Carlo-francoism (Spanish: carlofranquismo, also carlo-franquismo) was a branch of Carlism which actively engaged in the regime of Francisco Franco. Though mainstream Carlism retained independent stand, many Carlist militants on their own assumed various roles in the Francoist system, e.g. as members of the FET y de las JONS executive, Cortes procuradores, or civil governors. The Traditionalist political faction of the Francoist regime issued from Carlism particularly held tight control over the Ministry of Justice. They have never formed an organized structure, their dynastical allegiances remained heterogeneous and their specific political objectives might have differed. Within the Francoist power strata, the carlo-francoists remained a minority faction that controlled some 5% of key posts; they failed to shape the regime and at best served as counter-balance to other groupings competing for power.
In Spanish the term appears in scientific narrative,[1] though it is mostly used as a derogatory designation intended to stigmatize and abuse;[2] the related name of carlofranquistas has filtered out from Spanish historiography[3] and public discourse[4] into the English academic language.[5] Alternative terms used are “carlistas colaboracionistas”,[6] “carlistas unificados”,[7] “carlismo franquista”,[8] “tradicionalistas pro-franquistas”,[9] “pseudotradicionalistas franquistas”,[10] “carlo-falangistas”,[11] “carlo-fascistas”,[12] "tradicionalistas del Movimiento",[13] “tacitistas”[14] or "carloenchufistas",[15] usually highly abusive and disparaging. There is no obvious corresponding but non-partisan term available.
Carlism, the movement born in the 1830s, during the following 100 years became known for rigid, die-hard, adamant stand – by supporters hailed as virtuous principled consistency and by opponents ridiculed as backwater fanaticism – rather than for political compromise and give-and-take alliances.[16] The movement has always prided itself in totally independent, unaligned status. At different points in time it absorbed various political groupings, like the so-called apostólicos in the 1830s or the so-called neocatólicos in the 1860s, rather than joined alliances with others.[17] In fact, periodically surfacing temptations to form broad coalitions were usually quashed and resulted in secessions, like in case of the so-called pidalistas in the 1870s or the so-called mellistas in the 1920s.[18] Even mild and provisional attempts to co-ordinate political strategy within the monarchist camp generated enormous internal resistance and were eventually abandoned, like in case of the so-called TYRE in the mid-1930s.[19]
Until the late 19th century the Traditionalists viewed the army as a backbone of godless state, ravaged by liberalism, masonry and secularism;[20] this approach started to change in the 1880s. While highly suspicious of other parties and unwilling to engage in political trade-offs, since the late 19th century Carlism was increasingly looking towards the military as to a potential partner on the path towards seizing power. Encouraged by the rise of Boulangism in France, they started to hope for a general who would be prepared to carry out a conservative coup d’état; in such case, they were ready to lend him their support.[21] Throughout the next few decades these speculations focused on a few individuals, like Polavieja, Weyler, Primo de Rivera or Sanjurjo. In most cases these schemes eventually failed,[22] though in the early summer of 1936 the Carlists managed to close a vague and ambiguous deal with general Emilio Mola, chief engineer of the military anti-Republican conspiracy; the agreement sealed their access to the military coup of July 1936.[23]
During first months of the Civil War the Traditionalists viewed the anti-Republican coalition as sort of a Carlist-military alliance; they were increasingly baffled by the rise of general Franco, who in apparent disregard of earlier agreements started to consolidate power and to marginalize all independent political groupings.[24] When in early 1937 he started to make hints about amalgamation of existing organizations into one party, supposed to unite all patriotic individuals, the Carlists were left disoriented. On the one hand, they appreciated the need for political unity as means of winning the war; some of their earlier documents have actually advocated that all parties get dissolved and a common patriotic front be created, most likely themselves assuming the leading role.[25] On the other hand, they feared that in a united amalgam controlled by the military they would either lose political identity or get maneuvered into a minority position.[26] During a series of meetings between February and April 1937 the Carlist executive proved split in two. The faction led by Rodezno advocated compliance and suggested the Traditionalists take part in buildup of an anticipated unified organization; the faction led by Fal suggested non-participation.[27] Eventually the former prevailed and the regent-claimant grudgingly provided his consent to enter unification talks.[28]
In April 1937 it turned out that there would be no negotiations about conditions of merger into the new monopolist party.[30] Franco and Serrano have designed the unification terms themselves; the Carlists were barely consulted, and they learnt about emergence of Falange Española Tradicionalista from the official decree.[31] Their own organization, Comunión Tradicionalista, was declared amalgamated into FET together with Falange Española and all other individuals willing to join. Program of the new party was modeled after original national-syndicalist principles of Falange, with little if any attention paid to traditional Carlist outlook.[32] The 10-member FET executive, nominated by Franco, included five Falangists, four Carlists and one Alfonsist.[33] Where possible, authorities staged public demonstrations of unity: joint parades, marches and rallies. The new state party soon started to seize assets of pre-unification parties, like newspapers, buildings or bank accounts. The Francoist administration made it clear that non-compliance was not a viable option.[34]
Despite official pressure, the Carlist command continued to operate as leadership of independent political grouping. Though executive bodies like Junta Nacional Carlista de Guerra ceased to meet, by means of semi-clandestine pre-war territorial structures or informal communication networks the Traditionalists tried to save their property from takeover by FET and to retain own political identity of the movement.[35] Their attitude towards the unificated state party and the emerging Francoist regime was highly ambiguous; falling short of explicit opposition, it amounted to marginal controlled participation. It seemed that the Carlist executive were prepared to put up with unification as a limited, temporary measure, acceptable for duration of the war.[36]Don Javier authorized selected individuals to enter FET command structures but he expulsed from Carlism these who took positions without his consent.[37] In case of major administrative jobs like civil governors or mayors of large cities the Comunión leaders welcomed appointments of their men given the individuals in question kept working for the cause and do not abandon the Traditionalist outlook.[38]
It soon turned out that the process of controlled Carlist participation in Francoist structures was not manageable. As the emerging new system was taking shape, more and more Traditionalist militants were accepting positions in various structures not seeking any formal authorization or informal approval on part of their leaders.[39] Some of them retained close links with Carlist structures, some merely cultivated selected Carlist relations, and some preferred to discontinue their Carlist engagements. In their new party and state roles some actively promoted Traditionalism e.g. by means of propaganda or personal appointments, some strictly stuck to the official "unificated" line, and some turned into zealous new Falangists, advancing national-syndicalism and at times engineering anti-Traditionalist measures.[40] In the late 1930s and early 1940s it was already clear that a significant section of Carlism was actively engaged in development of Francoism.[41] Though internally heterogeneous, this group emerged as a visible component of the Spanish political scene. It was distinct from other currents forming the regime, like pre-war Falangists, Alfonsists or generic conservatives. It was also distinct from independent Carlism, which continued to operate on the verge of legality, beyond the official political framework and at times assuming recalcitrant, if not openly opposing stance versus the regime.[42]
Mechanisms of recruitment
FET training camp
Some authors lambasted carlo-francoists as traitors pure and simple.[43] In such case they were usually presented as people who betrayed Traditionalism for the sake of their own, personal interest, which either took shape of political power or translated into wealth and material gain.[44] Other scholars agree that numerous individuals have probably joined due to opportunism and careerism; they concluded that active engagement in Francoist structures would improve their personal lot, and that non-participation would harm their position.[45] However, there were also numerous political mechanisms responsible for Carlist access.
In the late 1930s and early 1940s many individuals joined because of bewilderment or disorientation. Some believed that Carlist leadership willingly entered the unification path.[46] Some concluded that with death of Alfonso Carlos and new polarization caused by the Civil War, Carlism was to melt down in a new political amalgam, possibly embodied in the emerging Francoist state.[47] Some viewed the regime as a temporary framework, needed for duration of the war only and to be dismantled afterwards.[48] Some believed that Carlism might maintain its political identity within the Francoist structures, and some thought that it could even dominate the regime and sideline competitive factions.[49]
In the mid-1940s within Carlism emerged a current named Carloctavismo, centred around a new claimant to the throne;[50] it is not agreed whether he was an independent political agent or a figurehead, manipulated by Franco.[51]Carloctavistas placed all their bets on the regime, either with the intention to outsmart the dictator or in genuine hope of a monarchist-Francoist merger; in some regions of Spain they formed a large fraction of Traditionalists and might have even outnumbered the mainstream Javieristas.[52] With unexpected death of the pretender in 1953, the current gradually dried out, though some of its representatives were active until the late 1960s.[53]
In the mid-1950s mainstream Carlism changed its stand versus Francoism; non-participation bordering opposition gave way to cautious engagement and rapprochement with the regime.[54] The movement returned to the earlier controlled access strategy and its members,[55] including top leaders, started to aspire to official posts;[56] the process produced another wave of Carlists landing jobs within state, party and media structures.[57] It lost momentum in the early 1960s, when Traditionalist executive realized that the path would not lead them to power and that Franco was determined to contain the movement in minority positions.
Since the mid-1960s another mechanism of recruitment started to operate. At the time Carlism was increasingly subject to internal power strife between Traditionalists and the progressist faction of Carlos Hugo; the latter were gaining the upper hand. Some of those sidetracked or leaving willingly were determined to restrain the carlo-huguistas by all means possible, including an alliance with the regime.[58] Also Franco, the master of balancing game, started to lure disappointed Traditionalists into his camp. The result was a group of Carlists, including most recognized individuals, assuming prestigious posts in official structures.[59] The process continued until the early 1970s; some of these late carlo-francoists soon withdrew into the back row,[60] but some assumed key roles and in the mid-1970s they were among leaders of the so-called hardline Francoist bunker.[61]
Modes of engagement
official feast; note Carlist emblem
During primer franquismo many Carlists who joined the regime structures remained totally committed to the Traditionalist cause; they did their best to promote Carlism at the expense of Falangist syndicalism.[62] These attempts have generated resistance, typically either on part of the military or the Falangists; castigated as attempts to build local “Carlist fiefdoms”,[63] they invariably led to counter-action and individuals in question being usually[64] either ousted[65] or marginalized;[66] some resigned on their own.[67] There were two exceptions, though. In Navarre the Traditionalists managed to mount successful opposition to falangisation of the province and achieved sort of a balance of power.[68] Except the late 1940s, also the Ministry of Justice remained dominated by the Carlists, who controlled not only mid-level posts but also institutions dependent on the ministry.[69] Some 30 years later a distinct group of committed Carlists competed for seats in the Cortes; their objective was to dismantle the system from within.[70]
Another attitude adopted was clinging to Carlist outlook as long as it did not stand in the way of political career and did not generate major controversy. Individuals in question could have attended Traditionalism-flavored feasts (though not independent Carlist political rallies), sponsored or otherwise supported Traditionalism-flavored periodicals, appointed moderate, non-belligerent Carlists to jobs which remained under their control, openly admitted in the press their Traditionalist background and mindset, or at times even visibly saturated official ceremonies with Carlist essence,[71] though all this always within limits permitted by sense of loyalty to Franco and the regime.[72] With sufficient degree of skill and craft, such tactics could have worked, either in the military,[73] or at the level of provincial ayuntamiento[74] or at presidency of the Cortes.[75]
There were individuals who authentically strove to achieve synergy between Traditionalism and what they understood to be a patriotic amalgam.[76] They clung to their Carlism not as to an independent political standing, but approached it as a valid component of the fused ideology, especially after the system shook off major vestiges of Fascism and started to pose as “monarquía tradicional católica, social y representativa”. Some did not engage in political structures of Francoism, but they rose to top figures of public life, e.g. in science,[77] or self-government.[78] Others, having been rather few genuine “unificated” Francoists, emerged as recognizable political personalities, e.g. holding numerous posts of civil governor in the 1940s;[79] some joined the intransigent Francoist hardline core and mounted a last-ditch attempt to save the falling system in the mid-1970s.[80]
A large and most representative group of Carlists who joined the regime structures have abandoned their Traditionalist militancy almost entirely or indeed entirely. When holding official posts they demonstrated no particular sympathy for the movement and terminated any links relating them to the organization, its initiatives or individuals, perhaps except strictly private contacts.[81] Single individuals grew to hierarchs of the system and became public faces of Francoism, but at this role they have not revealed any preference for Traditionalism.[82] Some former militants who discontinued their party engagements went even further and have actively engaged in anti-Carlist measures; they engineered or executed initiatives aimed against either independent Traditionalism or against carlo-franquistas who cultivated their Traditionalist heritage.[83]
Cohesion and conflict
Carlist symbols at official rally, early Francoism
The Carlists who joined Francoist structures have never formed a homogeneous group, either in functional or structural terms. Except that they were all coming from the same political background there was hardly any particular behavioral feature that would have rendered them a cohesive faction. They were not united by uniform motivations, common objectives, or similar modus operandi. Though many of them attempted to preserve or at times even to promote Traditionalist ingredients, there were also many who have abandoned even lukewarm or watered-down Traditionalist sentiments. The carlo-franquistas neither built any structural network and there has never been even a shadow of their organization. The closest thing were structures of the Ministry of Justice, where many former Carlists found employment;[84] however, the ministry has never become anything even vaguely resembling their operational headquarters or political backbone.
