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((Short description|Philosophical study of value))
((Philosophy sidebar))
'''Axiology''' (from [[Ancient Greek|Greek]] ((lang|grc|[[wiktionary:ἀξία|ἀξία]])), ''axia'': "value, worth"; and ((lang|grc|[[wiktionary:-λογία|-λογία]])), ''[[wiktionary:-logia|-logia]]'': "study of") is the [[Philosophy|philosophical]] study of [[value (ethics)|value]].  It includes questions about the nature and classification of values and about what kinds of things have value. It is intimately connected with various other philosophical fields that crucially depend on the notion of value, like [[ethics]], [[aesthetics]] or [[philosophy of religion]].<ref>((cite book |last1=Flew |first1=Antony |title=A Dictionary of Philosophy Editorial Consultant, Antony Flew. – |date=1979 |publisher=Macmillan |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/FLEADO-2 |chapter=Axiology))</ref><ref>[http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/axiology ''Random House Unabridged Dictionary'' Entry on Axiology.]</ref> It is also closely related to [[value theory]] and [[meta-ethics]]. The term was first used by [[Eduard von Hartmann]] in 1887<ref>((cite book |last=Hartmann |first=Eduard |title=Philosophie des Schönen |publisher= |year=1887 |location=Berlin))</ref> and by Paul Lapie in 1902.<ref>((cite book|last=Lapie|first=Paul|title=Logique de la volonté|url=https://archive.org/details/cihm_87792|year=1902|publisher=F. Alcan|location=Paris|isbn=9780665877926 ))</ref><ref>((Cite web|url=http://www.infotaste.com/axiology-and-aesthetics/|title=Axiology and aesthetics - article|website=www.infotaste.com|date=14 November 2016 ))</ref><ref>((Cite journal |last=Hart |first=Samuel L. |date=1971 |title=Axiology--Theory of Values |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2105883 |journal=Philosophy and Phenomenological Research |volume=32 |issue=1 |pages=29–41 |doi=10.2307/2105883 |jstor=2105883 |issn=0031-8205))</ref>

The distinction between ''intrinsic'' and ''extrinsic'' value is central to axiology.<ref>((Cite book|last1=Dicken|first1=Thomas M.|title=Dialogues on Values and Centers of Value: Old Friends, New Thoughts|last2=Edwards|first2=Rem Blanchard|publisher=Rodopi|year=2001|isbn=90-420-1397-4|location=Amsterdam|pages=283|language=en))</ref> One conceptualization holds that something is ''intrinsically valuable'' if it is ''good in itself'' or ''good for its own sake''.<ref>((Cite book|last=Keller|first=David R.|title=Environmental Ethics: The Big Questions|publisher=John Wiley & Sons|year=2010|isbn=978-1-4051-7639-2|location=Malden, MA|pages=5–6|language=en))</ref> It is usually held that intrinsic value ''depends'' on certain features of the valuable entity. For example, an experience may be said to be intrinsically valuable ''by virtue of'' being (because it is) pleasurable or beautiful or "true" (e.g., the ascertainment of a fact can be said to be valuable in itself). ''Extrinsic value'', by contrast, is ascribed to things that are valuable only as a ''means'' to something else. ''Substantive theories'' of value try to determine which entities have intrinsic value. ''Monist theories'' hold that there is only one type of intrinsic value. The paradigm example of monist theories is [[hedonism]], the thesis that only pleasure has intrinsic value. ''Pluralist theories'', on the other hand, contend that there are various different types of intrinsic value, for example, virtue, knowledge, friendship, etc. Value pluralists face the problem of explaining whether or how the different types of value can be compared when making rational decisions. Some philosophers state that values ''do not exist'' on the most fundamental level of reality. One such view holds that a value statement about something just expresses the speaker's approval or disapproval of this thing. This position is opposed by ''realists about value''.

==History==
((More citations needed|section|date=January 2009))
Between the 5th and 6th centuries BC, it was important in Greece to be knowledgeable if you were to be successful. Philosophers began to recognize that differences existed between the laws and morality of society. [[Socrates]] believed that knowledge had a vital connection to virtue, making morality and democracy closely intertwined. [[Socrates]]' student, [[Plato]] furthered the belief by establishing virtues which should be followed by all.

