why not use Manufactured Explosive Devices (mines)?[edit]

I would like to see the article say why IEDs are used instead of manufactured explosive devices. There are huge stockpiles of mines which are designed and tested by experts. In almost all areas manufactured, professionally designed items are cheaper and more effective than home-made ones, from clothing to can openers.

If the answer is "mines are not available to those using IEDs", explain why they cannot get mines but can get rocket-propelled grenades, heavy machine guns, and raw explosive materials. Ttulinsky 21:26, 3 April 2018 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Ttulinsky (talk • contribs)

You ask a somewhat complicated question that leads to many other questions being asked. I will try my best to answer them here. And, I am not sure whether or not this should be covered in the article, so I’ll leave that up to others, but I do believe I can answer your question, as well as correct some inaccurate beliefs you seem to be holding. It may benefit the article to explain that land mines (a specific type of manufactured explosive device) are a common COMPONENT of IEDs. And, when I first read your question, I interpreted to mean “Why do certain groups use IEDs instead of mines as a tactic.” And that question assumes these organizations only use one of those tactics. A quick Google search of “landmines in Afghanistan” will instantly show you the immense problems caused by overwhelming numbers of landmines being scattered all over Afghanistan, so a better question is “When do insurgent forces in Iraq and Afghanistan (and other countries, but I will focus on those two mainly as that is where my experience lies) prefer improvised munitions over manufactured munitions?” Which is really the repackaged question: “What are the pros and cons of improvised vs. manufactured munitions.” Another point I need to make is when I talk about manufactured explosive devices here, I am primarily talking about conventional land mines, unless noted, which I will come to when I talk about Iran’s EFP, technically an “off-route land mine”. I make this distinction because “manufactured explosive device” doesn’t really have a set meaning. That sounds like it could refer to anything from Bangalore Torpedoes, to artillery rounds, to aerial munitions, to shaped charges that are used before cratering charges. Since, you are comparing them to IEDs, I am presuming you are talking about land mines.
Landmines are used typically as the initiator if an antipersonnel mine, or it can be used as the main charge (and initiator), usually in conjunction with other munitions or bulk explosive if an antitank mine. Which should help you start to understand why land mines are not used commonly against US forces, as a stand-alone device. That last bit is the operative phrase, because, like I just stated, land mines were commonly employed against US forces, in the Afghanistan and Iraq theaters of war, as one component of an IED.
So, you make the comment that manufactured explosive devices are more effective than home-made devices, but that statement doesn’t really mean anything because you would have to know: MORE EFFECTIVE AT WHAT? Sure, as a safe-to-handle, easily emplaced, reliable at detonating in victim-operated mode (although occasionally it can be command detonated), with the goal of defeating a tank, land mines (MAY) be more effective (though, the completeness of the kill is questionable, which is why double and triple stacked emplaced mines is a common practice).
But, that is not our primary mode of transportation now. US Forces transitioned to the use of MRAPs, away from the older HMMWVs, M113 Tracks, tanks, Bradleys, etc. . Now, you may see the otherworldly beefiness of a tank, and reach the conclusion that the tank’s armor is obviously superior to that of the MRAP. But again, SUPERIOR IN WHAT WAY? When it comes to engineering, there are always trade-offs. The tank was designed to withstand tank battles. In tank battles, your primary concern is projected munitions with heavy armor defeating capabilities. This necessitates the heavy armor in the front, sides, and while to a lesser extent, the rear. The tops and bottoms of tanks are the weak points. Which is exactly why the US’s antitank weapons attack tanks in those two places; i.e. traditional mines attack the bottom, and the more advanced munitions (like the M93 Hornet and the FGM-148 Javelin) attack the top. The USs newest anti-tank mine, the M-19, has about 21 pounds of composition B in it. Now, it’s probably pretty likely that a single M-19 will result in at least a mobility kill for an M1 Abrams (based on a generalization I know about landmine warfare, NOT based on my knowledge about the specific capabilities of the Abrams, I could be wrong). Now, if you want a more complete kill, you will need to combine 2 or 3 mines (I have never heard of a quadruple-stacked mine, but it is certainly conceivable). But you have to also keep in mind that the goal of an antitank landmine is the destruction of the tank (often times ending its ability to maneuver and fire is sufficient), not the crew. So enough mechanical damage will fulfill the mine’s goal.
But, what about a Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected vehicle (MRAP)? Well, as the name suggests, these vehicles are designed to be HIGHLY resistant to mines, while still providing the vehicle/convoy protection from ambushes. The ambush protection capability comes from a few different features that vary from MRAP to MRAP. The usual features providing the “ambush-protected” function are very thick armor, which is common to all MRAP, (though, considerably less than a tank, save the bottom) though armor thicknesses varies, maneuverable turret, sometimes port holes for dismounts inside the vehicle to fire out of, large “transparent armor” windows for increased visibility, as well as occasionally other various add-ons like cages to protect against RPGs, or heavy “rollers” that were mounted in the front of the vehicles with the intent of initiating victim-operated IEDs prematurely, so the explosive detonated in front of, rather than under the vehicle (the enemy adapted by offsetting the pressure plate and the main charge; in turn we adapted using several different lengths of rollers to keep the enemy guessing.). However, the mine-resistant part for the entire MRAP family of vehicles came from a single feature common to all of them: a heavily-armored “V”-shaped hull on the bottom of all of the vehicles. This seemingly minute detail makes all the difference in the world. This design feature deflects the blast out to the sides of the vehicle, limiting the detonation pressure experienced by the hull. This dissipates the blast relatively safely, which means you need significantly more explosives to attack these vehicles. And keep in mind, the goal of the enemy in these attacks is to kill as many US (or coalition) forces as possible, with the ultimate goal being to kill all occupants; merely destroying the vehicle is not considered a mission success, usually. Keeping this in mind, the average weight of an explosive device intended for a vehicle in the entire theater of Afghanistan around the year 2009 was about 80 pounds. These could occasionally cause KIAs. That is according to a brief I received in Afghanistan from personnel from either the Joint IED-Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) or the Combined Joint Task Force- Paladin. I’m not sure exactly which, because there was substantial overlap between the two organizations. I received the brief because I was a Route Clearance team leader just entering country.
Now, while 80 pounds (most frequently carried in two separate 5 gallon jugs, each weighing 40 pounds) was the norm for most of Afghanistan, where I was going, Kandahar, they used MUCH bigger IEDs. The IED cells operating in and around Kandahar had started using a new method of IED attack: “Large, Deep, Burieds.” The name says it all. In the same time frame as the aforementioned 80 pound average, “over 200 pounds” was given as the average in Kandahar. These large IEDs, not infrequently weighed 500 pounds or more. And there was a relatively rare, though usually devastating, bigger cousin to the Large, Deep, Burieds, the Large Tunneled Burieds. This was using a tunnel to tunnel under the desired attack site, thus allowing a concealed approach to the IED site, which facilitated the safe delivery of considerable amounts of explosive material to the location. This tactic holds the record for the most explosives used in a single IED (FOR ME; I in no way believe my experience accurately represents the experiences of the many thousands of various personnel assigned in some way to deal with the IED threat). In one IED event, a Large, Tunneled, Buried emplaced approximately 2,000 pounds of HME (probably Ammonium Nitrate and Aluminum Powder) and detonated it (from what I was told) directly under the Buffalo. Again this is hearsay, but from a person who was not only in the know, but it was specifically his job to track the injuries that occurred to Route Clearance and EOD teams, I was told that only one of the soldiers inside the Buffalo died, and it was the lone soldier NOT wearing his seatbelt. He was thrown into the roof of the Buffalo, breaking his neck. Additionally, I was told the Buffalo was thrown 26 feet into the air and did a full flip, then another half, landing on its roof. I am suspicious as hell about the 26 feet estimate because it’s 26 feet. I mean, if it were 25 feet, I would say he’s roughly estimating, but 26 feet makes me think he’s telling a story. As a side note, 2,000 pounds of any explosive in any vehicle is unfathomable to survive; it’s only when you realize a good portion of the explosive force is consumed in blasting the ground and road away to get to the MRAP, making the 2,000-pound estimate, reasonable.
