The term G-Zero refers to an emerging vacuum of power in international politics created by a decline of Western influence and the domestic focus of the governments of developing states.^[1] It is a reference to a perceived shift away from the pre-eminence of the Group of Seven industrialized countries and the expanded Group of Twenty, which includes major emerging powers like China, India, Brazil, Turkey and others.^[2] It is also a rejection of terms like G2, often used to identify a possible strategic partnership between the US and Chinese governments, or G3, which represents an attempt to align US, European and Japanese interests to defend free market democracy from the rise of Chinese-inspired state-dominated capitalism.

Those who argue that G-Zero has become the current international order warn that the G7 has become obsolete, that the G20 offers too many competing visions of the proper role of government in an economy to produce well-coordinated policies, that China has no interest in the responsibilities that come with a G2, and that America, Europe and Japan are too mired in internal problems to forge a common approach to economic and security policy. The term G-Zero was first coined by political scientists Ian Bremmer and David Gordon. ^[3][4]

The concept of G-Zero has been criticized by some who argue that it overstates the decline in America’s political and economic power and underestimates the willingness of developing countries to play a larger role on the international stage.