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Former good article nomineeSix-Day War was a good articles nominee, but did not meet the good article criteria at the time. There may be suggestions below for improving the article. Once these issues have been addressed, the article can be renominated. Editors may also seek a reassessment of the decision if they believe there was a mistake.
Article milestones
DateProcessResult
September 28, 2006Good article nomineeNot listed
March 12, 2008Good article nomineeNot listed
Current status: Former good article nominee

I edited part of the section about the events leading to war

The article was missing an important confrontation that occurred on April 7, 1967 between Israel and Syria, so I added it. -- Wiki Khalil (talk) October 13 2012

Note to editors.Oren as a source

He is cited 44 times here. I.e. the article is built round his book. Stephen Walt has recently charged that Oren is an unreliable source.

Third, Roberts declares that Israel's "preemptive strike" on Egypt in 1967 "saved the Jewish state." This is nonsense. Although Nasser's decision to order the U.N. peacekeepers out of the Sinai and to send part of his army back in was both provocative and foolish, he was not preparing to attack Israel and Egypt's forces in the Sinai were not deployed for offensive action. Strictly speaking, the Six Day War wasn't preemption, though some Israeli leaders may have seen it that way. Israel had more troops arrayed against the Egyptian forces, and U.S. military intelligence correctly predicted that Israel would win easily even if the Egyptians attacked first. No less an Israeli patriot than Menachem Begin described it accurately when he said: "The Egyptian Army concentrations in the Sinai approaches do not prove that Nasser was really about to attack us. We must be honest with ourselves. We decided to attack him." That attack might have been justified on other grounds -- such as not allowing Nasser to alter the status quo in the Sinai -- but it was not a case of preemption and thus does not support Roberts' case.

So the article, at a minimum, requires a drastic overhaul since serious scholars challenge the accuracy of its basic source, and argue it is a Zionist fantasy (WP:NPOV).Nishidani (talk) 21:01, 5 May 2013 (UTC)[reply]

The article requires no overhaul, serious or otherwise. Walt is a political scientist with a political agenda and an ax to grind, , not a historian,. His opinions on this article's topic, or on the works of academic historians are worthless. Ditto for Finklestein. Oren is an academic historian, a graduate of Princeton and Columbia, and his book on the 6 day war was published by Oxford University Press, no less. The only thing more amazing than your statement above is the double standard you employ - shunning non-historians when it suits you, and advocating for non-historians when the historians say some thing you don't like . Firkin Flying Fox (talk) 18:30, 8 May 2013 (UTC)[reply]
A lot of material has been published since Oren's book by historians under academic imprint or in peer reviewed journals that discredits a lot of the claims he makes in the book. Oren qualifies as a source for historical scholarship, but where his view is not supported by other historians that have been published since e.g. Segev 2007, Moaz 2006, Gluska 2007, that should be made clear in the article, and we should not be over-relying on a single source when there is a significant divergence of opinion. Academics specializing in Political science are entirely suitable sources for an article topic such as this. Dlv999 (talk) 18:45, 8 May 2013 (UTC)[reply]
I am bemused by seasoned wikipedians talking about overhaul etc. You know very well this is not how wikipedia works. One needs to delve for a few weeks into the archives to see how the current state was created as a compromise between various factions. For instance, there was a massive debate as to how to decribe the hotly contested question of preemption. Not sure what the outcome was; in the end, I had enough and moved on. Oren is a prominent academic historian of the 1967 war and no wonder his account is very prominent in the aritcle. Obviously on such a hotly contested topic as this, there are many views, and it is perfectly appropriate to add other views by academic historians where they are due. So the best way to address this bias, if any, is to add other points of view (for instance: Oren says that the earth is flat. However Segev suggests that a hyperboloid is a more adequate description, and so on). Complaining about bias, calling for overhaul etc., is not constructive. I don't think there exists an account of these events that hasn't been challenged or contested from all sides. If you are prepared to put a few months of your time into it, go for it. A great thing to do for a retired wikipedian. Cheers. - BorisG (talk) 17:45, 10 May 2013 (UTC)[reply]

I agree with that Oren is a very unreliable and biased person considering who he is, and therefor should not be used as a source. --Supreme Deliciousness (talk) 02:34, 9 May 2013 (UTC)[reply]

