Nuclear weapons of the United Kingdom has been listed as one of the Warfare good articles under the good article criteria. If you can improve it further, please do so. If it no longer meets these criteria, you can reassess it.
	Nuclear weapons of the United Kingdom is the main article in the Nuclear weapons and the United Kingdom series, a featured topic. This is identified as among the best series of articles produced by the Wikipedia community. If you can update or improve it, please do so.
Article milestones Date Process Result May 22, 2006 Good article nominee Not listed June 8, 2006 Peer review Reviewed September 1, 2018 Good article nominee Listed June 26, 2019 Good topic candidate Promoted September 12, 2021 WikiProject A-class review Approved Current status: Good article

This article is rated A-class on Wikipedia's content assessment scale. It is of interest to the following WikiProjects:

Military history: Technology / Weaponry / British / European / World War II / Cold War This article is within the scope of the Military history WikiProject. If you would like to participate, please visit the project page, where you can join the project and see a list of open tasks. To use this banner, please see the full instructions.Military historyWikipedia:WikiProject Military historyTemplate:WikiProject Military historymilitary history articles Associated task forces: /  Military science, technology, and theory task force Weaponry task force British military history task force European military history task force World War II task force Cold War task force (c. 1945 – c. 1989) Additional information: /  This article has passed an A-Class review. Politics of the United Kingdom Mid‑importance This article is within the scope of WikiProject Politics of the United Kingdom, a collaborative effort to improve the coverage of Politics of the United Kingdom on Wikipedia. If you would like to participate, please visit the project page, where you can join the discussion and see a list of open tasks.Politics of the United KingdomWikipedia:WikiProject Politics of the United KingdomTemplate:WikiProject Politics of the United KingdomPolitics of the United Kingdom articles Mid This article has been rated as Mid-importance on the project's importance scale.

On 6 December 2023, it was proposed that this article be moved to United Kingdom and nuclear weapons. The result of the discussion was not moved.

An abridged copy of the papers presented at the Royal Aeronautical Society Symposium on Chevaline 2004 and subsequently published as ISBN 1-85768-109-6 is available as a free email download (approx 450kb zipped-up) from Brian.Burnell Contact via wiki email facility on User page. Brian.Burnell 01:09, 19 August 2006 (UTC)[reply]

I just added a link [1] to a well researched table of UK nuclear weapons systems / bomb models. At some future point, someone with some bandwidth should take that and its source materials and expand the article out. Georgewilliamherbert 06:51, 2 April 2006 (UTC)[reply]

This is a nice article but I am hesitant to approve it with so many sections listed as being stubs. Several sections are both stubs and have links to a Main Article this is probably redundant since a section with a main article should be little more than a stub. Eluchil404 21:46, 17 May 2006 (UTC)[reply]

1. No references.
2. Presence of section stubs.

Cheung1303 04:50, 22 May 2006 (UTC)[reply]

I have added a section regarding the recently released documents for the 1979 Warsaw Pact plan "Seven Days to the River Rhine", and have noted the lack of nuclear strikes on France and the United Kingdom. A relevant news story is: http://www.guardian.co.uk/russia/article/0,2763,1651315,00.html#article_continue

I have also noted how the UK and French strategies regarding "Counter Value" nuclear strikes may have influenced the lack of strikes on both nations. I cannot claim inspiration or originality regarding this position, as I have seen it put forth on several discussion fora.

--Wbd 17:03, 7 June 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Was already there in the following section headed 'Number of Warheads'. Two citations were supplied; the Strategic Defence Review and one other. Brian.Burnell 18:11, 6 August 2006 (UTC)[reply]

'Failure' was a common misconception based on folk-tales with no research evidence in support. What evidence there is suggests that the reason for cancellation was not because of project 'failure' but because military requirements had changed and had been changing rapidly. Like all similar land-based liquid-fuelled ballistic missiles sited close to coastlines, or the Eastern European launch sites of the USSR, Blue Streak was vulnerable to a pre-emptive attack, because of the time needed to fuel the weapon. An added factor was the unsuitability of British geology and geography for silo construction. Such sites need to be in the centre of large land-masses, remote from large population centres; not possible in a small overcrowded island. The same military logic led to the removal of UK-based Thor IRBMs and Jupiter IRBMs based in Italy and Turkey. Because they were just too vulnerable. Blue Streak went on to a successful second career as the first-stage booster for a European collaborative programme of civil satellite launches. The withdrawal of Jupiter IRBMs was implicated in a tit-for-tat deal after the Cuban Missile Crisis. But the Jupiters were militarily worthless anyway. Use of the word 'failure' suggests to me a partisan POV. Brian.Burnell 18:36, 6 August 2006 (UTC)[reply]

The main reason for the cancellation of Blue Streak was the political repercussions, i.e., the votes of the residents in the areas (mostly on the east coast) where the silos were to be built, and which were likely to, in the eyes of the areas residents, make them all targets for enemy missiles. This was thought to be akin to committing political suicide, in terms of loss of votes, for the political party initiating the building of the silos. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.144.50.186 (talk) 10:32, 17 December 2018 (UTC)[reply]

All of this POV section was based on the false premise that UK targetting policy was a so-called 'Counter-Value' strategy. Consequently the whole passage was speculative and promoting a POV, which was not sustained by any evidence. It is now known from material declassified in relation to the Chevaline project, and elsewhere, that the UK never adopted any strategy other than one designed to 'decapitate' the Soviet leadership in Moscow. The 'Moscow Criteria' referred to elsewhere in this article and duly cited to hard evidence of its veracity demolishes the speculation about 'Counter-Value', entertaining though it was. Brian.Burnell 16:00, 10 August 2006 (UTC)[reply]

I have edited and re-added the material regarding modern perspectives. At any rate, an attack on Moscow counts as a counter-value attack- I was explaining the concept of "counter value" by citing examples, not stating them as utter fact, as counter value was not well-explained elsewhere. That is not POV, that is a clairification for someone who may not be aware of the term.

• • "An attack on Moscow counts as a counter-value strike"
  • No it does not. The Moscow Criteria outlined to ONLY circumstances where targets in the Moscow area was contemplated. As a decapitating strike on the Soviet government apparatus to obliterate it and leave the remainder of the USSR without government, possibly leading to the regimes collapse elsewhere. That is not defined as a counter-value strike. Your personal views are not relevant here. The whole section was stricken because it was based on the false premise that UK targetting policy was a counter-value strategy; when it was never that, even going back to the days when the weapons were delivered by aircraft. The whole raison-etre for the extremely expensive Chevaline project was so that the decapitating strike on the Soviet leadership would remain possible. Without a decapitating strike strategy, and substituting a counter-value strategy, the whole expensive Chevaline fiasco would have been unnecessary; because a counter-value strike would could be launched at a less heavily defended target other than Moscow. That was never the strategy. Hence the £1B wasted on Chevaline.

I take offense at your statement regarding my adding of POV material. While I may have over-stepped, my "speculation" was based on considered analysis by others more expert in their understanding of the Cold War environment.

The entire section should not have been removed, but re-written for a more clear view. I have done some looking to find my examples, and have sourced Tanknet, a discussion group with several experts on the Cold War for my material:

http://63.99.108.76/forums/index.php?showtopic=13477&hl=seven+days+to+the+river+rhine

No, I can't source as well as other people can, as I don't have full access to archives or scholars. Perhaps the other writers, rather than just removing my "speculation", could assist in sourcing.

A golden rule (not really a rule but an aspiration) worth adhering to is this: if you can'y source it, don't include it in the text. If you do its your choice, but others will judge your edits accordingly, and ascribe a lower value to them than those that adhere to the (non) rule.

