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In working to finish this, I've started a complete rewrite of this article here. Feel free to lend a hand if you have the time, but I ask that you only do so if you have access to reliable sources—this article will eventually go to FAC and we don't need to spend time redoing things because they weren't properly sourced the first time. Though based on the response I got when I overhauled Bismarck class battleship, I doubt this will generate much of anything... Parsecboy (talk) 21:27, 11 January 2011 (UTC)
I am just curious. I remembered reading in Otto Busch that the Scharnhorst had as motto "Scharnhorst voran" and so I put that in (initially incorrect). Why was it taken out? Hpvpp (talk) 09:38, 13 January 2011 (UTC)
not sure how to add an nopther issue but have several, the article states the oiltanker and passneger boat were sunk by the ugly isters they werent tha was the estroyer escort that aprted company with the scharnhorst according to the gemran footage , the sruvivors being taken aboard fom the tanker onto the admiral hipper, the film claerly states this, the original german narration and footage are in direct conflict with the article.
"Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had reached a point north-west of Lofoten, Norway, by 12:00 on 9 June. The two ships then turned west for 24 hours while temporary repairs were effected. After a day of steaming west, the ships turned south and rendezvoused with Admiral Hipper on 12 April. An RAF patrol aircraft spotted the three ships that day, which prompted an air attack. The German warships were protected by poor visibility, however, and the three ships safely reached port later that day. Scharnhorst returned to Germany, and was repaired at the Deutsche Werke in Kiel. During the repair process, the aircraft catapult that had been installed on the rear gun turret was removed.[19]
The two ships left Wilhelmshaven on 4 June to return to Norway. They were joined by Admiral Hipper and four destroyers.[20] The purpose of the sortie was to interrupt Allied efforts to resupply the Norwegians and to relieve the pressure on German troops fighting in Norway.[19] On 7 June, the squadron rendezvoused with the tanker Dithmarschen to refuel Admiral Hipper and the four destroyers. The next day, a British corvette was discovered and sunk, along with the oil tanker Oil Pioneer. The Germans then launched their Arado 196 float planes to search for more Allied vessels. Admiral Hipper and the destroyers were sent to destroy Orama, a 19,500 long tons (19,800 t) passenger ship, while Atlantis, a hospital ship, was allowed to proceed unmolested. Admiral Marschall detached Admiral Hipper and the four destroyers to refuel in Trondheim, while he would steam to the Harstad area.[20]"
and this bit? all of a sudden the 9th of june comes and there is an attack? a day after the sinking of the glorious? the 6th and 7th are the sinkings of the oil tanker and the passenger ship are mentioned as simulatneous to the battle for the glorious.
the ugly sisters are "released on a special mission" accoring to the film from the hipper and the destroyers...
was it really that chance a meeting? they were scouting the area for the norwegian retreat, the vents onto he scharnhrt leading up to the sighting of glorious are interesting... the intercepted battle orders that wer heard at bletchley but not decoded? what did they say excatly? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 149.254.49.133 (talk) 18:17, 3 August 2015 (UTC)
The Gneisenau has some external links so why not the Scharnhorst? I think this website should be mentioned http://www.scharnhorst-class.dk/index.html and http://wn.com/Die_Deutsche_Wochenschau has archival footage. Hpvpp (talk) 21:26, 14 January 2011 (UTC)
And so I learned something new. Thanks, Parsecboy & Toddy. Hpvpp (talk) 20:53, 3 February 2011 (UTC)
Scharnhorst and Gneisenau have been referred to as the "ugly sisters" according to many sources on the web. Even if no good source can be found it still should be mentioned. One of the videos on http://wn.com/Die_Deutsche_Wochenschau actually has an overprint with those words. Hpvpp (talk) 23:40, 14 January 2011 (UTC)
Is this a fault or just confusingly written?