I don't have any problem with bias, to the contrary. All history is 'biased', the difference is, the best historians make awareness of it a guiding light in their research, and the rest just ignore the problem.
  • Boris, I agree with you, and fail to understand why our agreement trips up over the use of 'overhaul', which means thorough revision, not elision (of Oren), more or less along the lines I suggested.
  • Flying box, saying 'Walt is a political scientist with a political agenda and an ax to grind, while praising Michael Oren as an historian is to no purpose. Oren's first degree was in Walt's field, actually. He did go on to do a Phd in Near Eastern Studies. It's news to me that he was trained in history. If you want a political agenda read Oren's wikibio, which suggests he's spent more time in politics and in the IDF than in the dryasdust archives of pure historical research. Both are competent sources: Oren's work is regarded as partisan, and that is why balance is required. Walt mentions Segev, who is a competent historian, and whom we almost totally ignore. Certainly no historical article on an international conflict can be written mainly from the perspective of a political activist for one government.
  • I am retired from article writing because my enjoyment in doing precisely what you suggest met a stonewall with a chap blocking all constructive editing at every point, and, as soon as I withdrew from the overhaul, because of his ostructionism, he too withdrew and relaxed, leaving the article's second part (on the Jews in Khazaria) in the mess I hoped to correct. People who play politics don't overhaul articles: they track an ostensible adversary who does, and make life impossible for them, and that done, leave the article stale. You've never noticed this kind of thing? Retired people occasionally give advice. Retirement is not silence, until of course fate snips the thread or dementia.Nishidani (talk) 18:32, 10 May 2013 (UTC)[reply]
Want a neutral account that judiciously sums up Israeli, Arab and Western sources? It's Henry Laurens, La question de Palestine 1967-1982: Tome 4: Le rameau d'olivier et le fusil du combattant, Fayard, Paris 2011. With this and several other sources, some mentioned above, it would be short work, a week, to fix this POV imbalance from top to bottom. Laurens is what Oren is not, an historian of international standing in this specific field, noted for his comprehensive and impartial use of all sources. Nishidani (talk) 18:47, 10 May 2013 (UTC)[reply]
Oh, and since I see Dlv mentions him, and the relevant chapter is completely accessible via google books, see the overview by Zeev Maoz Defending the Holy Land, University of Michigan Press 2006 pp.80-112 which argues that there are three general explanations for the outbreak of that war, which he analyses to expose their inadequacies (pp.97), and then provides his own alternative conclusion, based on Israel’s policy, Israel’s prior misconduct with Syria as the predominant factor precipitating the crisis, and the dominance of the IDF in foreign and security affairs, with however an understanding of the general incompetence al round. Most versions ignore the Syrian front and the IDF’s autonomy over the preceding years of provoking Syria.
‘The interaction between Israeli military “controlled escalation” and the domestic Syrian problems and inter-Arab struggles is, therefore, the key to understanding the Six Day War as emanating from a process of unwanted escalation p.108
‘The Six Day War was an inadvertent war. Everybody could have done much to prevent it, instead, almost every action taken by each of the parties accomplished just the opposite –making the war inevitable. Yet, the “everybody was guilty” notion serves only to minimize the role of Israeli policies and practices in the process leading up to the crisis and the management of the crisis itself.’ p.110 (and the several conclusions re.)Nishidani (talk) 19:15, 10 May 2013 (UTC)[reply]
Nishidani, if this is what you think needs to be done, why not do it, rather than rant on the talk page? Has any of your specific suggestions been opposed? Besides, you claim that the whole article is so POV, yet all you mention is the hotly contested and important issue of the events related to its outbreak. The issue is important, but only a small fraction of the whole article. If this is all you are concerned about, there have been numerous debates on this, particularly as to how it is covered in the lead, and I think some sort of compromise has been reached. Of course, the way Wikipedia works, you can open this Pandora box again... And quite frankly, it appears that what you are doing is trying to find reliable sources that support your own POV. Given the prominence of the topics, there likely to be others with differet POV who will do the same. I have read the entire Oren's book, and it sounds very convincing and impartial, but I am no historian. So the sum of all these vectors will result in some compromise (hopefully without ArbCom etc). This is, regrettably, how Wikipedia works in practice. Good luck. - BorisG (talk) 03:40, 11 May 2013 (UTC)[reply]
Boris, please check the meaning of the word 'rant'. I know that in Russian it means декламация, громкие слова, торжественная речь etc., but in contemporary English the denotation is extremely pejorative, meaning turgid bombast by an unhinged person frothing at the mouth, usually in a political vein. It jars as extreme irony to be told that one rants, and at the same time should contribute to an article premised on NPOV obligations. A bit like kicking an athlete heftily in the shin before a race and suggesting he run.
