¹ — Involved an Allied convoy or delivery mission
² — Involved an Axis convoy or delivery mission
Operation Calendar in 1942 was an Anglo–American operation in the Second World War to deliver Supermarine Spitfire fighter aircraft to Malta. The aircraft were desperately needed to bolster the island's defence against strong Axis air raids.
In the autumn of 1941 Axis intelligence agencies had established eleven stations around Gibraltar, the main one at Algeciras.[1][a] Two of the stations had Spanish agents and others had German and Italians in Spanish uniforms and by early 1942 had gained a fair degree of efficiency. Messages usually reached Berlin within the hour but the British code-breakers at Bletchley Park could decrypt the signals so quickly that the Admiralty knew of a ship arrival at Gibraltar before the authorities there had sent a notification signal. Axis reports were usually accurate enough to name the big ships, except in poor visibility. The Germans began to install infra-red devices and night telescopes, to be more effective in poor weather and in the dark. In Unternehmen Bodden (Operation Bay) buildings were put up on either side of the Strait of Gibraltar for the new apparatuses and were operational by April 1942, the Admiralty having warned on 7 March that ships were likely to be detected at night.[2]
British
The British on Malta obtained tactical intelligence from the local Royal Air Force (RAF) Y service unit. The Government Code and Cypher School (GC & CS) at Bletchley Park in England was able to decrypt some Luftwaffe operation orders, which showed that the main effort was to be against British airfields on Malta. The decrypts were infrequent because much of the Axis signals traffic was sent by land line and the time needed to decrypt wireless signals precluded their use for early-warning. The exploitation of radio and wireless transmissions by the Y unit was useful but neither it nor the radar on the island could give sufficient warning of air raids. The air superiority enjoyed by the Axis air forces meant that such warning of raids that was possible was of little tactical value. As soon as a supply convoy left Gibraltar or Alexandria, Axis agents reported it, GC & CS gaining a plethora of decrypts from them which the Admiralty could pass on to the local naval commanders on Axis positions, strengths, reconnaissance practices and the equipment and methods of their bombers and torpedo-bombers. Before a Malta convoy, the RAF conducted many photographic sorties, revealing more about Axis air force locations and strengths but this reached only as far as Naples. The authorities in London had a grandstand view but for early warning of attacks, until May 1942, convoys were reliant on aerial patrolling, radar and lookouts.[3]
As Malta began to run short of supplies, Operation MG 1 was mounted to escort Convoy MW 10 from Alexandria on 21 March.[4] The convoy was the subject of a tentative attack by an Italian fleet; the Italians inflicted severe damage on several escorts in the Second Battle of Sirte but the weaker British force fended off the Italian fleet. The attack on the convoy led to its dispersal which caused a delay and it reached Malta in the morning and not at night as planned, leaving the merchant ships exposed to Axis air attack. In the next 48 hours, all the merchant ships were sunk off Malta or at their moorings; barely 5,000 long tons (5,100 t) of supplies were unloaded.[5]
By the end of April 1942, Axis bombing had smashed the docks, ships, aircraft and airfields and the bombers began attacks on army camps, barracks, warehouses and road junctions, the preliminaries of invasion. After 18 April, German bombing suddenly stopped and Italian bombers took over, regularly bombing with small formations of aircraft. During the month, Axis aircraft flew more than 9,500 sorties against 388 by the RAF all but 30 of which were fighter sorties. The British lost 50 aircraft,20 shot down in combat against 37 Axis losses, during the dropping of 6,700 long tons (6,800 t) of bombs, three times the March figure, 3,000 long tons (3,000 t) falling on the docks, 2,600 long tons (2,600 t) on airfields.[6]
The bombing killed 300 civilians, left 350 people seriously wounded and demolished or damaged 11,450 buildings. Good shelters existed but some of the casualties were caused by delayed-action bombs.[6] Three destroyers, three submarines, three minesweepers, five tugs, a water carrier and a floating crane were sunk in port and more ships damaged. The island continued to function as a staging post but the Axis bombing neutralised Malta as an offensive base. Two boats of the 10th Submarine Flotilla had been sunk, two were damaged in harbour and on 26 April the flotilla was ordered out because of mining by small fast craft, which were undetectable by radar and inaudible during the bombing; the surviving minesweepers were too reduced in numbers to clear the approaches.[7] The governor, Sir William Dobbie had given a deadline of mid-June for the exhaustion of the food on the island and could only be met by the delivery of substantial supplies of food, fuel, ammunition and equipment brought by sea.[8]