During almost 40 years of Carlist presence in Francoist structures there were periods of competitive sub-factions operating within the group. In most cases, divisions were developed along dynastical lines, though they also translated to different visions of the regime itself. An early example comes from the late 1940s. One section worked for the cause of the Alfonsist claimant Don Juan, considered ready to adopt Traditionalist principles; this bid was associated with the concept of a somewhat liberalized regime.[85] They competed for influence against the Carloctavistas, determined to support their own claimant, Don Carlos Pio, and aligned with the hardline Francoist idea of state and society; the group found cautious supporters among top-positioned Carlists.[86] Another example of competition is dated at the early 1960s. A wave of militants from the independent Carlist Javierista branch landed posts in FET Consejo Nacional and in the Cortes; their objective was to promote Don Carlos Hugo as a prospective Franco-appointed king. At the time a group of influential carlo-franquistas were already engaged in so-called “operación salmón”, a long campaign in support of Don Juan Carlos as the future king of Spain.[87] An example of conflict non-related to dynastic issues was the one centred on Law on Religious Liberty of the late 1960s; one faction promoted the draft and another one tried to block the law.[88]
Within carlo-francoism certain individuals emerged as most prestigious politicians or perhaps even as informal leaders, though there has never been one unchallenged champion of the cause. The only person who built his own clientage was conde Rodezno, minister of justice in 1938-1939 and member of the Cortes later; since the late 1930s until the early 1950s he was leading a group named Rodeznistas. He was succeeded at ministerial post by Esteban Bilbao, Antonio Iturmendi and Antonio Oriol, but none of them enjoyed comparable standing, even though Bilbao and Iturmendi grew also to speakers of the Cortes and members of Consejo del Reino and Consejo de Regencia, while Oriol and Joaquín Bau entered Consejo del Reino and Consejo de Estado. The only other individuals which stood out among the carlo-franquistas were Jesus Cora y Lira (early 1950s) and José Luis Zamanillo (early 1970s), the former as champion of Carloctavismo and the latter among key personalities of the búnker. However, personalist terms like “Iturmendistas”[89] or “Zamanillistas”[90] were used only exceptionally.
The weight of Francoism within Carlism remains unclear. None of the sources consulted estimates what proportion of Carlists actively engaged in buildup of Francoist structures and how large was the carlo-francoist faction within Carlism in general.[92] General historiographic accounts present contradictory views. On one hand, numerous high-level overviews of history of Spain or the Spanish Civil War tend to blanket statements which suggest that Carlism was absorbed in FET and ceased to exist as autonomous political current.[93] Also some focused works suggest that the movement was fully integrated in the emergent Francoist system.[94] On the other hand, there are historians who present Carlism as a systematic opposition to the regime and play down cases of collaboration as entirely marginal.[95]Prosopographic reviews reveal that many pre-war Traditionalist leaders or otherwise distinguished personalities at one point or another chose to enter Francoist structures. Among members of the 1932 Carlist executive who survived the war at least 43% actively supported the emerging Francoism.[96] Some 68% of surviving Carlist deputies to the Cortes of the Republican era actively engaged in the regime;[97] for Traditionalist candidates to the Republican Cortes the figure was 44%.[98] Among members of Consejo de Cultura, a board of Carlist pundits set up in the mid-1930s, some 38% of these surviving assumed various posts within Francoism.[99] Some 67% of members of Junta Nacional Carlista de Guerra, the Traditionalist wartime executive created in August 1936, were later engaged in Francoist structures.[100] Whether the above figures, representative for high command layer, are applicable to mid-level leadership or to rank-and-file, is not clear.[101]
The weight of Carlism within the Francoist regime has already been subject to numerous quantitative estimates.[103] One study claims that individuals clearly identified with Traditionalism formed 2,5% of all government ministers,[104] another author opts for 4,5%.[105] The duration of particular tenures factored in, clear-cut Traditionalists occupied 4,2% of ministerial posts available during 36 years in question;[106] with those vaguely associated the figure is 9,7%.[107] According to one scholar the Carlists formed some 3,1% among members of the quasi-parliament, Cortes Españolas;[108] the 4% threshold was exceeded during only 2 terms, in 1943-1949 and 1958–1961.[109] One scholar claims that within the contingent of civil governors, during primer franquismo some 14,5% officials were related to Traditionalism;[110] another scholar calculated that there has never been more than 3 Carlist governors during any specific period.[111] Until the mid-1940s among vaguely specified personal político some 6,6% were Traditionalists; there is no similar statistics available for the remaining 30 years.[112] No definite statistics is available for top posts within FET; in the very initial period Carlists made up some 22-24% of the party executive Consejo Nacional,[113] but since the early 1940s their share of seats remained in the range of 5-10%;[114] it climaxed to 13% in 1958.[115] Initially they held 29% of provincial FET jefaturas[116] and commanded 18% of specialized FET branches;[117] later this share dropped dramatically. Locally the percentage of Carlists holding posts of power could have differed widely; studies for traditional Carlist strongholds like Navarre or Vascongadas indicate Traditionalist share of power in ranges between 30 and 50%,[118] while in case of regions with noticeable though not dominant Carlist presence the figure drops to 2-3%.[119] In the late 1940s the Carlists formed some 3,3% of all concejales in local ayuntamientos in Spain.[120] Regardless of detailed figures, there seems to be a general agreement that the Carlists formed a minor fraction among holders of high jobs within the regime.[121]
Personal trajectories
Carlist and Nazi emblems
It is close to impossible to sketch a typical path of a Carlist engaged in Francoism. Personal careers differed widely, from time of access to level of enthusiasm to political success or failure. Moreover, numerous carlo-francoists did not maintain a consistent stand during almost 40 years of the Franco regime; many demonstrated a vacillating approach, marked by varying modes of engagement or even by erratic twists and turns of their careers.
A significant group of recognized personalities who landed top jobs in the late 1930s in few years were already no longer associated with the official policy. Some got increasingly disappointed with the emerging system and resigned,[122] up to total withdrawal into privacy;[123] some were sidetracked to marginal roles by political opponents;[124] some were totally ousted[125] and persecuted, up to the point of serving jail sentences.[126] A large group scaled down their engagement in the system; having earlier been chief promoters of unification, they later preferred to remain at arms-length and pursued their own objectives.[127] There were cases of grand returns, marked first by engagement, then by marginalization, and then by re-engagement,[128] at times including assumption of top state jobs.[129] Some individuals re-engaged to dismantle the system from within;[130] some re-engaged to abandon the officialdom again and to work to other political ends.[131]
There were examples of political transformation in the opposite direction, when opponents to Francoism later joined its official structures. Some individuals outwardly rejected high ministerial jobs in the 1940s but were aspiring to them in the 1960s; when eventually assuming prestigious posts they could have adhered to Francoist orthodoxy or they could have advanced own political schemes.[132] In few cases the U-turn performed was dramatic, as most zealous adversaries of the system turned into its most zealous advocates. There were individuals who resigned jobs in Carlism as a measure of disagreement with unification and were jailed or exiled, but some 20 years later they neared the regime; they not only landed prestigious jobs, but also emerged as most vociferous advocates of Francoism during its terminal years, speaking out against the commencing transición.[133]
Last but not least, a large fraction of carlo-francoists maintained a fairly constant stand. Very often it boiled down to amalgamation into Francoist structures.[134] With focus on ongoing administrative work, their political activities were reduced to hardly visible minimum;[135] this was the case especially of mid-level officials[136] and military men.[137] Most of them got consumed by routine and advancing in age, ended up as colorless bureaucrats.[138] Some recorded periods of more intense militancy interchanging with dormant decades spent on day-to-day routine tasks.[139] Some for most of the time remained somewhat lukewarm participants; undecided whether to engage or to withdraw, they refused major jobs and for years performed second-row roles.[140] Some became public faces of the regime and started to demonstrate dissent no earlier than on retirement.[141] Few, following decades at minor positions, grew to more important roles, e.g. as mayors of provincial capitals[142] or assuming high jobs in central administration.[143] Finally, some having entered the regime identified with it totally and throughout the rest of their career remained militant Francoists, engaged in eradicating perceived opposition or groupings deemed not sufficiently loyal to caudillo.[144]
Impact
Carlist ex-combatants at official rally, late Francoism
There are very few studies which try to gauge the actual political impact of the carlo-franquistas. In most cases they are merely listed among so-called “families” which made up the official political amalgam, along the Falangists, the Alfonsists, the military, the technocrats and the Church.[145] Within such perspective all these groupings are presented as constantly competing for power and trying to outmaneuver the others,[146] while Franco mastered the practice of balancing them. The Carlist component of the regime is usually presented among the least influential ones; only in the period between the mid-1940s and the mid-1950s it enjoyed somewhat less marginal position. Though as part of the official amalgam the Traditionalists are deemed co-responsible for final Nationalist triumph in the Civil War, repressive policy of early Francoism or some liberalization of the regime later on, no scholar claims they can be credited for shaping the system.[147]