• Try PRO DEFE 19/190 or DEFE 25/335 for a clear exposition of what the so-called Moscow Critera actually means. If I can help you short-cut, it means a decapitating attack on the Soviet leadership not on the Soviet people. The basis being that almost all the critical highly centralised Soviet apparatus of Government was based inside or around the Moscow outer ring road, and these were the UK nationally selected targets, not NATO's, which would have struck at multiple other targets. Although you must make your own judgement about whether the UK would ever go to war with the USSR alone. That is the ONLY scenario where the Moscow Criteria would apply. As for the collateral damage to the Moscow population; well that is an inevitable consequence of an attack on military targets located close to major population centres. That doesn't make the Moscow Criteria a plan to attack the Russian people. Its merely a consequence of how the USSR arranged its government apparatus. Equally, the MoD in London is a legitimate military target, even though the consequences for others don't bear thinking about. Email me using the Wiki email facility and by return of email I'll supply a copy of yer actual declassified Moscow Criteria target map. It can't be uploaded to Wiki for copyright reasons. Brian.Burnell 09:10, 25 August 2006 (UTC)[reply]

• • Well, I disagree to some degree, but that is probably due to a philosophical difference regarding what I would consider both a decapitating and counter-value strike (as I feel that the implications of the removal of both civilian governance and communications/transportation networks fall far beyond the basics of the removal of the military fighting capacity or the head of military governance).

• • • What contributors philosophical differences are are not relevant, nor is our personal view of what contstitutes a counter-value or a decapitating strike means. Each term has an established definition. Its not our function here to try to substitute a different meaning, based on our personal preferences. That will confuse the non-specialist reader; precisely the people that Wikipedia exists to serve. Our task, insofar as we can manage it is to record verifyable information. Our task is not to engage in debate. There are other places for that. 194.223.81.75 10:07, 26 August 2006 (UTC)[reply]

• • At any rate, I don't have the ability to source to Wikipedia's satisfaction the information I have supplied, and while I don't feel that this should occur, I have edited it out. The information I have heard regarding strikes beyond Moscow is not reliable according to the standards set, and therefore will not be added by me, at least not until some sourcing or statements appear in the form expected by Wikipedia.

• You shouldn't be offended because others have sought to help you. Wikipedia is an encyclopedia. It isn't a soapbox. Where material was edited out it was edited out in good faith because it was unsourced and unverifiable (unless you are a senior military officer writing incognitio, which seems unlikely). On the other hand, bearing in mind that this subject is bedevilled by military secrecy, some speculation is almost inevitable to fill in the gaps; but only where it is made crystal clear that it is speculation. Many distinguished academics have themselves fallen into this trap, Hugh Trevor-Roper and the Hitler Diaries come to mind. And no-one has the unfettered access to scholars that you claim others have. Some of the most misleading and inaccurate speculation actually comes from those sources. Some of the material re-instated recently needs to be removed because it is both POV and highly speculative. Brian.Burnell 09:10, 25 August 2006 (UTC)[reply]

• • That may be true, but you must also remember that Wikipedia policy states that it is not preferable to remove whole sections in a revert, but to pare away the problematic parts. I disagree with the final statement you make, of course. I'm not quite sure how the entire removal of a section that I addded, without some offer of assistance in re-tuning it, followed by a talk statement that ended with the quip "entertaining though it was", is helping me, however.

• • My statements were no more soapbox-ish than any other statement on the article- to which, they may have made implications that perhaps I should have been more careful to ensure that they did not make, but beyond that, were not attempts to display unfounded speculations, at least not without the appropriate phraseology employed to ensure that the reader would understand that they were extrapolations.

• • • Its true that there are other parts of this article that are 'soapboxish' as you put it. But its a lengthy article, and we have to start somewhere and work through it as time permits. But yours wasn't the only one. See the note below about Gordon Brown. This isn't the place to promote the case for current contenders for the Labour Party leadership. I see that there has been no response to my inquiry about deletion. Brian.Burnell 09:28, 26 August 2006 (UTC)[reply]

I have also added the Guardian's contrary position that nuclear strikes were omitted owing to a desire by the WP forces to not go beyond the Rhine River. While not added, the Guardian also noted that in the plans the attack was a defensive measure following a NATO attack that had been repulsed.

• Personally, I don't see the relevance of these to this article, which is not in essence about military tactics. Although I don't have any reason to doubt the genuineness of the Guardian's sources. To me, it seems this section belongs elsewhere; perhaps in an article about Warsaw Pact intentions. Brian.Burnell 09:10, 25 August 2006 (UTC)[reply]

• • I feel that this section, while seemingly irrelevant, is one of the few items that presents a WP viewpoint on one scenario of attack into NATO and how the United Kingdom would be treated in such an attack, and has one significant feature that it for one reason or another omits nuclear strikes on France and the United Kingdom. It is to be hoped that in future more information regarding plans will eventually emerge, but showing at least one possible contingency indicates the conceptualizations of uses of force that existed amongst the Soviet-bloc states at the time.

• • • I take your point about illustrating the French position in relation to Nato. But it will be confusing to some readers (those who come to Wiki for a reliable reference source) unless fully explained, because the Moscow Criteria bears no relation to Nato's target plans. The Moscow Criteria was a plan for a solely British strike at Moscow; unlikely though that seems.

While I appreciate your pointing out of material which wasn't fully encyclopaedic (which is necessary for the production of quality materials), not all of it should have been removed, and I do not like the assertion that I was acting contrary to Wikipedia standards. I think that some statement about this plan and how it omits strikes on the United Kingdom and France is warranted in this article.

• As said earlier, you are making assumptions about other peoples intentions that are unfounded. No one is perfect, and Wiki is comprised of imperfect people who produce work that is also imperfect. Striving to better it is good. Being offended where no offence is intended pisses others off, and is not good, but we have to live with it. Can I remind you of what Wiki policy actually is. See the text that appears below under 'Please Note'.

Its considered 'bad form' to remove other peoples comments from Talk Pages. Remove your own if you feel inclined to, but not those of others. Editing content is for the main article page only. 194.223.81.75 10:07, 26 August 2006 (UTC)[reply]

• • I had a difficulty with the tone taken in the initial talk message, not about the edit itself. Perhaps offense was too strong a word, and I apologize for using it, but the statement made it seem that I was fully culpable in commiting a violation of Wikipedia standards and the total removal implied a wholesale failure on my behalf. I also have some issue with the tone you are taking now- surely you can see that someone might feel somewhat perturbed by the statement "Being offended where no offence is intended pisses others off, and is not good, but we have to live with it". It's the "but we have to live with it" portion which is an annoyance, implying that I am somehow at fault, and I disagree with that.

• • • It does annoy me somewhat when others claim to be offended by a legitimate critique based on the fact of what appears in print. It was not a critique of you personally. I wouldn't do that. But I am entitled to legitimately comment on what others write. Its a part of the give and take of free expression. Taking personal offense where none was stated or implied does piss me off. It (to me) implies that you felt the critique was dishonest. And being annoyed by that is a part of what I am. To suggest that I shouldn't feel annoyed by that feels like an attack on my character. But this is not what Wiki is supposed to be about. One guiding principle is that we should assume good faith unless proven otherwise. That applies everyone. The remark about taking offence triggered a defensive reaction in me because it appeared to be an attack on my motivation and honesty. If you don't like the 'tone' ...... well only you can resolve that. You can't expect others to adjust their personality to suit you. We have to take each other as we find them, and assume good faith. If you can't do that then its not my problem, but yours. Lets try to put this personality thing aside and concentrate on the article. Brian.Burnell 09:28, 26 August 2006 (UTC)[reply]

• And if there is any, I would like to see any material that supports the contention that France adopted a policy similar to the UK's Moscow Criteria. It seems very likely that France did, given their situation and likely resources. But where is the evidence?

• • I know that we are not supposed to cite Wikis for evidence, but this is the best translated one I could find: Force_de_frappe, specifically:

• • "Stratégie du faible au fort ("Weak-to-strong strategy"); the idea behind is that a full-scale nuclear war would be lost by both opponents, and that a stronger opponent, having more to lose, would therefore refrain from proceeding further".

• • This is supported in other french postings across the web, but I don't have access to their initial sources. I am making an assumption that this is correct, based on the De Gaulle quote "Dans dix ans, nous aurons de quoi tuer 80 millions de Russes. Eh bien je crois qu'on n'attaque pas volontiers des gens qui ont de quoi tuer 80 millions de Russes, même si on a soi-même de quoi tuer 800 millions de Français, à supposer qu'il y eût 800 millions de Français."

• • Assuming that De Gaulle really meant it, and that the succeeding governments followed it, then it represents a clear case of a "counter-value" strategy.