Malta convoys
A supply convoy to Malta in January 1942 lost one of four ships and an escort was sunk by a U-boat; the February convoy suffered the loss of its three merchant ships to aircraft attack. During the March convoy, the escorts were forewarned by a submarine sighting and decrypts from the Italian C 38m coding machine that an Italian fleet had sailed from Taranto, leading to the Second Battle of Sirte on 22 March 1942, the defence of the convoy by the 15th Cruiser Squadron which forced the battleship Littorio, the heavy cruisers Gorizia, Trento, one light cruiser and ten destroyers to turn away, having inflicted little serious damage to the British escorts and none to the convoy. Two of the four merchantmen were sunk by air attack near Malta and the other two were sunk at their moorings when the unloading of their cargoes had barely begun. Despite the ferrying of fighter aircraft to Malta by aircraft carrier, submarines had to be used to ferry aviation fuel.[9]
The Axis air offensive against Malta and the losses inflicted on the Mediterranean Fleet by Italian human torpedoes of the Decima Flottiglia MAS and other losses made it much harder for the British to attack convoys to Libya. On 4 January, massed air attacks on Malta coincided with the Italian Operazione M43, six merchant ships crossing from Italy escorted six destroyers and five torpedo boats, a close escort of a battleship, four light cruisers and five destroyers and a distant escort of three battleships, two heavy cruisers and eight destroyers. Intelligence decrypts revealed to the British the timing and route of the battleship convoy, with reconnaissance reports from aircraft. Bombers from Malta and Cyrenaica missed the convoy and Force K in Malta remained in port.[10] The convoy arrived on 5 January, a notable Axis success; British submarine attacks on the convoy on its return journey failed. On 22 January, Operazione T18, another battleship convoy, got four of five ships to Tripoli. On 21 February in Operazione K7, three groups of merchant ships departed Italy with another elaborate battleship escort, a British air attack was defeated by German fighters on 22 February and the convoy arrived the next day. The Italians sent eleven convoys in February, thirteen of the fifteen ships arriving, 58,965 long tons (59,911 t) (99.2 per cent) of the supplies despatched being unloaded; submarines sank three of the eleven ships making the return journey.[10]
Convoy V5 sailed on 7 March from several ports and attacks failed as they did on the return convoy. Operazione Sirio on 15 March brought four merchant ships to Tripoli on 18 March. The Regia Marina had used much of its fuel oil on the battleship convoys, when German oil deliveries had been suspended and the Italians had to return to smaller escort operations. Four ships departed Italian ports on 17 and 18 March, one hitting a mine near Tripoli and the rest arriving, the danger of attacks from Malta having diminished considerably. Fourteen convoys had sailed for Tripoli in March and eighteen of twenty ships survived the journey, 47,588 long tons (48,352 t) of supplies arrived (82.7 per cent). On 4 April, Operazione Lupo six ships in three convoys arrived at Tripoli and Operazione Aprilia delivered six merchantmen on 16 April. The decline of Malta as an offensive base led the British to rely on submarines, which sank a light cruiser and six freighters and RAF bombers from Egypt bombing Libyan ports. In April, 159,389 long tons (161,947 t) of supplies arrived (99.2 per cent)..[11] Italian ships were at their safest from April to mid-July 1942, convoys sailing 50 nmi (58 mi; 93 km) from Malta, escorted by a couple of aircraft.[12]
Italian convoy deliveries to Libya, data is from Playfair (2004) unless indicated.[12]
Month
Non-fuel (tons)
Fuel (tons)
Losses (%)
Notes
April
102,000
48,000
<1
With Malta suppressed and western Cyrenaica lost, 750 aircraft anti-shipping sorties had little effect on Italian convoys.[13][b]
Operation MG 1, to escort Convoy MW 10 to Malta, succeeded but hardly any of the supplies reaching Malta survived Axis air attacks. Malta had been neutralised as an offensive base by the loss of 126 aircraft on the ground and twenty in the air. The RAF withdrew most of its bombers and reconnaissance aircraft and the Navy evacuated most of its ships; Axis convoys could now be run to Libya with scant opposition. The demands on the Home Fleet for escorts for the Arctic Convoy PQ 16 in May 1942, led Churchill and the War Cabinet to decide that merchant ships could not be risked on Malta convoys until its air defences had been reinforced. The Air Officer Commanding, Air H.Q. Malta, Sir Hugh Lloyd wrote that