Except preservation of semi-separate establishments in Álava and Navarre,[148] the list of carlo-francoist political accomplishments is mostly about thwarting radical Falangist designs. In 1940 they mounted a successful opposition to totalitarian draft of Ley de Organización del Estado.[149] In aftermath of the 1942 Begoña crisis the Carlist outrage contributed to de-emphasizing of Fascist threads.[150]Ley de Sucesión en la Jefatura del Estado of 1947, co-drafted by Carlists in the ministry of justice, was by many viewed as designed with the Carloctavista claimant in mind.[151] The draft of Leyes Fundamentales, promoted in the mid-1950s, was dubbed resemblant of Soviet-style regime and eventually blocked by a coalition of Carlists and other groups.[152] The 1958-adopted Ley de Principios del Movimiento Nacional defined the state party using a Carlist notion of a “comunión” and declared Spain “monarquía tradicional, católica, social y representativa”, which vaguely resembled Traditionalist outline; however, practical effects were none. In the early 1960s, the Juan-Carlos-minded faction of carlo-francoists contributed to thwarting regalist ambitions of the Javierista hopeful Don Carlos Hugo;[153] in 1969 they saw Don Juan Carlos declared the future Spanish king and in the early 1970s they assisted in ensuring his ascendance against the hardline Francoist “regentialist” faction.[154]
Franco si, Juanito no at Carlist Montejurra rally, late 1960s
The list of carlo-francoist failures starts with marginalization in the state structures. They occupied no more than 5-10% of top posts, were unsuccessful at shaping the regime,[155] and at best were used by Franco as a counter-weight when he needed to keep other political groupings in check. During almost 40 years they failed to get any of their preferred claimants crowned, be it Don Juan, Don Carlos Pio, Don Javier or Don Carlos Hugo; the crowning of Don Juan Carlos came about already after the death of Franco and his rise to power was the process that the carlo-franquistas did not control. Except the role of culture and religion, which until the mid-1950s resembled the Traditionalist model,[156] other spheres of public life in Franco's Spain did not conform to Carlist prescriptions.[157] In broad terms, the carlo-francoists failed to implement Traditionalist blueprint upon Spain of the mid-20th century. Their defeat was marked by adoption of Ley de Libertad Religiosa in 1967;[158] it contravened most fundamental Carlist principles and was followed by further transformation, leading towards buildup of consumer, democratic, secular society. Marginalization of post-Francoist Carlists was amply demonstrated during the transición, when their electoral attempts ended up in utter failure.[159]
^see e.g. Virginia López de Maturana, Política y poder local: el ayuntamiento vitoriano durante el franquismo, [in:] Antonio Rivera (ed.), Dictadura y desarrollismo. El franquismo en Alava, Vitoria-Gasteiz 2009, ISBN9788496845305, p. 162
^see e.g. discussion under Antílope con Salsa de Soja, [in:] NickJournalArcadiano service 17.10.08, available here. Some highly partisan groups like Ateneo Basilio Lacort systematically use the term as stigmatization, referred after Manuel Fernández de Sevilla, No somos nada…, pero nos imputan todo, [in:] PartidoCarlista service 2017, available here
^see e.g. exchange of posts in a thread Sobre el carlista Jose Maria Sentis Simeon, [in:] ForoDeDebate service, May 2016, available here. For historical use, see e.g. Pajaritos, [in:] Tierra Vasca 167 (1970), available here
^see e.g. Jeremy MacClancy, The Decline of Carlism, Reno 2000, ISBN9780874173444, pp. 76, 92, 292
^Manuel Santa Cruz Alberto Ruiz de Galarreta, Apuntes y documentos para la Historia del Tradicionalismo Español, vol. 3, Madrid 1979, p. 19; Mercedes Vázquez de Prada, El final de una ilusión. Auge y declive del tradicionalismo carlista (1957-1967), Madrid 2016, ISBN9788416558407, p. 18 (“carlistas colaboracionaistas”); Manuel Martorell Pérez, La continuidad ideológica del carlismo tras la Guerra Civil [PhD thesis in Historia Contemporanea, Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia], Valencia 2009, pp. 11, 43 (“carlismo colaboracionista”); Ramón María Rodón Guinjoan, Invierno, primavera y otoño del carlismo (1939-1976) [PhD thesis Universitat Abat Oliba CEU], Barcelona 2015, p. 144 (“colaboracionistas” vs “anticolaboracionistas”). As a linguistic copy the term is accepted also in some foreign languages, see „collaborationists” in English, Martin Blinkhorn, Carlism and Crisis in Spain 1931-1939, Cambridge 2008, ISBN9780521207294, p. 294, or “kolaboracjoniści” in Polish, Jacek Bartyzel, “Don Carlos Marx”. Studium przypadku rewolucyjnej transgresji tradycjonalizmu w socjalizm w hiszpańskim karlizmie, [in:] Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia V/4 (2010), p. 68
^Joan Maria Thomàs, La Falange de Franco: fascismo y fascistización en el régimen franquista, 1937-1945, Madrid 2001, ISBN9788401530524, p. 328, also used systematically in his other works, like Joan Maria Thomàs, Franquistas contra franquistas: Luchas por el poder en la cúpula del régimen de Franco, Madrid 2016, ISBN9788499926346, or Joan Maria Thomàs, José Antonio: Realidad y mito, Madrid 2017, ISBN9788499927503
^Fermín Pérez-Nievas Borderas, Contra viento y marea. Historia de la evolución ideológica del carlismo a través de dos siglos de lucha, Pamplona 1999, ISBN9788460589327, p. 205
^José Carlos Clemente, El Carlismo en la España de Franco: Bases Documentales 1936-1977, Madrid 1994, ISBN9788424506704, p. 423
^Josep Carles Clemente, Franco: Anatomía de un genocida, Madrid 2014, ISBN9788494236501, p. 234, Tomás Urzainqui Mina, Llamamiento por una Navarra democrática, [in:] TomasUrzainqui service 03.02.10, available here; another spelling is „carlofalangistas”, see e.g. Fernando Mikelarena Peña, Respuesta a Jesús María Aragón Samanes, [in:] Noticias de Navarra 11.04.2014, available here; the term is also used across the blog of Fernando Mikelarena Peña, see ElBlogDeFernandoMikelarena service, available here; the term is usually intended as insult. A related term is “carlo-falangismo”, see e.g. Oriol Malló, Alfons Martí, En Tierra de Fariseos: Viaje a Las Fuentes Del Catalanismo Católico, Barcelona 2000, ISBN9788423966363, p. 42
^for usage among vehement Carlist foes see e.g. Clemente Bernad, Víctor Moreno, José Ramón Urtasun, Carlos Martínez, Fernando Mikelarena, Carolina Martínez, Ángel Zoco, Txema Aranaz, La consagración de la desmemoria, [in:] NuevaTribuna service 03.03.19, available here; however, also the Javierista Carlists resolved to "carlofascismo" insult, see Observaciones de un viejo carlista sobre las pretensiones de un Principe al trono de Espana, a 1948 pamphlet by Melchor Ferrer
^Daniel Jesús García Riol, La resistencia tradicionalista a la renovación ideológica del carlismo (1965-1973) [PhD thesis UNED], Madrid 2015, p. 350
^see e.g. discussion at Jose Maria Sentis Simeon, [in:] ForoDeDebate service, May 2016, available here
^"enchufismo" usually stands for cronyism or favoritism; the term suggests that the individuals in question blended some Carlist sympathy with much stronger pursuit of personal gain, Ferrer 1948
^"ningún movimiento político de la España contemporánea ha mostrado, como el tradicionalismo carlista, una predisposición tan franca y tan persistente a la violencia, hasta hacerla formar parte indisociable de su praxis política, de su identidad colectiva y de su acervo cultural", Eduardo González Calleja, Aproximación a las subculturas violentas de las derechas antirrepublicanas españolas (1931-1936), [in:] Pasado y memoria 2 (2003), p. 113
^for interpretation of the 19th-century Carlism of as an “amalgama contrarrevolucionaria” see Jordi Canal i Morell, Espacio propio, espacio público. La sociabilidad carlista en la España mediterránea an la etapa de entresiglos, [in:] Jean Louis Guareña, Isidro Sánchez Sánchez, Rafael Villena Espinosa, Sociabilidad fin de siglo: espacios asociativos en torno a 1898, Cuenca 1999, ISBN9788489958890, pp. 128-129. For the 20th century compare "el carlismo se había erigido de nuevo como núcleo cohesivo de otra alamgama conterrevolucionaria, aungque de dimensiones bastante más modestas que las del siglo XIX", Jordi Canal i Morell, Banderas blancas, boinas rojas: una historia política del carlismo, 1876-1939, Madrid 2006, ISBN9788496467347, p. 324
^for discussion of Carlism as a movement permanently plagued by secessions see e.g. Martin Blinkhorn, Los carlistas: cisma en el tradicionalismo (1876-1931), [in:] Historia 13 (1977), pp. 71-79. Numerous works discuss particular breakups, for the 1888 one see e.g. Jordi Canal i Morell, Las 'muertes' y las 'resurrecciones' del carlismo. Reflexiones sobre la escisión integrista de 1888, [in:] Ayer 38 (2000), pp. 115–136, for the 1919 one see e.g. Juan Ramón de Andrés Martín, El cisma mellista. Historia de una ambición política, Madrid 2000, ISBN9788487863820. For treatment in classic works written from the Traditionalist perspective see Roman Oyarzun, Historia del carlismo, Madrid 1969, pp. 477-478, Melchor Ferrer, Breve historia del legitimismo español, Sevilla 1958, pp. 69-76
^Blinkhorn 2008, pp. 109-110, 139, 202 and passim; for detailed discussion of monarchist alliance of the mid-1930s see Julio Gil Pecharromán, El alfonsismo radical en las elecciones de febrero de 1936, [in:] Revista de Estudios Políticos 42 (1984), pp. 101-136
^all Carlist violent attempts to seize power, and especially these resulting in civil wars of 1833-1840 and 1872-1876, were thwarted by the army; the military in general remained loyal to the Madrid government
^Jordi Canal, El carlismo, Madrid 2000, ISBN8420639478, pp. 231-255, Oyarzun 1969, pp. 475-489, Ferrer 1958, pp. 67-92
^generals Polavieja and Weyler were unwilling to rise against the government in the late 1890s and early 1900s; general Primo de Rivera did topple the government in 1923 and remained on close terms with some Traditionalists, but remained loyal to the Alfonsist king; general Sanjurjo collaborated closely with individual Carlists during the coup of 1932 but remained politically ambiguous
^Canal 2000, pp. 325-326, Blinkhorn 2008, pp. 228-250
^Juan Carlos Peñas Bernaldo de Quirós, El Carlismo, la República y la Guerra Civil (1936-1937). De la conspiración a la unificación, Madrid 1996, ISBN8487863523, pp. 187-196
^Mercedes Peñalba Sotorrío, Entre la boina roja y la camisa azul, Estella 2013, ISBN9788423533657, pp. 21-43
^Peñas Bernaldo 1996, pp. 241-301, Manuel Martorell Pérez, Navarra 1937-1939: el fiasco de la Unificación, [in:] Príncipe de Viana 69 (2008), p. 28-50, Peñalba Sotorrio 2013, pp. 30-47
^iconic part of the Carlist gear, a red beret, was officially declared part of the FET uniform in 1937. A governmental decree replaced it with a peaked cap in 1939
^Martorell Pérez 2008, p. 41, Aurora Villanueva Martínez, Organizacion, actividad y bases del carlismo navarro durante el primer franquismo [in:] Geronimo de Uztariz 19 (2003), p. 101
^not few Carlists demonstrated genuine enthusiasm about the unification, Canal i Morell 2006, p. 341
^for a variety of positions taken by the Carlist militant towards the unification see e.g. Peñalba Sotorrio 2013, pp. 51-91, Martorell Pérez 2009, pp. 28-175, Peñas Bernaldo 1996, pp. 294-300
^Francisco Javier Caspistegui Gorasurreta, El naufragio de las ortodoxias. El carlismo, 1962–1977, Pamplona 1997; ISBN9788431315641, pp. 1-7
^Martorell Pérez 2009, pp. 167-175, Canal 2000, pp. 342-346, Caspistegui Gorasurreta 1997, pp. 8-12, Peñas Bernaldo 1996, pp. 295-301