[[E. J. Dijksterhuis]] found that axiological [[antithesis]] characterized the [[philosophy of ancient Greece]]:<ref>E. J. Dijksterhuis (1961) [https://archive.org/details/e.j.dijksterhuisthemechanizationoftheworldpictureoxforduniversitypress1961/page/n1 The Mechanization of the World Picture] C. Dikshoorn translator, pages 75 & 75, via [[Internet Archive]]</ref>
((Blockquote|text=...typical Greek habit of thinking in axiological antitheses, of always wanting to decide which of two comparable activities, properties, or qualities is the higher, the better, the  nobler or the  more perfect. The Pythagoreans set the finite above the  infinite, the odd above the  even, the square above the rectangular, the male above the female. Plato never tires  of arguing how much superior ideas are to appearance. Aristotle contrasts the  imperfection of the sublunary sphere  with  the perfection of the celestial sphere. Thus uniform motion is also  superior to non-uniform motion, a regular polyhedron  is of greater value than any other polyhedron but is itself surpassed by  the sphere.))

As with the fall of Rome so values became more individual and personal, causing [[skeptic]] schools of thought to flourish, helping to shape an [[ontologically]] objective philosophy that is thought to have contributed to [[Christian Philosophy]]. During the medieval period, [[Thomas Aquinas]] made the distinction between natural and supernatural (theological) virtues. This concept led philosophers to distinguish between judgments based on fact and judgments based on values, creating the division between science and philosophy.<ref name="autogenerated70">Arneson, P. (2009). Axiology. In S. Littlejohn, & K. Foss (Eds.), Encyclopedia of communication theory. (pp. 70-74). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc.</ref>

== Intrinsic value ==
Traditionally, philosophers held that an entity has ''intrinsic value'' if it is ''good in itself'' or ''good for its own sake''.<ref>((cite book |last1=Honderich |first1=Ted |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy |date=2005 |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/HONTOC-2 |chapter=good-in-itself))</ref><ref>((cite book |last1=Borchert |first1=Donald M. |title=Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd Edition |date=2006 |publisher=Macmillan |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/MONMEO-3 |chapter=Intrinsic Value))</ref> ''Intrinsic value'' is contrasted with ''extrinsic or instrumental value'', which is ascribed to things that are valuable only as a ''means'' to something else.<ref name="Schroeder">((cite web |last1=Schroeder |first1=Mark |title=Value Theory |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-theory/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=8 December 2020 |date=2016))</ref> For example, tools like cars or microwaves are said to be extrinsically valuable by virtue of the function they perform, while the well-being they cause is intrinsically valuable, according to [[hedonism]]. The same entity can be valuable in different ways: some entities have both intrinsic and extrinsic values at the same time. Extrinsic values can form chains, in which one entity is extrinsically valuable because it is a means to another entity that is itself extrinsically valuable. It is commonly held that these chains must terminate somewhere and that the endpoint can only be intrinsically valuable.<ref name="Zimmerman">((cite web |last1=Zimmerman |first1=Michael J. |last2=Bradley |first2=Ben |title=Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-intrinsic-extrinsic/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=8 December 2020 |date=2019))</ref> The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic values is important for understanding various disagreements within axiology. Different substantive theories of value often agree on whether something, for example knowledge, is valuable while disagreeing on whether the value in question is intrinsic or extrinsic.<ref name="Schroeder" /><ref name="Heathwood">((cite book |last1=Heathwood |first1=Chris |title=The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory |date=2015 |publisher=Oxford University Press USA |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/HIROHO |chapter=8. Monism and Pluralism about Value))</ref>

The traditional conception of intrinsic value presented above has been criticized in contemporary philosophy on the grounds that it combines various distinct notions that are better discussed separately.<ref name="Orsi2">((cite book |last1=Orsi |first1=Francesco |title=Value Theory |date=2015 |publisher=Bloomsbury Academic |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/ORSVT |chapter=2. Meet the Values: Intrinsic, Final & Co))</ref> One such contrast is between ''intrinsic'' and ''final'' values.<ref name="Rønnow-Rasmussen">((cite book |last1=Rønnow-Rasmussen |first1=Toni |title=The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory |date=2015 |publisher=Oxford University Press USA |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/HIROHO |chapter=2. Intrinsic and extrinsic value))</ref> On a more narrow conception, an ''intrinsic'' value is a value an entity has in virtue of its [[Intrinsic and extrinsic properties (philosophy)|intrinsic properties]]. For example, assuming that the phenomenal aspect of a pleasant experience is an intrinsic property, we might say that the experience is intrinsically valuable because of this intrinsic property. An entity with ''final'' value, by contrast, is valuable for its own sake.<ref name="Rønnow-Rasmussen"/> It is usually accepted that there is a conceptual difference between intrinsic and final values.<ref name="Orsi2"/> For example, the pleasure experience may be said to be intrinsically valuable on the one hand, and finally valuable on the other hand. But it has been disputed whether there are actual things where these value types can come apart. Proposed candidates for bearers of final non-intrinsic value include unique or rare items (e.g. a stamp) or historically significant items (e.g. the pen that Abraham Lincoln used to sign the Emancipation Proclamation).<ref name="Zimmerman" /> ''Being-rare'' and ''having-been-used-by-someone'' are ''extrinsic'' properties that may be responsible for their bearers having ''final'' value, i.e. being valuable for their own sake.