The 'small fraction of the whole article' is what scholars debate most intensely (and is poorly evidenced here). Compare similar articles where war was drifted into. The Iraq War of 2003, Soviet War in Afghanistan, World War 1 or the Yom Kippur War, which have lengthy detailed backgrounds totally missing here. The last named was a 'war of aggression' because Arabs attacked first. The Six Day War, where Israel attacked, was just 'a war fought between Jun 5-10 by Israel and neighbouring states'. But of course, to note such things is 'ranting'.Nishidani (talk) 12:12, 11 May 2013 (UTC)[reply]
Just to note, I have changed the Yom Kippur War article as the claim of "aggression" was not supported by the cited source. Dlv999 (talk) 13:45, 11 May 2013 (UTC)[reply]
Nishidani, the Urban Dictionary says one of the meanings of 'rant' is 'When someone is pissed about something and they rabmle on about it'. I think this is a very precise description of your speech. Yet out of respect for your linguistic credentials I take back the word 'rant'. The rest of my comment still stands. Dlv999, this is a welcome way forward. Cheers. - BorisG (talk) 13:59, 12 May 2013 (UTC)[reply]
I gave an analysis of sources on the page, provided indications of a dissenting view about the reliability of the major RS, added material relevant to that judgement, and suggested lines of development. You call that 'being pissed off about something and rambling on'. Loose talk is facile. Reading books out of one's daily round of professional interests, carefully weighing words in articles, and providing assistance to one's fellow editors on an encyclopedia is not, by any stretch of the imagination, 'ranting'. You're entitled to find Oren superb. Honesty obliges you to recognize that, since serious doubts about his neutrality are held by scholars in good standing, one's initial impression may merit reexamination. Shortly after the 67 war, I was impressed by Walter Laqueur's The Road to War.(Camelot Press 2nd printing 1969). Friends who had fought in it on Israel's side confirmed my impression. Everything I've read since shows me my first impression was utterly uninformed. The same could be said of many books which, though they support my POV, on further reading, strike me as glib. At my age, one doesn't get pissed off. One reads or watches, and nods one's head sadly because whoever gets pissed off hasn't yet understood that bad news, skewed reportage, spinning, is what one should expect from all sides. It's to Israel's merit that the finest scholarship on most of this comes from there or the diaspora, and is light years ahead of the clichés that still inform people raised under or adopting Zionism's glowing/self-tragic narrative of the nice-decent-guy-in-a-vicious- neighbourhood version of history. Nishidani (talk) 20:35, 12 May 2013 (UTC)[reply]
OK, I did say I take it back. It is not for me to describe your emotions, though I am afraid your claims of objectivity won't be taken very seriously if you cite Finkelstein 'the Hezbollah represents hope' as a credible source. Arguably if you base your opinion (of Oren) on such sources as Finkelstein, people will conclude that you don't have more credible sources. And this is not to start a discussion on credibility of Finkelstein; one has the right to believe whatever one wants. But it is not for them to judge whether they are objective or not. Everyone is objective in their own mind; it is the opinion of others that counts. - BorisG (talk) 06:44, 13 May 2013 (UTC)[reply]
Sloppy logic. Guilt by association. Mutatis mutandis, Oren would be unobjective because he serves with the IDF, and is proud of his role as a paratrooper in the war Israel inflicted on an unrpovoking Lebanon in 1982, where the IDF's love of violent solutions to any problem effectively created Hezbollah. Hezbollah and the Israeli military complex (IDF/Shin Bet/Mossad etc) differ only in this: the former is not involved in violence against foreigners, in shooting and arresting civilians and children every day as part of crowd control, in occupying other countries, or in wars of choice as a matter of institutional work every other day. The only difference is the level of institutionalization of routinization of terror.
I've never made a claim to be objective, in the odd sense that word is used to signify 'not having a decided point of view'. I think I represent reliable sources accurately, and on any difficult argument will use a dozen to see the lay of the land, not just one. You've never read Finkelstein, evidently. He's deeply hated in your community because it's almost impossible to refute him on the grounds he falsifies or misreports source. Indeed, he shows how widespread this practice is in the field, and names names. That's why he lost his job, he blew AD's pretenses to be objective or factual. In that sense, he's objective. Let's drop it, eh. Cheers Nishidani (talk) 07:17, 13 May 2013 (UTC)[reply]
This is not a forum or blog for your anti-Israel lies. Read WP:TALK. But I can't stop mentioning several notable attacks by Hezbollah against foreigners: 1983 United States embassy bombing, 1983 Beirut barracks bombing, TWA Flight 847, Lebanon hostage crisis, 1992 attack on Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires, AMIA bombing, Alas Chiricanas Flight 901, 1994 London Israeli Embassy attack, 2009 Hezbollah plot in Egypt, 2012 Burgas bus bombing... besides, Iranian and Hezbollah terrorist cells have been involved in (failed) recent attacks against foreign objectives in Berlin, Thailand, Georgia, India, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Nepal, Azerbaijan, Kenya, Nigeria, Greece, Turkey, South Africa, Canada, etc (at least 24 countries in five continents).--IranitGreenberg (talk) 11:45, 13 May 2013 (UTC)[reply]
Proof, if it were needed, that you did not understand my point, misread what I said and worst of all, failed to read the articles you scooped up. Having said this is not a blog for lies, you then indulge in both. This is not the place for that, but since you wish for enlightenment I'll provide a short reading list for your page, which illustrates my point about Israel's routinization of terror. Goodbye Nishidani (talk) 17:04, 13 May 2013 (UTC)[reply]

