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Are there any earlier explanations of the problem of evil than that of Epicurus, BCE 341/270: ?Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil? Is he neither able nor willing? Then why call him God???
Interesting article, Larry. I too believe that God is much more interested in our character than our comfort. However, I do find your concept of Natural Evil a bit puzzling. A tornado may be disasterous and horrible, but calling it evil seems a bit strange to me. And where do you draw the line? Does a tornado have to take a life to be evil, or can it simply destroy some property? What if it never touches down - is it still evil? I dunno, I just don't think I buy into this.
Terrible things happen to good people, and these events you call evil. But often these people can overcome these events and eventually become a much better person than they ever would have if the event had never happened. I've seen it happen dozens of times. So was the event really evil, can a thing that is evil result in something that is good? Can it do so if God does not really exist?
The small little community I live in just recently was devistated when three high-school aged girls were killed when the mini-van they were riding swerved off the road and rolled over. There was no alcohol involved, it appears they hit a pothole and lost control of the vehicle. All three girls were very active in their respective churches, we know that they were all Christians. I do not wish to diminish in the least the amount of grief that their families and indeed our entire community went through. But I will say this, that our community pulled together around these families, and absolutely outpoured our love onto them. Hundreds of families got involved in bringing whatever comfort we could to the grieving families, and as a result of their testimonies many kids who were making bad choices for themselves have decided to start making better ones. I'm sorry, but I simply cannot see the pothole as evil.
The premises of the argument seem to have the bent that if God truly existed we would live in a environment where nothing ever went wrong. No one would ever get hurt regardless of the circumstances, and everyone would have enough to eat and drink. Why that does sound a lot like the Garden of Eden, doesn't it? It also sounds a lot like we would have very little freedom there - all of our choices would be between things that were already pre-ordained to be good for us. God never promised us smooth sailing, it simply isn't how the world works anymore. He did, however, promise us comfort in our times of sorrow and I can tell you from personal experience that he does deliver.
--RaviDesai.
Ravi - One of Webster's definitions of the noun "evil" is something that brings sorrow, distress or calamity. That leaves plenty of room for Larry's natural evils. If you read the next to last paragraph of his essay/lecture, you see the outline of your own argument above. You will also see that his conclusion is that the argument claiming that the existence of evil disproves God, fails. A conclusion which you obviously share. In very dry and "clinical" terms, he has actually made the same argument to which you bring a wonderfully huma perspective, above. I think you'll agree his article is not in itself defective, and deserves a careful reading to the end.
AyeSpy, I did read his article carefully, I don't disagree with the result all. It is quite clear to me that we share quite similar views. What I disagreed with is calling a natural phenomenon "evil". However, by your Webster's definition, perhaps I need to recant that. But for me, evil was not the result, but the intent. In other words, you could do evil by intent, even if the result was "good". The reverse also true. Since a tornado cannot show intent, I have a difficult time labelling it evil.
At the beginning of my post I indicated that I agreed with Larry that God is more interested in our Character than in our Comfort. I said I agreed with him because, while he did not use those exact words, that is essentially what the result of his argument is. That which does not kill us outright makes us stronger, and gives us more moral character. In general, this is quite true, as the example I gave indicated as well.
However, I don't think we need to view everything bad that happens to us as something evil that God passed our way in order to grow our moral character.
Just so. One needs to take care to distiguish the moral concept of evil, which implies intent, from the generic evil as a noun, which is basically "something bad." When you look at evil in the dictionary as an adjective, all the value judgement stuff is included.
There are gobs and gobs of different conceptions of even the one Christian God, from person to person and sect to sect. Some will tell you that an anthropomorhic God, possessed of human-style motivations while being omniscient and omnipotent, has the time, attention and resources and what's more the will, to attend to each and every one of His children on earth, map out a specific plan for them, and then watch and judge each individually moment-to-moment as to whether that individual accepts and follows God's plan for his life, or rejects it and strays. Theoretically, those disposed to go along with the program get to heaven. In such a scenario, literally everything which happens to one is directly and literally part of God's plan, and how one responds to the various tests presented help determine his worth as a potential heaven-dweller. For the sake of economy, God could test hundreds or thousands at a time by smiting them with a tornado or a tsunami.
Larry's comments would fall right in line with that conception of God, or a very similar one.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, there is a Christian theory that God is not matter but spirit, and when he created man in his own image, that was a siritual image and man is therefore a soul like unto God. This same God, omniscient and omnipotent, set up a universe full of traps once his children rebelled against him (ate of the fruit of the tree of knowlege of good and evil) and cast them out into it, knowing all the while that only those with a pure soul and loving heart would be able to escape it. Those who valued matter over spirit would be lost forever. His "plan" for salvation was general, not specific to this or that individual. When Man in his conceit strayed too far, He tried wiping them out and starting over with Noah, but material man was still too in love with the world. So, He sent His son (reduntant as all all men are his literal children, born of his will) to remind everyone, "Hey - love one another, and follow the path I set out, or you ain't never gettin' home. There's only one road back to the Father, and you're not on it." Then He went about His divine business, whatever that may be, checking in now and again to see how the kids are doing.