Was 18:26 before the six minutes after opening fire? Then why is it metioned afterwards?--WerWil (talk) 23:34, 19 May 2011 (UTC)
I came to ask the same thing. It says:
"At 17:45, the German battleships spotted the British aircraft carrier Glorious and two escorting destroyers, Ardent and Acasta, at a range of some 50,000 m (55,000 yd). Scharnhorst was closer and therefore fired first.[21] Six minutes after opening fire, Scharnhorst scored a hit at a range of 24,100 m (26,400 yd). The shell struck the carrier's upper hangar and started a large fire. Less than ten minutes later, a shell from Gneisenau struck the bridge and killed Glorious 's captain.[22] The two destroyers attempted to cover Glorious with smoke screens, but the German battleships could track the carrier with their radar. By 18:26 the range had fallen to 25,600 m (28,000 yd), and Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were firing full salvos at the carrier"
It seems to imply that she first started firing at 24,000 yards, yet later the "range had closed to 28,000 yards". It's either wrong, or confusingly written. If it's correct, the bit about the range being closed to 28,000 yards and beginning to fire full salvos ought to precede the part where she makes a hit at 26,000 yards. It seems to be saying that they began firing with less than full salvos, and managed to score deadly hits, and later got closer and began with full salvos, yet the numbers don't add up. If they're right, it ought to say that they started at 55,000, closed to 28,000, began to fire full salvos, and at 26,000, scored the hits..45Colt 08:47, 14 November 2015 (UTC)
An image used in this article, File:HMS Glorious last picture.jpg, has been nominated for deletion at Wikimedia Commons in the following category: Deletion requests July 2011
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I know I've read of numerous other ships that were repeatedly damaged in action, but the frequency with which the Scharnhorst was damaged and forced to dock for repairs (both by enemy action and by weather) seems remarkable. Seems I recall the Gneisenau suffering similarly. Not sure whether I'd call that lucky or unlucky, but I'd be interested to see how the numbers compare to other ships. How many other naval vessels were subjected to enemy attack, injured, repaired and returned to be damaged again with such frequency? It's also curious that some of the secondary damage mentioned (turrets jammed by mine explosions, etc) seems to be excessive; I've read of other ships hitting mines, being hit by AP bombs, etc, and basically shrugging the damage off (relatively speaking). Yet it happened a number of times to the Scharnhorst. Not to mention that she seems to end up "a meter down" in the water on 4-5 occasions. Is that a symptom of her relatively light weight and protection, mere bad luck, or was flawed engineering a factor? Or was it just because she was one of only a few heavy German surface vessels, and so was unusually heavily engaged, and therefore took an unusual brunt of the enemies wrath?.45Colt 09:15, 14 November 2015 (UTC)
In the article: "With only turret Caesar operational, all available men were sent to retrieve ammunition from the forward turrets to keep the last heavy guns supplied[63]" - I cannot believe that it is possible to retrieve ammunition weighing some 100s of pounds and carrying it inside a ship along a distance of 200 feet which is under constant fire! This can only be pure fiction or a bad translation! 84.155.58.33 (talk)
The raid on the Scharnhorst on 24 July 1941 is described in the wartime book Tail Gunner by R C Rivaz. Whilst wartime security makes the book a less than complete account of the attack, the aircraft are undoubtedly Halifax's. A website[1] whose provenance I am not able to establish gives a fuller account, confirming the story in the book.
A quality confirming source appears to be needed for this point. ThoughtIdRetired (talk) 23:20, 31 December 2016 (UTC)
References
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Looking at Garzke and Dulin (pg 159) they are both right and wrong: they say that the aircraft were Halifax Bombers, but say they were from several squadrons. I am satisfied from other sources that there were 9 aircraft from 35 squadron and 6 from 76 squadron involved in this raid - so "several" is a bit misleading. I think the other aircraft types that were shown in the article until recently are an example of how someone can sneak in a change that does not match a source - and it just stays there until challenged. I am sure some deep philosophical comment about the way Wikipedia works is appropriate - but fortunately words escape me.
Just spotted that this error arrived on 12 Jan 2011 when a lot of editing was done "outside" of the article. ThoughtIdRetired (talk) 20:55, 14 January 2017 (UTC)
The account of the action with Ardent, Acasta and Glorious seems to have combined times from 2 sources which report this action based on different time zones. The start of the action is listed as 1745 with the initial sighting. The cited source, Garzke & Dulin, gives this time as 1645 and this is confirmed by Koop and Schmolke.[1]
It is accepted that the discrepancy might be, for instance, due to an adjustment by an editor to GMT (or some other time zone). However, the torpedo hit is timed at 1839 in the article, citing Garzke & Dulin, and this matches the source (and also Koop and Schmolke). So if an adjustment to time zone has been made, it has not been done consistently.
It is possible that the confusion on times is the source of the problems with ranges, as shown in the "Confusion" section shown above.
It appears that this part of the article needs to be re-researched and rewritten. (Perhaps also solving the problem that the account is difficult to follow, even with the log transcripts that appear in Koop and Schmolke to assist in comprehension.)
ThoughtIdRetired (talk) 21:23, 18 January 2017 (UTC)
References
I have made some changes to the details of the air raid at La Pallice on 24 July 1941.