So, in addition to the need for increased explosive capabilities, there are a few other factors driving the Taliban’s (and you can be assured that other “threat organizations” evaluate conditions similarly in their territories when deciding whether to use improvised or manufactured explosive devices) use of improvised over manufactured devices. An important fact about life in Baghdad led to the development of a highly advanced type of “manufactured” explosive device, the EFP (Explosively Formed Penetrator or Projectile, depending on the literature, with military circles seeming to prefer the “projectile” version, while academic circles seem to prefer the “penetrator” version). The EFP that came to dominate to a devastating effect in East Baghdad, and to a lesser extent the surrounding area, and in limited numbers later in Afghanistan, is frequently referred to, incorrectly, as a type of IED; however, there is NOTHING improvised about these munitions. First, to create an EFP, you need pretty advanced machining equipment, as well as commercial or military explosives, as the explosive mix needs to be evenly mixed. The reason for this is because the weapon is designed in such a way that the detonation must occur in exactly the rear center of the charge (there are other ways of detonating it, but in all cases the exact placement of the detonating charge, and timing of those charges must be EXACT). Furthermore, the plate” used must be of a specific concavity, and metallurgical and mechanical consioderations must be made as well. For example, a very specific type of steel performs much better (i.e. deeper penetration) than copper; however, creating that type of steel is highly technical, so most often, copper is used. In highly advanced applications of EFPs (for example certain “bunker buster” munitions) molybdenum is used, but due to the high cost of the material, copper is usually preferred. The way the weapon operates is shockwaves from the explosives construictively interfere, amplifying the shockwaves well-beyond the detonation velocity of the explosives, putting immense pressures on the plate that deform it and accelerate it, in the form of a slug, into, and often times back out of, it’s armored target, traveling at the speed of “Mach: Jesus.” These devices were employed because a mixed set of conditions basically necessitated their use in the area. The first condition that strongly indicated the use of EFPs was an inability to bury anything in the roads, as they were primarily paved (in Baghdad). If there was a hole in a paved road, most people err on the side that there is an IED there an they just blow the hole up, so “off-route” attack methods have an advantage.
A second condition that preferred the EFP method of attack was incredibly congested roads all over the city. This limited the use of victim-operated devices, as you could never be sure who the victim would be. To get around this, the insurgents in Iraq (and to a much lesser extent in Afghanistan) incorporated the Dual-Tone Multifrequency (DTMF) board with a Passive Infrared (PIR) sensor onto the EFP. This device allowed the IED to lay dormant indefinitely, until a cell phone attached to the device was called and a specific code was entered. This would then arm the device, setting it to detonate on the next target to go by. This also allowed them to effectively defeat some of the US Electronic Counter Measures aimed at stopping Remote IEDs, because a spotter for the IED can simply arm it when the US ECMs are out of range. Then, when the first truck passes in front of the IED, it detonates, propelling a “self-forming slug” at the vehicle.
I mention the Iranian EFPs because, this is an example of the maligned actors preferring professionally manufactured as opposed to improvised devices. Also, a side note to address something you may come across if you decide to look further into this subject of Iranian EFPs. Iran strongly denies that they had anything to do with the EFPs, and claim America is unfairly blaming them for their introduction into the theaters of Iraq and Afghanistan. They are 100% lying. Just based on the unclassified evidence, the proof is incontrovertible. My unit, A co. 4BSTB 4IBCT 4ID, was awarded the Itschner Award after our deployment to Baghdad Iraq (2006-2008), because we were so effective at finding EFPs. We regularly discovered, disrupted, confiscated, and exploited EFPs for their intelligence value. With conventional IEDs, they are simply “BIP’ed” – Blown In Place. However, we were not allowed to BIP EFPs, they could only be disrupted and confiscated. This is done by placing a “disruption charge” on the device consisting of a small explosive encased by, usually, saline water. This greatly reduces the heat and force of the explosion. The intent of these charges is to blow the device into its component parts (obviously without detonating the device), rendering the device. It is by doing this many several dozens of times by our unit alone, and several hundreds to possibly thousands of times by the US Army in general that we were able to develop evidence of Iran’s involvement. The most glaring piece of evidence was that the EFPs had targeting instructions on them, written in Farsi. Farsi is basically ONLY spoken in Iran. Dari, which is very close to Farsi has identifiable differences, and Tajik, which is also close to Dari and Farsi, has a different alphabet. Farsi is spoken in small numbers by people in Iraq, Bahrain, Oman, Yemen, and the UAE. So, to the naïve, the question may arise, “How do we know these non-Iranian speakers of Farsi did not create these devices?” And that is answered most easily by pointing to the fact that there were also industrial identifiers found on the devices that identify which plant in Iran made the devices, but also, you could suggest NONE of the other countries listed have the desire to do this, certainly not risking confrontation with America, other than Iraq and Afghanistan. And neither Iraq nor Afghanistan had the technical expertise as well as manufacturing ability to do this. The manufacturing plants needed to churn out thousands of these highly technical devices could not have gone unnoticed by coalition forces in these two countries. However, the US’s real reason for accusing Iran for these devices is due to classified material that is FAR MORE damning. While, I’m not stupid enough to divulge this information here. Just know that it is 100% certain that these devices originated in Iran. When I learned this information, it infuriated me then, and still does now, that we did not target these plants for destruction. We could have easily destroyed these facilities without risking any loss of life to us. And I am certain (now, though I would have not been so confident back then) that this would not have resulted in a direct military confrontation. But, sadly, the US limits its actions against those countries supplying terrorist organizations, much to the ire of many US servicemembers. But, I digress.
Now, when mentioning the possibility these threat groups, COULD get access to “rocket-propelled grenades, heavy machine guns, and raw explosive materials.” You seemingly preemptively rejected this possibility, but hopefully, I can make it seem sensible. So, the Taliban (and their allies Al-Qaida) really do not have the type of access to military explosives that you seem to think they do. Now, keep in mind, they DO have a lot. But they do NOT have enough in sufficient quantities to replace their use of homemade explosives. For a rough estimate, assume HME is about half the strength of high-quality military-grade explosives, so you save about half the weight. But, the aforementioned “military-grade” is a difficult hurdle to overcome. Before 9/11, the Taliban had ready access to landmines, as well as other munitions (though it’s important to note that no landmines have ever been manufactured in Afghanistan), all being provided by legitimate governments that were widely recognized by the international community. The landmines that have been found in Afghanistan have come from 10 different countries (not including the US) and consist of more than 50 different kinds. Not included in this list is US land mines that were given to the Northern Alliance during the years the Taliban was in power.
During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, China, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United States supplied money and arms to Mujahedin. Shortly after the Taliban took power, Pakistan recognized the legitimacy of the Taliban government and encouraged Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to follow suit which they did. During this time, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan directly provided funding and materiel aid to the Taliban government. Likewise, as the Taliban seized control of the country, they came to possess various weapons caches that foreign governments had intended for the Mujahedin or pro-Soviet factions. So, basically, from the 70’s onward, various outside factions armed and funded various internal Afghan factions, with the end result being that the Taliban came to acquire all this materiel, when they gained control of the country. However, it is not likely that these munitions still exist in any large quantities, for a few reasons.
The primary reason it is unlikely that large amounts of land mines that are not emplaced exist in Afghanistan is because you need storage facilities to hide these munitions. However, it is unquestionable that probably several millions of land mines have been emplaced around the country, but just going and grabbing a land mine from a mine field that could be several decades old is INADVISEABLE; though, don’t get me wrong, they DO do this, it’s just, if you’re doing this regularly, the odds that you are able to continue to do this for a long time are nearly nil. Storage space is all fine and dandy pre 9/11 as the Taliban were sovereign rulers of nation, with basically limitless opportunities for war materiel storage; however, after 9/11 you had the most powerful, most technologically advanced military the world has ever seen, augmented by an intelligence gathering apparatus that was given a limitless budget, hunting for these munitions, and ALL munitions. In an insurgency, when you are blending in to the local populace, you can’t have substantial depositories of munitions. The main reason is because they are noticeable, which will lead to them being found. And it is a huge defeat to an insurgency if a large cache is lost. Also, you seem to think that enemy forces in Afghanistan have easy access to weapons and the like. This is not the case. After 9/11, Taliban forces were basically ostracized from the entire world, including allies they had previously. There are really only two nations that provided support to enemy Afghan forces after 9/11: Pakistan and Iran. And they both severely curtailed their assistance to the Taliban after the attacks, now having to use clandestine methods of supply, usually via proxy groups smuggling the items over their respective land borders. But this is NOT to say that these stores of war materiel from the days the Taliban was running the country, do not exist. Quite the contrary, we KNOW they exist, and that they are dwindling.
This article is from August 2002 and details several caches, one containing land mines, found in the early stages of that war (https://www.deseret.com/2002/8/20/19672859/afghan-weapons-caches-found)
This article from October 2002 (https://www.deseret.com/2002/10/1/19680540/u-s-forces-uncover-giant-cache-of-weapons-in-afghan-mountains) talks about a decent-sized cache: “hundreds of rocket propelled grenades, thousands of rounds of heavy machine gun ammunition and dozens of mortar rounds,” is definitely a large cache, but it’s a large cache for an insurgent force, NOT a sovereign nation.
But don’t worry, we have on more than one occasion, discovered that “sovereign nation-sized” cache, at least twice (https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/63441.htm). The first one consisting of over 160,000 pounds of explosives, over 15,000 land mines. The latter consisting of 10 tons of materiel, though it did not list specifics (https://www.rferl.org/a/1078564.html).