Lead

Syrian artillery attacks against Israeli settlements in the vicinity of the border followed by Israeli response against Syrian positions in the Golan Heights and encroachments of increasing intensity and frequency (initiated by Israel) into the demilitarized zones along the Syrian border.

If that means anything, it is that the temporal order is

(i)Syria's artillery bombarded Israeli settlements in the vicinity of the border.
(ii) Israel responded against the artillery that had fired and against encroachments ..initiated by Israel into the demilitarized zone.
Complete nonsense, historically, conceptually and grammatically.Nishidani (talk) 13:54, 12 May 2013 (UTC)[reply]
Hi, I don't see why the sentence can't be read as saying that both the response and encroachments followed the atrillery attacks. But I see the ambiguity here, do you have a suggestion on how to re-word the sentence? --Dailycare (talk) 16:52, 12 May 2013 (UTC)[reply]
'Encroachment' in this context refers to unilateral Israeli encroachments over the armistice line, (which, on the eviction of Arab villagers, met with the Syrian artillery response). The qualifying parenthesis ('initiated by Israel') implies there were also Syrian encroachments. There weren't: they use Palestinian militants as proxies to retaliate, of course. These 'encroachments' over the armistice line into the demilitarized zone had gone on and off for well over a decade, with Arabs over wide swathes in that zone evicted. Our text abolishes history, and squeezes the encroachments of a decade into artillery attacks into Israeli settlements in the vicinity of the border, the last phrase euphemistically glossing over the whole process of encroaching over the demilitarized zone that long preceded the war. This collapses long term patterns and immediate casus belli incidents prior to the war into one sentence. These incidents have nothing to do with ther reasons and unreasons that led to war.
(Michael Prior Zionism and the State of Israel: A Moral Inquiry, ‎1999 p.196 on the 4 United Nations Security Council Resolutions over Israel's consistent breach of the northern armistice 1949-1967. None were passed against Syria); Norman Finkelstein, Image and Reality of the Israel Palestine Conflict, rev.ed. Verso, 2003 p.131.)
In an otherwise not very reliable account, in my view, Itamar Rabinovich does make a good point in writing:-
An uninterrupted cycle of violence was unleashed in which a clear distinction no longer existed between cause and effect. When Israeli tanks hit Syrian bulldozers implementing the Arab diversion scheme, Syria retaliated by sending a Palestinian terrorist squad through the territory of Jordan, to which Israel retaliated with an air raid, only to invite the Syrian response of laying a mine in the Israeli patrol road in the valley dominated by the Golan Heights' The Brink of Peace: The Israeli-Syrian Negotiations, Princeton University Press, ‎2009 p.20
I see that in the meantime the boy genius has just added another 'in response to sabotage acts aimed at Israeli targets'. Sabotage, when not of a peace plan, is destruction of a nation's property, usually in time of war. The genius manages to retrodate the outbreak of the June war, define shooting at encroachments in the demilitarized zone as damage to Israel's property. I.e. Israel attacked Syria because Syria had destroyed Israel's property outside of Israel during the war before the war broke out. Brilliant. (please note that 'response' is a wiki POV word used predominantly to define any Israeli act of war, all over the articles. Iranit added it again, so the lead has it twice (asociated with Israel), and the overall text now uses 'response'4/0/'responded' (3/1), seven times in Israel's favour with regard to Israeli military actions. Nasser responded by just a troop move before the war. Of such sneaky niceties are I/P articles written.Nishidani (talk) 20:10, 12 May 2013 (UTC)[reply]