• • • That was never British policy. Brian.Burnell 09:28, 26 August 2006 (UTC)[reply]

• • • Well, I have to bow to your superior knowledge of French strategy; although I still am unable to see how relevant it as to 'Nuclear weapons and the United Kingdom', except perhaps as a comparison. Brian.Burnell 09:28, 26 August 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Finally, I cannot verify your assertion that the only strike plan was to Moscow, but am using it in this section. I do not believe that all materials regarding the United Kingdom's position have in fact been fully declassified, and in some cases may never

• Again you make a dangerous assumption that that MAY be other declassified target plans, but you have no evidence to support that. You may be right. But you have no way to verify your belief. So that belief is unsuitable and too POV for an encyclopaedic historical account of nuclear weapons and the UK. But its OK for these Talk pages, because beliefs expressed here are not expected to conform to encyclopaedic standards. The only verifyable targetting plans known of originate either from official sources, or from declassified material; whether directly accessible, or second-hand through the press; although much press coverage is biased, misinformed, speculative, or just plain disinformation. You have to make a judgement of it based on known hard evidence. And the fact is that only those highly placed in government actually know; and their thought processes are unverifyable. So you have to tread carefully to avoid the traps set for the Trevor-Ropers. I hope that you are finding this helpful rather than critical. BTW, the verification for the UK strike plans can be found in the sources cited above. Brian.Burnell 09:10, 25 August 2006 (UTC)[reply]

• • There is a contrarian view that could be presented at this point that would suggest that the declassified materials are not in fact either complete or accurate representations, and that the official statements may or may not be fully committed to terminological exactitude regarding the status of plans that may or may not exist, and therefore, as a result, may be considered verifiable, but like the press, not be fully reliable.

• • • That's rather akin to saying that nothing the Civil Service or government says is truthful. Now I know that there are people who genuinely believe in such conspiracy theories. But thats all they are. Theories. Archived sources from fifty years ago; that is documemts that were written by Civil Servants for internal circulation are not in the same category as government public relations handouts claiming that WMDs are 45 minutes from launch. I don't accept your argument as having any validity, and its hard to think of any reputable researcher or writer who would. Although there may be some. Brian.Burnell 09:28, 26 August 2006 (UTC)[reply]

• • I hope that my statements here have helped to clear up my basic understanding and position on the matter. I am not trying to cause trouble or difficulty to either you or the Wikipedia structure at large, but merely attempting in my own small way to somehow create something of perhaps some benefit to someone within the guidelines set out.

• • • Lets not make this a personal thing. These issues are too important.

• • --Wbd 15:04, 25 August 2006 (UTC)[reply]

--Wbd 15:06, 24 August 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Removed Section Arghh...I've somehow gone very wrong here. I have removed the entire section and agree with your critique. Please accept my apologies for the troubles caused, as I have caused you and others trouble undeservedly. Whatever viewpoints that were NPOV that I placed in the article do not belong, and those that were POV definitely needed removal.

Thank-you for pointing these issues out.

--Wbd 16:51, 26 August 2006 (UTC)[reply]

I'm happy to be able to help. But if I'd had the foresight to illustrate it with the Chevaline example sooner it could have been acheived with less anst for both of us. Maury Markowitz has recently completed an excellent rewrite of the Chevaline article that I can recommend for its insight into targetting strategy. Regards Brian.Burnell 15:05, 29 August 2006 (UTC)[reply]

I have serious doubts about the suitability of this passage for inclusion. Wikipedia is not a political pamphlet, its an encyclopaedia, and a passage promoting a recent speech by a prominent politician seems to me to be too much like political posturing for my personal taste. Perhaps the best place for it might be a biog of Brown? Would others out there like to justify its continued inclusion? Brian.Burnell 17:18, 10 August 2006 (UTC)[reply]

• After a two month period waiting for any objections to removal of the passage about Gordon Brown's recenr speech there are no objections at all lodged here. So ... I'll remove it for the reasons listed above. Apart from it being not to my personal taste, a speech by a politician with no previous governmental responsibility for nuclear weapons or defence matters, at a time when he and others are hustling for promotion to the top job in government is hardly suitable material for an encyclopaedia. When, or if, Brown becomes Prime Minister, the situation obviously changes. But until then he is just another contender on the hustle, and Wikipedia isn't the hustings. Someone might want to insert a suitable piece in Brown's biog page though. That is a more suitable place for it. Brian.Burnell 17:38, 7 October 2006 (UTC)[reply]

It may be true that a Windows-based system has been installed recently, but there is no evidence presented that this minor change is in any way related to replacement plans for Trident (if they yet exist). It is quite normal in the lifespan of all weapon systems for aged components to be replaced; often by more modern components than before. The reason for this can be no more sinister than that the older components are no longer being produced. One example being Windows XP SP1, whose upgrades and support will cease in Oct 2006 for all users, military and civilian. The passage is simply not relevant to the debate about Trident replacement, which is unlikely to take effect before 2025. Use of the word 'probably' is also indicative of the provenance of the passage. Wikipedia is an encyclopaedia, not a soapbox. It requires content to be verifiable. Speculation, however well-intentioned does not belong here, because by its very nature, speculation is not verifiable. Brian.Burnell 10:31, 8 September 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Couldn't agree more. The contributor of this section has some sort of agenda, i.e. allowing personal opinions to effect editing. Mark83 16:43, 8 September 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Thanks Mark. Its good to know that there are like minds out there. Unfortunately though, contentious topics do attract contributions with a thinly-disguised agenda. Brian.Burnell 23:01, 9 September 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Nevertheless, it remains the case that, while the UK parliament has discussed and approved updates to numerous submarine systems, those didn't include the Vanguard command system (Hansard, various); that the proposal to update that command system came not from MoD requirement but rather from one supplier (BAE Systems), thus able to oust the equipment of the original supplier (Ultra) - remember that the original equipment was designed to see out the full service life of the Vanguard boats; that conversion from a proven bespoke software system (which has no extraneous software, and no security issues) to a commercial system (which has both, in plenty) is a dramatic engineering change, especially for a nuclear weapons platform; and that when asked about these proposals in October 2004, the UK's minister told parliament that no decision had been made (Hansard), but nevertheless chose to award the contracts the next month (BAE news releases). Clearly, the GBP24M awarded to BAE Systems for submarine command systems updates is small money compared with the cost of full programmes for Trident replacement or extension; but it must have come from somewhere, and given the political sensitivity of the nuclear programmes, it is odd that money was spent on this without parliament's foreknowledge and approval. Shlgww 07:27, 10 September 2006 (UTC)[reply]

It may well be true that these changes TO Trident are a 'dramatic engineering changes' as you claim; and on these software related topics I have to bow to your superior knowledge. However, it is clear that changes TO Trident in the middle of its lifespan are demonstrably not related to a debate in Parliament and the press about plans for Tridents eventual replacement. If and when Trident is retired, all the systems (including these software changes) needed for it to function now and in its remaining life will be thrown on the scrapheap with the missiles. You seem unwilling to grasp that that is why your otherwise informative contributions are not relevant to this section. There is probably a more suitable place for them elsewhere on Wikipedia, perhaps a newly created page. If there isn't one, then there should be, or its waiting for someone like you to create it. But here, these contributions simply sow confusion, and are not verifiable; and without exception, that is the test to apply. Brian.Burnell 15:27, 10 September 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Agreed that this information relates to Trident now, rather than Replacement for Trident, so I shall create a correctly linked and verifiable version and put it in a suitable place. (mildly comical that you use Win XP SP1 as your example of ageing software above, since it's actually the still older Windows 2000 which has gone into the replacement Vanguard command systems. Hey ho.) Shlgww 15:48, 11 September 2006 (UTC).[reply]

I don't claim to be knowledgable about software. Its another planet to me. You could also insert the links you wanted others to see in External References as hyperlinks, ISBN or internal links to the SCMS or Windows for Warships pages. Their presence there is not dependent on references to them in the main article text, just an encouragement to others to do some further reading. Brian.Burnell 20:29, 11 September 2006 (UTC)[reply]

This page is titled Nuclear weapons and the United Kingdom and its purpose is to give an overview of British nuclear weapons history from inception to the present day. What is not its purpose is to duplicate the Trident missile page, although the Trident system should of course feature in any well-balanced article about the United Kingdom's nuclear weapons. Nor is its purpose is to be a platform for a section about ship/submarine control software. However well-written or informative that section may be, it is irrelevant to the subject matter of Nuclear weapons and the United Kingdom and should be located elsewhere. On a dedicated page. From a careful reading of the text (and its links to other places) inserted here on the Windows control system it becomes clear, even to a non-specialist, that this has nothing whatsoever to do with either nuclear weapons, or their delivery systems, or their targetting or launch procedures. The Windows system is a purely ship and submarine control system that is NOT unique to the Vanguard class SSBNs, but is a system common to many types of vessel, some conventionally-powered, some not; some are armed with conventional weapons only, some like the Vanguard class are not; some are nuclear-powered submarines, and some are surface vessels, eg, frigates and destroyers. Some are of the British Royal Navy, and others are Dutch, Italian, German etc. These states do not possess nuclear weapons or nuclear-powered vessels, yet use this Windows-based operating system for some of their ships. Nor is this page the appropriate place to elaborate on the merits or lack of merit of the Windows operating system, that has no connection whatsoever with British nuclear weapons.