Some philosophers have questioned whether extrinsic values should be regarded as values at all rather than as mere indications of values.<ref>((cite book |last1=Zimmerman |first1=Michael J. |title=The Nature of Intrinsic Value |date=2001 |publisher=Rowman & Littlefield |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/ZIMTNO-2 |chapter=Appendix: Extrinsic Value))</ref> One reason for considering this idea is that adding or removing extrinsically valuable things does not affect the value of the whole if all intrinsically valuable things are kept constant.<ref name="Zimmerman" /> For example, the [[2011 Tōhoku earthquake]] had a negative extrinsic value because of all the damage it caused. But arguably, the world would not have been a better place if exactly the same damage had been caused without the earthquake.

== Ontological status of values ==
In axiology, it is often important to distinguish between the entity that is valuable and the features in virtue of which it is valuable.<ref name="Orsi1">((cite book |last1=Orsi |first1=Francesco |title=Value Theory |date=2015 |publisher=Bloomsbury Academic |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/ORSVT |chapter=1. Value and Normativity))</ref> For example, an experience may be said to be valuable in virtue of being pleasurable. This distinction is particularly relevant for intrinsic values since it is commonly held that the intrinsic value of an entity [[Supervenience|supervenes]] on its intrinsic features.<ref name="Rønnow-Rasmussen"/><ref>((cite book |last1=Bunnin |first1=Nicholas |last2=Yu |first2=Jiyuan |title=The Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy |date=2009 |publisher=Wiley |isbn=978-0-470-99721-5 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=OskKWI1YA7AC |language=en |chapter=value, intrinsic))</ref><ref>((cite book |last1=Audi |first1=Robert |title=The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy |publisher=Cambridge University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/AUDTCD-2 |chapter=value|year=1999 ))</ref> This means that the entity could not have a different intrinsic value unless it had different intrinsic features.

Substantive theories of value focus on the features in virtue of which something has intrinsic value.<ref name="Schroeder"/><ref name="Heathwood"/> Popular candidates for these features include pleasure, virtue and knowledge. Another question concerns the nature of the entities that are the bearers of value. The main approaches to this question can be divided into the [[Kantianism|Kantian]] tradition, which considers concrete things like [[persons]] to be the bearers of value, and the [[G.e. Moore|Moorean]] tradition, which holds that only [[states of affairs]] bear value.<ref name="Rønnow-Rasmussen"/><ref name="Orsi2"/><ref>((cite journal |last1=Bradley |first1=Ben |title=Two Concepts of Intrinsic Value |journal=Ethical Theory and Moral Practice |date=2006 |volume=9 |issue=2 |pages=111–130 |doi=10.1007/s10677-006-9009-7 |s2cid=144778528 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BRATCO-45))</ref> This difference is important when determining whether a value is extrinsic or intrinsic to an entity. Some philosophers hold that objects like Napoleon's hat are valuable because of their relation to extraordinary persons. From a Kantian perspective, this value must be extrinsic since it is based on the extrinsic property of having been worn by an extraordinary person. But from a Moorean perspective, it can be intrinsic since it is born not by the hat but by a state of affairs involving both the hat and Napoleon.<ref name="Orsi2"/>