So large caches of manufactured explosive devices, whether they be projected artillery munitions, dropped aerial munitions, or emplaced land mines, certainly do exist. The issue is, the bigger the cache, the more difficult it is to conceal, so it is likely that by now, the majority of these caches have been found. And these caches are not being restocked at a similar rate to which they are being used. You have to remember that while yes, the Taliban were basically rulers of a country for a while, they were never a legitimate, recognized group whose power was unchecked. Throughout the Taliban’s existence, there has never been a time when they could rest and stockpile munitions. Basically, as soon as they got it, they employed the various weapon systems available to them. They have NEVER NOT been in war. And, now, due to the nature of insurgency, they will be frequently moving their stockpiles, further suggesting the need for stockpiles of reduced size.
Likewise, you know what also is difficult to conceal, when not emplaced: land mines. If you (certainly if any Combat Engineer/ EOD tech) see a landmine, you will immediately know that it is a landmine, making transportation and storage of these munitions tricky, especially when you compare land mines to HME. An enemy could literally have thousands of pounds of HME loaded onto a sufficiently-sized vehicle, drive right past me, and I would never be able to discern that HME from regular palm oil that is ubiquitous in Afghanistan. Those 5-gallon yellow jugs are typically for palm oil, but these jugs have been emptied and are used quite frequently for ALL MANNER of storage. Stopping every one with a yellow jug, to inspect its content is NOT a practical tactic in Afghanistan, there are simply too many. Likewise, many of the HME precursors are completely legal, even in large quantities, so insurgents pose no risk by transporting them.
Also, it seems like you misunderstand a crucial aspect of military munitions/ explosives when you correctly mention the huge stockpiles of these munitions. The first part you misunderstand is that “stockpile” rarely refers to an unattended mass of munitions. This is not the case. These “stockpiles” are typically found in large, underground bunkers (much like the biggest find in Afghanistan, the one containing over 100,000 pounds of explosives, which was spread out over 5 different bunkers), and they are HEAVILY guarded. Remember, these are military munitions NOT commercial. So, militaries control them. Now, in some war-torn countries, abandoned stockpiles of munitions CAN be found (former Soviet-bloc countries, usually, but African and other countries as well). However, it seems like you envision finding an abandoned stockpile of explosives, then just grab the munitions, and immediately employ them against your enemy. But this is a fantasy not based in reality. Munitions degrade over time, for several reasons. For some munitions, the type of explosive degrades and destabilizes over time. Other munitions have weak links, such as firing pins that can degrade beyond the point of usability. And if you are a non-state actor who just happens to come across an abandoned stockpile, the odds are very good that you are not stumbling upon modern, well-maintained munitions. It may seem that, because America safely oversees the stockpililng and storage of millions of pounds of explosives on a daily basis, with basically no injuries or deaths reported, the safety of these stockpiles, or lack thereof, can be easily missed. For the US Army, underground bunkers that are specially temperature and humidity controlled, the strength and location of lights monitored, and a few other bells and whistles, are required to store these munitions. In addition, AT LEAST annual inspections are made of all the munitions, with any defective items being identified and disposed of. The US, and other similarly sized and equipped militaries, are only able to safely maintain these stockpiles because of INCREDIBLY thorough and meticulously supervised programs that spend considerable time training those who will be handling, inspecting, issuing, receiving, etc. ammunition and explosive materiel.
A question that may arise in your head is, “How old are some of these stockpiles?” Well, when I was in the Army between 2006 and 2014, I got to go in one of the bunkers where all kinds of munitions were stored. I saw a munition dated to the 1940s. I believe it was an old M6 anti-tank mine. So, these stockpiles can consist of functionally ancient (at least in the world of explosives) munitions that could be incredibly unstable. In the overwhelming majority of cases, when large stockpiles of munitions are encountered, they are almost always destroyed (often in a single, MEGA BOOM). And In situations where a stockpile is abandoned, it is likely the stockpile has been subjected to temperature and humidity extremes, as well as the stockpile being uninspected for likely several years. For an example, check out the Wikipedia page Efraim Diveroli. And this can all lead to worst happening, if it happens to your own, or it can lead to the very best-case scenario in which enemy combatants blow up themselves and several other people, in an IED lab, like what occurred to anti-coalition forces in Afghanistan, TWICE. The first in 2005 (https://www.eastbaytimes.com/2005/05/03/explosion-of-arms-cache-kills-28-in-afghanistan/) glosses over the deterioration of stockpiled weapons, while still pointing out the plight. And the second was in 2019 (http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-09/23/c_138415481.htm). But there was also a similar incident in Pakistan in 2010 (https://www.standard.co.uk/news/suicide-vest-explosion-kills-taliban-in-safe-house-6732186.html).
Now to address your concern directly about how enemy combatants can obtain large amounts of materiel, but NOT mines. Well, as I pointed out earlier, they do frequently use landmines; however, these attacks typically try to target “soft targets,” i.e., those that are not heavily armored, most frequently Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), which include the Afghan National Army (ANA), the Afghan National Police (ANP), and Afghan Border Patrol (ABP), among others. I found a publication from the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) about Iran weapon smuggling into Afghanistan. I could not find a date on this, but I am fairly certain this is the exact same report I read when I was in Afghanistan from ’09-10’, so it is almost certainly around that time frame. It states:
“It does not appear that Iran supplies any significant quantity of home-made explosive (HME) chemical precursors or miscellaneous materials used in IED construction. Iran possesses a large arsenal of conventional weapons that insurgents can more readily employ these against U.S. Forces. However, conventional anti-tank mines have been modified by insurgents for more specific targeting purposes. According to a June 2009 statement by NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, mines are still commonly used as the main charge for many IEDs constructed by Afghan insurgents.”
While Iran and Pakistan deny supplying munitions, including landmines, to Afghanistan and Iraq, these excuses are absolute bullshit. Iran is ABSOLUTELY privy to and a part of the weapons transfers. However, the weapons smuggling by Iran and Pakistan alone would not be sufficient to equip the militant organization. For arms and munitions, the Taliban rely heavily on the slowly aging Russian stockpiles they acquired after Russia fled Afghanistan. The overwhelming majority of weapons found on enemy militants or in enemy caches are older, damaged, and barely serviceable. The Taliban does depend on Iran and Pakistan heavily for updating their existing stockpiles, but Iran’s and Pakistan’s materiel assistance may be matched -oddly – by the US.
It is not entirely accurate, though still reasonable to say, the US has been supplying the Taliban since the US started giving vast sums of money and munitions to the Mujahideen fighters that fought the Soviet invasion from 79-89. But, we have undoubtedly been supplying them since the US started putting boots on ground in Afghanistan late 2001. This was just because we were making all kinds of uncouth (putting it mildly) deals with shady characters to get Bin Laden. Undoubtedly some of those funds and munitions found their way into the hands of the Taliban and their allies. More recently, the Taliban has been able to acquire, whether through illegal purchases, or theft, large numbers of US weapons intended for the Afghan National Security Forces. Task and Purpose reports: “A non-declassified 2016 Department of Defense audit revealed that poor record-keeping and regulations had allowed nearly half of the 1.5 million firearms provided to Iraqi and Afghan security forces since 2002 to go missing, including nearly 978,000 M4 and M16s. An earlier 2014 report from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction found that some 43% of weapons provided to the Afghan National Security Forces likely ended up in the hands of ISIS or the Taliban.” According to the Special Inspector’s General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) newest quarterly report, 1,164 M-4 rifles and 100 M240 machine guns were proc Feb 1 to Ap 30. If those 43% were still accurate, that’s 43 machine guns, 500 rifles. Of course, this all says nothing about explosives. On that, I would doubt any significant materiel comes from the US, minus a small percent of artillery rounds and aerial munitions that do not detonate. The explosives the US brought over would be a small amount. I would be surprised if we brought any mines over, and astonished if they were ever taken out of the container.
In conclusion, your initial question of why improvised munitions are preferred to manufactured munitions incorrectly presupposes that BOTH are not used. This is not true; various threat groups employ a wide variety of tactics that include both improvised and manufactured munitions. In addition, when deciding whether to use improvised or manufactured munitions, threat groups evaluate a variety of factors, including but not limited to: availability (you can’t use what you don’t have), the selected target (land mines will do no good if you want to blow up a checkpoint), concealability (you can’t use what the enemy confiscates), and personal expertise (HME can be dangerous; whereas traditional munitions may be “safer”). CuriousLayman (talk) 22:34, 20 September 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]
Thank you for your reply, which is very interesting. Sorry I add comments and don't go back to check for replies. I suggest you use your tremendous knowledge to add to the article itself, which you can do far better than me. (I'm serious not sarcastic) Ttulinsky (talk) 05:27, 3 September 2022 (UTC)Reply[reply]