Firstly, Koop and Schmolke are quite definite that the intention was for the Scharnhorst to leave Brest as too many large warships were now concentrated in one port. (Obviously, as events turned out, La Pallice was not sufficiently far away to avoid bombing attacks.) Koop appears to have excellent credentials as a WP:RS.
Secondly, (a) the readily available aerial photograph [4] and
(b) the account by RC Rivaz
both show/talk about the Scharnhorst lying alongside at La Pallice, rather than being anchored. Neither of these sources are precise about whether the ship was simply alongside on 23 Jun and then went to anchor, or was still moored alongside at the time of the attack. However, if the article uses the word "moored" then the ambiguity of that nautical word solves the problem. All we know for certain is that "anchored" has a good chance of being wrong.
ThoughtIdRetired (talk) 18:52, 29 December 2017 (UTC)
(see also sections above, titled: Confusion and Incorrect times in account of Glorious/Ardent/Acasta action)
This article relies heavily on Garzke and Dulin for the account of the sinking of Glorious, Ardent and Acasta. Looking at other sources suggests that some of the details in Garzke and Dulin are wrong. Furthermore, Garzke and Dulin's account is relatively short, whereas much more comprehensive information is available elsewhere. At this stage, I have compared information with Koop and Schmolke[1]: 102–107 and an analysis by Captain Vernon W. Howland[5]
Problems with the article/Garzke and Dulin are as follows:
(1) Distance at which Scharnhorst sighted Glorious. The article states this was 50km, whilst both Koop and Schmolke and Howland give this as 40km. As a check on this, if you use a height of eye calculator, the maximum distance that the masthead lookout would be able to detect another warship is around 40km. (The Scharnhorst lookout who first sighted Glorious, Midshipman Goos, was in the foretop. I don't have the height of eye for that part of the ship, but scaling off the plans in Koop and Schmolke, the masthead is 41m above the waterline - so giving an absolute maximum height. This gives a horizon distance of 22.9km. Presuming that enough visible superstructure, plus the small amount of smoke from Glorious is of a similar height, then that would be an additional 20km or so. So 40km is around the maximum distance that one could expect the sighting to have occurred. From discussion of the rangefinders in Koop and Schmolke, it would appear that the foretop is actually 35m above the waterline, giving a horizon distance of 21km, so shortening the distance a little. In any case, 50 km is clearly too much.)
(2) The article states that Scharnhorst opened fire first. This is incomplete and ambiguous. The first of the two German ships to open fire was the Gneisenau, using her secondary armament against Ardent. The Scharnhorst used her main armament against Glorious about 4 minutes later.
(3) The article gives the impression that the German ships' radar was useful in overcoming the smokescreens laid by the British ships. At this stage, both the battleships had the FuMO22 radar that had a maximum useful range of between 14 and 18km. Whilst this would have been useful for ranging the Ardent (14.5km opening range) , the Glorious was about 26km distant when Scharnhorst opened fire - with critical hits being achieved at not much less distance. The article's comments on radar are misleading by being incomplete.
(4) The article is not clear about when the German ships opened fire - it would be easy to believe from the article that this was a few minutes after the first sighting. Actually, there was a delay of 41 minutes between sighting and the order to open fire.
It appears that other editors on this article have made substantial reliance on Garzke and Dulin, but there is a clear case that this source is not adequate for this section of the article. Before starting a rewrite of the appropriate paragraphs, it seems sensible to see if anyone disputes the account in the two alternative sources given.
ThoughtIdRetired (talk) 00:37, 1 January 2018 (UTC)
References
It is stated that Scharnhorst got back up from 5 to 22 knots after the damage by the shell that penetrated the boiler room was partially fixed. Then it is stated that it was pulling away from the British forces; which is false. It was pulling away before that shell penetrated, not after. The destroyers wouldn't have been able to catch up if it didn't take that hit. Top speed of Scharnhorst almost 32 knots, top speed of Duke of York about 27 knots. So Scharnhorst wouldn't be pulling away at 22 knots. The information just has to be repositioned. Thanks. Best wishes; David Torre
DaveTorre (talk) 07:15, 28 February 2019 (UTC)
I question "....Operation Cerberus, would avoid the increasingly effective Allied radar and patrol aircraft in the Atlantic". My understanding, from a range of sources is that the following dictated the Kriegsmarine thinking:
(1)The network of supply ships that were pre-deployed in the Atlantic had been mopped up. (The Germans were unaware that this was largely due to effective signals intelligence by the British.) Operations by the steam turbine powered ships were not practical as they needed to be refuelled for any sortie to be meaningful.