^see e.g. a chapter titled Gallery of traitors. The ‘Carlists’ of Franco, in Josep Carles Clemente, Franco: Anatomía de un genocida, Madrid 2014, ISBN9788494236501
^the Carlist family usually mentioned first when discussing economic oligarchies of Francoist Spain is the Oriols, business tycoons engaged in energy, transport and banking sectors, see e.g. Josep Carles Clemente Muñoz, Breve historia de las guerras carlistas, Madrid 2011, ISBN9788499671710, pp. 234-235. The companies of Tomás Dolz de Espejo landed hefty governmental contracts in construction, see Hoja Oficial de Lunes 15.05.44, available here. Isidoro Delclaux built an own multi-business industry fortune, see Delclaux Arostegui, Isidoro entry, [in:] Aunamendi Eusko Entzikopedia, available here. José María Sentís Simeón was granted licenses related to trade with Spanish Guinea, Rosa Pardo Sanz, El Franquismo y las Colonias, [in:] Renato Moro, Giuliana de Febo (eds.), Fascismo y Franquismo. Relazioni, immagini, rappresentazioni, Roma 2005, p. 239. Some authors suggest that the Baleztena family benefitted financially from their initial support for unification, Fernando Mikelarena Peña, Sin piedad. Limpieza politica en Navarra, 1936. Responsables, colaboradores y ejecutores, Tafalla 2015, ISBN9788476819166, pp. 292-293
^“like most single parties the FET of the 1940s – its heyday – was riddled with political and economic corruption, welcome to the ‘arrivistes’ of the Falange but frowned on by the more sober Carlists”, Blinkhorn 2008, p. 298
^this was the case e.g. of José Angel Zubiaur, a 19-year-old requeté who became the FET propaganda chief in Navarre, Daniel Jesús García Riol, La resistencia tradicionalista a la renovación ideológica del carlismo (1965-1973) [PhD thesis UNED], Madrid 2015, p. 231. For a sample of his endeavors as a Falangist propaganda jefe see e.g. a circular issued prior to a homage feast for José Antonio Primo de Rivera, José Andrés Gallego, Antón M. Pazos (eds.), Archivo Gomá: documentos de la Guerra Civil, vol. 12, Madrid 2009, ISBN9788400088002, pp. 293-294
^this was the case e.g. of Roman Oyarzun. Over time he started to consider himself sort of an appendix to an extinguished idea, as he declared the Carlist dynasty finished and Carlism "reduced into debris and ashes”, Oyarzun 1965, p. 90
^this was the case e.g. of Agustín Candido Tellería Mendizábal. Initially outraged about forced unification, he later concluded that the moment was very opportune to get rid of the Falangists and format FET as a new Carlist organization; he became an enthusiastic member and did his best to convince the other Carlists to follow suit, Peñalba Sotorrío 2013, pp. 57-58, 133
^César Alcalá, Cruzadistas y carloctavistas: historia de una conspiración, Barcelona 2012, ISBN9788493884253, Francisco de las Heras y Borrero, Un pretendiente desconocido. Carlos de Habsburgo. El otro candidato de Franco, Madrid 2004, ISBN8497725565
^"carloctavismo fue inventado y auspiciado desde la sombra, en las reuniones de „La Ballena Alegre” que altos dirigentes falangistas celebraban", Josep Carles Clemente, Historia del Carlismo contemporaneo 1935–1972, Barcelona 1977, ISBN9788425307591, p. 184; similar theory was advanced by Fermín Pérez-Nievas Borderas, María Teresa de Borbón-Parma or Joaquín Cubero Sanchez. More balanced views e.g. in Robert Vallverdú i Martí, La metamorfosi del carlisme català: del "Déu, Pàtria i Rei" a l'Assamblea de Catalunya (1936-1975), Barcelona 2014, ISBN9788498837261, MacClancy 2000, Martorell Pérez 2009, Blinkhorn 2008
^the most iconic example of the Carloctavista militant was Jesús Cora y Lira. Other notable Carloctavistas active in the 1960s were Claro Abanades López, Jaime del Burgo Torres and Antonio Lizarza Irribaren
^some semi-official Carlist publications boasted of FET Consejo Nacional nominations made reportedly on recommendation of the official Carlist executive; the cases in question were these of Echave Sustaeta, Astrain Baquedano, Codón Fernández, López Sanz and Zamanillo González-Camino, see e.g. Montejurra 11 (1961)
^José María Valiente was offered a post of vice-minister of justice in the early 1940s, but declined; in the 1960s he aspired to position of the minister. Juan Sáenz-Díez opposed Francoist unification in the 1940s, but in the 1960s targeted jobs in the Madrid ayuntamiento and was also rumored to become a minister. Miguel Fagoaga initially stayed clear of officialdom, but on official Carlist recommendation landed a Cortes seat and a secretary role in FET
^a relatively unknwown case in the wave of Carlist promotions in the regime structures from the early 1960s is this of Javier María Santiago Pascual Ibañez, who in 1961 moved from a niche Carlist periodical Azada y Asta to one of the best known regime reviews, El Alcazar
^the best known case is this of José Luis Zamanillo González-Camino, who opposed the ascent of progressist Hugocarlistas within the Carlist structures, lost the internal struggle, was expulsed from Comuníon and approached Francoism. There were many similar cases, e.g. this of Francisco Guinea Gauna
^the political Carlist leader of the time, José María Valiente, was twice admitted by Franco. The dictator made no references to his role in Carlist organization, technically illegal, but instead encouraged the Traditionalists to work for their cause and hope for the better
^e.g. Valiente, ousted from Carlist structures and handed a post in FET’s Consejo Nacional, did not identify with Francoism; he soon opted for Juanismo and did not exploit his position in the Falangist structures
^the case of Zamanillo. Other búnker-related Carlists, like Antonio Ma. Oriol or Jesús Evaristo Casariego, were not latecomers but individuals who sided with Francoism since its early phase
^the cases e.g. of José María Zubiaur Alegre in Navarre, Luis Ventallo Vergés in Catalonia, Joaquín Manglano in Valencia, Fernando Vázquéz Ramos in the Baleares, Agustín Tellería and then Elías Querejeta Insausti in Gipuzkoa, José María Sentís Simeón in Guadalajara and Palencia, Jesús Comín in Aragon
^for detailed insights into competition between Carlists and Falangists at the provincial level see e.g. Jordi Esteve Rubío Coromina, “Dios, Patra y Tradición” o la falsa unitat de les forces franquistes a la provincia de Girona, [in:] Antoni Segura, Andreu Mayayo, Teresa Abelló (eds.), La dictadura franquista. La institucionalització d’un régim, Barcelona 2012, ISBN 9788491687139 (Girona), Eduardo Martínez Lacabe, La unión imposible: Carlistas y Falangistas en Navarra durante la Guerra Civil, [in:] Huarte de San Juan. Geografía e historia 1 (1994) (Navarre), Virginia López de Maturana, Política y poder local: el ayuntamiento vitoriano durante el franquismo, [in:] Antonio Rivera (ed.), Dictadura y desarrollismo. El franquismo en Alava, Vitoria-Gasteiz 2009, ISBN 9788496845305 (Alava)
^there were some exceptions, though. José María Sentís Simeón openly advanced the Traditionalist cause as civil governor in Guadalajara and Palencia, as usual found himself in conflict with the Falangists, but survived within the regime structures. Joaquín Manglano y Cucalo openely supported Carlism when civil governor and later Valencia mayor, but remained in the Francoist top strate for decades to come
^the cases e.g. of Heliodoro Rolando de Tella y Cantos (in 1943 fired from the post of military governor of the Lugo province), Elías Qyerejeta (in 1939 released from the post of provincial FET jefe in Gipuzkoa), José Quint Zaforteza Amát (in 1937 dismissed as the civil governor of Baleares); they all ran into conflict with Falange and were charged of trying to build “Carlist fiefdoms”. The ousting of Joaquín Bau from the first Francoist quasi-government was probably not related to his Carlism, but driven rather by a personal conflict with Ramón Serrano Suñer
^Luis Ventallo, shocked with the anti-Catalanist course of Francoist administration, was gradually moved to inferior positions; Fernando Vázquéz Ramós lost struggle against the local FET jefe in the Baleares; Agustín Telleria Mendizabal was moved to minor positions in Gipzukoa, Ramón José Maldonado y Cocat was outmaneuvred from FET jefatura in Logroño and settled for academic career; Eustaquio Echave Sustaeta was lambasted as Tradicionalist cacique when serving as FET jefe in Alava and shortly moved to the far less important position
^Jesús Elizalde Sanz Robles, outraged at Falangist dominance in the unificated state party, resigned his position in the FET Junta Política shortly prior to the Nationalist triumph in the Civil War
^some scholars claim even that, “their control of the party and the province was secure”, Blinkhorn 2008, p. 295
^apart from ministerial posts held by conde Rodezno, Esteban Bilbao and Antonio Iturmendi, the less known cases of deputy ministers, department heads, sub-secretaries or directors of ministry-dependent bodies are these of Mariano Puigdollers Oliver, Luis Arellano Dihinx, José María Sentis Simeón, Rafael Díaz Aguado, Lorenzo María Alier Cassí, Florencio Aldaz Villanueva, or María de Naverán Sáenz de Tejada
^the case of Carlists who entered the Cortes elected from the so-called tercio familiair; perhaps the best known cases is this of José Angel Zubaiur Alegre and Auxilio Goñi, others are these of Fidel Carazo Hernández and Antonio Arrue Zarauz, though some sources consider the latter an exponent of Francoism
^José María Oriol at various posts in the Vascongadas mastered the skill of demonstrating Traditionalist identity up to the point permitted by the regime; similar was the case of Tómas Dolz de Espejo, conde de Florida
^saturating official feasts with Carlist flavor could have produced various results depending upon personal position and skill of the Carlist promoter of the gala. José María Oriol as mayor of Bilbao and Agustín Tellería as FET jefe in Giuzkoa have never appeared in FET uniform, avoided Falangist imagery during public ceremonies, exposed Traditionalist rather than syndicalist ex-combatants, orchestras or juvenile groups and generally placed Carlist symbols in prominent places; the first survived at his post until he resigned some time later voluntarily, the latter was promptly fired
^see e.g. the cases of Manuel Agreda Aguinaga, Jaime Bofill-Gasset Amil, Enrique Alonso Cuevillas, José Chicharro Lamamié, José Iruteagoyena Solchaga, Luis García Redondo or José María Sentis Simeon
^see e.g. the case of Juan Araluce Villar, Fidel Azurza Aramburu, Lorenzo de Cura Lopé, José Elizagarate Berrueta, Elias Querejeta Insausti or Miguel Urmeneta Ajarnaute
^the most iconic are cases of Esteban Bilbao and Antonio Iturmendi, Traditionalist militants who became public faces of the regime
^José María Roma Comamala, longtime Carlist propagandist and sort of iconic person for the cause, in the early 1940s considered Carlism politically expired and himself fully unificated within a new, patriotic front. Also another Carlist veteran, Luis Argemí, joined FET and in 1943 was nominated president of the Barcelona diputation, later to be active within Carloctavismo. Roman Oyarzún Oyarzún, somewhat less known party propagandist, declared Carlism dead and though with some doubts, welcomed emergence of the new state