(These are not theories I made up, but I've had both of them preached to me)
Under the second theory, God is "more concerned about our character than our comfort," and has set out signposts to be followed. Those who follow the road get to come home and dwell in the house of the Lord forever. This would be a God who would neither cause nor prevent tornadoes or eathquakes, but whose children would have an infinite variety of opportunities to learn from their lives and either move closer to Him or farther away. In either case he would love them all, and mourn the lost. Larry's argument still works under this scenario, but the literalness with which this or that person is "tested" would no longer apply.
However you believe is up to you, but you can look at Larry's article on its bare merits and then suggest or make changes which retain the arguments but perhaps open the way for a wider range of interpretation of the same Omniscient, Omnipotent, and All-loving God. No?
Hi, Ravi! Thanks for the thoughtful comments! You wrote:
This isn't my concept; it's the way that natural misfortunes are referred to when philosophers and theologians discuss The Problem of Evil. Nothing hangs on our using that word, either. The so-called Problem of Evil is just as bad if you refer to "natural evils" (notice, this can take a plural) as "disasters," "misfortunes," or whatever. If you like, we can call it the Problem of Really Bad Things.
This is one of the options you have in replying to the argument: you are free to deny that natural evil (misfortune, disaster) really is a bad thing. Maybe it's all a good thing and therefore perfectly consistent with God's being all-loving. Regardless of that, I don't see how God's existence would be required to have something good result from pain and suffering.
AyeSpy wrote:
Did I really say that? I shouldn't have, if so.
Ravi replied:
Again, did I really say that (so that you can agree with me)? I thought I was just explaining one point of view, not necessarily expressing my own.
Then AyeSpy:
By all means, Ravi, if you wish to expand any particular point that I've made in the article, go for it. While you do it, however, please be sure to attribute your views to the person or people who hold them, rather than asserting straightforwardly that the views are correct. We want to retain a semblance of lack of bias here. :-)
-- Larry Sanger
"AyeSpy wrote:
If you read the next to last paragraph of his essay/lecture, you see the outline of your own argument above. You will also see that his conclusion is that the argument claiming that the existence of evil disproves God, fails.
Did I really say that? I shouldn't have, if so." -- Larry Sanger
I should put this differently: If you are persuaded, as I am, that premise (5) does not logically fit any known data, then the combination of an all.../all.../all... God is not disproven by the ProblemOfEvil argument, as one of its necessary premises fails. This, in combination with the second-to-last paragraph seem compatible with Ravi's stance, just not as emotionally so.
Obviously, if you believe an all-loving God cannot permit evil, then you must bow to the force of the original argument. But then you would also have to believe that a loving mother could not visit unpleasantness and therefore discipline upon her child, since the child obviously would not find discipline pleasant. A Christian believer already believes, likely, that scripture supports discipline as essential to love. For this reason, It would appear futile for an atheist to attemt to pursuade a Christian with the ProblemOfEvil. He might pursuade non-believers, but then what would be the point? He'd be "preaching to the choir." Heh heh ;^)
Ed, I see your recent edit. Whilst this is interesting information, wouldn't this be a case of the possibility raised under presmise 2 c) - that "God does not want to eliminate evil", the consequences of which are examined under premise 5? IANAPOT (I Am Not A Philosopher Or Theologian :) ), so my interpretation might be horribly wrong. --Robert Merkel
This is a hard question and thus a good question, Robert. As someone who believes a priori that God exists, I see the problem of evil as a struggle to understand why God has permitted it to go on so long. Perhaps I am a bit off-topic, if the article is primarily an argument against the possibility of God's existence.
Anyway, what I meant was: God wants to eliminate evil but is "tolerating" it (as liberals nowadays always request). Meanwhile, He is encouraging us to take responsibility for eliminating it.
Evil, defined (in the UC) as "taking advantage of another person for one's own benefit", may be seen as a kind of immaturity rather than as a force equal and opposite to God. Why do human parents let their children do all sorts of zany and inappropriate things, rather than strictly enforce standards? To answer my own question, it's because excessive strictness restricts human growth. Parents must tolerate their children's immature behavior because that aids their growth to maturity. (Hmm, that sounds paradoxical.)
God, as our Heavenly Parent, likewise tolerates our immaturity.
Now, this may be more a statement of faith than an answer to a philosophical question, but it's the best I can do. Unless you want me to pray about it, then maybe I'll be able to do better! -- User:Ed Poor
my background is in mormonism, which I have always found to deal with classical theological arguments quite differently than other churches. I say this, and make the following comments, not to go off about a (my) specific religion, but to point out several more arguments and counter-arguments and loopholes to "the argument from evil"...
>First, some people, including some Christians, believe that the occurrence of natural evil is a direct result of moral evil. If everyone were to turn from evil, disease, famine, and natural disasters would end. The problem with this proposal is that natural evils often befall virtuous people and leave evildoers unharmed; the entire scene appears distributively unjust.
but at least it moves these "natural evils" into the realm of "moral evils" since they technically would be caused by the bad people; hurting the innocent the same as if the bad people directly harmed the innocent.