Tractors, provocations in the DMZ

Ykantor. Looking at this edit I had the vague sense you might be conflating two distinct periods. The tractor episodes I always associate in my mind with the mid 1950s, not with the 1965-66 period. I checked Maoz, and what you cite on p.110 is correct, but that summarizes what he writes of more extensively on pp.102-104. On p.104 he writes:

While in the 1960s 'there is no evidence of a deliberate Israeli effort to encroach into the DMZs, the IDF did regard these areas as a Syrian soft spot and capitalized on this sensitivity to provoke a Syrian response. In this respect, Raban and Elazar emulated to a large extent Dayan's "deterioration" policy of late 1955.'

In other words, the tractor business relates to 1955 etc., whereas the Israeli provocations a decade later were of a different kind and order. To conflate these would be WP:OR.Nishidani (talk) 16:18, 10 June 2013 (UTC)[reply]

I appreciate that you check me, since it is important for me to be as reliable as possible. In this case, you can click the 1st source and read it yourself. It talks about the sixties, rather than the fifties. as I said. Ykantor (talk) 18:20, 10 June 2013 (UTC)[reply]
I reciprocate your sentiment (though I try not to 'check' (i.e. create obstacles editors) while 'checking' edits). My point was Maoz is used to introduce Israeli provocations 1965-6, and this is then followed by details from Rabil (pp.19-16). Maoz's point was that the tractor business was, per Dayan, characteristic of the mid-fifties, (p.110) and says evidence for deliberate Israeli encroachment into the DMZ is lacking for the 1960s. Your second source Rabil mentions the tractor business, relates it first to the 50s, but then says two such incidents occurred in December 1962, and August 1963. That means (a) there is a source conflict between Maoz and Rabil on this detail over what actually took place and (b) Rabil cites two incidents in 62 and 63, two years before the 1965-6 period the text is discussing concerning Israeli provocations. My impression is that you cannot write of provocations for 1965-6 by illustrating it with details that in either Maoz or Rabil, took place in the mid fifties and perhaps 1962-3. It's called WP:OR. I appreciate that you can edit in material for both sides in a conflict,-this is rare. While I generally edit to ensure a proper representation of Palestinians and their history I am also under an obligation, as here, to ensure Israel is not misrepresented. Nishidani (talk) 18:41, 10 June 2013 (UTC)[reply]
Zeev Maoz himself , in his book Paradoxes of War: On the Art of National Self Entrapment , Zeev Maoz - 1990, p. 124,125 talks about years 1964 to 1966.
Concerning edit for both side, it is OK in my opinion. Facts are facts, does not matter whether it present one of the sides in a good or bad light. We have to live with that. The problem arise when it is a conclusion or interpretation. e.g. who started the 1948 civil war ? In my opinion, the Arabs has started (although that was not their intention). I guess that in your opinion it was an escalation where it does not matter who shot first. you see, that is a problem.
Generally speaking, what for we need all those wars? At the 1st reliable Census at 1922 , there were about 1.2 million people in Palestine. At 1947 the number had increased to 1.8 million . Nowadays, there are about 12 million between the sea and the Jordan, and the Negev (about half of the country) is still nearly empty. (numbers from my memory only). There is sufficient space for all of us. Could not we live together without those wars? I can understand an Arab person who says: this my country and the Jews are foreigners. On the other hand, Jews had nowhere to go ( That is a sad chapter in History), and Israel is the only place , Jews were dreaming about, during thousands of years. . Each side should have accept reality and give up some of it's dreams. Ykantor (talk) 20:01, 10 June 2013 (UTC)[reply]
Sure, but having a piece of land registered in your own name expropriated because your DNA is not the one apparently given to the Chosen People, and all their collateral descendents or people who can convert to Judaism, from India to Peru (Incas!) and Ethiopia, and Russian Eurasia(300,000 non Jewish Russians) according to hearsay some 3400 years ago, makes happy coexistence a pipedream, one even without the blessing of marijuana. I'm fine with one eretz Israel/Palestine, as long as civil property law is applied without distinction, impartially to everyone who's born there. That will happen in about 2050, barring a really catastrophic. Patience.
