvachar/Kelbajar, Berdzor/Lachin, etc.) So just "Borders claimed by Artsakh" would seem inaccurate to me, maybe "NKAO (Borders claimed by Artsakh)"?

@Jr8825: Yes, of course, but it has legal significance.

Mapeh (talk) 20:00, 12 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Artsakh agreed to giving these territories up willingly in a peace deal, meaning it does not claim them anymore. And the status of Artsakh is not even known at this point anyway. We don't know if there'll be an "Artsakh" to talk about. So, a caption like "Pre-war claimed borders of Artsakh" would be fine. — CuriousGolden (T·C) 20:03, 12 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

I have uploaded a possible compromise: just show the bits outside of pre-2020 Artsakh-controlled territory. We can add a caption such as "Territories also claimed by the Republic of Artsakh". Would this work @CuriousGolden:? Mapeh (talk) 20:21, 12 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Yes, that's fine. Also, you should change the word "conquered" to "recaptured" or "captured" since "Conquered" breaks WP:NPOV. — CuriousGolden (T·C) 20:25, 12 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Done. I'm going to add the map to the article page. Mapeh (talk) 21:31, 12 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Thanks for your efforts. My main concern is about exactly where the line of contact is, particularly south of Shusha, so I hope you'll be able to tweak this as more info comes to light. I suspect the Armenian snake towards Hadrut may simply be out of date information (I don't especially trust File:QarabaghWarMap(2020).svg on this). Jr8825 • Talk 21:49, 12 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

The map by Mapeh seems quite fair but hard to understand, there are several colors and zones. The map by EurAsiaNet ( https://eurasianet.org/in-karabakh-deal-as-many-questions-as-answers ) seems to me quite simple. I think we should make use of it. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 88.230.79.194 (talk) 06:06, 13 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

I agree and I would also like to point out that there's no confirmation whatsoever that the remaining parts of NK will remain under "Armenian control". There have already been reports of Armenian military leaving the remaining parts of NK. We could use what Eurasianet used: "Land with no scheduled cession to Azerbaijan". And also, the southern gains of Azerbaijan is not quite correct in Mapeh's map. On a less relevant note, I don't think enclaves/exclaves in and out of Nagorno-Karabakh should be marked as given or kept since there probably won't be any enclave/exclave situation there. — CuriousGolden (T·C) 06:10, 13 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

I also like the IP editor's suggestion. Could this be looked at Mapeh? @CuriousGolden: the deliberate ambiguity over the future of Armenian control can be cleared up with the caption's wording. I think "remaining under Armenian control" is fine, as there's no scheduled transfer to change the current situation and "remaining" doesn't strongly imply that this is a permanent situation (although I'm sure Armenians will interpret it this way...) Jr8825 • Talk 07:33, 13 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

"Land with no scheduled cession" avoids making any interpretations, which should be our top priority in my opinion. — CuriousGolden (T·C) 07:37, 13 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Hi all, I will be busy this weekend but if any changes are decided here I will be able to make them on Monday afternoon. No problem for what is above; that said the map in IP's link seems quite similar to September 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh clashes.png, no? Concerning the caption, "Land with no scheduled cession" seems like a good legend to me. We can then see in the coming weeks what exactly happens and adapt accordingly. Mapeh (talk) 12:43, 13 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Hi, yes it's pretty similar to September 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh clashes.png. — CuriousGolden (T·C) 12:45, 13 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Hey there, I'm the guy that made September 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh clashes.png! I figured it was easier to modify it from the Russian version than continue the English version as it was very outdated. I replaced the Russian text with English text, then reuploaded. Whatever inaccuracies were in the Russian version were thus in the English version. I did not check any details. Unknown-Tree (talk) 18:54, 13 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

@Unknown-Tree: thanks for your help, those boundaries now seem to be the most commonly shown, although I don't know how authoritative their source is. @Mapeh: the frontlines on our main article map File:QarabaghWarMap(2020).svg have been updated to match this live map and are similar to Unknown-Tree's offering; I think we should do the same. Could you do this when you're back on Monday? Cheers, Jr8825 • Talk 19:43, 13 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

I agree. — CuriousGolden (T·C) 19:51, 13 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

@CuriousGolden: I now just droped the mentioning of Russian troops along the ceasefire line, as this line will change across time anyway. I hope the map now gives a good overview of the agreement. --Don-kun (talk) 19:31, 14 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Hi all. Sorry I was away unexpectedly yesterday as well. The frontline was updated by someone else over the weekend (although I had to do minor corrections afterwards), so all good there. A couple of things have changed on the map:

• Minor background corrections as said.
• Southern front line was updated by someone else, I did minor corrections, and it is now the same as QarabaghWarMap(2020).svg.
• Changed color of Azeri-captured area, since old color was near identical to Karvachar/Kelbajar area.
• I came accross your comments, @CuriousGolden:, here (commons:User_talk:Ahmetlii#2020 Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire map.svg)
  • "Ashghi Asghjakend" and "Khachen" corrected to "Ashaghi Aghjakend" and "Askeran"
  • Bolding standardized to no cities apart from the capital Stepanakert/Khankendi
  • I didn't change the Southern frontline however and prefered to stick to the one in QarabaghWarMap(2020).svg as we have done so far.