>The Unification Church believes that God wants human beings to get rid of evil themselves. According to this premise, then, God does not allow evil so much as He allows us to allow it. When we determine to get rid of it, this will make Him very happy. I'm not sure if any other churches have a similar belief.
mormons believe similarly. human beings cannot progress without real experience. "give a man a fish feed him for a day, teach him how to fish..."
>Some may say that death in and of itself is not evil, since we all must die. The manner in which we die is mostly irrelevant, whether it is by natural disaster or by disease.
this is especially true if one also believes that this earth life is infinitesimally short and that we will literally live again.
>Furthermore, an effective argument can be made against free will forcing humanity to contend with "moral evil".
and >The obvious objection to this is why are we tested? Why are we brought into the world through no choice of our own, only to be put through tests?
this approach completely ignores the mormon and early christian notion that we chose to come here. we in fact sat in council and the details of this life and what we would gain from it were explained to us and we accepted it... such a believe also makes John Rawls' thought experiment, Original Position aka Veil of Ignorance, irrelevant.
>God could have made us perfect and saved us the effort of all these tests. In the end, all the testing proves unnecessary.
again, the mormons believe that the testing is not for god's benefit, but for our own. so that we may know ourselves... even the word test is in fact the wrong word since it implies failure and punishment (similar to suffering, of course we brought it on ourselves...) but that is only one way to look at it. one way that mormons look at it is that this whole process is a sorting process so that we essentially are choosing where we want to go, and that we would not be happy somewhere else (some people would not be happy in heaven...) so this is ultimately just and fair.
>At the very least, one can have free will but physically be prevented from performing the evil, so that the intentions can be noted but not the act which would cause pain to others.
this assumes that there is no significant difference between thought and action. many people believe that that is the critical line that one must not cross. for example, we have no control over many of the thoughts that pop into our minds or are flashed on us by surprise (for which a just god could not condemn us), but it is what we chose to do with those thoughts that matters...
it also assumes that god and man are fundamentally different and that for god to be omnipotent he must not be subjected to any laws, except maybe his own. this is such a strong point of disagreement that some christians feel it defines a border for the christian concept of God. nevertheless, mormons, who basically believe in the judaeo-christian god believe that there is some reason that god cannot just fill our heads with knowledge (that it is by definition, not knowledge if it comes that way -- or in other words, relating to an earlier comment, perfection cannot be attained that way), and that reason is somehow related to that fact that we are like god in some ways. in other words, that some part of our aspect is not created by him and we therefore are not just his "pawns", and that there is some quality of actual material existence that must be experienced in order to be appreciated.
in fact this is a clear mormon teaching: the wicked must be allowed to do their wickedness, to condemn themselves by their actions... (http://scriptures.lds.org/alma/14/8, esp vs. 9-11 a story of an atrocity)
again, my point here is to show that there are a lot of details of doctrine which easily bypass the argument from evil by a wide berth...
from the discussion: >One of Webster's definitions of the noun "evil" is something that brings sorrow, distress or calamity.
but is that the sense in which we should be discussing it. after all, evil can also refer to bad smells, and is that really relevant just because the philosophers chose to use that word? perhaps we should be talking about suffering, not evil. when you look at it that way, a quick look at the buddhist approach to suffering (which millions accept) makes "natural evil" look a lot less "eeeeevil". evil being a very subjective term to begin with can seem to be derived from peoples' reaction to it, which is why i point out the buddhist reaction...
my personal opinion is that the whole argument from evil is superficial and obsolete as an argument against the existence of a judaeo-christian God. Plasticlax (I'm new here, feel free to educate me on proper wikipedia ettiquette...)
I propose to make the following edit as an addition after the last paragraph in the discussion of premise (2) Darist:
Some Christians believe that premise (2) of the argument from evil contains an appeal to arrogance. The arrogance takes two forms. Accordingly, we twice show the argument is fallacious, once for denying necessary attributes of God and once for attributing near omniscience to humans.
If the God described by the Bible exists, then his actions cannot be judged by humans. (The context suggests to Christians that it is the God of the Bible that is being discussed. So, to see why they say God must be above the judgement of humans, see Job 38, Isaiah 55:8-9, Mt 7:1 (if humans cannot judge humans, how much more can they not judge God), Rom 9:14,20, 1 Cor 2:16.)
But, because the premise (2) assumes that God?s actions can be judged by humans, it merely assumes that God does not exist. This is what it is supposed to prove. (A valid argument does not assume what it is supposed to prove.)
So, the evils in the ?argument from evil? are arrogance and circular reasoning. (?Eliminate! Eliminate!?)
Further, there is an unstated assumption in premise (2).
As originally written, premise (2) begins, ?If evil exists in the world, then??
Let?s rewrite the premise to show what was left unstated: ?We humans are smart enough to know what an omniscient, omnipotent, and all-loving God should do about every evil, and we have decided that God should immediately eliminate all evil. Therefore, if evil exists in the world, then??