36-ish Suggestions to improve this page in 2020[edit]

I tried making a couple edits, but it doesn't stay, and I don't know why. So, I apologize and sincerely thank whomever takes on the task of implementing (or providing feedback that they should not be implemented)these suggestions.

Now, from reading the article, it seems to me that much of it was written by US Servicemembers with varying levels of expertise. But, I found a few problems-

1) This sentence "An IED is a bomb fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals and designed to destroy or incapacitate personnel or vehicles," should be changed to this "An IED is a device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic or incendiary chemicals and designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass or distract. It may incorporate military stores, but is normally devised from non-military components." (Taken from pg 4-1 here: https://www.dtra.mil/Portals/61/Documents/Missions/NATO%20AJP-3.15(A)%20ALLIED%20C-IED%20MAR%2011.pdf?ver=2017-03-10-134619-480) Reason being, the statement in the article calls IEDs a "bomb". This is not accurate as bombs are dropped aerial munitions lacking any sort of propulsion. So, it is inaccurate to call an IED a bomb because some IEDs have propulsion systems, and very few are aerial munitions.
2) A reference for this sentence, "IEDs may incorporate military or commercially sourced explosives, and often combine both types, or they may otherwise be made with homemade explosives (HME)." Can be found at the same above reference, in the definition that specifies munitions may be mixed (https://www.dtra.mil/Portals/61/Documents/Missions/NATO%20AJP-3.15(A)%20ALLIED%20C-IED%20MAR%2011.pdf?ver=2017-03-10-134619-480)
3) I think it's a little ridiculous to require a citation for this sentence, "An HME lab refers to a Homemade Explosive Lab, or the physical location where the devices are crafted." Technically, it could be called a "facility", "lab", "complex", "factory" and others, this phrasing is unimportant. Regardless, in this document you will find many references to an "HME lab", (https://www.ftig.ng.mil/Portals/39/Documents/Regulations%20and%20Documents/FTIG%20REG%20350-2%20-%2001%20MAY%202018.pdf?ver=2019-05-24-131451-890)
4) A reference for this sentence, "An IED has five components: a switch (activator), an initiator (fuse), container (body), charge (explosive), and a power source (battery)." can be found here on pg h-9, figure h-4 (https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_42.pdf)
5) This sentence, "An IED designed for use against armoured targets such as personnel carriers or tanks will be designed for armour penetration, by using a shaped charge that creates an explosively formed penetrator." is all wrong. First, it is very common (indeed in Afghanistan it is much more common) for IEDs targeting "armoured" targets to simply use a more conventional IED with a LOT of explosives. Next, iit says that a shaped charge creates an explosively formed penetrator. This is wrong as shaped charges, which use the Munroe effect, are not the same as EFPs, which use the Misznay-Schardin effect. It drives me crazy that EFPs are listed under the "Shaped Charge" wikipedia, but they are NOT the same. The fact that this statement says they "will be designed... by using a shaped charge... etc." implies that in all cases threat groups used "shaped charge EFPs" and this is not true. This sentence should be removed.
6) A reference for this sentence, "IEDs are extremely diverse in design and may contain many types of initiators, detonators, penetrators, and explosive loads." can be found in US Army Field Manual FM 3-34.210 from 2007 (there are probably newer versions, but I am sure they will have the same sentence in the same place) on page 7-8 where it states the following, "IEDs can be initiated in many different ways and are only limited by the imagination and sophistication of the enemy using them." Just searching the word "imagination" will bring up another sentence verifying the complexity of these devices. If specific examples of IED diversity are needed, the reader can simply continue reading, where they will find the multitude of various combinations.
7) For this sentence, "Antipersonnel IEDs typically also contain fragmentation-generating objects such as nails, ball bearings or even small rocks to cause wounds at greater distances than blast pressure alone could." I am not sure what needs a reference, so I will supply one for both claims. As for the first claim, that AP IEDs contain shrapnel, the following sentence, "Additional materials such as nails, ball bearings, and glass are commonly added to increase the number and severity of injuries." can be found here (https://pubs.rsna.org/doi/pdf/10.1148/rg.2016150114) but really, verifying that IEDs contain shrapnel should be an incredibly easy task. As for the second claim that fragmentation can travel further than blast pressure, this is a calculator by NATO that will determine safe distances for fragmenting vs. bare munitions (https://www.un.org/disarmament/un-saferguard/explosion-danger-area/). Note, the calculator may not be ideal evidence, but it's the best I could find in a short time.
8) This sentence "In the conflicts of the 21st century, anti-personnel improvised explosive devices (IED) have partially replaced conventional or military landmines as the source of injury to dismounted (pedestrian) soldiers and civilians." implies IEDs and landmines are "THE [only] source of injury to dismounted... etc." This is obviously not the case, as soldiers face the threat of small arms fire, indirect fire, RPGs, etc. This sentence could be removed entirely, or edited to reflect that IEDs are now a common source of dismounted casualties. When that edit is made, I will furnish a reference.
9) A reference for this sentence, "Some groups, however, have been known to produce sophisticated devices constructed with components scavenged from conventional munitions and standard consumer electronics components, such as mobile phones, consumer-grade two-way radios, washing machine timers, pagers, or garage door openers." contains this sentence, "Radio- or remote-control devices are another common form of COIED. Car alarms, garage door openers, remote control toys, mobile telephones, and two-way radios have been adapted to this purpose." and this sentence, "The next level of sophistication involves the use of an analogue clock or kitchen timer. A metal contact is attached to a clock hand or a timer’s rotating mechanism, so that it will eventually reach another contact, thus completing a circuit and activating the device." and can be found here (http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/A-Yearbook/2013/en/Small-Arms-Survey-2013-Chapter-10-EN.pdf). I believe this should be sufficient.
10) A reference for this sentence, " Chlorine liquid has been added to IEDs in Iraq, producing clouds of chlorine gas." can be found here (https://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/21/world/middleeast/21cnd-baghdad.html) and here (https://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/17/world/middleeast/17cnd-iraq.html).
11) This phrase, "They [VBIED] are typically employed by insurgents in particular, ISIS..." is misleading. I think "insurgents" should be replaced with "terrorists," as VBIEDs, and particularly suicide VBIEDs, are a terrorist tactic. Yes, many insurgents are terrorists, but not all terrorists are insurgents, and the VBIEDs are used exclusively in terrorism campaigns. They incorporate indiscriminate killing with the intent to terrorize the populace. Furthermore, the part, "in particular, ISIS" should also be removed. Maybe somewhere in the article it could state that ISIS is known to have used the VBIED, but to say they use it "in particular" makes it seem like other organizations are less likely to use the tactic. VBIEDs are used by dozens of threat groups throughout the world, rather regularly. ISIS does not hold a monopoly.
12) Recommend removing this sentence, "Of increasing popularity among insurgent forces in Iraq, is the house-borne IED, or HBIED from the common military practice of clearing houses; insurgents rig an entire house to detonate and collapse shortly after a clearing squad has entered." This sentence is just stupid. First, "borne" means "carried or transported by." A house can neither carry, nor transport anything. While I'm sure some infantry who ran into IED'ed structures thought he was being clever, but this is ridiculous.
13) I recommend changing the title of the section, "By Warhead" to "Types of IEDS." I say this because the "warhead" implies there is a "head", which means there is a direction of travel to the munition. I have only ever heard of "warhead" being used to describe the explosive element of some sort of projected munition. The DOD definition does not actually specify it must be a projected munition, but all three of the examples provided in the definition are projected munitions. If this change is made, I recommend adding a statement to the section to the effect "IEDs are constantly evolving, and new forms of the device are being conceived of frequently. As such, it may be impossible to ensure this list is fully up-to-date."