Should we keep the new color for Azeri-captured areas? Or any other suggestions? The old color made it hard to tell the two apart, especially around the Mravi/Murovdagh mountain in the north.

Mapeh (talk) 12:48, 17 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Thanks for the changes. However, QarabaghWarMap(2020).svg is quite flawed. It basically uses LiveUAMap as reference for some but doesn't include other parts LiveUA has for whatever reason. Since many of the villages in the southern front have been independently confirmed through geo-location on Twitter, I suggest making southern border like in https://caucasus.liveuamap.com . I don't mind the new colour btw. — CuriousGolden (T·C) 12:54, 17 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

I'm not against CuriousGolden's suggestion, it has the added benefit of clearing up the issue of labelling the area south of the Lachin corridor as Lachin, when it actually isn't. @CuriousGolden: are you able to have a scout around and see if there are any other reliable sources showing the same borders/frontlines as liveuamap.com? @Mapeh: my main suggestion is re-adding the former oblast borders back in. I think they provide important context and help illustrate how much of the former "official" NKAO territory has been taken by Azerbaijan, how much remains under Artsakh's control, and why the other areas are being transferred back to Azerbaijan (it's not a newly-drawn map, but reflecting formal territorial divisions except for where the current frontlines crossed these). If this has to come at the expense of the extra areas claimed but never controlled by Artsakh, I think it's much more advantageous to show the former NKAO. Jr8825 • Talk 19:24, 17 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

The Russian MOD has published this map yesterday; I think this is as official as information can get. I could readjust the Southern frontline according to this map? There are some other particularities (no difference between Agdam district and NK, part of territory controled by Azerbaijan pre-2020 north of Martakert/Aghdara is also included in NK, no sign of Mravi/Murovdagh territorial change), but I think we can ignore those for the moment and see how the ceasefire agreement is enacted.

I'll add the border of the former NKAO (without Shahumyan, I don't agree but this seems to be the norm in all sources) and keep the "Other zones claimed by Artsakh" label.

Mapeh (talk) 11:04, 18 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

I don't think we can follow all aspects of that MoD map, particularly as Agdam district is specifically mentioned in the ceasefire agreement. re: Shahumyan district, whether ot not it was within the former NKAO isn't something that can be disagreed about, it simply wasn't. I agree the best compromise is to have it shown with a separate label. Jr8825 • Talk 11:51, 18 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

I agree with Jr8825 here. The Russian MoD map shouldn't be used as a definite source as it's barely even detailed and it tends to have mistakes (e.g. there being shown Russian posts in Agdam district in first maps and it being removed later). Also, replying to @Jr8825:'s request yesterday: Here's a pretty prominent mapper/geolocator's map about the latest situation around Khojavend/Martuni (much closer than it is on the map), here's another map by another prominent Twitter mapper/geo-locator and another one. Please note that these are not some random mappers and they geo-locate all footage to confirm before adding it to their maps. — CuriousGolden (T·C) 15:19, 18 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

As promised, I have added the former NKAO boundries, but without Shahumyan provice (which is in dotted lines). Concerning the Southern frontline, to be honest it's a mess. Here is a map where I overlaid the different frontlines that each source gave. Nowhere do they all match. Sometimes they're further North, sometimes they're further South than the frontline currently on the map. Whether the Western fringe of the Gubadli and Zangilan districts was captured by Azerbaijan is ambiguous. So, to be honest, I don't see what consensual changes can be made to the Southern frontline, as every change is contradicted by a different source. Mapeh (talk) 13:31, 19 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

@Mapeh: We should at least colour the areas that all the 3 sources in your overlaid map agree on (e.g. areas near Fuzuli and Martuni, east of Shusha and near Gubadli). — CuriousGolden (T·C) 13:38, 19 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

@CuriousGolden: Done. New Southern frontline has been uploaded. Mapeh (talk) 21:59, 20 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

@Mapeh: Looks great, thank you. — CuriousGolden (T·C) 07:57, 21 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Hi all. Just a quick note to say that it seems as if Russian troops will be stationed around Dadivank monastery, in a similar fashion to the Lachin corridor. Check this article [1] as well as the Russian Army maps [2] (cf. "Ванк" [Vank] towards the North-West). We'll have to see how this evolves (the article explicitely talks about ongoing "negociations"), and then can adapt the map accordingly in the following days. Mapeh (talk) 12:00, 23 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

This is most likely either temporary or just in the church itself, so it wouldn't be big enough to put on the map. We should wait until Kalbajar District is handed back, then we'll most likely know the real deal. — CuriousGolden (T·C) 12:50, 23 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

@CuriousGolden: Yes agreed. Let's wait and see. Mapeh (talk) 13:22, 23 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