We submit that this restatement explicitly states what is implicitly required by the original. (The original implicitly asserts that immediate elimination is the right way to handle all evil. But, the argument doesn?t pretend to hear that from God, (also, for counter examples to that possibility, see Exodus 34:6-7 and 2 Peter 3:9-10). So the argument must assume that we know this from a human source. That source has to be sufficiently smart to be able to make that decision.)
Now that we have noticed this previously unstated part of premise (2), we need proof that it is correct before we can accept premise (2). If premise (2) cannot be accepted, the argument does not prove that God does not exist.
So, looking at the previously unstated part, it should be apparent that the real problem with the supposed ?problem of evil? is arrogance. If this is not apparent to you, prove that you are smart enough to know what an omniscient, omnipotent, and all-loving God should do about every evil.
---
Hmm... I (Beoran) think the mormon ideas interesting, but they seem to reduce life to a "great 100% immersive Role Playing Game". Anyway, perhaps they could be included in the pages on Theodicity? Or those of Mormonism?
Another point I want to raise is that the comparison between a "loving god" and a loving parent that Wesly makes does not work always. In several religions and denominations, god is supposed to inflict or at least allow eternal suffering, or spiritual death upon those of his "children" who "fail". If we apply the metaphor in this case, we would have to conclude that a loving parent doesn't need to shield their children from lethal dangers, and that parents may even impose needlessly prolonged, cruel, or even lethal punishments to their children. The case of loving parent being unable to cure the suffering of there child canot be maden, since an omnipotent god /is/ able to remove all suffering.
I think that one who believes in a loving god and in the theodicity of "life as a learning school" must also include some provisions for the "failiures". Reincarnation of the wicked, or a "purification through fire" as seen in Zoroarstrianism are the most viable options here.
I agree with the header text that the article requires further development. But for now I have a comment restricted to part of the 2nd last paragraph, which I feel somewhat misunderstands the Christian viewpoint on natural evil. It currently reads:
First, some people, including some Christians, believe that the occurrence of natural evil is a direct result of moral evil. If everyone were to turn from evil, disease, famine, and natural disasters would end. The problem with this proposal is that natural evils often befall virtuous people and leave evildoers unharmed; the entire scene appears distributively unjust.
True, the Christian viewpoint is that natural evil results from moral evil ("Cursed is the ground because of you" - Genesis 3:17), but never claims that this will be such as to effect distributive justice in this world (e.g. Luke 13:4-5), but rather that creation in general is currently in a state of "groaning" (Romans 8:22), and that justice will be perfected when Jesus comes to judge (e.g. Revelation 22:12).
Will change accordingly.
--Trainspotter 12:46, 31 Jul 2003 (UTC)
To turn the argument around:
Hi.....Mr blah you are taking on the opinion of St. Augustine who believes that Suffering is the consequence of free will.
I am a protest atheist and cannot believe that a god would give us a free will knowing the consequences.
God did not create evil, and therefore is not responsible for it. What God did create was man, with free will. It was man, armed with his free will that created evil, and it is man that is responsible for it.
Also if you believe in God you believe in Satan/the devilwhich means that good and evil balance out —Preceding unsigned comment added by 85.210.184.32 (talk • contribs)
Mel -
You are very unclear as to why you are making so many edits, especially deletions. Could we get some substantial justification? Infinity0 and I are trying to compromise and work together to make some good articles. Why not join the effort of construction rather than destruction?
By the way everyone, Mel Etitis is doing this same thing to other articles, including the Philosophy of Religion article on Wikipedia.
68.6.99.244 04:42, 18 October 2005 (UTC)
Mel Etitis, what exactly do you not understand about the current revision?? Everything is on there which was on the version YOU understand, plus a little extra which describes the format of the argument, and a few reworked arguments. Infinity0 20:04, 15 October 2005 (UTC)
Just wanted to thank Infinity0 for defending improvement rather than mass deletion of article content additions. Mel Etitis has been doing some massive, pompous deletion without sufficient justification. Be advised.
68.6.99.244 06:15, 14 October 2005 (UTC)
Why are there separate articles on the "The Problem of evil", "Theodicy", and "Free Will and the Problem of Evil"? Maybe these sections of the encyclopedia should be written with some kind of coherent article structure, instead of everybody's little, overlapping, essays on various topics.
Would anyone mind if I simply folded this material into the fuller article, Free will and the problem of evil ? This page then could b turned into a redirect. The two articles are essentially the same topic. RK 19:44, 19 Aug 2003 (UTC)
The entire article is silly since "evil" is a religious term for a variety of things more appropriately described by other terms. "Moral evil" is worse, since the person engaged in it often (if not always) perceives the same action as "good." Then it degenerates into assuming free will exists in the absolute sense, not just the obfuscatory sense used by "compatibilists", which is equivalent to "freedom" and is not relevant to discussions of ultimate choice. The example of rape represents a violation of freedom, not of free will; if free will existed, it could not be violated. Fairandbalanced 23:41, 12 Sep 2003 (UTC)
I merged the theodicy article in. This reduced the coherence of the article, but at least we have started to consolidate this material. 66.82.112.10 16:53, 30 Aug 2003 (UTC)
This argument is weak:
Why? The writer seems to missuse the term "will" to mean "destiny". Despite the freedom the victim has to not wanting to be raped, he can suffer from it against her will.
