Monument to the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet, Potala Square, Lhasa in 2009. Built after the demolition of Shol Village administration center at the base of Potala Palace, a World Heritage Site. In 1996, UNESCO describes the demolitions as "deliberate destruction of heritage".[1].

Sinicization of Tibet is a phrase which is used by critics of Chinese rule in Tibet in reference to the programs and laws which force "cultural unity" in Tibetan areas of China, including the Tibet Autonomous Region and surrounding Tibetan-designated autonomous areas. The efforts are untaken by China in order to remake Tibetan culture into mainstream Chinese culture. Another term for sinicization is cultural cleansing, used by the 14th Dalai Lama[2] and by the Central Tibetan Administration[3] to describe the results of China's sinicization programs and laws in Tibet.

The changes, which have been evident since the annexation of Tibet by the People's Republic of China in 1950–51, have been facilitated by a range of economic, social, cultural, religious and political reforms which have been introduced to Tibet by the Chinese government. Critics cite the government-sponsored migration of large numbers of Han Chinese into the Tibet Autonomous Region as a major component of sinicization.

According to the government of Tibet in exile, Chinese policy has allegedly resulted in the disappearance of elements of Tibetan culture; this has been called "cultural genocide".[4][5][6] The government in exile says that the policies intend to make Tibet an integral part of China and control desire for Tibetan self-determination.

The Chinese government maintains that its policies have benefited Tibet, and cultural and social changes are consequences of modernization. According to the government, Tibet's economy has expanded; improved services and infrastructure have improved the quality of life of Tibetans, and the Tibetan language and culture have been protected.

History

Early developments

Main article: Battle of Chamdo

After the fall of the Qing dynasty and before 1950, the region which roughly corresponds to the modern-day Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) was a de facto independent nation. It printed its own currency and postage, and maintained international relations. Tibet claimed three provinces (Amdo, Kham and Ü-Tsang), but only controlled western Kham and Ü-Tsang.[citation needed] Since 1950, China made eastern Kham part of Sichuan and western Kham part of the new Tibet Autonomous Region.[7]

During the early-20th-century Republic of China era which followed the Qing dynasty, Chinese Muslim general and Qinghai governor Ma Bufang is accused by Tibetans of implementing sinicization and Islamification policies in Tibetan areas.[8] Forced conversion and heavy taxes were reported under his rule.[9] After Mao Zedong won the Chinese civil war in 1949, his goal was the unification of the "five nationalities" as the People's Republic of China under the Communist Party of China.[10] The Tibetan government in Lhasa sent Ngabo (known as Ngabo in English sources) to Chamdo in Kham, a strategic town near the border, with orders to hold his position while reinforcements came from Lhasa to fight the Chinese.[11] On 16 October 1950, news arrived that the People's Liberation Army was advancing towards Chamdo and had taken the town of Riwoche (which could block the route to Lhasa).[12] Ngabo and his men retreated to a monastery, where the People's Liberation Army surrounded and captured them.[13] Ngabo wrote to Lhasa suggesting a peaceful surrender instead of war.[14] According to the Chinese negotiator, "It is up to you to choose whether Tibet would be liberated peacefully or by force. It is only a matter of sending a telegram to the PLA group to recommence their march to Lhasa."[15] Ngabo accepted Mao's Seventeen-Point Agreement, which stipulated that in return for Tibet becoming part of the People's Republic of China, it would be granted autonomy.[16] Lacking support from the rest of the world, in August 1951 the Dalai Lama sent a telegram to Mao accepting the agreement.[17] The delegates signed the agreement under duress, and the Tibetan's government's future was sealed.[18]

Mao Zedong receives Tibetan Buddhist prayer scarf from Tenzin Gyatso, the 14th Dalai Lama of Tibet in 1954

Although the incorporation of Tibet into China is known in Chinese historiography as the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet, the Dalai Lama considers it a colonization[19] and the Tibetan Youth Congress agrees that it was also an invasion.[20] The Chinese government points to improvements in health and the economy as justifications for their assertion of power in what it calls a historically-Chinese region. According to the Dalai Lama, China has encouraged Han Chinese immigration into the region.[19]