14) There is a problem with this sentence, "These definitions address the Nuclear and Explosive in CBRNe." The issue is the acronym CBRNe. It should be noted that the "E" (always capitalized in military literature) stands for "high-yield" explosive. What this means is unclear, but I have always thought it to mean an as yet undiscovered explosive material with similar blast effects to nukes, but this is a personal belief. I recommend using the acronym CBRN. The reason being this acronym is used to denote specific types of events that require special assistance from the Chemical Corps. Whether we use the vague "high-yield explosive" or the regular old "explosive" it does not require special assistance from the Chemical Corps, as such the "E" should be removed.
15) There are a few problems with this section, "That leaves chemical, biological and radiological undefined. Four definitions have been created to build on the structure of the JCS definition. Terms have been created to standardize the language of first responders and members of the military and to correlate the operational picture." The first, most glaring issue here is that in the same reference mentioned at the beginning of this paragraph includes a definition for a Radiological Dispersion Device, and a Chemical Dispersion Device, only leaving "Biological" undefined. Second, the fourth proposed definition, "Improvised Incendiary Device" is already covered by the definition of the IED, "An IED is a device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, PYROTECHNIC OR INCENDIARY chemicals..." The last problem I have is that this gives the impression that the proposed definitions in the given reference have been accepted by the explosives community at large, and this is far from the case. I recommend removing this whole section. It serves no purpose. IED was defined early on, and the article covers possible types of IEDs that include chemical, biological, nuclear (fission or fusion takes place), or radiological (disperses radioactive material, but no fission or fusion occurs).
16) Recommend adding "Conventional" to the "Explosive" section under "By Warhead." The reason being that ALL IEDs are explosive. This just specifies what type of explosive.
17) The following sentence, "IEDs have been deployed in the form of explosively formed projectiles (EFP), a special type of shaped charge that is effective at long standoffs from the target (50 meters or more)..." is inaccurate. AGAIN, an EFP is NOT a special type of shaped charge. People only believe this because the Wikipedia page on shaped charges is wrong. Shaped charges ALWAYS use the Munroe effect, which results in a a jet of molten metal being projected; whereas, EFPs ALWAYS use the Miznay-Schardin effect, which does NOT result in a jet, and only produces a "slug"-type object being projected.
18) The following is misleading, "however they are not accurate at long distances. This is because of how they are produced." Saying their inaccuracy is a result of how they are "produced" makes it sound like manufacturing practices is the cause of their inaccuracies. However, this is not the case. I recommend changing this part to say, "however, the types of EFP IEDs, predominately manufactured and distributed by Iran that are found in the Middle-East are not typically accurate at long distances (beyond 50 meters). This results from how the slug is formed via the Misnay-Schardin effect." I specify we are talking about the EFPs found in the Middle-East because some EFPs can be accurate at much greater distances. For example, there are some anti-helicopter landmines that use EFPs that will be launched at the helicopter when it comes within 200 meters. And I KNOW someone will have an issue with the "predominately... Iran" part, SOLELY based on the fact that Iran denies it (yeah, no shit they do), but the evidence is undeniable. Many of the EFPs we found in Iraq had Iranian factory markers and targeting instructions IN FARSI. Beyond that, there is classified evidence that is WAY more convincing, but I can't go into that. And, while some may point to the handful of "EFP factories" found in Iraq as proof that Iran is innocent, this proves nothing. It was OBVIOUS in 2007 that there were AT LEAST 2 (there were in fact more) different originators of AT LEAST 2 (again, there were more) different types of EFPs. It was always immediately apparent which ones came from Iran manufacturing plants, and which ones came from locals trying to duplicate Iran's EFPs. We could even tell from the post-blast analysis whether or not it was an Iranian or local EFP. Local EFPs tried different metals for the plate, which often ended in a plate that would fracture into several pieces, forming more of a fragmentation effect. Also, with larger EFPs, the locals ALWAYS packed too much explosive in the EFP, again resulting in a fragmentation vs. EFP effect (the reason for this is because increasing the diameter of the plate, decreases the needed depth of explosives). Furthermore, locals would sometimes use a simple, flat plate (known as a platter charge), that would often slam into the side of a vehicle causing no real damage. And the biggest giveaway as to whether the EFP was Iranian or local was the IRANINAN FACTORY MARKINGS AND TARGETING INSTRUCTIONS IN FARSI. If it makes you feel better, add a caveat that states "Iran denies these accusations." BECAUSE OF COURSE THEY DO. According to them, they also don't supply the Taliban and Hezbollah. But EVERYONE KNOWS THIS IS HORSE SHIT.
19) The following is not entirely accurate: "The large 'slug' projected from the explosion has no stabilization because it has no tail fins and it does not spin like a bullet from a rifle. Without this stabilization the trajectory can not be accurately determined beyond 50 meters." I would again recommend adding "In the case of the Iranian EFPs found throughout the Middle-East, the large 'slug'..." because EFPs can be made to form tail fins that stabilize the projectile for much greater distances, as explained here (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214914714000348).
20) Again, this is not correct, "The force of the shaped charge turns the disc into a high velocity slug, capable of penetrating the armor of most vehicles in Iraq." Saying the "shaped charge" does anything is misleading. Technically, the explosive is FORMED around the liner, there is no "shaped charge", which has a specific meaning in technical usage. Also, it may be helpful to add some things to this snetence. I recommend changing it to state, "The force of the explosive shockwaves turn the liner into a slug traveling at hypersonic speeds (in excess of mach 5), which causes the EFP to interact with armor hydrodynamically, punching through any type of armor found in Iraq and/or Afghanistan." The reference for the mach 5 is (https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/18200915/), and for the hydrodynamically (https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2F978-3-319-01905-5_49-1.pdf), it says, "Penetration of EFPs is often described by a hydrodynamic penetration equation..." on page 42. NOW, I WILL NOTE- The pubmed reference classifies EFPs as a form of shape-charge. Because this is now the third time I have seen this in an academic paper, I will consider changing my stance on the EFP thing; however, note that all other references given differentiate between the two as two different types of charge. But, I am open to suggestions.
21) The section "Directionally Focused Charges" should be altered to specify one type of "Directionally Focused Charge" (I'll use DFC for short). To my knowledge, IEDs are not normally classified DFC. I admit, I have heard the term on occasion, and I'm sure I could find it in one of my manuals, but this is not a helpful classification. The reason for that is because EFPs, shaped charges, directionally-focused fragmentation charges, as well as explosives that are merely tamped a certain way could ALL fall under this broad categorization, and since this includes the charges designed for antiarmor, antipersonnel, and antihelicopter (FOB Loyalty, Baghdad, Iraq, saw a 55-gallon drum filled with explosives with thousands of ball bearings on top fired at helicopters attempting to land at our HLZ; technically a DFFC, it would also fall under DFC), and charges in this categorization can involve only conventional explosives, or include Misnay-Schardin plates, or Munroe plates, or extra shrapnel, or even possibly rockets, this categorization is entirely unhelpful and should be deleted.
21a) I recommend one section for "Platter Charges" which states "A platter charge is a less common antiarmor IED in which an in-tact plate is propelled at the target." Honestly, there is a pretty good chance that these IEDs were never intentional. It was most likely some uneducated IED maker trying to replicate an EFP, not knowing this was about a billion times less effective.
21b) I recommend another section be added for "Directionally-Focused Fragmentation Charges (DFFC)". It should state "Also called 'improvised claymores' they are defined as "An improvised weapon, military or homemade, designed to explosively propel a pattern of ball bearings or other fragmentation in an aimed direction." (https://unmas.org/sites/default/files/unmas_ied_lexicon_0.pdf)
22) The section titled "Chemical" should be changed to "Chemical Dispersion Device," to reflect the proper terminology. (https://ssem.eku.edu/sites/ssem.eku.edu/files/files/HAHN%20-%20ICDD%20091311.pdf), aslo, this reference can be used for the text under "Chemical."