^best known cases of Carlists assuming high posts in scientific structures of Francoist state are these of Julio Urquijo Ibarra (initially secretary of Real Academia Española), Cayetano Mergelina Luna (rector of the Valladolid university), Martín de Riquer Morera (catedrático in various scientific and academic bodies); Salvador Minguijón Adrián (member of Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas, Tribunal Supremo, RACMYP, ), Ramón José Maldonado y Cocat (academic pundit at various positions), Manuel Bofarull Romaña (in executive of scientific jurifical bodies), Agustín González de Amezúa (historian of literature, member of the Academia) and Agustín Asis y Garrote (academic, state official). Some individuals remained vehemently anti-Francoist, but considered their participation in official scientific structures compatible with their anti-regime stand; this was e.g. the case of Marcial Solana y González-Camino, longtime member of Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas. Francisco Elías de Tejada following his zealously pro-Francoist phase of the early 1940s turned into a vehement anti-Francoist yet held high academic posts in Seville
^the Francoist grip on self-governmental structures was somewhat less firm and the regime did not entirely control membership in provincial diputaciones or in municipal ayuntamientos; only presidents of the diputations and mayors were subject to official governmental confirmation. The cases of high self-government officials of Carlist preferences are these of José Gabriel Sarasa Miquelez, Alejandro Encinas de la Rosa, Luís Argemí Martí or Jesús Ardaiz Fortún
^the best known case is this of Antonio Correa Veglison, a professional military active in Carlism during the Republican era. Already prior to outbreak of the Civil War he approached Falangism, but did not renounce totally his Traditionalist links. Between 1939 and 1945 he held 4 various civil governor post, and especially during his Barcelona tenure strove to achieve sort of a Traditionalist-Falangist synthesis, Javier Tébar Hurtado, La Barcelona azul de posguerra: reflexiones sobre una indagación biográfica, [in:] Gerónimo de Uztariz 28-29 (2012-2013), p. 39
^cases of Antonio María Oriol Urquijo or Ramón Forcadell Prats
^personal examples are abundant, see e.g. the cases of Luciano Alba Candino, Florencio Aldaz Villanueva, Enrique Alonso Cuevillas, Agustín Barcena Reus, José Chicharro Lamamie, Lorenzo de Cura Lopé, Claudio Colomer Marquéz, Antonio Garzón Martín, Gonzalo Lacalle Leloup, Nicolas Lasarte Araña, José Llaneza Zabaleta, Ramón Maldonado Cocat, Joaquín Ordoño y López, Tomás Pero-Sanz, Juan Selva Mergelina and many others
^save for biographical notes, average Spaniard could have never learnt they had been related to Carlism in the past. Joaquín Bau Nolla, a Carlist MP during the Republic years, following the period of withdrawal into privacy in the 1950s emerged as one of the hierarchs of the Francoist state, because of his various functions frequently featured in the media. Unlike in case of other very high officials of Carlist background, notably Bilbao and Iturmendi, not a single case of Bau referring to his Traditionalist credentials has been identified
^former Carlists especially bent on blocking all personal nominations suspected of being related to Carlism were Julio Muñoz Aguilar and José María Mazón Sainz. Some sources note also Agustín de Asís y Garrote and Amadeo Marco Ilincheta, though the latter was somehow related to carloctavismo. Carlo-francoists usually lambasted as traitors sold out to Franco were ministers of justice who worked to contain Javierista influence, Antonio Iturmendi Bañales and Antonio María Oriol. However, both openly admitted their Traditionalist credentials; Iturmendi has even published theoretical works on Traditionalism
^Florencio Aldaz Villanueva, Mariano Puigdollers Oliver, Luis Arellano Dihinx, José María Sentis Simeón, Rafael Díaz Aguado, Lorenzo María Alier Cassí or María de Naverán Sáenz de Tejada
^the indisputable leader of the Juanista faction among the carlo-francoists was conde de Rodezno; others are e.g. Jesús Elizalde, Joaquín Manglano, or Luis Arellano Dihinx
^the highest-positioned Carlist who demonstrated some sympathy for the Carloctavista cause was Esteban Bilbao
^Antonio Iturmendi is at times quoted as the one who together with Manuel Fraga and Camilo Alonso Vega launched and executed the project, García Riol 2015, p. 217. Since Iturmendi succeeded Bilbao at the post of Minister of Justice and then as a Cortes speaker he is at times viewed as a clone of Bilbao. However, in the mid-1960s they represented opposing factions when it comes to the Alfonsist restoration; Iturmendi worked to make it happen, while Bilbao opposed it
^carlo-franquistas who engaged in promoting the law on religious liberty were especially José María Oriol, Antonio María Oiol and Antonio Iturmendi. Carlo-franquistas who oppsed it were Joaquín Manglano, Miguel Fagoaga Gutiérrez-Solána and José Luis Zamanillo, Mónica Moreno Seco, El miedo a la libertad religiosa. Autoridades franquistas, católicos y protestantes ante la Ley de 28 de junio de 1967, [in:] Anales de Historia Contemporanea 17 (2001), p. 358
^the only case identified is Rodón Guinjoan 2015, p. 210
^the only cases identified as intended as insults and appear in a militantly progressist Hugocarlista review Esfuerzo Comun from the early 1970s, see. e.g. Strip Tease político, [in:] Esfuerzo Común VI/1972, p. 21
^clear-cut Carlists and loosely related individuals; in the term commencing in 1943 there were 27 Traditionalism-related procuradores (out of 549); during the following terms the numbers were: 1946: 16 (576); 1949: 18 (619); 1952: 22 (598); 1955: 29 (744); 1958: 30 (700); 1961: 27 (738); 1964: 25 (774); 1967: 20 (742); 1971: 18 (894)
^“unos acceptaron plenamente el nuovo régimen ... otros, puede que la mayoría, ... se retiraron a sus casas, .. y un tercer grupo, también numeroso, pugnó per ver reconocida su aportación a la victoria y por indicir – ya fuese por la vía de la oposición o por la colaboracionista – en la construcción de la “nueva” España, Canal 2000, p. 342
^Serrano forced „the Carlists and the Falange to amalgamate into a new state party”, Martin Kitchen, Europe Between the Wars, London 2014, ISBN9781317867524, p. 71; “the Falangists, Alfonsine and Carlist monarchists, and conservative Catholics – were amalgamated into a single political group”, Simon Barton, A History of Spain, London 2009, ISBN9781137013477, p. 241; “The Falange and the Traditionalist Communion were amalgamated into a new organization”, John William Donald Trythall, El Caudillo: A Political Biography of Franco, London 1970, p. 110, “residual integration of Carlism into the single party”, Mercedes Peñalba-Sotorrio, Red berets, blue shirts: nationalist militia forces in the Spanish Civil War, [in:] James Matthews (ed.), Spain at war. Society, culture and mobilization, 1936-1944, London 2019, ISBN9781350030121, p. 44; “el carlismo no presentó ya resistencia; quedo ingresado en la FET y de las JONS, donde se desnaturalizaría”, Bernat Muniesa, Dictadura y transición: La dictadura franquista, 1939-1975, Barcelona 2005, ISBN9788447528899, p. 32; the unification decree “ponía fin a la existencia independiente de la Comunión Tradicionalista”, Pedro Rújula, Conmemorar la muerte, recordar la historia. La Fiesta de los Mártires de la Tradición, [in:] Ayer 51 (2003), p. 84
^see Mikelarena Peña 2015, the work which presents Carlism as a murderous component of the emerging atrocious Francoist regime
^José Carlos Clemente, El carlismo contra Franco, Madrid 2003, ISBN9788489644878, Josep Miralles Climent, La rebeldía carlista. Memoria de una represión silenciada: Enfrentamientos, marginación y persecución durante la primera mitad del régimen franquista (1936-1955), Madrid 2018, ISBN9788416558711, Manuel Martorell, Josep Miralles Climent, Carlismo y represión "franquista": tres estudios sobre la Guerra Civil y la posguerra, Madrid 2009, ISBN9788495735386, Fermín Pérez-Nievas Borderas, Contra viento y marea. Historia de la evolución ideológica del carlismo a través de dos siglos de lucha, Pamplona 1999, ISBN9788460589327, esp. pp. 143-192
^the first united Carlist executive, formed in 1932, was composed of 35 individuals, see Antonio M. Moral Roncal, La cuestión religiosa en la Segunda República Española: Iglesia y carlismo, Madrid 2009, ISBN9788497429054, p. 78. At least 8 of them did not live up till 1937, the fate of 4 (Cavero Esporcera, Cavero Irigoyen, Soler, Jaleon) has not been identified. Of the remaining ones, at least 9 engaged in buildup of the Francoist regime (Rodezno, Bilbao, Oriol, J. Roma, P. Roma, Telleria, de Cura, Comin and F. Contreras)
^out of 19 Carlist deputies to the Cortes of the Republican era who survived the war, there were 13 (68%) who at one point or another (though not necessarily systematically) remained active in Francoist structures: Arellano, Bau, Bilbao, de Carcer, Elizalde, Granell, Lis, Martinez de Morentin, Oriol, Ramirez, de Rodezno, Valiente, Zamanillo
^out of 50 individuals identified as running on the Carlist ticket for the Cortes in the Republican era who survived the war, there were 22 who later engaged in Francoist structures: Arellano, Bau, Bilbao, Elizalde, Granell, Lis Quiven, Llanas, Manglano, Martínez de Morentín, Oreja, Pagoaga, Puigdollers, Rodezno, Quint, Rada, Ramirez Sinues, Tellería, Toledo, Urraca, Valiente and Zamanillo
^out of 13 surviving members, there were 5 who engaged in Francoism: Rodezno, Comín, Bilbao, Lisbona Alonso and Echave Sustaeta. The survivors who did not engage were Larramendi, Senante, Solana, Tejera, Gonzalez de Amezua and Argamasilla
^there were 12 individuals holding various posts in Junta Nacional Carlista de Guerra, and all survived the war. 8 out them engaged in Francoist structures: Gaiztarro, Martínez Morentín, Muñoz Aguilar, Oriol, Rada, Rodezno, Valiente and Zamanillo. Those who did not were Fal Conde, Gómez Sanz, Lamamie and Olazábal Eulate
^“la masa carlista ... volvió a los veneros de los que había salido y se aletargó ante la ausencia de reclamos”, Caspistegui Gorasurreta 1997, p. 10; “the great majority of Carlists lost what interest they had had in the FET’s affairs and left it in droves”, Blinkhorn 2008, p. 295
^source: Martí Marín Corbera, Los gubernadores civiles del franquismo, 1936-1963: seis personajes en busca de autor, [in:] Historia y Política 29 (2013), pp. 296-297
^at one point also the Carlists themselves tried to gauge their influence in the officialdom. During a 1966 Congreso Nacional Carlista attendees were asked to fill a questionnaire about their access to various officials. The summary results were: Jefe Local del Movimiento 96 positive responses, Gobernador Civil 96, Alcalde de la Capital 88, Presidente de la Diputación 67, Jefe Superior de la Policia 54, Gobernador Militar 45, Obispo 25, Capitán General 22, Daniel Jesús García Riol, La resistencia tradicionalista a la renovación ideológica del carlismo (1965-1973) [PhD thesis UNED], Madrid 2015, p. 65
^Soledad Miranda García, José Manuel Cuenca Toribio, La elite ministerial franquista, [in:] Revista de Estudios Políticos 57 (1987), p. 108
^Enrique Moradiellos, La España de Franco, 1939-1975: política y sociedad, Madrid 2000, ISBN9788477387404, p. 22. In case individuals loosely related to Carlism are included, the figure is 5,0% - Rodezno, Bilbao, Iturmendi and Oriol combined served 28 years as ministers of justice; on average, there were 12 ministers in each government operational during 36 years between 1939 and 1975