What is the point in adding Armenian names to 7 formerly occupied districts outside of Nagorno-Karabakh? Those names were never official, or internationally recognized, and will not be used from now on. Why not just use only official names? Grandmaster 23:08, 29 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

@Grandmaster: it makes sense to include the Armenian names as they were frequently used by English secondary source coverage of the war and related events (for example, there are 285,000 Google hits for "kalbajar fire" because of the reports of house burning during evacuations, (such as here on Al Jazeera). Jr8825 • Talk 17:45, 30 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Exactly. Kalbajar is the official internationally recognized name, also used in UN Security Council resolution # 822. It is official name of the place in the USSR and Azerbaijan. Other names are not used by anyone, nor they ever had official internationally recognized status. Grandmaster 17:50, 30 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Actually you're completely right about that, I wasn't paying attention there as of course it's the Azeri name (I've now struck that comment). My preference is still to keep both so that both parties to the conflict have their nomenclature represented (mostly for the sake of even-handedness). Both ethnic groups have some claim on the region (historical, cultural or because of the de-facto situation before the war). I understand your point about legal recognition, and wouldn't say that I'm particularly adamant about keeping the Armenian names, it's just I don't see any reason to remove it, as I don't think the current stituation is harmful or confers legitimacy. Jr8825 • Talk 18:00, 30 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

I think it'd be better if we just included one WP:COMMONNAME for the cities (e.g. just Stepanakert; Shusha; Martuni; Kalbajar..). Because some of the names in Armenian (e.g. Varanda, Jrakan) weren't even used by most Armenians themselves to refer to these renamed cities outside NK, so including them doesn't really add anything of value. — CuriousGolden (T·C) 18:01, 30 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

I'm firmly against the suggestion of using only one name within NK proper, as places such as Shusha/Shushi and Stepanakert/Khankendi have within recent history had populations of both ethnicities and are sigificant to both. I think Grandmaster's point about the surrounding occupied Azerbaijani districts has a stronger basis, I just think it's case of WP:BROKEN, particularly as they were the names that Artsakh/Armenia military would've used during the conflict itself (and presumably also the (illegal) Armenian settlers in those areas). @CuriousGolden: do you have sourcing for the claim that Armenian names weren't used by Armenians themselves? Jr8825 • Talk 18:08, 30 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Nope, I'm mostly speaking of personal experience on social media (which is WP:OR, I know). I don't mind any addition really, just wanted to give my 2 cents. — CuriousGolden (T·C) 18:12, 30 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

It makes sense to use 2 names for places inside the NK, but not so much for the regions outside of it. Districts outside of NK had no Armenian population before the conflict, and I only learned those alternative names from Wikipedia. I agree with CuriousGolden, even Armenians don't use them. Grandmaster 18:22, 30 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

I think it is important that both names be used in disputed areas. The presence of both brings added value to the map and costs nothing. Even in regions outside the former NKAO the Armenian names are quite common (Google lists a quarter million webpages that use "Karvachar" and not "Kalbajar" [3] and over half a million that use "Berdzor" and not "Lachin" [4]). There is also the secondary problem that, if we only put one, which one do we put? For certain towns there is no clear answer, and there will inevitably be endless debates. I must say that my personal preference would be to make the whole map bilingual (and so put Jermuk/Istisu and Julfa/Jugha for example), but I find that the current situation is a good compromise. Mapeh (talk) 12:44, 8 December 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Dear Mapeh The official ceasefire agreement available at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/64384 says only transport links / transport communications. The green arrow currently shown on the map may satisfy the desire for single "land corridor" in Azerbaijani / Turanist circles, however the agreement says nothing about single "corridor" generally and nothing about the speculative concept of a corridor via Meghri / Syunik specifically. "Zangezur corridor" is a POV concept circulating in partisan Azerbaijani / pro-Azerbaijani media only. Leaving anything vague and unsupported on that map that would resonate with militarist propaganda on one side is highly undesirable, especially with the view of ongoing 2021 Armenia–Azerbaijan border crisis. Could you please remove that arrow from the map completely ASAP, thanks. Regards --Armatura (talk) 18:58, 23 May 2021 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Dear Jr8825, it looks like Mapeh logs in to Wikipedia / Wikimedia rarely in 2021 (previous login was in February), hence there is a chance this sensitive redundancy is going to be left there for some time before he could reply, do you have any quicker solutions like suspending the use of the file while the author is awaited to come back with a reply? There are already propaganda articles being published using this map... Thanks, --Armatura (talk) 22:45, 29 May 2021 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Hello Armatura. I have replied to your message here. Regards, Mapeh (talk) 11:56, 31 May 2021 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Thanks, Mapeh, opened a new map discussion thread here https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:2020_Nagorno-Karabakh_ceasefire_agreement#The_green_arrow_over_Syunik_in_Ceasefire_agreement_map, and linked it on 2020 NKR war talk map as well. --Armatura (talk) 17:01, 31 May 2021 (UTC)Reply[reply]