This rather misses the point. When we ask why on earth God allows all this evil, it's rather unsatisfactory to say "well, he's politely asked us all to be good - what more do you want him to do?" --Evercat 22:36, 4 Oct 2003 (UTC)
I am deleting that since it is irrelevant to this section. Also clarifying that free will is an unverified assertion. Attempted to tighten up some other parts without significantly changing the meaning. Fairandbalanced 03:54, 5 Oct 2003 (UTC)
Moved to talk since I have absolutely no idea what this means:
But that argument fails because it assumes an identity between the beings in this world and God. For God to be indicted on this charge He would have had to have been capable of making a world with Himself identically reproduced in it. But He is one and indivisible, so per Plantiga's reasoning, He can't do that. His omnipotence is not impugned and the argument falls.
Huh? Why does the argument assume God has to create a clone of himself? Evercat 21:32, 19 Nov 2003 (UTC)
"Karma's not a normal response from religions that are vulnerable to the PoE. Moving it to a less prominent position." (user:evercat, edit note) I'd like some explanation of what you mean by this. Are you saying that believers in karma are "invulnerable" to the problem of evil argument? If so, I think the deserves a particularly prominant place in this article :) Jack 19:41, 30 Jan 2004 (UTC)
Sanathana Dharma / Brahman Hinduism? Also, Karma is perfectly compatable w all faiths, Christianity included. I know of may christians who interpret "as you sow, so shall you reap" as karma. I agree it is not a "typical response" but it is a valid one. It appears that you agree w me that karma is a solid answer to PoE? If so, this deserves alot more attention, not a cover up. Jack 02:32, 31 Jan 2004 (UTC)
I direct you to [1]. I'm sorry if the word "cover up" came across harshly, but I feel this is an area which has been covered up (not necessarilly by you! :) and is consistantly glossed over. Reincarnation is probably necessary in order for karma to be an answer to the PoE, but reincarnation is generally seen as a byproduct of Karma. Its not easy to understand how Karma could work w/o it. Anyways, I plan to write more on this subject, and I do not agree that it must be relagated to a lower position due it's unconventional nature in western debate of this concept. You may want to look into Brahman if you have any confusion about the Hindu God. Jack 04:27, 1 Feb 2004 (UTC)
"Some atheists believe that the problem of evil can be used to prove that God does not exist by the method of reductio ad absurdum. "
I was about to remove it, but I figured I should hear any evidence for, or explanation of this. It seems absurd to me ;) Sam Spade 05:50, 20 Feb 2004 (UTC)
Wow, that really wasn't ment to stand up to scrutiny, was it? Ok, I accept your evidence. I put in a disclaimer about lack of imagination. Sam Spade 08:12, 20 Feb 2004 (UTC)
What is the problem with evil? God is God. Is it so hard to accept that his existence is beyond good and evil, beyond our understanding of certain issues ie: if evil exist then God doesn't because God is supposed to be all good?
Good and evil are attributes of human nature/understanding of what they mean in relationship to one another (to good and evil) and to our existence. They are nothing more than experiences for our understanding of life. How we choose to apply, understand or experience it is up to us.
Certainly good or evil can not be used to validate or invalidate God's existence. It is not a mean for us to use individually or in conjunction with any other thing to prove or disprove God's existence. God's existence is unlimited and without bound in any and every direction. "Good and evil" have already limited God to within our scope of understanding or what we want God to be. God would not and could not be God if his existence requires our validation or understanding.
It is by choice not by logic that one will begin to understand God or know God exist. It is a given, that God exist, whether we choose to accept this or not.
Say Yang
One might note the problem of Adam and Eve eating from the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil, and thus their loss of innocence leading to the fall. That might be one point of analysis for the user beginning this particular subject.
Yes, it's a very touchy subject. But I just reason: Parents can influence a child greatly, perhaps for the better. Parents can keep children from doing bad things. (Just bear with me :)) But some decide not to so that they can learn for themselves that doing bad things is... bad. I think it's just the same as with God. We're the children, he's the parent. He doesn't want to be such a control freak that we try to kill ourselves because our lives are being controlled. Of course, he could make us fail, but then we would just be more depressed. So he just hopes we'll figure it out on our own. 1337 r0XX0r 14:35, 21 February 2006 (UTC)
The point of the problem of evil isn't to say no god exists just that an all loving, all knowing , all powerful god doesn't exist. The problem of evil allows for an all loving god, as long as 'he' is not all powerful or all knowing. It allows for an all knowing god as long as 'he' is not all powerful or all loving. Finally it allows for an all powerful god as long as 'he' is not all knowing or all loving.Your god as parent could be seen as all loving, but without the power or the knowledge to help us. -- SamuellusSoccus 19:54, 24 February 2006 (UTC)
"But Plantinga reminds us that there are always trivial limits on omnipotence -- God can't make 2+2=5 or create a married bachelor."