23) A reference for the following, "A device incorporating biological materials designed to result in the dispersal of vector borne biological material for the purpose of creating a primary patho-physiological toxic effect (morbidity and mortality), or secondary psychological effect (causing fear and behavior modification) on a larger population. Such devices are fabricated in a completely improvised manner." can be found here (https://unmas.org/sites/default/files/unmas_ied_lexicon_0.pdf) under "Enhancements."
24) I recommend the entire section "Incendiary" be removed, because as established, conventional IEDs can be incendiary.
25) I recommend changing "Radiological" to "Radiological Dispersion Device," to reflect the correct terminology. Further, I think "speculative" here has a political connotation. A lot of people believe the threat of a dirty bomb is propped up by the US government to keep the public scared, and have them go along with whatever wars they are selling. However, this paper should put that theory to rest (https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/al-qaeda-wmd-threat.pdf). It is unquestionable that that malign actors have sought, and continue to seek weapons of mass destruction, including a radiological dispersal device. If you are tagging every IED concept that has not been observed, then the Biological, surgically-implanted, and nuclear IEDs are all also speculative. And at one point, they were ALL speculative. So, it just seems like it doesn't belong. As for a reference (https://www.osha.gov/SLTC/emergencypreparedness/rdd_tech.html#:~:text=Radiological%20dispersal%20devices%20(RDD)%2C,such%20as%20multiple%20city%2Dblocks.). And, I also HIGHLY recommend specifying that fission/fusion do not occur in this device.
26) I recommend renaming "Nuclear" to "Improvised Nuclear Device." Likewise, I would like to see this section specifically explain that in this case fission/fusion DOES occur. Here is a reference for this section (https://www.remm.nlm.gov/nuclearexplosion.htm). Also, more specific information is in there that can be added. And, I would also like to see a source for the claim that the device would be "of most likely gun-type or implosion-type." I have no idea whether or not this is true, as nukes are way above my pay grade, but I would like to see it verified.
27) I recommend changing the name of "Cars" to "Vehicle Borne IED VBIED" as trucks, minivans, etc., are used regularly. Leaving it specific to cars is a little moronic. Here is a reference on VBIEDs (https://www.dni.gov/files/NCTC/documents/jcat/firstresponderstoolbox/VBIED-Preparedness-Recognition-Response-ONLINE-Version.pdf). And, if we change it to "VBIEDs" then I don't think we really need a reference to say they can carry thousands of pounds of explosives, do we? I mean, we know there are a multitude of vehicles which can carry several thousands of pounds of explosives, right?
28) As far as the WWII kamikaze boats (https://www.al.com/news/2019/03/kamikaze-boat-rarest-wwii-killing-machine-in-alabama.html). I would also like to see this section mention the repeated use remote-controlled IED boats by the Houthi rebels in Yemen (https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/idex/2017/02/19/new-houthi-weapon-emerges-a-drone-boat/).
29) As for the monkeys and war pigs, that sentence is pulled directly from "HAZMAT Guide for First Responders" By Michael L. Madigan, but I can't see which page.
30) This is not correct, "Suicide bombing usually refers to an individual wearing explosives and detonating them in order to kill others including themselves, a technique pioneered by LTTE (Tamil Tigers)." on two accounts. First, suicide attacks can either involve a person wearing explosives, or it could be a person driving a bomb. In fact, originally, the latter was the case. Next, the Tamil Tigers did NOT pioneer the suicide IED (though the link provided does specify as much, it is just wrong). The Tamil Tigers' first SIED, which was a SVBIED, was in July 1987; whereas Hezbollah's first SIED attack, also a SVBIED was in October 1983. (https://aoav.org.uk/2013/a-short-history-of-suicide-bombings/) They did however, invent the SIED vest. And, I recommend adding some more info to represent the SVBIED part of suicide.
31) Because the "surgically-implanted IEDs" is so alarming, I think additions should be made to explain the extreme technical challenges needed to be overcome in their use. I.e., the difficulty of initiation, keeping the explosives from contacting and thus poisoning the body, the recovery from surgery, and hiding fresh scars and weird bulges from security screeners. It should also be mentioned that these IEDs have never been successfully used. And, please don't mention the Saudi prince assassination attempt. That was initially believed to be a body-cavity bomb, but most now believe it to have been an underwear bomb. After all, they estimated 4 kg of explosive. You try walking around with over 8 pounds of explosive in your ass and tell me if you don't walk differently.
32) I am not sure, but I believe the Lob bombs, and the improvised mortars are the same thing. Both are actually projected rockets, and NOT projected projectiles, like mortars are. Someone needs to look into this more thoroughly.
33) As far as command-wire IEDs go, the CW is not ALWAYS an electric wire. Though much less frequent than electric switches, shock tube has been used in both theaters.
34) To the types of VOIED, I would add "acoustic, active infrared (AIR), passive infrared (PIR), collapsing circuit, crush wire, photo-electric, magnetic, anti-disturbance (tilt or vibration), plunger, pressure, pressure release, pressure and pressure release, pull, radar, RF detector, tension, tension release (https://unmas.org/sites/default/files/unmas_ied_lexicon_0.pdf).
35) The "Infrared" is all fuckered up and obviously written by someone who is being confused by what they are reading. But, I don't blame the reader, I blame the writers, because they have misunderstood. But, then there's always the possibility that I have misunderstood, and if that's the case you can correct me. But, I am going to have to dissect this whole section. First, I want to point out that this entire section is plagiarized verbatim from the book How to Survive a Terrorist Attack – Become Prepared for a Bomb Threat or Active Shooter Assault, put out by Homeland Security and FEMA. I would like to know the ACTUAL authors, they seemed to have misunderstood some things. Anyways, it states-
"The British accused Iran and Hezbollah of teaching Iraqi fighters to use infrared light beams to trigger IEDs. As the occupation forces became more sophisticated in interrupting radio signals around their convoys, the insurgents adapted their triggering methods.[42] In some cases, when a more advanced method was disrupted, the insurgents regressed to using uninterruptible means, such as hard wires from the IED to detonator; however, this method is much harder to effectively conceal. It later emerged however, that these "advanced" IEDs were actually old IRA technology. The infrared beam method was perfected by the IRA in the early '90s after it acquired the technology from a botched undercover British Army operation. Many of the IEDs being used against the invading coalition forces in Iraq were originally developed by the British Army who unintentionally passed the information on to the IRA.[43] The IRA taught their techniques to the Palestine Liberation Organisation and the knowledge spread to Iraq.[44]"
Now, the first sentence is almost certainly confusing the part about using infrared beams to trigger IEDs, though there is the CHANCE they are correct, and this is simply new information to me; however, I doubt that, and I'll explain why. There are two types of infrared detecting systems- Active InfraRed (AIR), Passive InfraRed (PIR). Before we start, I should mention that infrared is really basically heat, and that will be important later. Active infrared works by emitting an infrared beam of light towards a sensor, which is then picked up by that sensor, and read as nothing between the emitter and the sensor. When something blocks the beam, the sensor fails to pick it up and it is read as something blocking the sensor. Now, this COULD be used by IEDs, but it wouldn't be very effective, because we would see the infrared beam with our NODs (Night Optical Devices, or Night Vision Goggles). This would be an immensely easy tactic to overcome. Also, there would be no need to shine a laser at it. The second type of IR detection system is PIR. PIR doesn't emit any light. All PIR does is watch the background environment. It has a camera that breaks up its field of view into hundreds (possibly thousands, I suppose, why not) of smaller individual fields of view (FOV), and it basically monitors the "temperature", which as I mentioned earlier, infrared light is heat (MOSTLY, look it up if you're interested). Each device is different, but the general way they are set up is if the temperature in any two (could be three, could be four, could be more) consecutive FOVs is raised [X] amount, then the sensor is activated. Now, if the IED sensor were PIR, again they would have no need to shine a laser at it. The reason for this is because, basically, every body gives off infrared radiation. Shining a laser at PIR defeats it's two primary strengths- standoff and targeting accuracy. You can be as far away from the IED as need be. In certain configurations, you don't even need line-of-sight. But, if you had to command detonate it, you would have to be closer for more accurate targeting; however, the PIR will activate when they're in range. A laser is not needed to trigger a PIR, because regular body heat will. And you may say, "Well, it's hot in Iraq/Afghanistan. How do we know the ambient temperature is not hotter than body/vehicle temp?" That doesn't matter, because reductions in temperature would have the same effect. And it's absurd to think that the body temperatures of all the soldiers and vehicles have the exact same ambient body temperature.