Before the agreement, Tibet's economy was dominated by subsistence agriculture and the stationing of 35,000 Chinese troops during the 1950s strained the region's food supplies. When the Dalai Lama visited Mao Zedong in Beijing in 1954, Mao told him that he would move 40,000 Chinese farmers to Tibet.[21][22][23]

As part of the 1960s Great Leap Forward, Chinese authorities coerced Tibetan farmers to cultivate maize instead of barley (the region's traditional crop). The harvest failed, and thousands of Tibetans starved.[24][25]

Cultural Revolution

The Cultural Revolution, involving students and laborers of the Communist Party of China, was initiated by Mao and carried out by the Gang of Four from 1966 to 1976 to preserve Maoism as China's leading ideology. It was an intra-party struggle to eliminate political opposition to Mao.[26][27]

The Cultural Revolution affected all of China, and Tibet suffered as a result. Red Guards attacked civilians, who were accused of being traitors to communism. More than six thousand monasteries were looted and destroyed. Monks and nuns were forced to leave their monasteries to "live a normal life", with those who resisted imprisoned. Prisoners were forced to perform hard labor, tortured and executed. Although the Potala Palace was threatened, Premier Zhou Enlai intervened and restrained the Tibetan Red Guards.[28]

Recent developments

A sign (in Tibetan and Chinese) indicating surveillance cameras near the Monument the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet, Lhasa, Tibet, 2018

China's National Strategic Project to Develop the West, introduced during the 1980s after the Cultural Revolution, encourages the migration of Chinese people from other regions of China into Tibet with bonuses and favorable living conditions. People volunteer to be sent there as teachers, doctors and administrators to assist Tibet's development.[29] Citing an unqualified labour force and less-developed infrastructure, the Chinese government has encouraged migrants to stimulate competition and change Tibet from a traditional to a market economy with economic reforms set forth by Deng Xiaoping.[30]

Tibetans are the majority ethnic group in the Tibet Autonomous Region, making up about 93 percent of the population in 2008.[31][6][32] The 2008 attacks by Tibetans on Han- and Hui-owned property were reportedly due to the large Han Hui influx into Tibet.[33][34][35]

According to George Fitzherbert, "To engage with China's arguments concerning Tibet is to be subjected to the kind of intellectual entrapment, familiar in the Palestinian conflict, whereby the dispute is corralled into questions which the plaintiff had never sought to dispute. Tibetans complain of being robbed of their dignity in their homeland by having their genuinely loved leader incessantly denounced, and of being swamped by Chinese immigration to the point of becoming a minority in their own country. But China insistently condemns such complaints as separatism, an offence in China under the crime of 'undermining national unity', and pulls the debate back to one about Tibet's historical status. Foreigners raise questions about human rights and the environment, but China again denounces this as a foreign intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation, and pulls the debate back to Tibet's historical status."[36][37]

The Chinese government has attempted to develop Tibet as part of its China Western Development policy and has invested 310 billion yuan (about 45.6 billion U.S. dollars) in Tibet since 2001. In 2009 it invested over $7 billion into the region, 31 percent more than the previous year.[38] The Qinghai-Tibet Railway was completed in 2006 at a cost of $3.68 billion, leading to increased tourism from the rest of China.[39] The Shanghai government contributed $8.6 million to the construction of the Tibet Shanghai Experimental School, where 1,500 Tibetan students receive a primarily-Chinese education.[40] Some young Tibetans feel that they are Tibetan and Chinese, and are fluent in Tibetan and Mandarin Chinese.[41]

In August 2020, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Xi Jinping gave a speech in which he stated that it is "necessary to actively guide Tibetan Buddhism to adapt to the socialist society and promote the Sinicization of Tibetan Buddhism."[42]

Religion

The Chinese government claims it will control how the 15th Dalai Lama will be chosen, contrary to centuries of tradition. Chinese government officials repeatedly warn "that he must reincarnate, and on their terms."[43]