This means God is not omnipotent. If the evil demon of Descartes can deceive us about logic in such a way, making married bachelors possible, why can't God do it? It seems absurd that some demon is more powerful than God...
But surely there is a false argument here: the definition of bachelor is someone who is not married.
There's more than one definition of omnipotence, and the married bachelor style of paradox only poses a problem using the least refined definition. Take a look at the page on the omnipotence paradox here - it's got a fantastic overview of the problem. 195.97.248.74 11:06, 14 September 2006 (UTC)
Shouldn't the article list both forms of the "problem of evil" -- ontological and epistemological? Right now there is only the ontological problem listed under the definition: God is all good / powerful, evil exists, therefore God is either not all good / powerful, or evil doesn't exist. But there is also an epistemological form of the problem: the existence of evil would make it impossible to know that God is all good (on the basis of experience alone), evil exists, therefore one cannot know that God is all good. The epistemological form of the problem is not very strong against 'revealed' religions, which claim to have knowledge of God's Omnibenevolence by direct revelation rather than by an inductive survey of human experience, but it is still a distinct form of the problem and probably merits some mention.
A wise man once said, "I think therefore I am". Simply put, "I exist because I am aware that I exist". Logic also dictates that, "If something can exist, then it does exist". The existence of that "something" in a physical or imaginary state is irrelevant. Existence is existence. For example, a fantasy exists in dreams in the mind. They are not physical, but they are still in existence; and are happening. Existence is a state of awareness. Yet at the same time, it is possible to be unaware that you exist and still be in existence. For example, a baby exists but doesn't perceive their own existence due to a lack of maturity. Omnipotence is (1.)the ability to do anything. (2.)The state of being all powerful. This ability is generally attributed to deities. "If it is possible to do anything, then it is possible to create anything; including a reality where absolutely everything can exist. Even creations who could resist their creator". One of the most asked questions by many is, "If an omnipotent being could make another being with the ability to resist their control, would they"? "And if so, why"? Many Gods of many faiths and fictions have varying rationales behind their actions. The God of the Christian faith gave his creations the freedom to choose not to serve his commands. Abstract arguments abound as to why this was done. The most accepted explanation is that God is a deity who has chosen to take on the attributes of good and love as defining characteristics of his nature. So much so in fact, that he can become the physical manifestion of these attributes. It would be logical that a God with such a character would prefer to have servants that obey because they have made a conscience choice to do so. It is also Logical that their would be creations that would choose just the opposite. The bible teaches that God has chosen to exist in a constant state of self denial towards anything that is of a negative state. It also teaches that his creations can exist in this same state of being when they are with him. If God is good incarnate and hince pleasurable to be around, then to exist in a state without him is to exist in evil and suffering. The next question is, "Why give these servants free will"? One logical explanation is that an omnipotent and omniscient being knows that just because you can be evil doesn't mean you will be. That being said, it is then logical that a reality in which good and evil co-existing in the same state with a God of such a nature can indeed exist. It is also logical that for an omnipotent being, a reality can be created where all its inhabitants exist in an infinite positive state. "If God is a creator of everything, did he create the Devil?" According to the logic above the answer could be considered an affirmative. God created beings that eventually chose to challenge him. But because these being had a choice to co-exist with him, it can then be argued that they were self made creations; hince God's involvement in their creation is an indirect result of his nature. "If a Good God can exist, then an Evil God can as also". Christanity calls this God "Lucifer, the evil one". The co-existence of a good diety and evil diety is logical in a world where all things can exist. An omnipotent being though can create realites where there exists only good and only evil. According to the bible, this will be the end result for the current conjoined reality will be replaced with the two separated forms of existence. The current will only exist as a memory in the minds of the inhabitants of the afermentioned. Cross reference Alternate Reality, Omniscience, Omnipresence and Parallel Dimension. References to these topics can also be found in such pop culture media as the Matrix Trilogy. I suggest cross referencing with other religions and their idealogies on Good and Evil; as well as thier thoughts on Heaven and Hell.
I've seen some crappy presentations but that takes the cake. It's like 1 line. There's a whole nice logical presentation that only takes a few lines.
Responses.
Seen some better presentations, for the formal logic argument. This one here is off the top of my head and I'm sleepy. So it's kinda weak. Tatarize 13:10, 23 Nov 2004 (UTC)
You are assuming that things can be created and destroyed. This violates the laws of thermodynamics. Also, you assume that God isn't good and evil combined (God = All), and that evil isn't necessary. I would say that without evil, good would have alot less meaning, that evil is the lack of, or distance from, God. [[User:Sam Spade|Sam Spade Arb Com election]] 18:50, 23 Nov 2004 (UTC)
You've entirely forgotten to directly mention the convention of "Free will". God chose to give us free will (according to believers, of which I am one), so therefore he cannot interfere with that.
apart from this article, we have
I know this was already discussed above. But it seems to have gotten worse instead of better. These articles are all about the same topic, and there shouldn't be so many of them...