I think this idea that infrared laser beams were used to trigger IEDs comes from the very real fact that the IRA used photoelectric cells, which were triggered in a highly complex way, via visible light, which is touched on in [43], though not with infrared light. I am aware of IEDs in Iraq and Afghanistan being initiated by photoelectric cells, but in all cases, the IEDs were initiated as soon as light was introduced. It seems the IRA programmed their devices to only be set off with a certain combo of strobes. And the IRA did use AIR in their devices. Also, I am highly skeptical of A LOT of the claims made by the supposed informant in [43] as well as a few other places I have read. These (it maybe THIS, it may be the same guy in all three places, certainly the "voice" seems similar throughout the writings) British officers seem to think because similar devices or tactics are used by a group, they must have learned it from the IRA. This is insulting towards the Afghans and the Iraqis. I'll give a few quick examples. The fact that the Iraqis or Afghans employ a smaller initial charge is used, then followed up by a larger secondary charge targeting first responders; because similarly-designed, crude pipe bombs were made (the design for which can be found on the internet); because car bombs or improvised mortars were used... etc. One more is that Iraq used a Cellphone-armed, PIR initiated, Command Wire backup IED the IRA MUST be involved. This is arrogance. The RC-armed, PIR-initiated, CW backup, was FULLY expected. You can see a natural progression. At the beginning, VOIED were used but they kept hitting wrong targets. Then they moved to CWIED, but they were too easy to spot because they were attached to the IED. So, then they got the RCIEDs and greatly increased their standoff. But electronic jammers started fucking up the program again. So, they got the RC-armed, PIR-initiated. But this STILL was not entirely reliable, so that had to start putting low man on the totem pole back attached to the device, because they were losing too many EFPs. Now, I don't doubt that SOME information was exchanged, probably with the IED expertise flowing from the IRA to some Islamic Extremist groups. However, what I strongly object to is this, "Many of the IEDs being used against the invading coalition forces in Iraq were originally developed by the British Army who unintentionally passed the information on to the IRA.[43]" This so matter-of-factly claims that the Brits are directly responsible for the IEDs that killed them. But this is ridiculous. These terror organizations have had FAR more experience with explosives through their experiences in the militaries/paramilitaries/militias of Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan.
This whole section of "Infrared" is based on incredibly sketchy evidence. I repeat, I vote it gets removed.
36) The entire section on "Counterefforts," hurts my very soul... you know, if I had a soul. But, as Combat Engineer, I don't. Oh, speaking of Combat Engineers, you know what's missing from "Counterefforts?" THE FUCKING ENGINEERS. What in unholy god-damned buttfuckery is this!? Now, I think a LOT about the "Counterefforts" section should change, but I'm going to reserve my improvements for what is there, and after taking a look at the "Counter IED" page, I may come back and make further recommendations for additions.
36a) So, first, change the section from "Counterefforts" to "Counter-IED Efforts". This is simply the generally accepted term.
36b) For a reference for the first (intro) sentence under "Counterefforts" find US Joint Publication 3-42 page II-7.
36c) Next, I think "Detection" and "Disarmament" should be two different sections as they are almost always conducted as two separate missions, often with separate personnel. Typically, Combat Engineers are the ones who actually do the detecting, and if they are lucky enough to have EOD embedded (which I was spoiled, I always did), EOD will sit cozy in the back of the convoy drinking beer or smoking pot, or maybe gambling? I don't know what the hell they do back there, I just know they wake up after we find the IED. Then, they put a little charge on a robot that they then drive to the IED, and place. Then, they pull a little pull-ring up, and the device goes boom. That is ALL stuff a good portion of Engineers know how to do, but we tend to be a little reckless, so they put limitations on what we can and cannot BIP. We were li,ited to a single jug of HME (40 pounds), or a single landmine. We also couldn't BIP any daisey-changed IEDs, EFPs, or DFFCs.
36d) I'm going to ignore the self-indulgent, egotistical "Only the chosen ones may determine whether to BIP or exploit," nonsense that HAS to be written by an EOD tech... AND OH GOD DAMNIT. Almost this ENTIRE Wikipedia page (possibly all of it) has been taken verbatim from the STUPID fucking book "How to Survive a Terrorist Attack" that was coauthored by DHS and FEMA, and contains some obvious errors. I'm new to editing Wikipedia; is this allowed, to just plagiarize a book entirely? Anyways, I'll grind on (I'm worried about what I'll find on The Counter-IED Efforts Wiki). So, the next thing that needs to change is the abbreviating of Explosives Ordnance Disposal "IEDD". This is stupid. The acronym for Explosives Ordnance Disposal is EOD, I'm not sure how anyone can disagree with that. Beyond the obvious, as the section correctly points out, in order to render safe an IED, the EOD tech must be grounded in the basics of explosive hazards. And, someone can correct me on this, but I presume ALL EOD also deal with IEDs.
36e) Next, this sentence, "Beyond this, as the stakes increase and IEDs are emplaced not only to achieve the direct effect, but to deliberately target IEDD operators and cordon personnel, the IEDD operator needs to have a deep understanding of tactics to ensure they are neither setting up any of their team or the cordon troops for an attack, nor walking into one themselves." makes it sound like it is up to the EOD team leader to determine the tactics surrounding the IED incident. This was literally never once the case in my entire career (three separate route clearance deployments as a Combat Engineer). The closest the EOD tech got to control over the convoy was suggesting we move a vehicle, either because the explosive was bigger than we anticipated, or we were potentially in the path of the EFP, but even in these cases, we determined our positioning. Now, this is not to say that we told EOD what to do, but we had separate missions. We (the Combat Engineers) ran convoy operations, security (EOD sometimes didn't even have a gunner in their truck), any sort of situation encountered, our PL was in charge. However, we had EXCELLENT working relationships with our EOD. We worked fluidly as a team. We both knew what our missions were, and how they interacted, and we never stepped on each other's toes. We would operate the convoy, find the suspected device, set up a cordon with overlapping sectors of fire, "interrogate" the device (usually by abusing it with the mechanical arm of the buffalo), confirm the device, then we would hand things off to EOD by precisely describing the situation to them (we would explain what were seeing as far as the device, but also the situation in general, like security concerns). Then, EOD would take over. Based on what we told them, they made a plan of attack. Sometimes EOD would do everything from their truck, often they would dismount and get in the Buffalo, so they could get a closer look with their own eyes (as opposed to the robot's). We were always eager to help them complete their mission (they were more content to kick back until we found the IED), but their mission was narrowly defined, and they were enlisted, so our Lieutenant's orders took precedence. So, this whole section really needs to take a more realistic look at the Counter-IED mission.
36f) I'm going to ignore the whole choppiness and lack of flow of this section, and just focus on the more factual problems, like this sentence, "The supposed effectiveness of IED jamming systems, including vehicle- and personally-mounted systems, has caused IED technology to essentially regress to command-wire detonation methods.[45]" The stated reference makes no claim about a regression to CWIEDs due to the effectiveness of the jammers. I have been out of the Army for awhile, so this could be true, I don't know.
36g) Reference [46] is a domain for sale, so that should be deleted. And, a search of "Canadian Unmanned Systems Challenge" doesn't reveal an easy match for anything, so that sentence should be removed if no new reference can be produced.