^apart from 28 years occupied by Carlists at the ministry of justice, one might add 4 years served by Garicano at interior, 7 years served by Lacalle at aviation, and 3 years served by Varela at army, combined 42 years
^Garricano (interior), Varela (defence) and Lacalle Laraga (aviation) are usually not counted in as Carlist ministers, though they had some earlier relations to Carlism
^one scholar claims there were 79 procuradores he classified as Traditionalists among 2,551 individuals serving in the Francoist Cortes, Miguel Angel Giménez Martínez, Las Cortes de Franco o el Parlamento imposible, [in:] Trocadero: Revista de historia moderna y contemporanea 27 (2015), p. 78. In this article there are 71 individuals listed (77 if those also loosely related to Carlism are counted in)
^there were 6,934 mandates available in 10 terms of the Francoist Cortes. Depending upon definition of political allegiances of specific individuals, the number of mandates held by the Carlists is between 196 and 227. The highest proportion of Carlists was recorded during the 1943-1949 term (4,6%-4,9%), 1958-1961 term (3,9%-4,4%) and 1955-1958 term (3,5%-3,9%); the lowest one was in during the 1971-1977 term (1,8%-2,0%). The number of total Cortes mandates available during specific terms was 549 (1943), 576 (1949), 619 (1949), 598 (1952), 744 (1955), 700 (1958), 738 (1961), 774 (1964), 742 (1967) and 894 (1971)
^calculation of Carles Viver Pi-Suner, referred after Martí Marín Corbera, Los gubernadores civiles del franquismo, 1936-1963: seis personajes en busca de autor, [in:] Historia y Política 29 (2013), p. 278
^i.e. 55 out of 837, calculations by Pi-Sunyer quoted by Marín Corbera 2013, p. 278. When calculating the share of positions held by the Traditionalists, the author arrives at the same percentage (123 out of 1871), Stanley G. Payne, The Franco Regime, Madison 2011, ISBN9780299110741, p. 236. One scholar calculated that Carlists formed 6% of civil governors, appointed in 1940-1945, Julián Sanz Hoya, Falange y el nombramiento de gobernadores civiles durante el segundo mandato de Arrese (1956-1957), [in:] Studia Historica 41 (2023), pp. 327
^in the first FET Consejo Nacional, appointed in October 1937, the Carlists took 12 out of 50 seats
^in the 3rd Consejo Nacional, at that time composed of 100 members, there were 7 Carlists, Payne 2011, p. 238
^in 1958 there were 22 individuals related to Carlism sitting in Consejo Nacional, at that time a 150-member body
^9 out of 31; for Republican-held provinces there were no FET jefes appointed, Payne 2000, p. 276
^it was the case mostly of 2 provinces, Navarre and Alava; for Navarre see e.g. Aurora Villanueva Martínez, El carlismo navarro durante el primer franquismo, 1937-1951, Madrid 1998, ISBN9788487863714; for Alava see Iker Cantabrana Morras, Lo viejo y lo nuevo: Díputación-FET de las JONS. La convulsa dinámica política de la "leal" Alava (Primera parte: 1936-1938), [in:] Sancho el Sabio 21 (2004), pp. 149–180, and Iker Cantabrana Morras, Lo viejo y lo nuevo: Díputación-FET de las JONS. La convulsa dinámica política de la "leal" Alava (Segunda parte: 1938-1943), [in:] Sancho el Sabio 22 (2005), pp. 139–169
^e.g. in Cantabria, the province with notable though not major Traditionalist presence, the Carlists held 3 out of 86 (2,1%) local party jefaturas; in case of members of the ayuntamientos, the figure was 4,84%, Julián Sanz Hoya, La construcción de la dictadura franquista en Cantabria: Instituciones, personal político y apoyos sociales (1937-1951), Santander 2009, ISBN9788481024869, pp. 239, 295
^out of 46,288 consejales elected in 1948, there were 1,539 individuals related to Carlism, at least according to the confidential governmental statistics, Villanueva Martínez 1998, p. 518
^“todos los estudios prosopográficos de amplio alcance han seńalado como la presencia en los altos cargos de la política del estado del tradicionalismo fue muy pequeńa”, Martí Marin, La democracia orgánica como forma de representación política: un análisis de las fórmulas de cooptación de procuradores en Cortes y de sus resultados, [in:] Revista Estudos do Século XX 16 (2016), p. 107
^perhaps the most striking is the case of Jesús Elizalde Sanz Roblés, one of 2 “asesores políticos” of the unificated FET militia and member of the FET Junta Política at the same time; outraged at Falangist domination in the state party, he resigned both posts in March 1939, shortly before the ultimate Nationalist triumph in the Civil War later. María Rosa Urraca Pastor, one of 3 Carlist leaders of 18 existing FET branches, resigned in 1938, following a conflict with the Falangist leader Pilar Primo de Rivera. In 1938 José María Oriol resigned his place in Junta Política and protested to Franco personally
^José Quint Zaforteza was the Carlist pre-war leader in the Baleares and was nominated the civil governor of the province in 1937. He immediately clashed with the Falangists and was ousted following a few months. He continued political activity as president of the local diputación, but only until 1939. Following 25 years of withdrawal into and privacy, he died in 1965. Javier Ramírez Sinués held the posts of civil governor in 1938-1943, but afterwards he withdrew from the public eye and stayed so until his death in 1977
^Fernando Vázquéz Ramós, Agustín Telleria Mendizabal, Ramón José Maldonado y Cocat, Eustaquio Echave Sustaeta and Elías Querejeta Insausti held key positions of either civil governors or provincial FET jefes, but outmaneouvred into other positions of minor or nil political importance
^e.g. Luis Ventallo Vergés was appointed the first Nationalist civil governor of Lerida shortly following conquest of the province in April 1938. He immediately run into conflict with the military alcalde of Lerida and was ousted in August 1938, not to assume any political job in the future. He was replaced by another individual of Traditionalist leaning, Fernando Vázquéz Ramós; the latter also clashed with the Falangists, was moved to Las Palmas, again engaged in conflict with the party old-shirts, and was dismissed in 1940
^María Rosa Urraca Pastor following her resignation from jefatura of the FET sanitary branch withdrew into privacy and tried to operate a small publishing house. In the late 1940s she was twice charged with financial misdeeds; sentenced, she left prison thanks to amnesty. Her incarceration is likely to have been a revenge, though perhaps personally rather than politically motivated; in 1937-1938 Urraca remained in very acute and virulent conflict with Pilar Primo de Rivera, who maintained some political influences for decades to come; Uraca was also systematically ridiculed in what became an iconic cartoon series, Doña Urraca. The only case of possible fatality related to Carlist-Falangist clashes is this is José María Olazábal Zaldumbide, who at the age of 31 passed away as FET jefe of the Las Palmas province. Some authors speculate that heart failure, the ultimate cause of his death, was triggered by a particularly violent altercation with the local Falangists
^the most iconic is the case of Rodezno, the chief Carlist advocate of unification. Already in 1939 he started to withdraw from Falangist structures, though he took up roles in provincial diputación and in the Cortes. Since 1946s he held no official job. Also his political lieutenant, Luis Arellano Dihinx, scaled down his engagement in the state party. Both have earlier voiced to Franco their unease about Falangist predomination in the emerging state. Both – like many carlo-franquistas – turned into supporters of the Alfonsist claimant Don Juan and worked for his cause
^e.g. Joaquín Bau Nolla, José María Valiente or Jesús Elizalde Sanz Roblés
^the most striking case of a grand return was this of Joaquín Bau Nolla. During the war he served as quasi-minister of economy, but was ousted following a conflict with Serrano Suñer and withdrew into total privacy. He returned to officialdom in the late 1950s, rising to top jobs in the 1960s; in the early 1970s he was one of public faces of the regime. Somewhat similar was the case of Antonio Iturmendi Bañales, who held civil governor or ministerial sub-secretary roles until the early 1940s, when he protested over the Falangist domination. However, he did not fall out of grace entirely, and in the late 1940s he was back at state jobs, over time rising to the Cortes speaker
^most Carlist members of the Cortes elected from the so-called tercio familiar were – at least at that time – vehement opponents of the regime, like José Angel Zubaiur Alegre, Auxilio Goñi or Fidel Carazo Hernández. A very peculiar and perhaps unique case was this of Elías Querejeta Insausti, who in the 1960s was member of the Cortes appointed as a syndicalist representative, but remained engaged in Javierista and then Hugocarlista Carlism
^Jesús Elizalde first abandoned Francoist structures in 1939, re-engaged in the mid-1950s, and in the late 1950s turned towards Juanismo, finally withdrawing into privacy. José María Valiente did not renew his Francoist engagements of the late 1930s and focused on Javierista Carlism, re-approached Francoist structures in the late 1960s and in the early 1970s switched towards the Juanista case
^José María Valiente was offered the post of vice-minister of Justice in the late 1930s, but declined; in the early 1960s he aspired to the job, recommended by the Javierista structures. Valiente failed in his ministerial bid but eventually landed a place in the Cortes as a personal Franco’s appointee. However, he took advantage of the position to advance the Juanista and then Juancarlista cause
^the most dramatic u-turn recorded was this of José Luis Zamanillo. He formed a hardline core of opponents to the unification in 1937; once declared, he resigned all official jobs and volunteered to frontline combat units. He then signed various protest letters directed to Franco, was detained, sentenced and exiled. In the mid-1950s he started to advocate co-operation with syndicalist Falangists and over time got jeered by the Javierista youth as a collaborationist. Once ousted from the Hugocarlista-dominated Carlist organization he joined Francoist structures are was considered a ministerial candidate in the late 1960s. In the early 1970s he was already firmly set within the so-called bunker, the hardline Francoist core
^Joaquín Manglano y Cucalo throughout all of his post-war career remained on good if not excellent terms with the Franco and though he did not renounce his Traditionalist identity and at very few times demonstrated dissent (law on religious liberty), he has always remained firmly mounted within the regime. The same stand was adopted by the Oriol brothers, especially José María and Antonio. Also the Oreja brothers, though not on equally high posts, remained firmly amalgamated within the Francoist structures
^e.g. the cases of Luis Redondo García (in the military), Mariano Puigdollers Oliver (in central administration) or Joaquín Ordoño y López de Vallejo (in local administration)
^e.g. the cases of Miguel Urmeneta Ajarnaute, Nicolás Lasarte Arana, Marcelo Fernández Nieto, Felipe Antoja Vigo, Antonio Archanco Zubiri