It is absolutely clear that this section on Windows for Warhips is completely irrelevant to the Nuclear weapons and the United Kingdom page. The page is not a vehicle for those with some kind of axe to grind about a topic that should be located elsewhere. The Windows section unbalances this page and it is a misuse of this article to repeatedly place it here after having the issues discussed earlier at great length, and solutions suggested for suitable links to a dedicated page. In that sense it is bordering on vandalism IMHO. Brian.Burnell 09:43, 15 September 2006 (UTC)[reply]

The reference to BAE Sytems is likewise unverifiable. No citable source is offered for the assertion that BAe is "one of the most powerful lobbyists ...". It may well be a perfectly reasonable view to hold; but Wikipedia is not a soapbox for such views, or of opposing views. The proper place for these is elsewhere, perhaps in a political pamphlet. Wikipedia is for encyclopaedic, verifiable content. Of course no contributor can ever be free of political bias, especially about such a contentious issue as Trident. But unless we strive to avoid using Wiki as a soapbox it will quickly degenerate into a forum where two opposing viewpoints crowd out all information that does not support their viewpoint. I note that the above passage ref 'Trident and Gordon Brown' posted one month ago dated 10 Aug 2006 has not attracted a single comment from contributors in favour of retaining it. Brian.Burnell 10:31, 8 September 2006 (UTC)[reply]

There is no evidence that the changes referred to are in any way connected with plans to replace Trident, which will not expire of old age until around 2025. There is no evidence that replacement plans even exist. Any assertion that there are such plans can only be speculation and unverifiable to the standards that Wikipedia requires. The software changes referred to are possibly no more than a routine replacement of worn-out equipment such as happens as a matter of course with all aging machinery. See above at 'Probably the first use of Microsoft Windows ...' If there is any hard evidence that the replacement software is in any way a neccessary precursor for replacement of the whole missile and submarine system then produce it, and the deleted material can be reinstated as compliant with Wikis requirements for verifiable encyclopaedic content. Wiki is not a soapbox for POV. Brian.Burnell 23:21, 9 September 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Well, because of the highly classified nature of these programmes, it is a little difficult to produce hard evidence of this kind from public sources. The few openly available references I am able to produce (Hansard, company news releases, etc) you keep removing, which makes it difficult for others to look up what limited source material is available. Shlgww 07:28, 10 September 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Of course they are difficult to source. I too have worked on highly classified nuclear weapons projects and understand the difficulties about sourcing. But contributions that are unable to be verified are often only the writers own speculation (although I don't suggest that yours is untrue). Remembering the very many differing acounts published about the Chevaline project provides numerous examples of misplaced, misguided speculation by distinguished academics. Because these publications came from apparently knowledgable sources they were then repeated ad nauseum elsewhere. Most of it we now know to be untrue and very wide of the mark after declassified documents were placed in the archives. That's a remarkably common tale in this area of contributions. The golden aspiration is don't assert what you cannot verify. What you cannot verify is only opinion, speculation; or even disinformation. The military authorities are exceedingly adept at that technique. The trick is to not swallow the PR whole. Because it is so difficult to source to hard evidence, a useful editorial gambit is to admit that so the readers understand that it is unverified. That can be done by the gambit of offering the material as "Dr, Prof, the Rt Hon, etc says that XYZ is ....." and sourcing the published opinion. That way, the reader understands the uncertain nature of the information, and its a practice usually accepted in moderation by Wikipedia. Brian.Burnell 15:27, 10 September 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Has never been one of massive retaliation. The UK has never possessed sufficient bombs to permit that strategy. Since Polaris, and probably earlier, strategy has followed three paths. First, the UK strategic and tactical weapons since 1960 or earlier were assigned to NATO, and SACEUR determined targetting plans (with input from UK staffs). That was true of the V-bombers weapons and is still true today. Second, in the unlikely situation where the UK launched a strike without allied support, the only strategic strategy was the so-called 'Moscvow Criteria' where the intention was to decapitate the Soviet leadership concentrated around Moscow, leaving the remaining USSR untouched and hopefully detached from the regime. To do that it was necessary to defeat the ABM defences protecting Moscow (but nowhere else). That was the raison-d'etre for the Chevaline project, that was not needed for any other targetting plan. It seems unlikely that that targetting strategy has changed significantly; although we are unlikely to have hard evidence for many years yet. Thirdly, the free-fall bombs deployed with the RAF and Royal Navy were also able to be used as a sub-strategic weapon against less well-defended targets on the periphery of the USSR or elsewhere. Nothing has changed since these bombs were retired, and their functions as a sub-strategic deterrent have been assigned to Trident missiles equipped with a suitable low-yield warhead. Note though that the 'sub-strategic' WE.177 warheads ranged from a minimum of 10 kilotons to 200 kt and 450 kt, depending on model used. Note also that 'sub-strategic' can mean many things; eg. there are declassified plans in the PRO for a tactical (or sub-strategic) strike from Navy carriers at ports on the coast of Burma should the UK's committments to SEATO be invoked by a Chinese attack into Vietnam or SE Asia. Burma is not usually regarded as worthy of such a strike, and doubtless there were other plans. Brian.Burnell 16:18, 29 August 2006 (UTC)[reply]

The phase was inserted in good faith to illustrate how public opinion as expressed by the quality press, has changed since the 1954 decision to develop a British thermonuclear weapon. Although it could perhaps have been better phased, the purpose of illustrating changing public opinion is a perfectly legitimate objective in the context of the narrative. Hopefully, the changes made and the additional references provided will meet with Palpatine's approval. Brian.Burnell 17:38, 7 October 2006 (UTC)[reply]

I'm not sure I agree with the link to tactical weapons in the first section. As I understand it, a 'sub-strategic' attack today would use reduced-yield strategic weapons against specific (probably political) targets. This is slightly different to the battlefield deployment of low-yield tactical nuclear weaponry against military formations/targets. I think 'sub-strategic' and 'tactical' are not the same thing, but easily confused. Can I suggest that a link to http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_warfare#sub-strategic might be better? Betdud 13:51, 8 January 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Good points. I think it's right to say Trident, no matter what way it is employed, is a strategic system. A single missile, single warhead with reduced yeild, qualifies as "sub-strategic". In a similar mission a "tactical" missile would be use a nuclear Tomahawk cruise missile (if the UK had such a weapon). Mark83 16:07, 8 January 2007 (UTC)[reply]

IIRC the whole point of retired the WE177 is that somehow an SLBM can do the same job. Of course its laughable but wasn't that the last lot of warhead work the AWE was doing int he mid to late 90s (ie a low yield warhead for the Trident D5 to allow the WE177 to be retired) ??? Of course there are a whole plethora of better ways to deliver a tactical of even small strategic bomb (tomahawks, harpoons, stand off missile, and a variety of guided and unguided "iron bombs") but its makes the UK look good only having one weapons platform that is overtly strategic (ie usage is even more unlikely). Pickle 21:29, 8 January 2007 (UTC)[reply]