When the Dalai Lama confirmed a Tibetan boy in 1995 as the reincarnation of the Panchen Lama, the second-ranking leader of the Gelugpa sect, the Chinese government took away the boy and his parents and installed its own child lama. The Dalai Lama's choice, Gedhun Choekyi Nyima's whereabouts are still unknown. The Chinese government claimed he has "a stable job and a “normal” life.[44] In 2020 US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said in a statement that "Tibetan Buddhists, like members of all faith communities, must be able to select, educate and venerate their religious leaders according to their traditions and without government interference," "We call on the PRC government to immediately make public the Panchen Lama's whereabouts and to uphold its own constitution and international commitments to promote religious freedom for all persons."[45] The head of the Kagyu sect, the Karmapa Ogyen Trinley Dorje, was also groomed by Chinese leaders, but at age 14 he fled to India in 1999.[46]

Within Tibet, schools issue warnings to parents that students should not be attending classes at monasteries, a long-standing tradition, or engage in any religious activity. Punishments for doing so are severe, including loss of government welfare and subsidies.[47]

The practice of removing prayer flags, symbols of Tibetan culture and religious belief, has increased since 2010 as the persecution of religion escalates. In June 2020 Chinese authorities started a “behavioral reform,” program, begun in the Tibet Autonomous Region's Qinghai's Golog (in Chinese, Guoluo) and Tengchen (Dingqing) county in Chamdo, ordering the destruction of prayer flags.[48] The 2019 Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy annual report found that Chinese police forces and surveillance teams moved into monasteries and villages to monitor Tibetan residents for signs of opposition to China's rule, “facial-recognition software and careful monitoring of digital spaces [were] deployed to suppress political protests against the increased clampdowns on civil and political rights.”[49][50]

According to the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, during the summer of 2019, the Chinese authorities demolished thousands of residences at the Yachen Gar Tibetan Buddhist center in Sichuan Province, displacing as many as 6,000 monks and nuns. In April 2019, China authorities closed the Larung Gar Buddhist Academy to new enrollment. Authorities also intensified a crackdown on possessing or displaying photos of the Dalai Lama, continued to monitor religious festivals, and, in some areas, banned students from attending festivals during their school holidays. In protest of repressive government policies, at least 156 Tibetans have self-immolated since February 2009.[51]

Education, employment and language

The Chinese Constitution guarantees autonomy in ethnic regions and says local governments should use the languages in common use. Since 1949 the Chinese government has used the minority-education system for Tibetans to acquire the Chinese language, considered a key tool of Sinicization pressure, contrary to UNESCO policy on cultural and linguistic diversity.[52][failed verification] Beginning in the early 2000s, there had been a process of Tibetanization of Tibetan education in Qinghai's Tibetan regions. Through grassroots initiatives by Tibetan educators, Tibetan had been somewhat available as the main language of instruction in primary, secondary and tertiary education in Qinghai.[53] This is no longer the case, China has been rapidly expanding government assimilation policies in the 2010s.[citation needed] Tibetan language in Qinghai remains even more marginalized in education and government employment, with a small number of public-service positions mandating a Tibetan degree or Tibetan language skills.[54][better source needed]

In 1987, the Tibet Autonomous Region published more explicit regulations calling for Tibetan to be the main language in schools, government offices and shops. Those regulations were eliminated in 2002 and state language policies and practices “jeopardize the continuing viability” of Tibetan civilization.[55] In Tibetan areas, official affairs are conducted primarily in Chinese. It is common to see banners promoting the use of Chinese. Monasteries and schools often held classes on the written language for ordinary people, and monks gave lessons while traveling, but officials ordered monasteries and schools to end the classes.[56] The Chinese Communist Party issued orders in December 2018 forbidding informal classes taught by Tibetan monks or other unapproved groups,[57] and ordered schools to stop teaching all subjects in Tibetan, except the Tibetan language in first grade classes, in May 2019 in Golog, in Chinese, Guoluo, Tibet Autonomous Region.[58]

Tibetan entrepreneur and education advocate Tashi Wangchuk was detained for two years and then indicted in 2017 by court officials after speaking to The New York Times for a documentary video[59] and two articles on Tibetan education and culture.[60][61]

Tibetan neidi or boarding schools, in operation since 1985, have been increasing enrollment rapidly. Tibetan children are removed from their families, and Tibetan religious and cultural influences, and placed in Tibetan only boarding schools across China, well outside the Tibet Autonomous Region. Older students are allowed to leave the campus only if accompanied by a teacher.