^see the cases of José Iruretagoyena Solchaga, Jaime Bofill-Gasset Amil, Luis Redondo García, Julio Rico de Sanz, Enrique Alonso Cuevillas or Florencio Aldaz Villanueva
^these were the cases e.g. of Manuel Agreda Aguinaga, Miguel Urmeneta Ajarnaute, José María Roger Amat, Mariano Puigdollers Oliver, Joaquín Ordoño y López de Vallejo, Jose Millaruelo Clementez, José Maldonado y Fernández del Torco, Eduardo Larrea Sáez de Navarrete, and José María Llaneza Zabaleta
^José María Sentis Simeon following a fairly active period of the 1940s assumed a passive stand in the 1950s, to resume militancy in the 1960s
^the case of Jaime del Burgo, initially outspoken opponent of the unification, later engaged in official structures, but politically promoted the carloctavista cause. He was offered a post of civil governor but rejected it and opted for second-rate position within the provincial Navarrese and municipal Pamplona structures. Also Jesús Fortún Ardaiz refused the post of civil governor, offered to him in the 1950s by Arrese, but was longtime member of the Navarrese diputacion. Ardent Francoist, he turned vehemently anti-Carlist; however, at times he also confronted the Falangist civil governor, Bermejo, Fortún Ardaiz, Jesús, [in:] Aunamendi Eusko Entziklopedia online, available here, Sanz Hoya 2023, pp. 331, 333, 339
^when in office, Esteban Bilbao has never publicly allowed his Traditionalist spirit to seem incompatible with the official Francoist political line. However, when a retiree he allowed himself to criticize what looked like an imminent nomination of Juan Carlos as the future king of Spain, Entrevista a Esteban Bilbao, [in:] Esfuerzo común 102 (1969). However, the same year Bilbao used to give more ambiguous answers. When asked by El Correo Catalan whether he was a Javierista, Bilbao replied: "I am a Carlist, I was and I will be. A king? I am faithful to the Dios – Patria - Rey ideario, and my king is the one who serves Fatherland and God. My king will be a Catholic prince, Spanish, over 30 years.. like specified in Ley de Sucesion", Rodon Guinjoan 2015, p. 435
^a fairly unique case of a Carlist - watered-down as he was - nominated to alcaldia of a provincial capital during late Francoism is this of Marcelo Fernández Nieto, who ascended to the mayor of Salamanca in 1969
^until the mid-1950s Antonio María Oriol was politically inactive and focused on business; then he started to rise in the official structures until becoming president of Consejo de Estado in 1973
^the Traditionalists who are routinely listed as “vehement Francoists” bent on confronting independent Carlism are José María Mazón Sainz, Amadeo Marco Ilincheta, Juan Granell Pascual and Agustín Asis y Garrote
^see e.g. Mikel Barreda, Rosa Borge Bravo, La democracia española: realidades y desafíos: análisis del sistema político español, Madrid 2006, ISBN9788497885102, p. 12, José Luis Rodríguez Jiménez, Reaccionarios y golpistas: la extrema derecha en España : del tardofranquismo a la consolidación de la democracia, 1967-1982, Madrid 1994, ISBN9788400074425, p. 80, Josemari Lorenzo Espinosa, Entre la espada y la pared: De Franco a la Constitución, Madrid 2017, ISBN9788416809530, p. 73, Julio Gil Pecharromán, El Movimiento Nacional (1937-1977), Barcelona 2013, ISBN9788408121381, pp. 29-30
^most of the “families” decomposed over time and in the mid-1960s they were either defunct or re-aligned along new lines: “the original sectors of old-guard Falangists, Carlists, doctrinaire monarchists, semiauthoritarian traditionalist Catholics, and right-wing generals had mostly fallen by the political wayside. The various institutions of the regime were still full of survivors from all these groups, but they were rarely any longer at the top”, Payne 2011, p. 506
^compare studies dealing with Carlism during the Francoist era: Caspistegui Gorasurreta 1997, Martorell Pérez 2009, Rodón Guinjoan Barcelona 2015, García Riol 2015, Miralles Climent 2018, MacClancy 2000, also Josep Miralles Climent, El carlismo militante (1965-1980). Del tradicionalismo al socialismo autogestionario [PhD thesis Universidad Jaume I], Castellón 2015
^detailed accounts differ; according to some sources it was the Minister of Economy who sought homogenisation of the country, according to others the Falangists aimed at undercutting the Carlist strength in Navarre and Alava by means of removing local legal establishments. Various individuals claimed the credit for eventual preservation of some Alavese and Navarrese fueros, see e.g. Entrevista a Esteban Bilbao, [in:] Esfuerzo común 102 (1969)
^Paul Preston, Franco. A biography, London 2011, ISBN9780006862109, p. 468; Paul H. Lewis, Latin Fascist Elites: The Mussolini, Franco, and Salazar Regimes, London 2002, ISBN9780313013348, p. 88
^currently scholars doubt such interpretation; "Franco acted as if he was prepared to turn his back on the direct line of the Bourbon dynasty and seek an eventual successor elsewhere", Payne 2011, p. 328; “he would produce a law which turned Spain into a kingdom but that would not necessarily mean bringing back the Bourbons”, Preston 2011, p. 534
^Alfonso Ballestero, José Ma de Oriol y Urquijo, Madrid 2014, ISBN, 9788483569160, p. 105; Mercedes Vázquez de Prada, El final de una ilusión. Auge y declive del tradicionalismo carlista (1957-1967), Madrid 2016, ISBN9788416558407, pp. 299-300, Manuel Martorell Pérez, Carlos Hugo frente a Juan Carlos. La solución federal para España que Franco rechazó, Madrid 2014, Miralles Climent 2015, pp. 230, 234, García Riol 2015, p. 295
^Joaquín Monserrat Cavaller, Joaquín Bau Nolla y la restauración de la Monarquía, Madrid 2001, ISBN8487863949, pp. 337, 352
^Martí Marin 2016, p. 107, Cuenca, Miranda 1987, p. 108, Giménez Martínez 2015, p. 79
^see Alvaro Rodríguez Núñez, Franquismo y tradicionalismo. La legitimación teórica del franquismo en la teória política tradicionalista [PhD thesis Universidad Santiago de Compostela], Santiago de Compostela 2013. Also Pedro Carlos González Cuevas, Tradicionalismo, [in:] Javier Fernández Sebastián (ed.), Diccionario político y social del siglo XX español, Madrid 2008, ISBN9788420687698, pp. 1170–1171, Heleno Saña, Historia de la filosófia española, Madrid 2007, ISBN9788496710986, p. 255 and onwards
^see e.g. Carlist memoranda to Franco which outlined key points of divergence and denied the Francoist regime the Traditionalist qualification, Manifestación del Ideales (1939) and Reclamación del Podér (1943), Martorell Pérez 2009, pp. 244, 371-2, Payne 1987, p. 328, Ballestero 2014, p. 80, Martorell Pérez 2009, p. 244, Josep Carles Clemente, Los días fugaces. El carlismo, de las guerras civiles a la transición, Cuenca 2013, ISBN978-8495414243, p. 33
^perhaps the last moment when Traditionalists spoke to massive crowd, possibly exceeding 100,000 people, was during a rally at Plaza de Oriente in November 1978, see ABC 21.11.78, available hereArchived 2018-01-10 at the Wayback Machine. Right-wing political conglomerates with carlo-francoist component, like Fuerza Nueva, Unión Nacional Española or Alianza Nacional 18 de Julio, fared badly in general elections. None of the carlist candidates made it to the Cortes
^unless his/her Carlist militancy is clear from a linked personal entry, relationship to Carlism is explained in footnote
^asesor of AET in the early 1950s, scholar of natural law at various universities, allegedly expulsed from the Javierista branch of Carlism following his acceptance of the CN seat, José Carlos Clemente, El carlismo en su prensa, 1931-1972, Madrid 1999, ISBN9788424508159, p. 31. In the early 1960s vicepresident of Javierista-controlled Movimiento Obrero Tradicionalista, Josep Miralles Climent, La AET, el MOT y la FOS, Madrid 2007, ISBN9788495735331, p. 79
^active in pre-war Carlism, then requete, afterwards provincial Navarrese Carlist leader, recommended to Cortes by the Javierista branch of Carlism, Montejurra 6 (1961)
^Barcena (1917-1994) volunteered to and fought in requete during the war; no obvious political links to post-war Carlism are identified, though it is known he engaged in Traditionalist initiatives against the law on religious liberties in the 1960s and held high post in the ex-combatant requete organization in the 1970s
^from the syndicates pool, as representative of the Fishermen Union
^1936-1938, in fact president of Comisión de Industria, Comercio y Abastos within Junta Técnica del Estado, makeshift Francoist quasi-government
^pre-war young Carlist militant, active also in the early 1940s, last manager of El Correo Catalán before it ceased as Carlist newspaper in the mid-1950s, Palabras para la sesion de homenaje al academico Claudio Colomer Marques, available here, also Entrevista a Claudi Colomer, l'últim director «carlista» d'El Correo Catalán, [in:] Hispanismo service, available here
^formally general auditor, rank in the legal branch of the navy, equivalent to counter-admiral
^former head of Jaimista circulo in Logrono and Alava, Antonio Rivera (ed.), Dictadura y desarroluismo. El Franquismo en Alava, Vitoria 2009, ISBN9788496845305, p. 152
^1946-1955 from local administration pool as representative of Alava, 1955-1961 FET CN pool
^one of Traditionalist leaders in Alava, Iker Cantabrana Morras, Lo viejo y lo nuevo: Díputación-FET de las JONS. La convulsa dinámica política de la "leal" Alava (Primera parte: 1936-1938), [in:] Sancho el Sabio 21 (2004), p. 152
^1936; he served only few hours, having been promptly demoted by the military, Cantabrana Morras 2004, p. 152
^active in the Javierista and then Hugocarlista branch of Carlism, Manuel Martorell Pérez, Carlos Hugo frente a Juan Carlos: La solución federal para España que Franco rechazó, Madrid 2014, ISBN9788477682653, p. 250
^active in Carlism during his youth, Imperio. Diario de Zamora 11.05.58, available here, During Francoism published a few books on Traditionalist political thought and on history of Carlism, but no personal links to post-war Carlism are known
^came from a very distinguished family, his father revolved around Carlism; himself Jose was probably active as a Carlist militant in his youth. Referred as "otro carlista" in Joseba Agirreazkuenaga, Mikel Urquijo (eds.), Bilbao desde sus alcaldes: Diccionario biográfico de los alcaldes de Bilbao y gestión municipal en la Dictadura, vol. 3, Bilbao 2008, ISBN9788488714145, p. 238, also counted as Carlist in María del Mar Larraza-Micheltorena, Alcaldes de Pamplona durante el franquismo: Un retrato de conjunto, [in:] Memoria y Civilización 15 (2012), p. 237, and in Eduardo Martínez Lacabe, La unión imposible: Carlistas y Falangistas en Navarra durante la Guerra Civil, [in:] Huarte de San Juan. Geografía e historia 1 (1994), p. 360
^Herreros de Tejada y Azcona was a Riojan family traditoinally related to Carlism. Three brothers, Jose Maria, Rafael and Manuel, volunteered to requete; Jose Maria was heading a battalion-type unit, see Requete service, available here
^Herreros de Tejada y Azcona was a Riojan family traditoinally related to Carlism. Three brothers, Jose Maria, Rafael and Manuel, volunteered to requete
^"de origen carlista", though later referred as a "technocrat", Antonio Rivera (ed.), Dictadura y desarrolismo. El Franquismo en Alava, Vitoria 2009, ISBN9788496845305, p. 198. As a 17-year-old he volunteered to requete and spent the rest of the war in Carlist troops, Fallece don Gonzalo Lacalle Leloup, [in:] Tradicion Viva blog, available here