Malta's need is for Spitfires, Spitfires and still more Spitfires. And they must come in bulk, not in dribs and drabs.[14]
Recent Club Runs to deliver aircraft from Gibraltar had been dogged by failures and inefficiency; the new 90 imp gal (410 L; 110 US gal) external fuel tanks for Spitfires had proved inadequate, forcing the cancellation of the Club Runs Operation Spotter I and Operation Picket I Club Runs. The deck of HMS Argus was too short for enough Spitfires with long-range tanks to be accommodated, Eagle was in dock for emergency repairs and the fleet carriers had lifts that were too narrow for the wingspan of Spitfires or were busy in the Indian Ocean.[15][c] Churchill made a request to the US president, Franklin D. Roosevelt, for the use of the American aircraft carrier, USS Wasp (Captain John W. Reeves, Jr.), that was in British waters, which Roosevelt granted.[15]
NASA Satellite photograph showing the Strait of Gibraltar and the Alboran Sea
RAF staff officers briefed the pilots while the new long-range external tanks were attached.[17] The 90-gallon slipper tanks for the Spitfires were found to be unserviceable as they had been on Operation Spotter, ill-fitting and leaking large amounts of fuel, which was siphoned off into the slipstream instead of flowing into the engine.[18] Many of the Spitfires were discovered to have guns that were non-operational and only a quarter of the Spitfires had serviceable R/Ts.[17] The Spitfires, originally painted in a desert camouflage scheme, were repainted dark blue in anticipation of the long flight across the sea. An RAF mechanic was killed after he inadvertently backed into a Spitfire propeller, seen by several pilots as they were waiting to take off.[19] Despite the poor quality of the aircraft, the flight to Malta began at dawn on 20 April. Covered by F4F Wildcats from Wasp, the 48 airworthy Spitfires of the 52 embarked, take-off for Malta beginning at 5:18 a.m. at about 20° 20' East.[17][d] A US Sergeant pilot flew to Algeria and passed himself off as a "lost civilian pilot in need of repatriation".[20][e] The other 47 Spitfires arrived safely, 601 Squadron landing at Luqa and all but one of the 603 Squadron Spitfires landing at Takali; the Axis air forces were forewarned of their arrival.[22]
After the Spitfires had taken off, Force W turned about, stopped at Gibraltar and returned to the Clyde on 26 April. The Spitfire pilots found that the blast pens on the Malta airfields were so badly damaged that they gave scant protection from attack. The Germans and Italians knew about the operation and began the first of 300 sorties flown during the day. After three days none of the Spitfires were operational, most having been caught on the ground and destroyed. The Spitfires that survived the first attacks were hard to keep serviceable because of the chronic lack of spares and the lack of experience on Spitfires by the ground crews. The mediocrity of the aircraft sent by the RAF was made worse by the lack of maintenance at Malta. The situation brought Lloyd to despair, the Spitfire delivery having been wasted, which had been on show to the Americans.[23]
Aftermath
Analysis
Dobbie was reminded of the fiasco of convoy MW 10 and he reported that
It is obvious that the very worst may happen if we cannot replenish our vital needs, especially flour and ammunition... [It] had become a question of survival.[24]
and that food would run out by mid-June. Churchill took this as a sign that Dobbie was exhausted and needed to be replaced. The failures of MG1 and Calendar were considered to be that the Malta air defence was ineffective and that Dobbie was at fault in asking for a convoy when unable to give it adequate air protection. Dobbie was discreetly removed from his post, said to need a rest but somewhat unfairly blamed for being in an impossible position. Lord Gort flew from Gibraltar and met Dobbie at a seaplane base at RAF Kalafrana a seaplane base in the south-east of Malta, during an air raid, late on 7 May then Dobbie flew to Gibraltar in the Sunderland that had brought Gort. The next day, Operation Bowery, another Club Run with Wasp, headed towards Malta.[24]
Subsequent events
After the disaster of the sequel to the dispatch of the Spitfires from Wasp, Gracie reformed the ground organisation for the reception of the next batch of Spitfires and Lloyd managed to get an experienced ground controller from Britain. Spare parts and ground crew experienced on Spitfires were to be rushed to Malta by the fast minelayer HMS Welshman, Churchill told the Admiral of the Fleet, Dudley Pound, the First Sea Lord that,
