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The strong programme or strong sociology is a variety of the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) particularly associated with David Bloor,[1] Barry Barnes, Harry Collins, Donald A. MacKenzie,[2] and John Henry. The strong programme's influence on science and technology studies is credited as being unparalleled (Latour 1999). The largely Edinburgh-based school of thought aims to illustrate how the existence of a scientific community, bound together by allegiance to a shared paradigm, is a prerequisite for normal scientific activity.

The strong programme is a reaction against "weak" sociologies of science, which restricted the application of sociology to "failed" or "false" theories, such as phrenology. Failed theories would be explained by citing the researchers' biases, such as covert political or economic interests. Sociology would be only marginally relevant to successful theories, which succeeded because they had revealed a fact of nature. The strong programme proposed that both "true" and "false" scientific theories should be treated the same way. Both are caused by social factors or conditions, such as cultural context and self-interest. All human knowledge, as something that exists in the human cognition, must contain some social components in its formation process.


As formulated by David Bloor,[3] the strong programme has four indispensable components:

  1. Causality: it examines the conditions (psychological, social, and cultural) that bring about claims to a certain kind of knowledge.
  2. Impartiality: it examines successful as well as unsuccessful knowledge claims.
  3. Symmetry: the same types of explanations are used for successful and unsuccessful knowledge claims alike.
  4. Reflexivity: it must be applicable to sociology itself.


Because the strong programme originated at the 'Science Studies Unit,' University of Edinburgh, it is sometimes termed the Edinburgh School. However, there is also a Bath School associated with Harry Collins that makes similar proposals. In contrast to the Edinburgh School, which emphasizes historical approaches, the Bath School emphasizes microsocial studies of laboratories and experiments.[4] The Bath school, however, does depart from the strong programme on some fundamental issues. In the social construction of technology (SCOT) approach developed by Collins' student Trevor Pinch, as well as by the Dutch sociologist Wiebe Bijker, the strong programme was extended to technology. There are SSK-influenced scholars working in science and technology studies programs throughout the world.[5]


In order to study scientific knowledge from a sociological point of view, the strong programme has adhered to a form of radical relativism. In other words, it argues that – in the social study of institutionalised beliefs about "truth" – it would be unwise to use "truth" as an explanatory resource. To do so would (according to the relativist view) include the answer as part of the question (Barnes 1992), and propound a "whiggish" approach towards the study of history – a narrative of human history as an inevitable march towards truth and enlightenment. Alan Sokal has criticised radical relativism as part of the science wars, on the basis that such an understanding will lead inevitably towards solipsism and postmodernism. Markus Seidel attacks the main arguments – underdetermination and norm-circularity – provided by Strong Programme proponents for their relativism.[6] It has also been argued that the strong programme has incited climate denial.[7]


  1. ^ David Bloor, "The strengths of the strong programme." Scientific rationality: The sociological turn (Springer Netherlands, 1984) pp. 75-94.
  2. ^ Donald MacKenzie, "Notes on the science and social relations debate." Capital & Class 5.2 (1981): 47-60.
  3. ^ David Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery (1976)
  4. ^ Harry M. Collins, "Introduction: Stages in the empirical programme of relativism." Social studies of science (1981): 3-10. in JSTOR
  5. ^ Wiebe E. Bijker, et al. The social construction of technological systems: New directions in the sociology and history of technology (MIT press, 2012)
  6. ^ Markus Seidel Epistemic Relativism. A Constructive Critique, 2014, Palgrave Macmillan
  7. ^ Hansson, Sven Ove (29 August 2020). "Social constructionism and climate science denial". European Journal for Philosophy of Science. 10 (3): 37. doi:10.1007/s13194-020-00305-w. ISSN 1879-4920.

See also