This agreement is already a part of history. They have now signed a new agreement arranged by the Trump administration. However, some fighting is apparently still going on. But this article should be removed from ITN and 'retired.'[/s] 50.111.24.158 (talk) 15:19, 12 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Source? — CuriousGolden (T·C) 15:25, 12 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

I think they refer to the ceasefire in late october, that was indeed broken. --Don-kun (talk) 16:31, 12 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

They said "this agreement" in a talk page about the 9 November deal. So I don't think they're talking about the late October deal. — CuriousGolden (T·C) 17:38, 12 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

My mistake - that was an old news story that popped up by mistake on a news site.50.111.24.158 (talk) 00:16, 13 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

The following Wikimedia Commons file used on this page or its Wikidata item has been nominated for deletion:

• 2020 Armenia protest.png

Participate in the deletion discussion at the nomination page. —Community Tech bot (talk) 21:50, 14 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Hi Nzanjani, I've now reverted two of your edits. I don't believe your wording changes represent an improvement to the current wording, which was reached through discussion in the map section above. Under the ceasefire, the area is not specifically mentioned and will consequently remain under Armenian/Artsakh control for the immediate, foreseeable future, as attested by secondary source commentary on the ceasefire. Personally, I think the clearest and most neutral wording would be to say that it's the "area of NK remaining under Armenian control", but several Azeri editors objected to this, so the current compromise is "no scheduled cession to Azerbaijan" (I personally think this is a little bit leading, but because it's factually accurate I think it's an acceptable compromise). This caption is purely a description of the terms of the treaty, as they are reflected in practical terms on the ground. It's irrelevant to the legal status of NK under intl. law (which, of course, is that it has always been de jure part of Azerbaijan, since Artsakh unilaterally declared independence - nobody's disputing this here). Jr8825 • Talk 20:48, 17 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

You appear to be espousing a biased perspective that favors the Armenian position. This is directly contrary to Wikipedia rules, which demand neutrality. Nagorno-Karabakh is de jure Azerbaijani territory, which you are effectively refusing to acknowledge by reverting my edits. If we want to talk about de facto control, let’s make that clarification, but there can never be any “cession” to Azerbaijan because it is already part of Azerbaijan; only control can be ceded. You state that Nagorno-Karabakh will “remain under Armenian/Artsakh control for the immediate, foreseeable future” but that is totally unclear. The agreement makes no such mention of it and one cannot rely on uncited secondary sources, which are merely hearsay, as you have. The most accurate edit to the color key is to simply note that Nagorno-Karabakh will remain under Russian peacekeeping oversight and leave governance status up to future negotiations to determine. I am simply trying to remove hints of bias on an issue whose ultimate resolution is very much unclear at this juncture. Nzanjani (talk) 20:58, 17 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Firstly, please remember that Wikipedia has a policy that we should comment on the content, not other editors. Regarding "Nagorno-Karabakh is de jure Azerbaijani territory, which you are effectively refusing to acknowledge", please see the last sentence of my comment above.

Now, some sources (with my emphases):

• "The truce last week stipulated that Armenia turn over control of some areas it holds outside Nagorno-Karabakh’s borders to Azerbaijan." Associated Press
• "The deal leaves a cloud of uncertainty over parts of Nagorno-Karabakh that will continue to be administered by local ethnic Armenian authorities including the enclave’s main city Stepanakert" The Guardian
• "ambiguities were related to ... the start of the negotiation on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh." (so, as negotiations haven't yet started, Armenia will be retaining control of the area under the current terms of the ceasefire) Reuters
• "The deal has prevented the conclusive defeat of Nagorno-Karabakh and the likely expulsion of its Armenian inhabitants. Russia is sending about 2,000 peacekeepers to protect the remaining Armenian population, separate the two adversaries, and patrol a corridor that will connect Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh" BBC/Carnegie Moscow Center Jr8825 • Talk 21:52, 17 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Your response makes no attempt to defend the wording of the color key re: “cession to Azerbaijan” and instead focuses entirely on de facto control, affirming my original point. It appears as though another user modified the color key accordingly. I agree with the edit and, as such, have no further comments. I am satisfied that the color key no longer reflects a pro-Armenian bias and now is in accordance with Wikipedia policy. Restoring neutrality was my sole objective. Nzanjani (talk) 04:07, 18 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

I urge you to reflect on why you felt the need to revert my edits, which were fair, accurate, and sensible. Ensuring the integrity of Wikipedia requires an unbiased fact-based perspective. Nzanjani (talk) 04:10, 18 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

You don't seem to have read or understood the sources linked above, but as you're happy with the current revision I think we can leave it at that. Jr8825 • Talk 11:41, 18 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Do we have any reliable sources about analysts explaining why Azerbaijan stopped short of regaining all of its internationally-recognised territory when it was just a few kilometers from NK's capital? --ExperiencedArticleFixer (talk) 15:55, 25 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Russian interference. But there's no really good source so far. Grandmaster 23:04, 29 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