To get back to the text. I don't think you construed my argument correctly. There is a contradiction in your edit caused by a conflict in the data in your two sources, which makes out that events related to 1955, 1962 and 1963 occurred in 1965, 1966. Have another look. Nishidani (talk) 20:30, 10 June 2013 (UTC)[reply]
My writing "On the other hand, Jews had nowhere to go ( That is a sad chapter in History), and Israel is the only place , Jews were dreaming about, during thousands of years." is relevant to the period before 1948.
Sorry,but I do not find any contradiction. The tractors provocations happens during roughly all the sixties ( there is no dealing with the fifties in this section). My 2 initial sources were Rabil and Murray & Viot.( and not Maoz). Rabil mentions the 2 incidents at 1962, 1963. Murray & Viot mentions vaguely the whole period between 1948 to 1967. Maoz talks about 1964 to 1966. None of them deny tractors incidents in other years. To my knowledge it happened all over the sixties.
BTW, IT was not always Israel who provoked first (albeit with tractors). Rabil says (p. 15) "UN officialls found fault with the policies of both Israel and Syria and often accused the 2 countries of destabilizing the Israeli-Syrian borders. Rabil explains that internal Syrian considerations, were the motivation behind Syrian actions at the Israeli border. Ykantor (talk) 13:01, 11 June 2013 (UTC)[reply]
Well, I give up. I've done my best to preserve Israeli historical objectivity in the face of an edit which, in my view, gives an inappropriately anti-Israel slant by confusing dates and statements. I'm very particular about the logic and evidentiary basis of statements and I can tell you, the paragraph as constituted does not report what the sources say, but conflates them, and distorts the facts regarding Israel. I personally consider there's not a shadow of doubt Israel's behaviour at that time worked to provoke war, as so often, ('act crazy, and scare the Arabs' was the cabinet catchcry in the 1950s,'Israel must be like a mad dog, too dangerous to bother', Moshe Dayan) but that's not the point. The point is getting the order of facts and incidents correctly described per sources. I may be wrong. Plenty of people watch this page, and if they wish to reexamine this, they'll either confirm your impression, or back mine. Let's see.Nishidani (talk) 16:02, 11 June 2013 (UTC)[reply]
I am sorry that I left such an impression (concerning the tractors provocations), since that really happened ( together with some "provocation" of Israeli boats in Tiberias lake that came close to the Syrian side and were shot by the Syrians.)
concerning your "Israel's behaviour at that time worked to provoke war" , it is not a black & white image but a gray one. e.g. About 10 days before the 6 days war started, Ben Gurion blamed Rabin, the chief of staff, that he caused the war , by heating up the Syrian border. The prime minister, Eshkol, was definitely against war, but he was a weak defense minister (too) that gave the army too much power. Most of the generals wanted a war, but in my opinion, Rabin himself did not want ( although he heated the Syrian border). The government and Rabin, remembered the 1956 war, in which the U.S have forced Israel to retreat. They realized that in a case of successful war, it might happen again, and if IDF will fail, then it could be the end of Israel (Unlike the Arab states, who can "afford" to fail). So, when the situation got worse (end of May 1967) Eshkol stopped the eager generals from stating the war, since he was afraid of the American response. Eventually the government decided for a war, only after the U.S. president Johnson, realized that the U.S cannot fulfill it's signed promise to open the Tiran straights. ( BTW Johnson was crossed when he learned that Israel attacked first, and put an embargo on arms supplies to Israel).
It is difficult to believe , but the people in Israel where extremely worried before the war. People were very gloomy, some rich people left overseas, some U.S. / European relatives offered their Israeli family to send them the at least the kids. The Jewish Rabbi's has marked the edges of huge temporary cemeteries ( actually all the public parks were converted). Israeli farmers who happened to have an Arab worker, heard that those workers has already decided among themselves, who will "inherit" which farm. If you find it interesting, I have more to say. Ykantor (talk) 18:00, 11 June 2013 (UTC)[reply]
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