Chinese government policy requires only Tibetan government job candidates to disavow any allegiance to the Dalai Lama and support government ethnic policies, as announced in October 2019 on the TAR government's online education platform, “Support the (Communist) Party’s leadership, resolutely implement the [Chinese Communist] Party’s line, line of approach, policies, and the guiding ideology of Tibet work in the new era; align ideologically, politically, and in action with the Party Central Committee; oppose any splittist (division of Tibet from P.R.C.) tendencies; expose and criticize the Dalai Lama; safeguard the unity of the motherland and ethnic unity and take a firm stand on political issues, taking a clear and distinct stand.”[62]

In April 2020, classroom instruction was switched from Tibetan to Mandarin Chinese in Ngaba, Sichuan.[63]

Nomadic herders resettlement

The Chinese government launched an initiative that demanded the nomads[64] to relocate to urban housing in newly constructed villages in 2003.[65] At the end of 2015, in "what amounts to one of the most ambitious attempts made at social engineering, the Chinese government is in the final stages of a 15-year-old campaign to settle the millions of pastoralists who once roamed China’s vast borderlands," the Chinese government claimed it will have moved the remaining 1.2 million nomad herders into towns that provide access to schools, electricity and modern health care. This policy, based on the government view that grazing harms grasslands, has been questioned by ecologists in China and abroad claiming the scientific foundations of nomad resettlement are questionable. Anthropological studies of government-built relocation centers have documented chronic unemployment, alcoholism and the fraying of millenniums-old traditions. Human rights advocates say the many protests by herders are met with harsh crackdowns by security forces.[66][67][68]

In a 2011 report, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, criticized China's nomad resettlement policies as overly coercive and said they led to "increased poverty, environmental degradation and social breakdown".[69]

In 2017 Tibetan nomads previously forced from traditional grazing lands in a state-directed resettlement scheme in Qinghai were told to go back due to a new policy announced in 2016, so authorities could use their current homes for development as tourist centers and government employees housing. "After two years of living in the new towns, residents are now being forced to move back to their original grasslands without their animals, which are the main source of livelihood in Tibetan nomadic communities".[70][71]

Population growth

Market in Lhasa, 1993

In 1949, there were between 300 and 400 Han-Chinese residents in Lhasa.[72] In 1950, the city covered less than three square kilometres and had around 30,000 inhabitants; the Potala Palace and the village of Zhöl below it were considered separate from the city.[73][74] In 1953, according to the first population census, Lhasa had about 30,000 residents (including 4,000 beggars, but not including 15,000 monks).[75]

In 1992 Lhasa's permanent population was estimated at a little under 140,000, including 96,431 Tibetans, 40,387 Han-Chinese, and 2,998 Chinese Muslims and others. Added to that figure were 60,000–80,000 temporary residents, primarily Tibetan pilgrims and traders.[76]

Debate on the intention of the PRC

See also: Tibetan sovereignty debate

In 1989, high-profile French criminal lawyer Robert Badinter participated in an episode of Apostrophes (a well-known French television program devoted to human rights) with the Dalai Lama. Referring to the disappearance of Tibetan culture, Badinter used the phrase "cultural genocide".[77] In 1993, the Dalai Lama used the same phrase to describe the destruction of Tibetan culture.[78] During the 2008 Tibetan unrest, he accused the Chinese of cultural genocide in their crackdown.[79]

In 2008 Robert Barnett, director of the Program for Tibetan Studies at Columbia University, said that it was time for accusations of cultural genocide to be dropped: "I think we have to get over any suggestion that the Chinese are ill-intentioned or trying to wipe out Tibet."[80] Barnett voiced his doubts in a review in the New York Review of Books: "Why, if Tibetan culture within Tibet is being 'fast erased from existence', [do] so many Tibetans within Tibet still appear to have a more vigorous cultural life, with over a hundred literary magazines in Tibetan, than their exile counterparts?"[81]