I read an analysis somewhere saying that Azerbaijan would've faced much greater international pressure and a humanitarian crisis if it had pushed on to besiege the large Armenian population of Stepanakert (which was trapped because of both roads to Armenia being cut). I can't remember where I read this – it would've been an RS, as I'm picky about what I read, but unfortunately I follow a large number of current affairs sources! If it's helpful I can dig around and see if I can find the source again, although I'm a bit snowed under at the moment. (Also Stepanakert didn't have the historic Azeri population that Shusha did, so perhaps that was factored in because of international image, alhtough I'm not sure whether this was explicitly said in the source or my own inference!) Jr8825 • Talk 17:28, 30 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Thomas de Waal, an expert on the conflict wrote that in his article for Carnegie Peace Endowment. But that is just his opinion, not an official information. We will probably never know what exactly happened. Grandmaster 18:15, 30 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Expert opinion published in reliable sources is perfectly acceptable (it's actually preferable to the primary source official statements) – it just needs to be appropriately attributed. Jr8825 • Talk 18:18, 30 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Here's another source that provides a different explanation (threat of Russian military intervention after a helicopter shoot down), but de Waal's opinion is mentioned there as well: [5] Grandmaster 16:12, 1 December 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

So? Did Armenians evacuate Kalbajar? --ExperiencedArticleFixer (talk) 01:04, 26 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Yes, it was returned to Azerbaijan. — CuriousGolden (T·C) 09:16, 26 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Well, in original document it says "заявление" (in Russian), which means declaration or statement, but definitely not agreement. What about moving this page to 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire declaration/statement. Let's discuss before the edit request. Sincerely, Գարիկ Ավագյան (talk) 20:10, 29 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

@Գարիկ Ավագյան: "Ceasefire agreement" is the natural English translation and its usage is pretty broad – "ceasefire statement" isn't a common phrase, while to my mind "declaration" implies a stronger agreement. "Ceasefire agreement" doesn't necessarily imply any significant negotiation beyond agreement on the terms of the ceasefire, and anyway I think we should follow the English secondary sources on this. Jr8825 • Talk 17:35, 30 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

I agree with Jr8825. — CuriousGolden (T·C) 17:42, 30 November 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

• Dear map creators and specifically - Mapeh (as the last mapper who edited the ceasefire agreement map). Thanks very much for your work on ceasefire agreement map. The official ceasefire agreement text available on Kremlin website says only "transport links" and "transport communications" in the context of "unblocking regional communications", without any further specification - where, what kind and how many links. The thick green arrow over Syunik currently shown on the map (created by a user who was blocked for abusing multiple accounts for pro-Azeri POV pushing) essentially reflects the single land corridor concept that president Aliyev desires - this was not agreed with Armenia or Azerbaijan and this is clearly not what the published ceasefire agreement said. "Zangezur corridor" is a POV concept pushed by partisan Azerbaijani / pro-Azerbaijani media (particularly aggressively after 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War) based 1) partly on extinct the Gobles plan, 2) partly on Halil pasha's Turanist ideas of land continuity between Turkey and Azerbaijan and 3) partly on extinct discussions between Azerbaijan and Armenia on swapping Nagorno Karabakh for a land corridor via Meghri - none of them reflected in this ceasefire statement. Leaving anything vague and unsourced on this map that would resonate with propaganda, especially with the view of currently ongoing 2021 Armenia–Azerbaijan border crisis, is highly undesirable as it gives legitimacy to an illegitimate idea. Therefore,

1. shall we remove that green arrow from the map completely and wait until the transport communications are defined by trilateral Azerbaijan Azeri-Russian committees working on unblocking the regional communications, please?
2. and, while we are discussing, can the disputed map (the version with green arrow over Syunik) be temporarily suspended from showing up in Wiki articles please, at till this discussion is over? Many thanks. --Armatura (talk) 16:55, 31 May 2021 (UTC)Reply[reply]

• There is an ongoing deletion discussion about the so called "Zangezur corridor". Just as I said there, same applies here. The so called "corridor" doesn't exist, this isn't imaginarymaps.com. There is also no agreement of this "corridor", which for some "not really obvious" reason, is shown exactly where the Az propagandists want it to be with that green arrow. Per the 'delete' contributions [here], and the arguments presented here, I agree with both of the last points. This should've been done long ago. ZaniGiovanni (talk) 10:30, 1 June 2021 (UTC)Reply[reply]

• I believe it is better to wait for the outcome of the discussion on deletion of the article about Zangezur corridor. The article needs an illustration, and it is not known at this point what the community decides. Grandmaster 14:19, 1 June 2021 (UTC)Reply[reply]

This is the map of the official ceasefire agreement, not a map of hoax theories and speculations. This map should reflect only what ceasefire agreement explicitly says, without assumptions and WP:OR. That green arrow or "Zangezur Corridor" concept you favor are not supported by the ceasefire agreement text in any way, hence they should have no place on this map. Wikipedia is not a crystal ball, as a matter of fact, see WP:CRYSTAL. --Armatura (talk) 17:15, 1 June 2021 (UTC)Reply[reply]