The preceding discussion about the ontological categories of values and value-bearers assumes some form of [[Philosophical realism|realism]]: that there actually are valuable things. But the difficulties in reaching [[Scientific consensus|expert consensus]] in value-related fields like ethics, aesthetics or politics and considerations from [[Naturalism (philosophy)|naturalism]] have led various philosophers to doubt this assumption.<ref name="van Roojen"/> The ensuing dispute between [[Cognitivism (ethics)|cognitivists]] and [[Non-cognitivism|non-cognitivists]] is usually held on the level of value-statements or value-attitudes, either concerning all values or specifically concerning ethical values. Cognitivists assert that value-statements are ''truth-apt'', i.e. are either true or false, which is denied by non-cognitivists.<ref name="Craig">((cite book |last1=Craig |first1=Edward |title=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |date=1996 |publisher=Routledge |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BEAREO |chapter=Value, ontological status of))</ref><ref name="van Roojen">((cite web |last1=van Roojen |first1=Mark |title=Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-cognitivism/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=10 December 2020 |date=2018))</ref> Most cognitivists are realists about values: they believe that values are part of reality. [[Error theory]], as originally articulated by [[J. L. Mackie]],<ref>((cite book |last1=Mackie |first1=John Leslie |title=Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong |date=1977 |publisher=Penguin Books |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/MACEIR))</ref> is an exception. Error theorists hold that all value-statements are false, and thereby truth-apt, because the world lacks value-features that would be needed to make them true.<ref>((cite book |last1=Blackburn |first1=Simon |title=Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd Edition |date=2006 |publisher=Macmillan |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/MONMEO-3 |chapter=Error theory of ethics))</ref> Non-cognitivists, on the other hand, go one step further by denying that value-statements are truth-apt. This position involves the difficulty of explaining how value-statements can be meaningful despite lacking a truth value. This challenge can be met in different ways. [[Emotivism|Emotivists]], following [[A. J. Ayer]], state that value-statements only express the emotions of the speaker and are intended to influence the actions of the listener.<ref>((cite book |last1=Finlay |first1=Stephen |title=Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd Edition |date=2006 |publisher=Macmillan |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/MONMEO-3 |chapter=Emotive theory of ethics))</ref> [[Prescriptivism (philosophy)|Prescriptivism]], as developed by [[R. M. Hare]], interprets value-statements as imperatives or commands.<ref>((cite book |last1=Carson |first1=Thomas L. |title=Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd Edition |date=2006 |publisher=Macmillan |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/MONMEO-3 |chapter=Metaethics))</ref> [[Simon Blackburn]]'s [[quasi-realism]] states that value statements project emotional attitudes as though they were real properties.<ref name="Craig"/><ref>((cite web |last1=Joyce |first1=Richard |title=Moral Anti-Realism > Projectivism and Quasi-realism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-anti-realism/projectivism-quasi-realism.html |website=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=10 December 2020 |archive-date=1 May 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200501120536/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-anti-realism/projectivism-quasi-realism.html |url-status=dead ))</ref>

== Monism and pluralism ==
Substantive theories of value try to determine which entities have ''intrinsic value''. A traditional dispute in this field is between ''monist'' and ''pluralist'' theories. According to Chris Heathwood, monism and pluralism can be distinguished according to an evaluation of what is good in people and the concept of "value simpliciter" in terms of intrinsic value.<ref>((Cite book|last1=Hirose|first1=Iwao|title=The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory|last2=Olson|first2=Jonas|publisher=Oxford University Press|year=2015|isbn=978-0-19-995930-3|location=New York|pages=4|language=en))</ref> 

Monist theories hold that there is only one type of intrinsic value. The paradigm example of monist theories is [[hedonism]], the thesis that only pleasure has intrinsic value. Pluralist theories, on the other hand, contend that there are various different types of intrinsic value.<ref name="Schroeder" /><ref name="Mason">((cite web |last1=Mason |first1=Elinor |title=Value Pluralism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-pluralism/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=9 December 2020 |date=2018))</ref><ref>((cite book |last1=Frankena |first1=William K. |title=Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd Edition |date=2006 |publisher=Macmillan |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/MONMEO-3 |chapter=Value and Valuation))</ref>  They maintain that these types of intrinsic values cannot be reduced to a single feature of an act or entity.<ref>((Cite book|last=Peterson|first=Martin|title=The Dimensions of Consequentialism: Ethics, Equality and Risk|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=2013|isbn=978-1-107-03303-0|location=Cambridge, UK|pages=6|language=en))</ref> [[W. D. Ross]], for example, holds that pleasure is only one type of intrinsic value besides other types, like knowledge.<ref name="Heathwood" /> It is important to keep in mind that this disagreement only concerns ''intrinsic'' value, not value ''at large''.<ref name="Schroeder" /> So hedonists may be happy to concede that knowledge is valuable, but only extrinsically so, given that knowledge can be helpful in causing pleasure and avoiding pain.