See Variable yield - a W88 (similar US warhead used on Trident D5s) can have the amount of Tritium boost varied, resulting in yields from 20kt unboosted to 475kt - obviously the warhead would have to be set up with the yield before launch (i imagine, i don't see how you would extract the tritium form the warhead on board an SSBN). As the page says the short half life of tritium means there is an ageing affect on the yield. 20Kt was Hiroshima/Nagasaki so thats mostly in the Tactical / Sub-strategic realm, if not quite the smallest of battlefield weapons as seen during the height of the cold war. 160.5.247.8 20:53, 9 January 2007 (UTC) (Pickle not logged in!)[reply]

Someone has deleted this external reference:

[2]

Why? Vernon White (talk) 18:22, 5 February 2007 (UTC)[reply]

There doesnt seem to be any mention of the signigicant testing of atomic weapons in Australia. This was agreed to by Robert Menzies, the Australian Prime Minsister at the time. Significant numbers of above ground tests were carried out at Maralinga and other locations in South Australia. These resulted in significant radiation exposure to Australian and UK servicemen, and local Aboriginal people. I do not have the details, but someone may like to include this information.Patrats 06:15, 25 February 2007 (UTC)[reply]

I could write a whole page on it really, with UK test in OZ, UK test in (then UK owned) Christmas Island and the US tests there, then UK tests in Nevada. Also talk about the PTBT in the 1960s and finally the long running CTBT saga. There is then the political (domestic UK, domestic those states and international political implications of all these actions). Pickle 19:15, 25 February 2007 (UTC)[reply]

So why don't you? Declan Davis (talk) 20:17, 27 August 2008 (UTC)[reply]

There is an article British nuclear tests at Maralinga, however this page should reference it in the section about tests, as it was a significant part of the UK test programme. It should also mention either in the test section, or possible the politics section below the details of the ongoing saga over compensation for service personnel who suffered significant health problems as a result, and are currently still seeking compensation from the Uk gvt. This is seen as a significant issue in Australia, and deserves a mention on this page in my opinion. I would be tempted to write it myself, but am alreadty struggling to catch up with all the ongoing pages I am working on, I really don't think i can get involved in another new project at this time. Anyone who is more oriented to the nuclear subject want to volunteer?Rac fleming 07:54, 30 May 2007 (UTC)[reply]

In the early years of the British bomb project there was an understanding with Australia that they would also be a user of the weapons that Britain was developing, however as time went on later Australian governments decided against the country becoming a nuclear power, and so lost their interest in the weapons then being tested at places such as Maralinga, etc. So the tests were eventually perceived in the Australian public's eye as being solely for the benefit of the British. This was not so, at least initially, originally the weapons were being developed for joint UK/Australian use. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 80.4.57.101 (talk) 14:41, 19 December 2011 (UTC)[reply]

Am I alone in thinking that we should include mention of domestic opposition to nuclear weapons and CND in particular? I would think that at least passing reference to these would be useful context for the article (which is terrific by the way).--Smcgrother 18:35, 11 April 2007 (UTC)[reply]

That would be wholly appropriate. Add away! - Crosbiesmith 20:59, 11 April 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Am I the only one who reckons there is far too much use of the prase (propaganda slogan ?) nuclear deterrent in these articles. Other countries have nuclear weapons or (if not our friends) weapons of mass destruction but only the UK has a nuclear deterrent ! 213.40.226.94 (talk) 16:12, 31 August 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Not like the French Force de dissuasion then? 62.196.17.197 (talk) 11:13, 20 January 2014 (UTC)[reply]

this section- "A submarine's load of warheads were reduced from 96 to 48. This reduced the explosive power of the warheads on a Vanguard class Trident submarine to "one third less than a Polaris submarine armed with Chevaline." However, a fact that the 1998 Strategic Defence Review glosses over is that 48 warheads per Trident submarine represents a 50% increase on the 32 warheads per submarine of Chevaline. Total explosive power has been in decline for decades as the accuracy of missiles has improved, therefore requiring less power to destroy each target. Trident can destroy 48 targets per submarine, as opposed to 32 targets that could be destroyed by Chevaline."

The bit i've highlighted should probably read 32 targets? Because of the last line. Confusing but.. Cheers -- maxrspct ping me 13:36, 29 July 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Semantics as far as I can see - a warhead destroys a target. i.e. 1 warhead = 1 target. So the terms are interchangeable as far as I can see. Mark83 21:07, 29 July 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Dunno.. look closer. i'm not great at maths but.. This is confusing. --maxrspct ping me 21:13, 29 July 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Where is 32 wareheads in cheveline - its not in chevaline article (??)--maxrspct ping me 21:17, 29 July 2007 (UTC)[reply]

16 missiles per Resolution class, 2 warheads each equals 32. I agree though, terribly covered on any of the articles. Mark83 21:35, 29 July 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Bit late to the show, but have i missed something here. Chevaline wasn't a MIRV system just MRV (ie you fired a missile at Moscow, both warheads got to Moscow - a true MIRV would mean you could send one warhead to one target, and one to another some distance away).... ??? See the end of the Chevaline article Pickle 12:00, 31 July 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Your absolutely right about MIRV vs MRV - but I don't see the relevance to the discussion thus far. The question as raised was about the number of warheads, not the possible number or targets. Mark83 19:57, 31 July 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Not directly relevant, but i was getting confused through your talk ;) Pickle 17:30, 1 August 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Quoted from the article: "UK nuclear posture during the cold war was informed by interdependence with the United States. Operational control of the UK Polaris force was assigned to SACLANT". Who exactly controlls SACLANT? In other word, in the event that the UK wants to drop a nuclear weapon but the US disagrees with this, could the UK alone drop it? Does anyone have a source for this? I think this is a very important question that needs to be clarified.Herve661 15:34, 12 November 2007 (UTC)[reply]

SACLANT = Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic [theatre]. As the article says, targeting policy was determined by SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe) a predominately land-based theatre, and the joint targeting plan reflected that the targets were in the European theatre, although the subs themselves were not. So the subs were commanded by SACLANT, - always an American admiral based in Norfolk, Virginia. Confusing heh? But it suited British politicians to divide control and rule, and the confusion suited them. And there was also the option to withdraw command 'in a national emergency'. In practice, SACLANT normally delegated control to COMEASTLANT, Commander East Atlantic. Always a British admiral. The sources, as I understand it are declassified files in the national archives, now in the public domain. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 81.156.149.209 (talk) 23:43, 8 December 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Polaris Missiles required US firing codes to fire, so they were dependant on the US, the later Trident missiles were more independant though, Submarine commanders were in charge of the codes to actually launch a missile but the missiles themselves are sent to the US for maintenance and upgrades every few years, the US retained control of the technology to build and maintain them. 83.104.138.141 (talk) 03:00, 25 November 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Polaris Missiles required US firing codes to fire, so they were dependant on the US, - not true - this was removed (at great additional expense) from the systems installed in UK Polaris boats and the Captain retained the sole responsibility for firing the missiles. The 'firing codes' system was removed because it was originally used in the US boats because they didn't feel able to trust firing of the missiles to the submarine's crew. This was opposed by the Admiralty and so was not fitted in UK Polaris boats - the ship's Captain could order an attack by himself. It was thought that Royal Navy commanders could be relied on not to run amok and fire without authority. In any case, the ability for a Captain to order the firing of missiles was thought desirable in case the UK was nuked to the point that communications with the submarines was impossible. For this reason UK Polaris boats had to receive a coded signal every few days that signified that the UK had not been attacked - if this signal was not received then the submarine commander would then try and communicate with Northwood by other means. If this still brought no reply then the Captain could authorise the launch of the missiles on his own authority, something not to be taken lightly. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.112.59.174 (talk) 22:18, 22 June 2010 (UTC)[reply]

See here: Letters of last resort — Preceding unsigned comment added by 80.4.57.101 (talk) 12:44, 15 April 2012 (UTC)[reply]

Added a brief section on the government legal position in defence to the Sands and Singh reports given already which give a solely 'against' pov - ie not npov - perhaps could do with some more detail or attention of an expert. Thanks. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 81.96.243.127 (talk) 21:09, 20 December 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Surely, if nothing else, Parliament implicity legalised the nuclear deterrent by authorising its developement, construction and continued funding - in the absence of an specific act explicitly permitting it? 62.196.17.197 (talk) 11:17, 20 January 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Image:Blue Danube Bomb.jpg is being used on this article. I notice the image page specifies that the image is being used under fair use but there is no explanation or rationale as to why its use in this Wikipedia article constitutes fair use. In addition to the boilerplate fair use template, you must also write out on the image description page a specific explanation or rationale for why using this image in each article is consistent with fair use.