^during many years subgobernador primero of Banco de España; 1964-65 its acting president
^active pre-war Carlist militant, Iker Cantabrana Morras, Lo viejo y lo nuevo: Díputación-FET de las JONS. La convulsa dinámica política de la "leal" Alava (Segunda parte: 1938-1943), [in:] Sancho el Sabio 22 (2005), p. 163
^local administration pool, as representative of Alava
^militant Carlist before the war, then requete, ABC 18.06.61, available here
^local administration pool, as mayor of San Sebastian
^pre-war links to Carlism, Diario de Burgos 03.11.42, available here. In the mid-1930s active in Sociedad Tradicionalista of Barracaldo, in 1936 member of Junta de Guerra de Vizcaya, a provincial wartime Carlist executive, Antonio Francisco Canales Serrano, Las otras derechas: derechas y poder local en el País Vasco y Cataluña en el siglo XX, Madrid 2006, ISBN9788496467255, p. 246
^local administration pool, as mayor of Barracaldo
^José María Mazón Sainz (1901-1981) was head of Riojan Carlism in the mid-1930s; he was unexpectedly elevated to nationwide recognition when conde Rodezno suggested him, instead of Ulibarri, to Junta Politica of the unificated state party, at that time still prepared to be launched, Mercedes Peñalba Sotorrío, Entre la boina roja y la camisa azul, Estella 2013, ISBN9788423533657, p. 56
^Eugenio Mazón Verdejo (1929-2003) was son to José María Mazón Sainz, first Carlist member of FET Junta Politica. He was moderately engaged in Traditionalist current of Carlism during late Francoism and afterwards
^Jefe de la Casa Civil del Jefe del Estado, 1938-1961
^pre-war vice-president of Carlist circulo in Vitoria, Iker Cantabrana Morras, Lo viejo y lo nuevo: Díputación-FET de las JONS. La convulsa dinámica política de la "leal" Alava (Segunda parte: 1938-1943), [in:] Sancho el Sabio 22 (2005), p. 163
^former requete, active in post-war Carlism and later in its hugocarlista branch, member of Euskalherriko Karlista Alderdia, see e.g. Eka.Mforos service, available here. His son Juan Querejeta became an activist of the Hugocarlista terrorist organization GAC
^according to the 1941 confidential info by the civil governor, before the war Pero-Sanz had been active in Comunion Tradicionalista; contemporary scholar considers this engagement - if true - irrelevant, Joseba Agirreazkuenaga, Mikel Urquijo (eds.), Bilbao desde sus alcaldes: Diccionario biográfico de los alcaldes de Bilbao y gestión municipal en la Dictadura, vol. 3, ISBN9788488714145, p. 216
^head of Dirección General de Asuntos Ecclesiásticos department within the Ministry of Justice, head of Consejo Superior de Protección de Menores and member of Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas
^in scholarly prosopographic work on civil governors during Francoism listed as "tradicionalista", Martí Marín i Corbera, Los gobernadores civiles del franquismo 1936-1963: seis personajes en busca de autor, [in:] Historia y política: Ideas, procesos y movimientos sociales 29 (2013), p. 299. Others prefer to name him "integrist", Iker Cantabrana Morras, Lo viejo y lo nuevo: Diputación-FET de las JONS. La convulsa dinámica política de la "leal" Álava (Segunda parte: 1938-1943), [in:] Sancho el Sabio 22 (2005), p. 142. He is also identified as coming from the Carlist background by Manual Santa Cruz, Apuntes y documentos para la historia del tradicionalismo español, vols. 1-3, Sevilla 1979, p. 160
^a career officer, he became a Carlist sympathizer before the war and as such was possibly involved in the Sanjurjo coup. During his civil governor spells he was customarily accused of cultivating Carlism, the charge which cost him dismissal from the Las Palmas post, Martorell Pérez 2009, p. 218
^"antic tradicionalista vinculat a Alfons Sala Argemí, el comte d’Egara, havia estat secretari de la Mancomunitat quan aquell l’havia presidit, en temps de la Dictadura de Primo de Rivera. El 1934 havia propugnat la integració carlina en el Bloque Nacional impulsat per José Calvo Sotelo, en contra de la postura de la secretaria general. Durant la guerra havia estat partidari de la unificació carlina amb els falangistes", Josep Gelonch Solle, Falange i poder. Lleida durant la dictadura franquista [PhD thesis University of Lerida], Lerida 2010, p. 575
^descendant to a militant Carlist family, he might have been briefly involved in Carlism in his youth and he certainly developed great admiration for Victor Pradera, Tomás Garicano Goñi, [in:] Real Academia de Historia service, available here. Some sources refer to him explicitly as "carlista navarro", see Pedro Capilla: “Siempre ha habido intentos de regular la farmacia sin conocerla”, [in:] Correo Farmacéutico 18.05.09, available here, "tradicionalista", see José Basaburua, El sinsentido de una vida entregada a la ideología. Un líder comunista olvidado por la Historia: Jesús Monzón, [in:] Abril 37 (2008), available here. However, in other sources he is listed as a "monarquico". No explicit links to Carlism identified
^loosely related to Carlism, generally not formally in its ranks, however at one point figured in their Delegacion de Prensa. By some scholars described as "mezclado en los entornos carlistas, aunque solo militio an Comunion en el periodo republicano", Iker Cantabrana Morras, Lo viejo y lo nuevo: Díputación-FET de las JONS. La convulsa dinámica política de la "leal" Alava (Primera parte: 1936-1938), [in:] Sancho el Sabio 21 (2004), p. 169
^active in Carlism during youth, moved to Falange in the mid-1930s. Supporter of Carloctavismo in the late 1940s/early 1950s, Xavier Tornafoch Yuste, El carlisme vigatà entre la Segona República i el primer franquisme: victòria militar i derrota política, [in:] V Simposi d'historia del Carlisme, 2017, p. 11. Some scholars refer to his "temprana militancia carlista", Javier Tébar Hurtado, Barcelona, anys blaus: el governador Correa Veglison: poder i política franquistes (1940-1945), Barcelona 2011, ISBN9788496495463. Some works present him as nurturing a vision of genuine Carlism amalgamated in the new, national party, Tébar Hurtado 2012, p. 39
^career officer, actively involved in the 1936 conspiracy in Gipuzkoa, during the war commanded a Carlist tercio and then 1. Brigada Navarra, a division-type Carlist unit. No political links to Carlism identified
^1943-1967 FET CN pool, 1967-1971 as personal appointee of the head of state
^a Navarro, career officer, with no pre-war Carlist links identified. During the war commanded a Carlist tercio. No later political links to Carlism known
^a navarro and a career officer; no links to pre-war Carlism identified. During the war commanded a requete company in a Carlist tercio. No later links to Carlism known
^1961-1967 from FET CN pool, 1967-1977 as personal appointee of head of state
^a career officer, involved in conspiracy talks with the Carlists in the spring of 1936; commanded a Carlist battalion during some period of the civil war; demonstrated some benevolence towards requetes, though no political links to Carlism have been identified
^1943-1946 from FET CN pool, 1946-1952 as personal appointee of head of state
^originated from a Carlist Navarrese family; career officer who commanded a requete brigade during much of the civil war. No direct political links to Carlism identified. Some authors refer to him as "carlista", see e.g. Ricardo de la Cierva, La historia se confiesa: España 1930-1977, vol. 10, Madrid 1976, p. 65
^Carlist militant since the 1910s, in the spring of 1936 he entered Junta Técnica Militar, a joint Carlist-military conspiracy board, where he co-headed Department of Propaganda y Prensa; however, at the same time he was also involved in Falange, Roberto Muñoz Bolaños, "Por Dios, por la Patria y el Rey marchemos sobre Madrid": el intento de sublevación carlista en la primavera de 1936, [in:] Daniel Macias Fernandez, Fernando Puell de la Villa (eds.), David contra Goliat: Guerra y asimetría en la Edad Contemporánea, Madrid 2014, pp. 143-169. He was also managing Oficina de Prensa Tradicionalista, Eduardo González Calleja, Contrarrevolucionarios. Radicalización violenta de las derechas durante la Segunda República, 1931-1936, Madrid 2001, ISBN9788420664552
^career officer, he commanded a Navarrese Brigade during much of the Civil War. Known for monarchist, though not necessarily Carlist sympathies. No political links to Carlism identified
^married to a Carlist and involved in requete buildup in the early 1930s; no explicit political links to Carlism identified. Historiographic opinions differ, many authors consider him a "Carlist" or "Traditionalist", many other prefer more vague categorizations and few think him a broadly termed monarchist, perhaps even with an Alfonsist leaning, see discussion on dedicated Varela's WP entry
Juan-Cruz Allí Aranguren, El carlismo de Franco. De Rodezno a Carlos VIII [PhD thesis UNED], s.l. 2021
Francisco Javier Caspistegui Gorasurreta, El naufragio de las ortodoxias. El carlismo, 1962–1977, Pamplona 1997, ISBN9788431315641
Daniel Jesús García Riol, La resistencia tradicionalista a la renovación ideológica del carlismo (1965-1973) [PhD thesis UNED], Madrid 2015
Miguel Angel Giménez Martínez, Las Cortes de Franco o el Parlamento imposible, [in:] Trocadero: Revista de historia moderna y contemporanea 27 (2015), pp. 67–100
Martí Marín i Corbera, Los gobernadores civiles del franquismo 1936-1963: seis personajes en busca de autor, [in:] Historia y política: Ideas, procesos y movimientos sociales 29 (2013), pp. 269–299
Manuel Martorell Pérez, Carlos Hugo frente a Juan Carlos. La solución federal para España que Franco rechazó, Madrid 2014, ISBN9788477682653
Manuel Martorell Pérez, La continuidad ideológica del carlismo tras la Guerra Civil [PhD thesis in Historia Contemporanea, Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia], Valencia 2009
Manuel Martorell Pérez, Retorno a la lealtad; el desafío carlista al franquismo, Madrid 2010, ISBN9788497391115
Soledad Miranda García, José Manuel Cuenca Toribio, La elite ministerial franquista, [in:] Revista de Estudios Políticos 57 (1987), pp. 107–148
Josep Miralles Climent, El Carlismo frente al estado español: rebelión, cultura y lucha política, Madrid 2004, ISBN9788475600864
Josep Miralles Climent, El carlismo militante (1965-1980). Del tradicionalismo al socialismo autogestionario [PhD thesis Universidad Jaume I], Castellón 2015
Josep Miralles Climent, La rebeldía carlista. Memoria de una represión silenciada: Enfrentamientos, marginación y persecución durante la primera mitad del régimen franquista (1936-1955), Madrid 2018, ISBN9788416558711
Mercedes Peñalba Sotorrío, Entre la boina roja y la camisa azul, Estella 2013, ISBN 9788423533657
Ramón María Rodón Guinjoan, Invierno, primavera y otoño del carlismo (1939-1976) [PhD thesis Universitat Abat Oliba CEU], Barcelona 2015
Jordi Esteve Rubío Coromina, “Dios, Patra y Tradición” o la falsa unitat de les forces franquistes a la provincia de Girona, [in:] Antoni Segura, Andreu Mayayo, Teresa Abelló (eds.), La dictadura franquista. La institucionalització d’un règim, Barcelona 2012, ISBN 9788491687139, pp. 110–123
Joan Maria Thomàs, Franquistas contra franquistas. Luchas por el poder en la cúpula del régimen de Franco, Barcelona 2016, ISBN9788499926346
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