Various arguments have been suggested in the monism-pluralism-dispute. Common-sense seems to favor value pluralism: values are ascribed to a wide range of different things like happiness, liberty, friendship, etc. without any obvious common feature underlying these values.<ref name="Mason" /> One way to defend value monism is to cast doubt on the reliability of common-sense for technical matters like the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic value.<ref name="Smart"/> This strategy is pursued by [[J. J. C. Smart]], who holds that there is a psychological bias to mistake stable extrinsic values for intrinsic values.<ref name="Smart">((cite book |last1=Smart |first1=J. J. C. |last2=Williams |first2=Bernard |title=Utilitarianism: For and Against |date=1973 |publisher=Cambridge: Cambridge University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/SMAUFA-3 |chapter=3. Hedonistic and non-hedonistic utilitarianism))</ref> Value pluralists have often attempted to provide exhaustive lists of all value types, but different theorists have suggested very different lists. These lists seem to constitute arbitrary selections unless a clear criterion could be provided why all and only these items are included. But if a criterion was to be found then such a theory would no longer be pluralistic. This dilemma suggests that pluralism is inadequate as an explanation.<ref name="Heathwood" />

One issue closely related to the monism-pluralism-debate is the problem of [[Commensurability (ethics)|incommensurability]]: the question of whether there are incommensurable values. Two values are ''incommensurable'' if there is no fact as to whether one is better than or as good as the other: there is ''no common value scale'' according to which they could be compared.<ref name="Mason"/><ref>((cite journal |last1=Raz |first1=Joseph |title=VII—Value Incommensurability: Some Preliminaries |journal=Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society |date=1986 |volume=86 |issue=1 |pages=117–134 |doi=10.1093/aristotelian/86.1.117 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/RAZVIS-2))</ref> According to [[Joseph Raz]], career choices between very different paths, for example, whether to become a lawyer or a clarinetist, are cases where incommensurable values are involved.<ref name="Hsieh">((cite web |last1=Hsieh |first1=Nien-hê |title=Incommensurable Values |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-incommensurable/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |date=2016))</ref> Value pluralists often assert that values belonging to different types are incommensurable with each other. Value monists, by contrast, usually deny that there are incommensurable values. This question is particularly relevant for ethics. If different options available to the agent embody incommensurable values then there seems to be no rational way to determine what ought to be done since there is no matter of fact as to which option is better.<ref name="Mason"/> Widespread incommensurability would threaten to undermine the practical relevance of ethics and rational choice.

== Other concepts and distinctions ==
Many evaluative terms are found in everyday language, often with various different meanings.<ref name="Schroeder"/> It is important for philosophers to distinguish these different meanings in order to avoid misunderstandings. One such distinction is between a ''predicative'' and an ''attributive'' sense of good and bad.<ref name="Orsi1"/> In the ''attributive'' sense, an entity is good in relation to a certain kind.<ref name="Zimmerman2"/> For example, a person with a clear voice may be a good singer or a knife with a blunt edge may be a bad knife. But this still leaves it open whether the entity in question is good or bad in an ''unqualified'' or ''predicative'' sense. For example, a person may be a bad assassin but being bad as an assassin is not bad in a predicative sense.<ref>((cite journal |last1=Silverstein |first1=Matthew |title=Teleology and Normativity |journal=Oxford Studies in Metaethics |date=2016 |volume=11 |pages=214–240 |doi=10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198784647.003.0009 |isbn=978-0-19-878464-7 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/SILTAN-3))</ref> Axiology is usually interested in the predicative sense of goodness.<ref name="Orsi3">((cite book |last1=Orsi |first1=Francesco |title=Value Theory |date=2015 |publisher=Bloomsbury Academic |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/ORSVT |chapter=3. The Challenge against Absolute Value))</ref> But some philosophers deny that such a sense exists and therefore hold that all value is relative to a kind.<ref name="Zimmerman2"/>

A second important distinction is that between ''being good for a person'' and ''being good for the world''.<ref name="Schroeder"/><ref name="Orsi1"/> ''Being good for a person'' or ''prudential value'' has to do with this person's welfare or [[well-being]].<ref>((cite book |last1=Tiberius |first1=Valerie |title=The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory |date=2015 |publisher=Oxford University Press USA |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/HIROHO |chapter=9. Prudential Value))</ref><ref name="Zimmerman2"/> But what is good for one person may be bad for another person. For example, having a dry summer may be good for the hiker in virtue of the pleasant hiking conditions, but bad for the farmer, whose crop is dying because of a lack of water. In such cases, the question arises as to what is ''good for the world'' or ''good simpliciter''. [[Utilitarians]] can solve this problem by defining the ''good for the world'' as the sum of the ''good for each persons''.<ref name="Schroeder"/>