Also, into which of them would I include the observation that mention of the problem is probably first attested (and not resolved) in Psalm 14,1
dab (ᛏ) 17:34, 20 Dec 2004 (UTC)
Yes, now that I have an id, I'll point out that I'm the anon who made this point at the beginning of the Talk page, way back in summer 2003. I also tried in August 2003 to rewrite this page and merge Theodicy, although some time after I wandered off, this seems to have been undone. It seems to have only gotten worse since then, and someone has then merged stuff the other way into Theodicy. Or maybe it was already worse only I didn't realize it. Why don't we plan how to merge all these articles? Does anyone think there is a good reason for them to be separate? --BM 20:39, 21 Dec 2004 (UTC)
This afternoon, I made a start on merging. Logical and evidential arguments from evil was redirected to theodicy, and its content appended to the theodicy article. This is not ideal, but I didn't want to lose the content. I shortened this article (that is, The problem of evil) somewhat to make it an overview, and appended the content of Epicurean paradox here, after redirecting that article. Also, I renamed Eutheism and dystheism to Eutheism, dystheism, and maltheism, and merged the Maltheism in as a (too long) final section. For the moment, it is a separate article, but my feeling is that it should also eventually be discussed in the one article on this general topic, and that the eutheism, dystheism, and maltheism material should be much reduced.
So, we are down to a three articles at present. Now, does anyone have any thoughts on which article should be the final target of merges, theodicy or The problem of evil. I lean somewhat towards theodicy, with the the problem of evil becoming a redirect. --BM 23:17, 21 Dec 2004 (UTC)
Franc28: the passage, originally placed in the article by an anon, that you've replaced is original research, with no citations or reference, and is both poorly written and poorly argued. Why do you think that it should remain? Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 21:11, 6 May 2005 (UTC)
But that's not the point — there's a difference between a contradiction internal to religious belief and a contradiction between religious belief and the independent, objective facts. Philosophy is interested in the latter, but not so much in the former, which is the province of theology. Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 17:51, 7 May 2005 (UTC)
But that's hardly a standard or widespread view among non-believers or believers (the TANG reference doesn't really back it up, either). The fact remains that, whether one is a religious believer or not, one is faced with moral and natural, physical and metaphysical evil; one isn't faced with the reality of hell even if one is a believer — at most one believes that it exists. That is, belief in hell – and thus the problem of hell – is internal to and depends upon religious belief, while belief in evil – and thus the the problem of evil – isn't. Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 22:25, 7 May 2005 (UTC)
Well, first, the interpretation of evil and being faced with are two very different things. Secondly, you're still ignoring the central distinction. Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 11:31, 22 May 2005 (UTC)
Shouldn't this page be moved?? This has been suggested already for a related page The problem of Hell, and so it would follow that it should be done for this page too if it applies to the other page.
I've just removed this extended personal essay from this article and Theodicy, but copied it to the Talk pages because some of it could be incorporated into the articles:
One Solution in Modern Philosophy
One solution to the conclusion that evil provides a basis for the rejection of the existence of a theistic God that can be found in modern philosophy runs as follows. Nelson Pike in his essay entitled Hume on Evil makes an extremely incisive observation, namely that the ‘Problem of Evil’, as it is normally posited, is a poorly formulated. He asserts that in fact the Epicurian statement is not in fact logically inconsistent; and therefore that it is not inconceivable that evil could exist alongside the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient and benevolent deity. Pike gives the example of a parents giving a child a bitter medicine in order to better the health as an instance where it could be conceived that the child’s suffering (and therefore by analogy ‘evil’) could be understood as morally justifiable. Therefore rendering the ‘evil’ itself viable for a benevolent God on account of the fact that this benevolence is in fact maintained in the long run, if it could be asserted that there was a morally sufficient reason for this evil to have come about. The Epicurian formulation (or in Pike’s case, Hume’s restatement of it) thus needs to have a further premise added to it in order for it to be set of logically inconsistent. This Pike concludes is that a being who is omnipotent and omniscient would have no morally sufficient reason for allowing instances of evil. The newly understood problem would thus read.
(I) The world is a creation of a God who is omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good.
(II) The world contains evil.
(III) A Being who is omnipotent and omniscient would have no morally sufficient reason for allowing instances of evil.
These three statements, when held together, Pike concludes are logically inconsistent. Furthermore if one of the premises is removed then the other to can be held to be true. Pike therefore importantly asserts that in order for the problem of evil to really pose a threat to the theist (who presumably accepts (I) and (II)) then it will be necessary to prove the veracity of (III). Pike attests, however, that since (III) is seemingly impossible to prove for certain (given the limitations of our understanding of moral sufficiency at a cosmic level) so the problem of evil therefore ceases to become a real problem for the theist, who accepts on principle the first two statements. The problem of evil is therefore handed over to the atheist who is conscripted to prove the validity of (III) in order to attack the theistic position.
Although this is only one answer to this problem, and it has found its own critics, it is seemingly quite a robust solution which is at least able to allow for an agnostic verification. In order to understand the question entirely it is therefore necessary to take account of the numerous so-called 'solutions' to this problem. For there exists a great number of variants of the problem of evil, including inductive variants, logical variants, evidential variants, soteriological variants, arguments from natural law, pain and pleasure, and so on. Many of these are discussed in the Wikipedia article on Theodicy.