Please go to the image description page and edit it to include a fair use rationale. Using one of the templates at Wikipedia:Fair use rationale guideline is an easy way to insure that your image is in compliance with Wikipedia policy, but remember that you must complete the template. Do not simply insert a blank template on an image page.

If there is other fair use media, consider checking that you have specified the fair use rationale on the other images used on this page. Note that any fair use images lacking such an explanation can be deleted one week after being tagged, as described on criteria for speedy deletion. If you have any questions please ask them at the Media copyright questions page. Thank you.

BetacommandBot (talk) 04:59, 12 February 2008 (UTC)[reply]

This picture had to be taken when the weapon was in service with the RAF. The original uncropped photograph has an RAF serviceman standing next to the weapon to give an illustration of size. Since the weapon was withdrawn from service before 1960 and Crown Copyright expires after 50 years the photograph is now out of copyright, and in the public domain. No question of Fair Use applies. George.Hutchinson (talk) 22:45, 6 August 2010 (UTC)[reply]

As I understand it Crown copyright continues to subsist -

(a) until the end of the period of 125 years from the end of the calendar year in which the work was made, or

(b) if the work is published commercially before the end of the period of 75 years from the end of the calendar year in which it was made, until the end of the period of 50 years from the end of the calendar year in which it was first so published.(section 163, CDPA 1988) — Preceding unsigned comment added by 82.16.26.61 (talk) 16:06, 25 July 2011 (UTC)[reply]

To my mind, the rationale has always been political as well. If the UK ceases to have nuclear forces, France will be the only European country with them, and will start to act like it. It is unlikely that this would impinge on negotiations on the direction of the EU, with the French favouring a more socialist and less "Anglo-Saxon" model, but whatever the reality, diehard British fear of an arrogant and powerful France is a key factor behind keeping it.

The other key concern is fear of Germany. Almost all large European countries have a noisy and uncouth neo-nazi minority of overbearing unemployed young men. Any electoral advances eg. in Austria by anyone described sometimes unfairly as of the "far right" gets left-wing media outlets in a frenzy. But it is much more alarming from a military perspective when German parties like the NDP do well, even in city and state elections. The argument is that if in the highly unlikely event that Germany (currently a NATO ally) ever did become nationalist or militaristic again, there is no point in rearming to take on all the old enemies, including Britain, since Britain and France already have nuclear weapons, and for as long as Germany does not, it is the weaker power and all attempts to re-establish a greater Germany through force fall at the first hurdle. Put bluntly, the ability of London to (however destructive to Europe's environment overall) hit German cities with instant destruction makes all such efforts blatantly futile from a military perspective and thus doomed to irrelevance from a political one. Such ridiculous and backward-looking ideas simply never get off the ground.

These are the two actual reasons for keeping them. Those who say we have nobody to throw them at who we would wish to are quite right. We would never take on any rogue states without America anyway. I don't think Russia either wishes to dominate Europe any more and I don't think French or British weapons make any difference. We are already much too economically dependent on Moscow to attack it and vice versa.

The article should reflect these actual political rationales and calculations. This stuff may not be obvious to the public and the MOD probably would never say these to avoid painting NATO allies as potential enemies.

Civil servants may have argued that we "could annihilate Eastern Europe" but we didn't want to and couldn't then and certainly wouldn't now.

--81.105.243.17 (talk) 00:13, 21 July 2008 (UTC)[reply]

The image Image:Orange Herald warhead.jpg is used in this article under a claim of fair use, but it does not have an adequate explanation for why it meets the requirements for such images when used here. In particular, for each page the image is used on, it must have an explanation linking to that page which explains why it needs to be used on that page. Please check

• That there is a non-free use rationale on the image's description page for the use in this article.
• That this article is linked to from the image description page.

The following images also have this problem:

• Image:ProtectAndSurvive.jpg

This is an automated notice by FairuseBot. For assistance on the image use policy, see Wikipedia:Media copyright questions. --00:55, 1 October 2008 (UTC)[reply]

This picture had to be taken before the device was detonated in the Christmas Island tests of Spring 1957. Therefore the photograph (originally Crown Copyright) is now after 50 years out of copyright, and in the public domain. No question of Fair Use applies. George.Hutchinson (talk) 22:45, 6 August 2010 (UTC)[reply]

If the UK would not renew trident, would the UK still have other deploy-able nuclear weapons? How many of which ones? Chendy (talk) 08:45, 30 April 2010 (UTC)[reply]

The exact number of nuclear warheads which the UK has in total and has operational is 225/160.

http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5ge06eimPo1oS2tR3pGmTv836hE4gD9FUJIEO0

Can this article (and others) now be updated with this please. David (talk) 15:40, 26 May 2010 (UTC)[reply]

For those interested in the subject then this new book by Richard Moore might provide some answers: Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality: Britain, the United States and Nuclear Weapons, 1958-64 —Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.112.59.174 (talk) 21:55, 22 June 2010 (UTC)[reply]

The United Kingdom was the third country to test an independently developed nuclear weapon, - surely it wasn't third, it was second after the USSR - the US didn't independently develop a nuclear weapon, it did it with British and Canadian help, so that's hardly 'independently developed'. The US developed a bomb with the help of the UK and Canada and then after the passing of the McMahon Act and reneging on the deal to share information under the Quebec Agreement, Britain then had to do it all again on its own. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.112.83.125 (talk) 10:23, 6 August 2010 (UTC)[reply]

There's some more info on the early British bomb project in this Equinox documentary on YouTube entitled A Very British Bomb: [3]

The first paragraph after the title "Thermonuclear weaponry" states:

A month after Britain's first atomic weapons test, America tested the first thermonuclear bomb. The Soviets tested their first in 1953.[34] Although Penney believed that Britain could not afford developing a hydrogen bomb,[19] these developments alarmed Churchill and a decision was made on 27 July 1954 to begin development of a thermonuclear bomb, making use of the more powerful nuclear fusion reaction rather than nuclear fission.[34]

The problems are:

1. Grammer: Perhaps it should read "...Britain could not afford to develop a hydrogen bomb..."?

2. Technical issue: "making use of the more powerful nuclear fusion reaction rather than nuclear fission". Fusion reactions are actually less enegetic per reaction but more energetic by mass. Perhaps this should be reworded "making use of nuclear fusion to provide a higher yeild than nuclear fission "?

2.217.150.216 (talk) 17:01, 22 December 2011 (UTC)[reply]

Both issues fixed. Ylee (talk) 01:19, 23 December 2011 (UTC)[reply]

I am very surprised that there is no mention of the USA backstabbing the British by releasing (directly against British wishes and knowledge) all the serial numbers and highly classified data on the UK's nuclear arsenal to the Russians during the New Start negotiations, the act basically completely and utterly destroyed Britains deterrent. 82.31.236.245 (talk) 23:59, 2 April 2012 (UTC)[reply]

Probably because your point of view is utter rubbish? Please don't use the Talk Pages for a soapbox.HammerFilmFan (talk) 10:37, 3 December 2012 (UTC)[reply]

http://bos.sagepub.com/content/67/5/89.full.pdf+html

Phd8511 (talk) 18:31, 14 June 2012 (UTC)[reply]

"The British remembered that the United States had declined to bomb German V-1 and V-2 sites that threatened England." - what? For starters, in all my years of reading on the war I've never come across any such information. Secondly, the V-2's had mobile launchers, and at that time bombing them was impossible. Nor would it have been a "United States" decision, as the UK had it's own bombers. The Allied advance into Europe captured or destroyed these rockets and their launch-crews - Eisenhower responded to Churchill's request that this be given priority. FOR NOW, I am going to remove this line and ask for some pretty heavy support in scholarly materials for it to be put back in. Btw, the linked Wiki articles for the V weapons have no mention of any such 'decline' by the U.S. - which in the case of the V-2, wouldn't make any sense anyway.HammerFilmFan (talk) 10:42, 3 December 2012 (UTC)[reply]

"An independent test programme would see the UK numbers soar to French levels." I think this is highly speculative, which in itself is a reason to delete that sentence (or at the very least give a source).