The agreement says: The Republic of Armenia shall guarantee the security of transport connections between the western regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic in order to arrange unobstructed movement of persons, vehicles and cargo in both directions. There is only one way how the transport connection between NAR and the rest of Azerbaijan could be established, and it is shown on the map. It is not something new, it existed in Soviet times. Grandmaster 22:00, 1 June 2021 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Not true. No POV / OR / CRYSTAL, please. That singular "only way" is in President Aliyev's and his followers' dreams, but not in the ceasefire statement (this map should reflect only what the ceasefire statement says). You know well that there are at least two possible (and partially existing) rail routes, as you can see [here], Armenia prefers the Yerevan-Ijevan-Gazakh route, while Azerbaijan prefers Zangilan-Meghri-Nakhchivan route. But the ceasefire statement does not say "railroads only". If you check Transport, you will find out that the term "transport" includes air, rails, roads, water, cable, pipeline, etc. The statement says nothing like "Armenia gives part of his land to Azerbaijan as a corridor" or "Armenia not allowed to have transport links over Azerbaijani territory.". It says "unblocking regional communications". E.g., transportation between Georgia and Azerbaijan is not blocked - Azerbaijani people / cargo can move via Georgia and Georgian people / cargo can move via Azerbaijan, but it does not mean that Georgia cedes a land to Azerbaijan as a "corridor". Whereas the current thick green arrow pushes exactly that twisted "corridor" propaganda (absent in the agreement) --Armatura (talk) 23:08, 1 June 2021 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Who talks about ceding the land? The land will remain the property of Armenia, but under Russian control. Russian border guards will be protecting the corridor, and Russian railways will be servicing it. Obviously, the corridor will work both ways. Aliyev said a number of times that Armenia will use it to reach Russian markets, as well as Iran via Julfa, as that was the railway connection that existed in Soviet times. Armenia may prefer other routes, but it needs to find investments, which is quite unlikely. Zangezur corridor will be financed by Azerbaijan and Russia, who definitely have finances. I don't really understand all the panic in the Armenian media over the transport corridor, but I think it is related to upcoming elections. Grandmaster 00:01, 2 June 2021 (UTC)Reply[reply]

What's fundamentally wrong with what you are saying, Grandmaster, is a refusal to understand that Wikipedia is not a place for your or my or anybody's personal interpretations and forecasts. If ceasefire agreement says A, B and C, then the map illustrating it should show exactly A, B, and C, and not Ä, β, 𐌸 or 废话. 2+2 equals 4 and not 5. I can't make this more simple. --Armatura (talk) 11:24, 2 June 2021 (UTC)Reply[reply]

In my understanding, the green arrow does not necessarily show the exact location of the rail and motorway link. It just indicates that there will be a connection between the NAR and the rest of Azerbaijan, according to the agreement. Grandmaster 15:44, 2 June 2021 (UTC)Reply[reply]

That's your subjective understanding, which does not correlate with what the agreement or Wikipedia policies say. Which again takes us to my point that there should be no ambiguous vagueness left on this map, to avoid misunderstandings and misinterpretations such as the one you described. The map should be as unequivocal to a neutral reader as 2+2=4 and it clearly ins't now. --Armatura (talk) 16:03, 2 June 2021 (UTC)Reply[reply]

• Support 1 and 2: the current version of the map is misguiding with that arrow, the transcript says All economic and transport connections in the region shall be unblocked. The Republic of Armenia shall guarantee the security of transport connections between the western regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic in order to arrange unobstructed movement of persons, vehicles and cargo in both directions. And not that there will be one specific corridor to be used only by Azerbaijan, located wherever people speculate it will be, we shouldn't mix fact with opinion/speculation. The current version of the map pushes a WP:CRYSTAL propaganda concept pushed by one partisan side. thus I vote removal by WP:OR, WP:CRYSTAL and WP:NPOV. - Kevo³²⁷ (talk) 08:46, 3 June 2021 (UTC)Reply[reply]
• Comment: @Mapeh: would it be possible to change the Azerbaijani-green line with arrows to a dotted back line with arrows, with a small truck icon next to it? I made a mock up and it looked decent, but I don't currently have an SVG editor installed on my PC. @Armatura: do you have any suggestions for other ways we could visually show the improved transport connections mentioned in the ceasefire text? I think this solution would make it clearer than it's not a territorial concession. Jr8825 • Talk 00:39, 4 June 2021 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Many thanks for joining the discussion, Jr8825. If we are specifically talking about the railway links that could pass through Armenia ensure transport communication between Azerbaijan proper and Nakhchivan, then two most possible rail routes are highlighted in this article: https://eurasianet.org/armenia-proposing-restoration-of-rail-route-through-azerbaijan-to-russia. But even these are speculations at best currently, as the ceasefire statement does not specify where / how many / what type of transport connections, it just says unblocking all transport communications in the region, and all obviously includes 1) not only railway (although railways are likely to be the first modality to be unblocked, as at least they are talked about both by Azerbaijan and Armenia) but also other means of transportation - roads and even airspace, 2) not only one but several 3) not only Azerbaijan communicating with Nakhchivan (and hence also with Turkey +- Iran +-Georgia) via Armenia, but also Armenia being allowed transport via Azerbaijan - to Russia +- Caspian sea +- Georgia. Imagine a map showing all transport communications between Georgia and Azerbaijan - the ceasefire agreement map should show all possible Armenia<->Azerbaijan communications which, IMHO, could be hypothetically drawn based on the Soviet-era Caucasus transport maps. The largest number or suggestions/hypothetical considerations on communications I found in here: https://oc-media.org/ru/statyi/stoit-li-ozhidat-bolee-tesnykh-svyazey-na-kavkaze/. All these speculations can be included only with the legend saying that these are purely theoretical possibilities not stated by the ceasefire agreement and not agreed by post-statement talks, but added by wiki users, with attribution to reliable neutral sources (Aliyev's unilateral wishes are not a reliable source). Or the easier option - not to have any theoretical collection on this map till any connection becomes reality. --Armatura (talk) 01:35, 4 June 2021 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Any final thoughts on the green arrow Mapeh, Jr8825 ? ZaniGiovanni (talk) 14:22, 23 June 2021 (UTC)Reply[reply]