Philosophers often distinguish between ''evaluative concepts'' (like ''good'' or ''bad'') and ''deontic concepts'' (like ''right'', ''fitting'' or ''ought'').<ref name="Zimmerman2">((cite book |last1=Zimmerman |first1=Michal J. |title=The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory |date=2015 |publisher=Oxford University Press USA |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/HIROHO |chapter=1. Value and Normativity))</ref> The former belong to axiology proper and express what has worth or value while the latter belong to ethics (and related fields) and express what one ought to do.<ref>((cite book |last1=Tappolet |first1=Christine |title=International Encyclopedia of Ethics |date=2013 |publisher=Wiley-Blackwell |pages=1791–99 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/TAPEVD |chapter=Evaluative Vs. Deontic Concepts))</ref> Philosophers have tried to provide a unified account of these two fields since they seem to be intimately related. [[Consequentialism|Consequentialists]] see evaluative concepts as fundamental and define deontic concepts in terms of evaluative concepts. ''Fitting-attitude theories'', on the other hand, try to reduce evaluative concepts to deontic concepts.<ref name="Schroeder"/> ''Consequentialism'' is an ethical theory that holds that, given a certain set of possible actions, we ought to perform the action that has the best overall consequences.<ref>((cite web |last1=Sinnott-Armstrong |first1=Walter |title=Consequentialism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |date=2019))</ref> So what we ought to do is defined in evaluative terms: whatever leads to the consequences with the highest value. ''Fitting-attitude theories'' are axiological theories that define the value of something in terms of the attitude that would be ''fitting'' to have towards this thing,<ref name="Schroeder"/><ref>((cite web |last1=Jacobson |first1=Daniel |title=Fitting Attitude Theories of Value |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fitting-attitude-theories/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |date=2011))</ref> for example, that it would be good to find a cure for cancer because this would be a fitting object of desire. These accounts build on the deontic notion that some of our attitudes towards the world are ''fitting'' or ''right'' to define what is ''good''.<ref name="Zimmerman2"/>

==See also==
*((annotated link|Axiological ethics))
*((annotated link|Fact–value distinction))
*((annotated link|Praxeology))
*((annotated link|Nikolay Lossky))
*((annotated link|Money))
*((annotated link|Nihilism))
*((annotated link|List of Russian philosophers|Russian philosophy))
*((annotated link|Utility))
*((annotated link|Value (economics)))
*((annotated link|Value (ethics)))
*[[Value-form]]

==References==
((Reflist))

==Further reading==
* ((cite book
 |last=Hartman
 |first= Robert S.
 | author-link = Robert S. Hartman
 |title=The Structure of Value
 |year=1967
 |publisher=USI Press
)) 384 pages.
* ((cite book
 |last=Findlay
 |first=J. N.
 |author-link=J. N. Findlay
 |title=Axiological Ethics
 |publisher=Macmillan
 |location=New York
 |year=1970
 |isbn=0-333-00269-5
 |url-access=registration
 |url=https://archive.org/details/axiologicalethic0000find
 )) 100 pages.
* ((cite book
 |last=Rescher |first=Nicholas
 | author-link = Nicholas Rescher
 |title=Value Matters: Studies in Axiology
 |publisher=Ontos Verlag
 |location=Frankfurt
 |year=2005
 |isbn=3-937202-67-6
)) 140 pages.
* Marías, Julián (1967). ''History of Philosophy''. New York: Dover Publications, Inc.

==External links==
((Wiktionary))
* ((cite SEP |url-id=value-theory |title=Value Theory))
* [http://www.pdcnet.org/cultura Cultura: International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology]
* [http://www.axiology.org.uk/ Axiology.org.uk]
* [https://philpapers.org/s/axiology Axiology] at [[PhilPapers]]

((Philosophy topics))
((Ethics))
((Aesthetics))
((Authority control))

[[Category:Axiology| ]]
[[Category:Concepts in aesthetics]]
[[Category:Concepts in ethics]]
[[Category:Concepts in metaphysics]]
[[Category:Descriptive ethics]]
[[Category:Metaethics]]
[[Category:Metaphilosophy]]

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Axiological ethics (edit)
Axiology (edit)
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