I also disagree with the conclusion itself, in view of the ridiculously excessive amount of nuclear tests that the French have conducted. France has carried out 210 tests, for a peak stockpile of only 540 warheads. This is a full 0.39 tests per warhead. In relative terms, that's TEN times more than the United States (0.034 tests per warhead) and even TWENTY times more than the Soviet Union! (0.016 tests per warhead)--Cancun771 (talk) 15:56, 7 May 2013 (UTC)[reply]

The article says: "After British scientists demonstrated to the United States in late 1957 that they had developed a Teller-Ulam design different from American methods and thus understood how to build a hydrogen bomb, the 1958 US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement made fully developed and tested American designs available more quickly and more cheaply." This does not read very well when you consider that the "Teller-Ulam design" was itself an American invention.194.176.105.153 (talk) 12:20, 10 October 2013 (UTC)[reply]

Testing sites can be moved into Nuclear weapons and the United Kingdom as it is a part of the same. Cheers AKS 10:10, 3 January 2014 (UTC)[reply]

This merge has been suggested for three countries: France, Great Britain and China. To comment on this merge as well as the other two, go to Talk:France and weapons of mass destruction#Proposed merge with France's nuclear testing series to make comments. SkoreKeep (talk) 09:16, 21 January 2014 (UTC)[reply]

• Merge per nom. -Ad Orientem (talk) 23:39, 31 January 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Support merging these articles. Given the time period between the proposal and the current time, and given the lack of opposition, the article should be merged immediately. Dingomate (talk) 05:09, 15 May 2015 (UTC)[reply]

• Oppose No rationale given. Nuclear weapons and the United Kingdom is the main article, and could be greatly expanded. It is ongoing. United Kingdom's nuclear testing series is about UK nuclear testing. This ceased twenty years ago. Both subjects warrant their own articles. Hawkeye7 (talk) 06:23, 15 May 2015 (UTC)[reply]

(1) I didn't understand these statements: "From 1955 the government chose to emphasize the nuclear deterrent and deemphasize conventional forces,[51] a decision The Economist, the New Statesman, and many left-wing newspapers supported. Their view (in 1954–55) is fairly summarised as being not opposed to nuclear deterrence and nuclear weapons, but in their view that of the United States would suffice, and that of the costs of the 'nuclear umbrella' was best left to be borne by the United States alone." The first sentence made it sound as though the Economist, New Statesman and many leftwing newspapers supported the decision to emphasise the UK's nuclear deterrent. But then the second statement says that these papers believed the US nuclear deterrent would have been enough on its own and that the US should bear the costs alone - which is the complete opposite of saying that the UK should emphasise its nuclear deterrent, a view these papers had allegedly supported. What's the truth of the matter, and can the article be made to reflect it in clear language? (2) Am I read this right: Wilson regarded nuclear deterrence as an irrelevance, a Tory pretence, but didn't make any move to abolish it - and actually secretly spent huge amounts of money on a programme to upgrade the weapons. If the electorate had endorsed his view that the weapons were a pretence, why did he feel the need to spend a huge amount upgrading them? 86.138.85.255 (talk) —Preceding undated comment added 20:31, 19 September 2015 (UTC)[reply]

1. I have re-worded the first part to make the point more clearly. The issue here is a double meaning of the phrase "the nuclear deterrent", which could mean the UK deterrent, or the US deterrent.
2. The second point is rather more interesting, and a book could be written on this. In fact, someone has: Kirsten Stoddart has written Losing an Empire and Finding a Role: Britain, the USA, NATO and Nuclear Weapons, 1964-70. The bottom line is that Wilson and his senior ministers came to regard nuclear weapons as vital to national security, contrary his party policy; and the electorate had endorsed the party's view. So his government secretly spent huge amounts of money on Chevaline. Hawkeye7 (talk) 21:19, 19 September 2015 (UTC)[reply]

Thanks Hawkeye7, appreciated. It is indeed interesting. 86.138.85.255 (talk) 01:03, 20 September 2015 (UTC)[reply]

I feel it is not scholarly neutrality for US, UK, and Israel to have 'nuclear weapons', while Russia, France, India, Pakistan, China, North Korea have 'weapons of mass destruction'. This is in effect political propaganda. I suggest they all have 'nuclear weapons'. Aptos8080 (talk) 23:59, 27 October 2015 (UTC)[reply]

It seems to me you are confusing these countries policy with Wikipedia policy. Reporting on the goals of the various countries does not constitute a biased point of view, regardless of how you consider the fairness of the policies. In particular, wikipedia does not have the mandate (indeed, is forbidden) to push any agenda, including the total-hands-off-other's-nuke-fantasies agenda you would like to see. SkoreKeep (talk) 22:11, 28 October 2015 (UTC)[reply]

Not quite, @Aptos8080:. The key is the definition of WMD. Weapons of mass destruction are nuclear, biological, and chemical. The US and UK have seperate pages for their CW and BW programmes. I don't know about the status of CW and BW in Israel, but they definitely have a nuclear programme. Smaller states such as India, Pakistan, North Korea etc may have BW/CW etc rolled into their all-embracing WMD article. Not clear about France, Russia. I would encourage @SkoreKeep: to maintain WP:AGF and avoid characterising others' views in a way which may be inaccurate (as the WMD definition shows) and violates WP:CIVIL. Regards Buckshot06 (talk) 20:00, 6 November 2015 (UTC)[reply]

There is both a United States and weapons of mass destruction article and a United Kingdom and weapons of mass destruction article. Buckshot06 (talk) 20:08, 6 November 2015 (UTC)[reply]

Hello fellow Wikipedians,

I have just added archive links to one external link on Nuclear weapons and the United Kingdom. Please take a moment to review my edit. If necessary, add ((cbignore)) after the link to keep me from modifying it. Alternatively, you can add ((nobots|deny=InternetArchiveBot)) to keep me off the page altogether. I made the following changes:

• Added archive https://web.archive.org/20060503051954/http://www.sipri.org/contents/expcon/uk.pdf to http://www.sipri.org/contents/expcon/uk.pdf

When you have finished reviewing my changes, please set the checked parameter below to true to let others know.

This message was posted before February 2018. After February 2018, "External links modified" talk page sections are no longer generated or monitored by InternetArchiveBot. No special action is required regarding these talk page notices, other than regular verification using the archive tool instructions below. Editors have permission to delete these "External links modified" talk page sections if they want to de-clutter talk pages, but see the RfC before doing mass systematic removals. This message is updated dynamically through the template ((source check)) (last update: 5 June 2024).

• If you have discovered URLs which were erroneously considered dead by the bot, you can report them with this tool.
• If you found an error with any archives or the URLs themselves, you can fix them with this tool.

Cheers.—^{cyberbot II}_{Talk to my owner:Online} 19:37, 11 January 2016 (UTC)[reply]

I updated the Replacement for Trident section about the new Successor-class submarines (House of Commons vote on 18 July). However, there has been recent discussion of morality and the value of the Trident program. I think the article should be updated to incorporate some of that as well.

For example, see http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/theresa-may-trident-debate-nuclear-bomb-yes-live-latest-news-a7143386.html AND https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/jul/18/theresa-may-takes-aim-at-jeremy-corbyn-over-trident-renewal AND http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jul/17/corbyn-puts-trident-fore-labour-divisions-deepen and https://next.ft.com/content/3b239c2a-4c15-11e6-8172-e39ecd3b86fc Peter K Burian (talk) 16:10, 20 July 2016 (UTC)[reply]

Hello fellow Wikipedians,

I have just modified 3 external links on Nuclear weapons and the United Kingdom. Please take a moment to review my edit. If you have any questions, or need the bot to ignore the links, or the page altogether, please visit this simple FaQ for additional information. I made the following changes:

• Added archive http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20121026065214/http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/65F3D7AC-4340-4119-93A2-20825848E50E/0/sdr1998_complete.pdf to http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/65F3D7AC-4340-4119-93A2-20825848E50E/0/sdr1998_complete.pdf
• Added archive https://web.archive.org/web/20070616151407/http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/White%20Paper%20Nuclear%20Deterrent.pdf to http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/White%20Paper%20Nuclear%20Deterrent.pdf
• Added archive https://web.archive.org/web/20070927193241/http://www.greenpeace.org.uk/contentlookup.cfm?&ucidparam=20061123104513 to http://www.greenpeace.org.uk/contentlookup.cfm?&ucidparam=20061123104513

When you have finished reviewing my changes, you may follow the instructions on the template below to fix any issues with the URLs.