Holy shit! I'm done. Now I have to rewrite my intro, because it initially said,

"I am happy that there are not the usual introductions to the page with all the disclaimers stating that this is disputed, or that it doesn't meet this or that standard, etc. However, there are a lot of "Citation Needed" notifications, and I wanted to provide a note on that. The overwhelming majority of specific information is going to be contained in classified documents. However, in the coming weeks or months, I will try to find unclassified sources that can be cited."

Instead, I decided to take a few days and provide the citations. Thank you for your assistance fellow "Wikipedians?" "Wikipedites?" (nope way to close to pedo). Whatever. Thank you Wikipedia Community. CuriousLayman (talk) 03:28, 22 September 2020 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Unclear/dubious source[edit]

I noticed an issue with this paragraph under Historical Use: “According to a report by the Homeland Security Market Research in the US, the number of IEDs used in Afghanistan had increased by 400 percent since 2007 and the number of troops killed by them by 400 percent, and those wounded by 700 percent. It has been reported that IEDs are the number one cause of death among NATO troops in Afghanistan.[52]” Firsly, it doesn’t give a date for when, since 2007, that increase was reported. When I looked at the link cited, it seemed like a sort of public blog. Unhelpful at best, but probably completely useless. If there are facts to back it up, it’s a good spot to put them, but the source cited seems quite unreliable. I didn’t want to simply delete it, but I’m not sure how to confirm the details given. It would be good to find a proper source and word the paragraph more descriptively. Samuel010898 (talk) 06:07, 8 September 2021 (UTC)Reply[reply]

Construction?[edit]

No information regarding common designs or construction methods of improvised explosives was listed, this seems incomplete. 98.188.50.17 (talk) 14:25, 18 October 2022 (UTC)Reply[reply]

IED Definition[edit]

I served with 321 EOD in NI at the time 17 of my collegues were killed whilst attempting to deal with IED's over a short period of less than two years!

Hence - THE ONLY PREDICTABLE ELEMENT TO EVERY IED IS IT's TOTAL UNPREDICTABILITY! 2A02:1811:435:3900:7C8B:C26F:633E:78AA (talk) 07:15, 14 August 2023 (UTC)Reply[reply]

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