@ZaniGiovanni: I think the green arrow is abstract enough to be fine as the status quo, although as I said above I think replacing it with a dotted black line with a small truck icon would be even clearer. Unfortunately I don't have the time to download Inkscape and get to grips with it, so I can't make changes myself. You might want to try some of the links at WP:SVG to see if you can find an editor who's willing to help you out, if you still feel it's very important. Jr8825 • Talk 18:57, 26 June 2021 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Dear @Jr8825, the arrow isn’t status quo at all, the creator of it, CuriousGolden, also was heavy on POV pushing (and is now blocked). Moreover, they added that arrow without broad consensus. I suggest a removal of the arrow or two possible train routes as dotted lines with train icons (one via Syunik that Azerbaijan wants and one via Ijevan that Armenia prefers). If @Mapeh is kind enough, I’d ask them to please consider changing the map. Regards, ZaniGiovanni (talk) 09:53, 27 June 2021 (UTC)Reply[reply]

ZaniGiovanni what you suggest for Azerbaijan-Nakhichevan connections, makes sense to me, as the Armenian side agreed that train connections for transporting cargo would be okay, the PM Pashinyan himself said that. However, it's not the only problem of the current map. The agreement didn’t say "mainland Azerbaijan gets connections to Nakhichevan and Armenia gets no connections", it said unblocking all communications in the region, which means if we want to accurately reflect the agreement’s essence on the map, then there should also be vague signs showing the connections of Armenia’s eastern regions to Russia and Caspian sea and Armenia’s Syunik and Vayots Dzor region to Iran by route[ other than the current Meghri road. (I have not included Turkey as it shows no signs of unblocking Armenia). That will be fair and inclusive of all agreement points, instead of selectively showing just Azerbaijani interests. Jr8825, Mapeh was willing to change the map as needed, he just wanted a consensus for that. And he we are, trying to reach that consensus, instead of removing the current map and edit warring. --Armatura (talk) 18:37, 27 June 2021 (UTC)Reply[reply]

I'm contesting the removal of this relevant sourced content by Armatura. It doesn't seem reasonable at all, or to have been done in good faith. — Alalch Emis (talk) 20:02, 7 October 2021 (UTC)Reply[reply]

I'll just mention that reverting a revert is not a good tone but a recipe for sparking an edit war. This article is about the official agreement which has NO mentioning or room for any "corridors", and merging text on transport connections from another article (without pushing any unwarranted "corridor" agenda in) is under discussion as mentioned in the top of this and source article. Hence I removed it, while the discussion is ongoing. With this in mind, can you please self-revert, participate in the discussion above and wait to see what others are saying? And WP:AGF, please, and if you cannot - provide reasons. Thanks. --Armatura (talk) 20:23, 7 October 2021 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Is the addition of this section not an improvement to the article? You yourself said "the implementation of that point should be in the Aftermath (it isn't at the moment)". This concerns the implementation of point 9 -- the Azerbaijani side calls the implementation "Zangezur corridor". The current content reflects that. It's a part of the aftermath of the signing of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire agreement. I don't understand why this should be removed, and how the merge discussion affects it. I have to reiterate that your removal did not seem consistent with your earlier comment, so it did not appear to have been done in good faith meaning that I still feel justified in reverting and maintaining this pertinent addition. Regards. — Alalch Emis (talk) 20:29, 7 October 2021 (UTC)Reply[reply]