We may well lose this ship but in view of the emergency...there appears to be no alternative.[25]
Operation Bowery
A Spitfire makes ready to take off from USS Wasp
Having returned to Glasgow on 29 April 1942, Wasp embarked another 47 Spitfires Mk Vc (trop) at Shieldhall; the aircraft had better streamlining which yielded a small but useful improvement in performance, despite the drag of a tropical air filter. The loading arrangements were as incompetent as they were for Operation Calendar, the condition of the aircraft was just as deplorable and its recurrence was a serious embarrassment. The Flag Officer Glasgow reported that the situation "is unsatisfactory, and has unfortunately created a very bad impression".[26] The long-range fuel tanks still fitted badly and leaked; many aircraft had defective R/T and poorly serviced guns. Reeves refused to continue loading until the long-range tanks had been repaired. Wasp stopped at the Tail of the Bank and its crew completed the repairs to the long-range tanks. Wasp and its destroyers Lang and Sterett sailed to Scapa Flow. As Force W, with Renown, the cruiser Charybdis and the destroyers Echo and Intrepid the US ships sailed from Scapa Flow on 3 May.[25]
Notes
^Tarifa, Cape Trafalgar, Malaga, Cape de Gata, Tangier, Ceuta, Tetuan, Cape Tres Forcas, Melilla and Alboran Island.[1]
^This was a higher rate than for the previous three months. Even the new Wellington torpedo-bombers had little fuel left to find ships west of Benghazi. On 14 April an attack by eight Beaufort torpedo-bombers cost five Beauforts for no loss to the convoy.[13]
^From 8 to 21 April, longitudinal girders were replaced under the steering gear, rubber glands were re-packed and 418 rivets were replaced around the rudder. During 1942 Eagle made nine Spitfire Club Runs.[16]
^Lloyd had sent Squadron Leader "Jumbo" Gracie, the commander of 126 Squadron, to London to plead for Spitfires in large numbers, rather than in small instalments and he was the first to take off.[17]
^Another pilot reported that prior to take off, Walcott had told him that he had no intention of flying to Malta. Walcott claimed that he did this as a result of interference from enemy aircraft but later claimed that his Spitfire had developed a faulty undercarriage after taking off and he diverted to the nearest landfall. Interned by the Vichy French, he eventually was released and made his way back to Britain where he joined the United States Army Air Forces.[21]
Brown, David (1973). "HMS Eagle". Profile Warship. No. 035. Windsor: Profile Publications. pp. 249–272. OCLC33084560.
Cull, Brian; Galea, Frederick (2005). Spitfires Over Malta: The Epic Air Battles of 1942. London, United Kingdom: Grub Street. ISBN1-904943-30-6.
Greene, J.; Massignani, A. (2002) [1998]. The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1940–1943 (repr. pbk. ed.). Rochester: Chatham. ISBN978-1-86176-190-3.
Hinsley, Harry; Thomas, E. E.; Ransom, C. F. G.; Knight, R. C. (1981). British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations. History of the Second World War. London: HMSO. ISBN0-521-242908.
Nichols, Steve (2008). Malta Spitfire Aces. Aircraft of the Aces (No. 83). Oxford: Osprey. ISBN978-1-84603-305-6.
O'Hara, Vincent P. (2009). Struggle for the Middle Sea: The Great Navies at War in the Mediterranean Theater, 1940–1945. London: Conway. ISBN978-1-84486-102-6.
O'Hara, Vincent P. (2013). In Passage Perilous: Malta and the Convoy Battles of June 1942. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press. ISBN978-0-253-00603-5.
Playfair, I. S. O.; Flynn, F. C.; Molony, C. J. C.; Gleave, T. P. (2004) [1960]. Butler, Sir James (ed.). The Mediterranean and Middle East: British Fortunes Reach Their Lowest Ebb (September 1941 to September 1942). History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series. Vol. III (facs. pbk. Naval & Military Press, Uckfield ed.). London: HMSO. ISBN978-1-84574-067-2.
Woodman, Richard (2003). Malta Convoys 1940–1943. London: John Murray. ISBN0-7195-6408-5.
Further reading
Dannreuther, Raymond (2005). Somerville's Force H: The Royal Navy's Gibraltar-based Fleet, June 1940 to March 1942. London: Aurum Press. ISBN1-84513-020-0.
Hague, Arnold (2000). The Allied Convoy System 1939–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. ISBN978-1-55750-019-9.
Jacobs, Peter (2016). Fortress Island, Malta, Defence and Re-Supply during the Siege. Barnsley: Pen & Sword Aviation. ISBN978-1-47388-255-3.
Rohwer, Jürgen; Hümmelchen, Gerhard (2005) [1972]. Chronology of the War at Sea, 1939–1945: The Naval History of World War Two (3rd rev. ed.). London: Chatham. ISBN1-86176-257-7.
Smith, Peter C. (2009) [1995]. Eagle's War: Aircraft Carrier HMS Eagle 1939–1942 (2nd pbk. ed.). Manchester: Crécy Publishing. ISBN978-0-9075795-3-3.
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