See also

References

Citations

  1. ^ World Heritage Convention, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, https://whc.unesco.org/en/soc/2085
  2. ^ Dalai Lama: 'Cultural genocide' behind self-immolations, (07 November 2011), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-15617026 ["The Dalai Lama has blamed Beijing's "cultural genocide" for a wave of self-immolations among monks and nuns in ethnic Tibetan parts of Sichuan." "The Tibetan spiritual leader, speaking in Japan, said hard-line officials had created a "desperate" situation." "Eleven young Tibetans have set themselves on fire this year in apparent protest against Chinese rule." "The most recent was a nun in Dawu county, who died after setting herself on fire last week." ""Chinese communist propaganda create (a) very rosy picture," the Dalai Lama told journalists in Tokyo." ""But actually, including many Chinese from mainland China who visit Tibet, they all have the impression things are terrible."" ""Some kind of policy, some kind of cultural genocide is taking place.""
  3. ^ T. G. Arya, Central Tibetan Administration, China’s ‘ethnic unity’ bill aimed at complete sinicization of the Tibetan plateau through ethnic cleansing: CTA Information Secretary, (15 January 2020), https://tibet.net/chinas-ethnic-unity-bill-aimed-at-complete-sinicization-of-the-tibetan-plateau-through-ethnic-cleansing-cta-information-secretary/ ["China has waged unceasing campaigns at both central and local government level to aggressively consolidate its military occupation of Tibet in the last more than six decades. But this new state-sponsored regulation is seen as a desperately contemplated measure to curb the undiminishing defiance of the Tibetan people and their call for the protection of their identity, for freedom, human rights and for the honourable return of His Holiness the Dalai Lama to Tibet." "Central Tibetan Administration’s Information Secretary Mr T.G. Arya condemned the new ethnic identity law, calling it a measure of ethnic cleansing aimed at complete sinicization of the Tibetan plateau. The Secretary also criticised the legislation as a gross violation of the international law and the Chinese constitution." " “What China could not achieve through the sixty years of occupation and repression, now they are trying to achieve it through repressive law. The law aims to achieve complete sinicization of the Tibetan plateau through ethnic cleansing. China finds Tibetan language, religion and culture as the main barrier to achieving complete control over the land,” Secretary TG Arya told the Tibet News Bureau.]
  4. ^ Burbu, Dawa (2001) China's Tibet Policy, Routledge, ISBN 978-0-7007-0474-3, pp 100–124
  5. ^ Davidson, Lawrence (2012). Cultural Genocide. Rutgers University Press. pp. 89–111. ISBN 978-0-8135-5243-9. JSTOR j.ctt5hj5jx.
  6. ^ a b Samdup, Tseten (1993) Chinese population – Threat to Tibetan identity Archived 5 February 2009 at the Wayback Machine
  7. ^ Burbu, Dawa (2001) China's Tibet Policy, Routledge, ISBN 978-0-7007-0474-3, pp 86–99
  8. ^ Woser (10 March 2011). "Three Provinces of the Snowland, Losar Tashi Delek!". Phayul. Archived from the original on 4 October 2012. Retrieved 24 March 2011.
  9. ^ Blo brtan rdo rje, Charles Kevin Stuart (2008). Life and Marriage in Skya Rgya, a Tibetan Village. YBK Publishers, Inc. p. xiv. ISBN 978-0-9800508-4-4. Retrieved 28 June 2010.
  10. ^ Schaik 2011, p. 208
  11. ^ Schaik 2011, p. 209
  12. ^ Schaik 2011, p. 211
  13. ^ Schaik 2011, p. 212
  14. ^ Schaik 2011, p. 213
  15. ^ Schaik 2011, p. 214
  16. ^ Schaik 2011, p. 215
  17. ^ Schaik 2011, p. 218
  18. ^ Laird, Thomas (2006). The story of Tibet: Conversations with the Dalai Lama. London: Atlantic Books. p. 307. ISBN 9781843541448. Retrieved 29 July 2015.