When something is being discussed on talk page, it is a generally a good tone to make your proposal, and wait to see what others say, and discuss again, to come up with consensus, instead of rushing with controversial additions. No, my proposal is far from legalizing the purely Azerbaijan-Turkey-promoted "corridor" concept under the Aftermath (to the point of making it a subheader or a synonym of transport connections), but rather moving the NPOV transport connections text under agreement Aftermath and then in NPOV (not Azerbaijani POV) language explain who promotes what. You talk about WP:CONTENTFORKING, yet you started populatiing your controversial addition with what Mirzoyan said, which is WP:CONTENTFORKING. You have not provided valid reasons for assuming bad faith, against WP:AOBF. --Armatura (talk) 21:37, 7 October 2021 (UTC)Reply[reply]

The Zangezur corridor probably should be mentioned somewhere here, but does it have to be through exact copied text from its article, having to add unnecessary several tags on both articles instead of just slightly rewriting the copied text? Super Ψ Dro 20:51, 7 October 2021 (UTC)Reply[reply]

The transclusion has been done per WP:SUMMARYSTYLE and WP:SYNC. Lead transclusion as a summary is a highly formal and optimized way to add to one article what has already been covered in another article, and starts from a premise that the lead (per MOS:LEAD) should be a summary of the body. If there is unnecessary detail in the lead it is either the case that the lead should be trimmed (highly likely in general), or that using transclusion refinement the transclusion can be appropriately adjusted to match the intended purpose. "Slight rewriting" is often problematic leading to WP:CONTENTFORKING especially in controversial matters, especially in WP:WORDISSUBJECT matters. — Alalch Emis (talk) 21:00, 7 October 2021 (UTC)Reply[reply]

@Super Dromaeosaurus: regardless of what I said in the above comment, do you want to try out your "slightly rewriting" solution for including the missing information? — Alalch Emis (talk) 21:07, 7 October 2021 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Would that get the <noinclude></noinclude> tags removed? To be honest I am not sure why were they added, I assumed it was some kind of attribution tag or something like that. Super Ψ Dro 21:15, 7 October 2021 (UTC)Reply[reply]

@Super Dromaeosaurus: You can see what <noinclude> does by reading WP:PARTRANS. Keep in mind that WP:SYNC is a guideline. Rewriting would get rid of those, but "getting rid of those" is not a good in itself. — Alalch Emis (talk) 21:19, 7 October 2021 (UTC)Reply[reply]

@ZaniGiovanni: First of all, don't talk to me like that, in an emotive and threatening tone or you will see what will happen. Second, why are you disputing the addition? — Alalch Emis (talk) 21:12, 7 October 2021 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Comment Just to be clear, I'm disinterested in this issue. My only involvement was correcting the cite error caused by adding note without a noteslist. 89.241.33.89 (talk) 20:55, 7 October 2021 (UTC)Reply[reply]

ty IP, your fix was needed. — Alalch Emis (talk) 21:00, 7 October 2021 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Comment I think the merger proposal is not about mechanistic moving of the disputed “corridor”, but incorporating the text about transport connections – these are different things. While it is being discussed, it is better to wait for consensus. ZaniGiovanni (talk) 21:16, 7 October 2021 (UTC)Reply[reply]

I suppose the title of this section is not "wiki-friendly". Wouldn't it be better to rename it to "Unblock of transport communications"? Sincerely, Գարիկ Ավագյան (talk) 07:37, 14 October 2021 (UTC)Reply[reply]

agree, Article 9 is not self explanatory or notable enough to be self sufficient as a subheading, but “unblocking transport communications” would do perhaps, not sure whether there is a noun “unblock”. --Armatura (talk) 22:30, 15 October 2021 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Yes, it is much better. Sincerely, Գարիկ Ավագյան (talk) 09:00, 17 October 2021 (UTC)Reply[reply]

A merger is the process of uniting two or more pages into a single page. It is done by copying SOME or all content from the source page(s) into the destination page and then replacing the source page with a redirect to the destination page.

The president of the self-declared Republic of Artsakh, Arayik Harutyunyan, also agreed to an end of hostilities.[3] - This statement, which based on the Facebook post of the Arayik, should not be included into the article as per WP:WEIGHT. Arayik did have any role in the ceasefire agreement. No contacts or negotiations done with Arayik. Ceasefire was signed between Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia. No one even asked Arayik's opinion or agreement, he just wrote post on the facebook, where he claimed that "he agreed". No other evidences or proves that someone asked Arayik's agreement. Any solid objections? --Abrvagl (talk) 17:15, 5 May 2022 (UTC)Reply[reply]

It was reported by Ria Novosti and he's still the president. ZaniGiovanni (talk) 14:28, 10 May 2022 (UTC)Reply[reply]

In lieu of the follow-up war earlier this year, and the fact that the terms of the ceasefire agreement were not respect (such as, for example, through the Lachin blockade), this page should be edited in its aftermath section and even in the initial starting summary to reflect this. --Dynamo128 (talk) 09:25, 26 October 2023 (UTC)Reply[reply]