This message was posted before February 2018. After February 2018, "External links modified" talk page sections are no longer generated or monitored by InternetArchiveBot. No special action is required regarding these talk page notices, other than regular verification using the archive tool instructions below. Editors have permission to delete these "External links modified" talk page sections if they want to de-clutter talk pages, but see the RfC before doing mass systematic removals. This message is updated dynamically through the template ((source check)) (last update: 5 June 2024).

• If you have discovered URLs which were erroneously considered dead by the bot, you can report them with this tool.
• If you found an error with any archives or the URLs themselves, you can fix them with this tool.

Cheers.—InternetArchiveBot (Report bug) 02:05, 21 May 2017 (UTC)[reply]

This review is transcluded from Talk:Nuclear weapons and the United Kingdom/GA1. The edit link for this section can be used to add comments to the review.

Reviewer: Nick-D (talk · contribs) 01:16, 5 August 2018 (UTC)[reply]

It's great to see the article on this important topic at GAN. Due to its (justified) size, it might take me a few days to finish the review. Here are my comments:

• "and is one of the five nuclear-weapon states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" - perhaps broaden this to note that it's one of however many countries now have nuclear weapons?
• The lead is focused on British nuclear weapons programs: I'd suggest thinning this out a bit, and adding more on why the British Government has retained nuclear weapons and the underlying doctrine. The controversies around this could also be acknowledged.
• I'd suggest that the "Resumption of independent UK efforts" be broadened to note the reason the British Government decided to re-launch the nuclear weapons program by moving some of the material in the "An independent deterrent" section up. Was this focused specifically on the Soviet Union, or was it part of the efforts to maintain the UK's status as a great power? (or both?)
• "Operation Hurricane was detonated in the frigate HMS Plym" - should this be something like "During Operation Hurricane an atomic bomb was detonated in the frigate HMS Plym"?
• "When the US withdrew its theatre nuclear weapons from Europe, the British government followed suit" - I note this is referenced to a 1987 work, which I suspect pre-dates the withdrawal of the nuclear weapons.
• "The deployment of ships carrying nuclear weapons caused embarrassment during the Falklands War" - I might be wrong, but I think that this wasn't publicly known at the time. It did complicate British operations in the Falklands, as the warheads had to be moved out of frigates and destroyers into aircraft carriers, and then from the carriers to a ammunition ship which sailed them back to the UK. A fair chunk of the RN's nuclear stockpile was also effectively on the wrong side of the world for several months.
• I'd suggest broadening the 'Nuclear tests' section to note the human cost of the tests (the dispossession of the residents of the test ranges in Australia and Christmas Island, the the health affects on those exposed to the above-ground tests).
• While the 'Nuclear defence' section is adequate for GA, I'd suggest expanding this for A-class and higher. The British civil defence program was patchy, but ambitious, and included the construction of command bunkers across the country, evacuation plans for the Queen and sophisticated planning for how the UK would be run after being attacked by nuclear weapons (which included splitting the country between teams of ministers, who would effectively operate as independent governments). Peter Hennessy's book The Secret State covers this in detail, and the U section of the ANU's Chifley Library has quite a few works from the 1980s which go into detail.

Thanks for undertaking to review this. I realise that these top-level articles are hard to review. Each subsection has its own articles, and only a summary is presented here. Take as long as you like to review, but I have to go away at the end of the week, and while I'll still be able to edit, won't have access to my books. If necessary, we can shelf the review at that point.

1. The lead covers the article. I did consider splitting the History section off into its own article. I'll probably put the article up for Peer Review next.
2. I've added a summary of why Britain retains nuclear weapons to the lead: The possession of nuclear weapons is an important component of Britain's national identity.
3. The British government (well, the Cabinet) (well, the GEN.75 Cabinet Subcommittee) resolved to develop nuclear weapons before the Soviet Union was identified as a potential adversary. The key point is Britain's great power status. I thought the quote summed things up fairly well.
4. The 1987 reference is to the Falklands War. Moved it back one sentence. It's interesting to note that this was known in 1987, but there was fuss about it in 2003. "Embarrassment" is the word Grove used; I have have changed it to your word, "complications".
5. I have access to the Chifley library, and can borrow books for up to six months as a staff member. Several were borrowed for this article, including Campbell. Can't spot the book you're referring to in the catalogue though.

   I was thinking of books like these (I think there are some others). Hennessy's is much more recent and likely to be more comprehensive though, but from memory the British media covered his main revelations. Nick-D (talk) 08:48, 5 August 2018 (UTC)[reply]

Hawkeye7 (discuss) 04:56, 5 August 2018 (UTC)[reply]

Further comments

• The 'Anti-nuclear movement' and 'End of cross-party support' sections are more than fine for GA, but as the article is further developed I'd suggest adding material explaining the factors which drive opposition to nuclear weapons in the UK. The results of public polling on the issue would also be useful.

  I'd have to do some more research on this - I hadn't really been too interested in it. I expanded the section in this article on the CND. It seems that the whole ant-nuclear movement took off in the UK in the late 1950s, with the publication of reports on the dangers posed by atmospheric testing. I'm not sure why this struck such a chord in the UK. Hawkeye7 (discuss) 02:32, 8 August 2018 (UTC)[reply]

• I'd suggest noting the extreme vulnerability of the UK to nuclear weapons somewhere as the article is further developed (this would include the 3 minute warning period for attacks from the USSR/Russia and, from memory, UK Government assessments in the 1960s which judged that 10 hydrogen bombs could effectively destroy the country): these at least partly explain why the British have quite different arrangements for the command and control of their nuclear forces than the other nuclear powers, given that it's entirely realistic for the entire command chain to be killed. Nick-D (talk) 11:24, 5 August 2018 (UTC)[reply]

  I remember reading the 10 hydrogen bombs figure somewhere. Reading through Campbell, they actually did quite a good job. Hawkeye7 (discuss) 02:32, 8 August 2018 (UTC)[reply]

@Nick-D: I am back now. When=re is this at. What still needs to be done? Hawkeye7 (discuss) 02:36, 31 August 2018 (UTC)[reply]

I think that this is done. Sorry, I probably should have closed this ages ago. Nick-D (talk) 03:20, 1 September 2018 (UTC)[reply]

GA review – see WP:WIAGA for criteria

1. Is it well written?

   A. The prose is clear and concise, and the spelling and grammar are correct:

   B. It complies with the manual of style guidelines for lead sections, layout, words to watch, fiction, and list incorporation:

2. Is it verifiable with no original research?

   A. It contains a list of all references (sources of information), presented in accordance with the layout style guideline:

   B. All in-line citations are from reliable sources, including those for direct quotations, statistics, published opinion, counter-intuitive or controversial statements that are challenged or likely to be challenged, and contentious material relating to living persons—science-based articles should follow the scientific citation guidelines:

   C. It contains no original research:

   D. It contains no copyright violations nor plagiarism:

3. Is it broad in its coverage?

   A. It addresses the main aspects of the topic:

   B. It stays focused on the topic without going into unnecessary detail (see summary style):

4. Is it neutral?

   It represents viewpoints fairly and without editorial bias, giving due weight to each:

5. Is it stable?

   It does not change significantly from day to day because of an ongoing edit war or content dispute:

6. Is it illustrated, if possible, by images?

   A. Images are tagged with their copyright status, and valid fair use rationales are provided for non-free content:

   B. Images are relevant to the topic, and have suitable captions:

7. Overall:

   Pass or Fail:

There is a move discussion in progress on Talk:France and weapons of mass destruction which affects this page. Please participate on that page and not in this talk page section. Thank you. —RMCD bot 00:31, 6 December 2023 (UTC)[reply]