(2) The Kriegsmarnie believed that Allied radar was much more effective than it really was - therefore they felt their ships were more easily detected than they had expected. In reality, this detection was largely down to the use of HF/DF which gave accurate fixes of German radio transmissions in a much shorter time than they believed possible.
(3) The continuing risk of damage by attacks by the RAF - which was rationalised by the Kriegsmarine as a failure by the Luftwaffe to protect Brest from attack.
Given some time, I could dig out all the sources for this - but my efforts are currently directed at other articles. Furthermore, other editors might have a different slant on this. Hence this note to put this point out for the opinions/efforts of others. ThoughtIdRetired (talk) 22:37, 4 October 2021 (UTC)
Yes, I get the point about 20/20 hindsight. However, the article could (?should) make clear the bad position that the Kriegsmarine surface fleet was in, just before Cerberus - because this is not necessarily clear to the general reader. If all the article seems to say is that the three ships were moved back to Germany, that is very different to German admirals deciding that they had to move the ships away from Brest, together with a realisation that Atlantic sorties were simply too risky. Looking at sources to hand, p 145-146 of Garzke and Dulin states that (a) all 3 ships would have to refuel if going back to Germany via either northern route, (b) almost all supply ships had been lost (c) "British air raids were increasing in severity and intensity". Koop and Schmolke (pg 111) make clear that the risk of air attack and the abandonment of plans for another Atlantic sortie (following the loss of Bismarck) left no alternative but to "evacuate" the three ships. Hellwinkel gives the useful summary that
"This meant that all three major warships at Brest were now non-operational. The anti-shipping war with heavy units planned by the Skl had thus come to nothing because they had no more major warships to send out. The heavy cruiser Lützow had been torpedoed and seriously damaged by a British submarine whilst attempting to break out into the North Atlantic on 13 June 1941 and the heavy cruisers Admiral Hipper and Admiral Scheer were both being overhauled in the yards. The new battleship Tirpitz was still working up.
Hellwinkel also mentions the rolling up of the supply ship network. Frustratingly, I seem to have mislaid my paper copy of Hellwinkel (building work, everything has been in boxes) so cannot give you a page number on this - it is towards the end of chapter 2. I have therefore reinstated the "strategic summary" at the end of the section before Operation Cerberus, with the reference - though I think one could verify all the facts from other sources. Not the end of the world if you don't feel the reinstated (and slightly expanded) paragraph has a place in the article - but I think we need something that gives a clue to the reader that the Kriegsmarine surface fleet was in a bad way at that point.
To address the "single ship article" point - it is the damage to Scharnhorst at La Pallice that was the "last straw" in the whole matter - hence why the overall strategic position being relevant in this article. Where else would the general reader gain this information?
The (hindsight) wisdom of turbine powered battleships compared to the fuel efficient diesel ships is briefly mentioned by Koop and Schmolke in their closing remarks - p164 - doesn't really say more than that. ThoughtIdRetired (talk) 23:13, 5 October 2021 (UTC)
i don't have a Garzke & Dulin at hand, could somebody check page 146 ? In Martin Middlebrooks 'Hamburg 1943' on p.69-70 ( German lang ) there are some details about the window / Düppel developments by Germany, and it says there that the Germans knew the principle of chaff, and out of fear maybe the British learned about it and use it against the german air defensive, it was forbidden in the Luftwaffe to even talk about it. So it is doubtfull they would use consider to use it themselves first. Also, I don't find any other source stating that Germans possessed chaff for use in 1942, the Düppel research was mid 1942. Nor did I find any other source mentioning chaff in operation Cerberus. Klutserke (talk) 19:38, 4 October 2023 (UTC)
This affects both Scharnhorst’s page and the Page for the class.
The main belt is listed as 350mm, and to my knowledge this number originated from Janes, wich is known to have accuracy issues. It also partly originated from Gröner.
The proper thickness should be 320mm sourced from:
RM 25/15783 (Original Ship plans for Gneisenau) (using the given scale guide of 1:25) from 1938/39 plus others in the set.
RM 25/6319 shows it even better & straight up mentions the 320mm belt.
ONI lists it as 320mm (12.6in)
Gröner lists it as being 350mm, but this was most likely having very early 1936 plans.
Primary documents such as those shown in the Bundesarchiv should have president over secondary sources. Multiple other authors list it as 320mm (IE Whitley). if it says 340, it most likely is including the 20mm backing plate (cba to look up anymore information)
credits out to those who did the research for this on another area of the internet. I borrowed it. 166.181.85.49 (talk) 06:40, 8 February 2024 (UTC)