  19. ^ a b "Tibet profile - Overview". BBC News. 13 November 2014. Archived from the original on 10 December 2012. Retrieved 19 September 2015.
  20. ^ "50 years of Colonization". Tibetan Youth Congress. Archived from the original on 10 September 2015. Retrieved 19 September 2015.
  21. ^ (in German) Forster-Latsch, H. and Renz S., P. L. in Geschichte und Politik Tibets/ Tibet unter chinesischer Herrschaft Archived 13 February 2011 at the Wayback Machine.
  22. ^ (in German) Horst Südkamp (1998), Breviarium der tibetischen Geschichte, p. 191.
  23. ^ (in German) Golzio, Karl-Heinz and Bandini, Pietro (2002), Die vierzehn Wiedergeburten des Dalai Lama, Scherz Verlag / Otto Wilhelm Barth, Bern / München, ISBN 3-502-61002-9.
  24. ^ Shakya, Tsering (1999) The Dragon in the Land of Snows, Columbia University Press, ISBN 978-0-7126-6533-9
  25. ^ Stein, Rolf (1972) Tibetan Civilization, Stanford University Press, ISBN 0-8047-0806-1
  26. ^ MacFarquhar, Roderick & Michael Schoenhals (2006) Mao's Last Revolution, Harvard University Press, ISBN 978-0-674-02332-1, p. 102
  27. ^ Siling, Luo (3 October 2016). "The Cultural Revolution in Tibet: A Photographic Record". New York Times. Archived from the original on 31 January 2019. Retrieved 30 January 2019.
  28. ^ Southerland, Dan (9 August 2016). "After 50 years, Tibetans Recall the Cultural Revolution". Radio Free Asia. Archived from the original on 10 July 2019. Retrieved 31 January 2019.
  29. ^ Peter Hessler (February 1999). "Tibet Through Chinese Eyes". The Atlantic. Archived from the original on 7 March 2012. Retrieved 29 February 2012.
  30. ^ Tanzen Lhundup, Ma Rong (25–26 August 2006). "Temporary Labor Migration in Urban Lhasa in 2005". China Tibetology Network. Archived from the original on 19 August 2011. Retrieved 29 February 2012.
  31. ^ "Cultural shift". BBC News. Archived from the original on 25 July 2013. Retrieved 18 April 2013.
  32. ^ Pinteric, Uros (2003): http://www.sidip.org/SIDIP_files/pintericu_tibet.pdf[permanent dead link] International Status of Tibet, Association for Innovative Political Science, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia.
  33. ^ Wong, Edward (5 June 2009). "Report Says Valid Grievances at Root of Tibet Unrest". New York Times. Archived from the original on 31 January 2019. Retrieved 30 January 2019.
  34. ^ Wong, Edward (24 July 2010). "China's Money and Migrants Pour into Tibet". New York Times. Archived from the original on 31 January 2019. Retrieved 30 January 2019.
  35. ^ "Beijing renews tirade". Sunday Pioneer. 8 March 2011. Archived from the original on 11 March 2011. Retrieved 24 March 2011.
  36. ^ Fitzherbert, George (20 June 2008). "Land of the Clouds". The Times Literary supplement. Archived from the original on 31 January 2019. Retrieved 31 January 2019.
  37. ^ Corell, Anastasia (13 December 2013). "Tibet's Tense New Reality". The Atlantic. Archived from the original on 31 January 2019. Retrieved 31 January 2019.
  38. ^ Edward Wong (24 July 2010). "'China's Money and Migrants Pour into Tibet'". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 1 October 2013. Retrieved 29 February 2012.
  39. ^ Xinhua News Agency (24 August 2005). New height of world's railway born in Tibet. Retrieved 25 August 2005. Archived 25 April 2009 at WebCite
  40. ^ Damian Grammaticas (15 July 2010). "Is development killing Tibet's way of life?". BBC. Archived from the original on 20 November 2011. Retrieved 29 February 2012.
  41. ^ Hannü. (2008). Dialogues Tibetan dialogues Han. [Erscheinungsort nicht ermittelbar]: Hannü. ISBN 978-988-97999-3-9. OCLC 917425693.