Other Extended Perspectives
What do other editors think? Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 11:21, 22 May 2005 (UTC)
I've just reverted a very large-scale edit by LukeH. Some of it might go back, but much is, I think, not really salvageable. For example, he seems to miss the reductio nature of the argument in many of its forms, and so thinks that it fails because it starts with the premise that god is omnipotent, omniscient, etc., and then concludes that there is no such being.
It wasn't just a matter of adding a chunk of text — if it had been, I'd have brought it here instead of revrting it, but editors can find it in the history easily enough. Any comments? Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 22:15, 29 May 2005 (UTC)
LukeH 05:21, 30 May 2005 (UTC):
Either I misrepresented the point I was trying to make, or what I wrote was somehow misread by Mel Etitis. My comments did not "conclude that there is no such being". All my changes were intended to put the rebuttals under one heading (separating the argument from the rebuttal, which is why I moved one of the original paragraphs up), and I then added several further points. It is possible there were inconsistencies between what I added and the original points of the arguments -- but this is the point of a rebuttal. I did not conclude anything about the existence of God, I merely showed that the current arguments in this article are incomplete to prove the inexistence of God. This is an important point, and I feel the article is not complete without it.
The main points I added were that:
I feel that both sides of the argument need to be fully represented. Suggestions describing reasonable changes to these arguments are welcome. Rebuttals existed in the article before, but were not explained in great depth. Any rational argument ought to stand up to scrutiny, and I simply added an analysis of the logical structure of the arguments that were previously presented, and attempted to illustrate internal inconsistencies in the arguments. The argument and rebuttal were clearly separated so that the two viewpoints would not be confused within the article.
I would like to respectfully un-revert the changes. Please add comments here as to suggested content changes. Thanks!
Further comments from LukeH 05:34, 30 May 2005 (UTC):
In order to be reasonable about the un-revert, I wanted to be sure I understood where you were coming from. I believe you read the phrase "If evil did not exist, would there be such a thing as good?" as "If evil did not exist, would there be such a thing as God?". That is not what I wrote and is not the intent. Undoing the revert.
You're right, I misread your comments. Sorry for the confusion, and thanks for taking the time to clarify further.
I'd be happy with the article if it made one thing clear, which is the primary thing I take issue with, as it appears logically incomplete to me.
There is a gap in the line of reasoning that is presented in the argument that starts with God's perfection and concludes that there is no god. It shouldn't be "filled in" if the gap exists in the standing argument; it just needs to be addressed in the "Responses to the problem" section. It is simply that the unjustified assumption is made that if a perfect God exists and evil exists, and God could destroy evil, then "obviously" He would destroy evil, so therefore there can be no God. You cannot imply that God would destroy evil if He could -- there may be a higher purpose in the existence of evil, which is beyond our mortal capability to comprehend. Agency and justice factor into this. This is a point I tried to make in my commits.
Hardly original research, since it is commonly acknowledged (and almost certainly does not need sourcing) that mankind recognizes his non-omniscience, and that most beliefs of God attribute God with omniscience. If God is omniscient, how can we really know why He does anything that doesn't seem logical to us? (There are an awful lot of things attributed to God, even by prophets that claim to worship that God and communicate with Him, that simply don't make sense to the mortal mind.) The fact we do not fully comprehend God does not necessarily mean He does not exist; simply that we don't understand how or why He (or anything else that He created or apparently allowed to come into existence) exists.
One other comment -- at least according to various Christian (and some non-Christian) beliefs, God has said that He will destroy evil, just not yet :-) --LukeH 17:37, 30 May 2005 (UTC).
Hi, BigD. When it comes to refuting these deities, I find it simpler and more effective to bring up "the problem of suffering" rather than the problem of "evil" per se. Especially when it comes to diseases like cancer. IE "Why would an omnibenevolent god allow those who worship him to be afflicted with hideous random diseases?". For "evil" they turn to the unscientific but commonly-accepted Free Will model of human behaviour (or even moral relativism in some bizarre arguments). I haven't yet met a Christian or Muslim who has been able to convincingly address the problem of random suffering when believing in a perfectly compassionate god. They usually address this by not addressing it, and continue on with the belief system regardless. Thanks for input.--Neural 15:15, 13 July 2005 (UTC)
I've removed a couple of links (one repeated with two different descriptions) placed by an inveterate link-adding Christo-Creationist apologist. If there's anything important in the documents linked to, it should be placed in the article. --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 08:21, 28 July 2005 (UTC)
I've just reverted a transformation of the summary into this:
Some of the new material points to additions that certainly could be made to the article (though the summary isn't the right place), but there are two big problems. First, the format: text should be preferred to numbered or bulletted lists (even if formatted correctly). Secondly, the content: it's oversimplified, to say the least.
Any comments? --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 18:33, 4 August 2005 (UTC)
There are still problems with the format - points referred to as a, b and c are now numbered 1, 2 and 3. Is it possible to have lists with 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 or similar? TheMadBaron 04:48, 10 September 2005 (UTC)