  42. ^ "Tibetan Buddhism must be tailored to fit Chinese society, says Xi Jinping". Apple Daily. 30 August 2020. Retrieved 30 August 2020.((cite news)): CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  43. ^ Buckley, Chris (11 March 2015). "China's Tensions With Dalai Lama Spill into the Afterlife". New York Times. Archived from the original on 31 January 2019. Retrieved 30 January 2019.
  44. ^ Theresa, Braine (18 May 2020). "China claims boy seized 25 years ago after Dalai Lama chose him as Tibetan spiritual leader is 31 and has a job". Barron's. Retrieved 5 July 2020.
  45. ^ "Pompeo Demands China Reveal Panchen Lama 'Immediately'". Aljazeera. 19 May 2020. Retrieved 5 July 2020.
  46. ^ Wong, Edward (6 June 2009). "China Creates Specter of Dueling Dalai Lamas". New York Times. Archived from the original on 31 January 2019. Retrieved 30 January 2019.
  47. ^ Halder, Bill (16 October 2019). "China Weaponizes Education to Control Tibet". Ozy. Archived from the original on 22 October 2019. Retrieved 22 October 2019.
  48. ^ Lhuboom (17 June 2020). "China Orders Prayer Flags Taken Down in Tibet in an Assault on Culture, Faith". Radio Free Asia. Retrieved 4 July 2020.
  49. ^ "China Expands Its Clampdown in Tibet: Report". Radio Free Asia. 16 June 2020. Retrieved 5 July 2020.
  50. ^ "Human Rights Situation in Tibet 2019 Annual Report" (PDF). tchrd.org. Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy. Retrieved 5 July 2020.
  51. ^ "IRF Annual Report" (PDF). www.uscirf.gov. 2020. Retrieved 30 August 2020.
  52. ^ "Cultural and Linguistic Diversity". unesco.org. UNESCO, United Nations. Archived from the original on 27 May 2019. Retrieved 27 May 2019.
  53. ^ Zenz, Adrian (2010). "Beyond Assimilation: The Tibetanisation of Tibetan Education in Qinghai". Inner Asia. 12 (2): 293–315. doi:10.1163/000000010794983478. ISSN 1464-8172. JSTOR 23615125.
  54. ^ Zenz, Adrian (2014). Tibetanness under Threat? Neo-Integrationism, Minority Education and Career Strategies in Qinghai, P.R. China. Global Oriental. ISBN 9789004257962.
  55. ^ Tatlow, Didi Kirsten (14 December 2012). "An Online Plea to China's Leader to Save Tibet's Culture By". New York Times. Retrieved 22 October 2019.
  56. ^ Wong, Edward (28 November 2015). "Tibetans Fight to Salvage Fading Culture in China". New York Times. Archived from the original on 31 January 2019. Retrieved 30 January 2019.
  57. ^ Gelek, Lobsang (30 January 2019). "Tibetan Monasteries in Nangchen Banned From Teaching Language to Young Tibetans". Radio Free Asia. Archived from the original on 27 May 2019. Retrieved 27 May 2019.
  58. ^ "Prefecture in Qinghai to Drastically Cut Tibetan Language Education". Radio Free Asia. 16 May 2019. Archived from the original on 26 May 2019. Retrieved 27 May 2019.
  59. ^ Kessel, Jonah M. (28 November 2015). "Tashi Wangchuk: A Tibetan's Journey for Justice". New York Times. Archived from the original on 31 January 2019. Retrieved 31 January 2019.
  60. ^ Wong, Edward (18 January 2017). "Rights Groups Ask China to Free Tibetan Education Advocate". New York Times. Archived from the original on 31 January 2019. Retrieved 31 January 2019.
  61. ^ Buckley, Chris (4 January 2018). "Tibetan Businessman Battles Separatism Charges in Chinese Court". New York Times. Archived from the original on 9 February 2019. Retrieved 31 January 2019.
  62. ^ Patranobis, Sutirtho (19 October 2019). "Tibetan graduates need to 'expose and criticise Dalai Lama' for Chinese government jobs". Hindustan Times. Archived from the original on 20 October 2019. Retrieved 22 October 2019.
  63. ^ "Classroom Instruction Switch From Tibetan to Chinese in Ngaba Sparks Worry, Anger". Translated by Dorjee Damdul. 9 April 2020. Archived from the original on 12 April 2020. Retrieved 12 April 2020. ((cite web)): Cite uses deprecated parameter |authors= (help)
  64. ^ Crowder, Nicole (11 August 2015). "Tibet's little-known nomadic culture, high on the 'Roof of the World'". Washington Post. Retrieved 31 January 2019.
  65. ^ Lowry, Rachel (3 September 2015). "Inside the Quiet Lives of China's Disappearing Tibetan Nomads". Time. Archived from the original on 25 February 2019. Retrieved 31 January 2019.
  66. ^ Jacobs, Andrew (11 July 2015). "China Fences in Its Nomads, and an Ancient Life Withers". New York Times. Archived from the original on 31 January 2019. Retrieved 30 January 2019.
  67. ^ ""They Say We Should Be Grateful" Mass Rehousing and Relocation Programs in Tibetan Areas of China". hrw.org. Human Rights Watch. 27 June 2013. Archived from the original on 10 September 2019. Retrieved 31 January 2019.
  68. ^ Hatton, Celia (27 June 2013). "China resettles two million Tibetans, says Human Rights Watch". BBC. Archived from the original on 9 December 2018. Retrieved 31 January 2019.
  69. ^ Jacobs, Andrew (10 June 2011). "Ethnic Protests in China Have Lengthy Roots". New York Times. Archived from the original on 31 January 2019. Retrieved 30 January 2019.
  70. ^ Tenzin, Kunsang (15 June 2017). "Tibetan Nomads Forced From Resettlement Towns to Make Way For Development". Radio Free Asia. Archived from the original on 31 January 2019. Retrieved 31 January 2019.
  71. ^ Tenzin, Kunsang (6 October 2017). "Tibetan Nomads Forced to Beg After Being Evicted From Their Homes". Radio Free Asia. Archived from the original on 31 January 2019. Retrieved 31 January 2019.
  72. ^ Roland Barraux, Histoire des Dalaï Lamas – Quatorze reflets sur le Lac des Visions, Albin Michel, 1993, reprinted in 2002, Albin Michel, ISBN 2-226-13317-8.
  73. ^ Liu Jiangqiang, Preserving Lhasa's history (part one), in Chinadialogue, 13 October 2006.
  74. ^ Emily T. Yeh, Living Together in Lhasa. Ethnic Relations, Coercive Amity, and Subaltern Cosmopolitanism Archived 22 February 2012 at the Wayback Machine: "Lhasa’s 1950s population is also frequently estimated at around thirty thousand. At that time the city was a densely packed warren of alleyways branching off from the Barkor path, only three square kilometers in area. The Potala Palace and the village of Zhöl below it were considered separate from the city."
  75. ^ Thomas H. Hahn, Urban Planning in Lhasa. The traditional urban fabric, contemporary practices and future visions Archived 31 March 2012 at the Wayback Machine, Presentation Given at the College of Architecture, Fanzhu University, 21 October 2008.
  76. ^ Fjeld, Heidi (2003). Commoners and Nobles: Hereditary Divisions in Tibet. Copenhagen: NIAS. p. 18. ISBN 978-87-7694-524-4. OCLC 758384977.
  77. ^ Les droits de l'homme Apostrophes, A2 – 21 April 1989 – 01h25m56s, Web site of the INA: http://www.ina.fr/archivespourtous/index.php?vue=notice&from=fulltext&full=Salonique&num_notice=5&total_notices=8 Archived 28 November 2008 at the Wayback Machine
  78. ^ "Archived copy". Archived from the original on 24 January 2009. Retrieved 30 January 2009.((cite web)): CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link) 10 March Archive
  79. ^ "'Eighty killed' in Tibetan unrest". BBC. 16 March 2008. Archived from the original on 20 March 2008. Retrieved 2 March 2017.
  80. ^ Robert Barnett, Seven Questions: What Tibetans Want Archived 19 December 2017 at the Wayback Machine, Foreign Policy, March 2008.
  81. ^ Robert Barnett, Thunder from Tibet, a review of Pico Iyer's book, The Open Road: The Global Journey of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, Knopf, 275 p. Archived 11 September 2015 at the Wayback Machine, in The New York Review of Books, vol. 55, number 9. 29 May 2008.

Sources

Further reading

Library resources about
Sinicization of Tibet
Categories