|Комитет государственной безопасностиКГБ СССР|
Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnostiKGB SSSR
|Formed||13 March 1954|
|Dissolved||3 December 1991|
|Type||State committee of union-republican jurisdiction|
|Headquarters||Lubyanka Building, 2 Bolshaya Lubyanka StreetMoscow, Russian SFSR|
The Committee for State Security (CSS) (Russian: Комитет государственной безопасности (КГБ), romanized: Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti (KGB), IPA: [kəmʲɪˈtʲet ɡəsʊˈdarstvʲɪn(ː)əj bʲɪzɐˈpasnəsʲtʲɪ] i) was the main security agency for the Soviet Union from 13 March 1954 until 3 December 1991. As a direct successor of preceding agencies such as the Cheka, GPU, OGPU, NKGB, NKVD and MGB, it was attached to the Council of Ministers. It was the chief government agency of "union-republican jurisdiction", carrying out internal security, foreign intelligence, counter-intelligence and secret police functions. Similar agencies operated in each of the republics of the Soviet Union aside from the Russian SFSR, where the KGB was headquartered, with many associated ministries, state committees and state commissions.
The agency was a military service governed by army laws and regulations, in the same fashion as the Soviet Army or the MVD Internal Troops. While most of the KGB archives remain classified, two online documentary sources are available. Its main functions were foreign intelligence, counter-intelligence, operative-investigative activities, guarding the state border of the USSR, guarding the leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government, organization and security of government communications as well as combating nationalist, dissident, religious and anti-Soviet activities.
On 3 December 1991, the KGB was officially dissolved. It was later succeeded in Russia by the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) and what would later become the Federal Security Service (FSB). Following the 1991–1992 South Ossetia War, the self-proclaimed Republic of South Ossetia established its own KGB, keeping the unreformed name. In addition, Belarus established its successor to the KGB of the Byelorussian SSR in 1991, the Belarusian KGB, keeping the unreformed name.
Further information: Chronology of Soviet secret police agencies
Restructuring in the MVD following the fall of Beria in June 1953 resulted in the formation of the KGB under Ivan Serov in March 1954.
Secretary Leonid Brezhnev overthrew Premier Nikita Khrushchev in 1964. Brezhnev (in power: 1964–1982) was concerned about ambitious spy-chiefs – the communist party had managed Serov's successor, the ambitious KGB Chairman, Aleksandr Shelepin (in office: 1958–1961), but Shelepin carried out Brezhnev's palace coup d'état against Khrushchev in 1964 (despite Shelepin not then being in the KGB). Brezhnev sacked Shelepin's successor and protégé, Vladimir Semichastny (in office: 1961–1967) as KGB Chairman and re-assigned him to a sinecure in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Shelepin found himself demoted from the chairman of the Committee of Party and State Control in 1965 to Trade Union Council chairman (in office 1967–1975).
In the 1980s, the Soviet Union glasnost provoked KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov (in office: 1988–1991) to lead the August 1991 Soviet coup d'état in an attempt to depose President Mikhail Gorbachev. The failed coup d'état and the collapse of the USSR heralded the end of the KGB on 3 December 1991. The KGB's main successors are the FSB (Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation) and the SVR (Foreign Intelligence Service).
The GRU (Foreign military intelligence service of the Soviet Union) recruited the ideological agent Julian Wadleigh, who became a State Department diplomat in 1936. The NKVD's first US operation was establishing the legal residency of Boris Bazarov and the illegal residency of Iskhak Akhmerov in 1934. Throughout, the Communist Party USA (CPUSA) and its General Secretary Earl Browder, helped NKVD recruit Americans, working in government, business, and industry.
Other important, low-level and high-level ideological agents were the diplomats Laurence Duggan and Michael Whitney Straight in the State Department, the statistician Harry Dexter White in the Treasury Department, the economist Lauchlin Currie (an FDR advisor), and the "Silvermaster Group", headed by statistician Greg Silvermaster, in the Farm Security Administration and the Board of Economic Warfare. Moreover, when Whittaker Chambers, formerly Alger Hiss's courier, approached the Roosevelt Government—to identify the Soviet spies Duggan, White, and others—he was ignored. Hence, during the Second World War (1939–45)—at the Tehran (1943), Yalta (1945), and Potsdam (1945) conferences—Big Three Ally Joseph Stalin of the USSR, was better informed about the war affairs of his US and UK allies than they were about his.
Soviet espionage was at its most successful in collecting scientific and technological intelligence about advances in jet propulsion, radar and encryption, which impressed Moscow, but stealing atomic secrets was the capstone of NKVD espionage against Anglo–American science and technology. To wit, British Manhattan Project team physicist Klaus Fuchs (GRU 1941) was the main agent of the Rosenberg spy ring. In 1944, the New York City residency infiltrated top secret Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico by recruiting Theodore Hall, a 19-year-old Harvard physicist.
The KGB failed to rebuild most of its US illegal resident networks. The aftermath of the Second Red Scare (1947–57) and the crisis in the CPUSA hampered recruitment. The last major illegal resident, Rudolf Abel (Vilyam Genrikhovich Fisher/"Willie" Vilyam Fishers), was betrayed by his assistant, Reino Häyhänen, in 1957.
|Chronology of Soviet|
|1917–22||Cheka under SNK of the RSFSR|
(All-Russian Extraordinary Commission)
|1922–23||GPU under NKVD of the RSFSR|
(State Political Directorate)
|1920–91||PGU KGB or INO under Cheka (later KGB) of the USSR|
(First Chief Directorate)
|1923–34||OGPU under SNK of the USSR|
(Joint State Political Directorate)
|1934–46||NKVD of the USSR|
(People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs)
|1934–41||GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR|
(Main Directorate of State Security of
People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs)
|1941||NKGB of the USSR|
(People's Commissariat of State Security)
|1943–46||NKGB of the USSR|
(People's Commissariat for State Security)
|1946–53||MGB of the USSR|
(Ministry of State Security)
|1946–54||MVD of the USSR|
(Ministry of Internal Affairs)
KI MID of the USSR
|1954–78||KGB under the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union|
(Committee for State Security)
|1978–91||KGB of the USSR|
(Committee for State Security)
|1991||MSB of the USSR|
(Interrepublican Security Service)
|1991||TsSB of the USSR|
(Central Intelligence Service)
|1991||KOGG of the USSR|
(Committee for the Protection of
the State Border)
Recruitment then emphasised mercenary agents, an approach especially successful[quantify] in scientific and technical espionage, since private industry practised lax internal security, unlike the US Government. One notable KGB success occurred in 1967, with the walk-in recruitment of US Navy Chief Warrant Officer John Anthony Walker. Over eighteen years, Walker enabled Soviet Intelligence to decipher some one million US Navy messages, and track the US Navy.
In the late Cold War, the KGB was successful with intelligence coups in the cases of the mercenary walk-in recruits FBI counterspy Robert Hanssen (1979–2001) and CIA Soviet Division officer Aldrich Ames (1985–1994).
It was Cold War policy for the KGB of the Soviet Union and the secret services of the satellite states to extensively monitor public and private opinion, internal subversion and possible revolutionary plots in the Soviet Bloc. In supporting those Communist governments, the KGB was instrumental in crushing the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and the Prague Spring of "Socialism with a Human Face" in Czechoslovakia, 1968.
During the Hungarian revolt, KGB chairman Ivan Serov personally supervised the post-invasion "normalization" of the country. Consequently, the KGB monitored the satellite state populations for occurrences of "harmful attitudes" and "hostile acts"; yet, stopping the Prague Spring, deposing a nationalist Communist government, was its greatest achievement.
The KGB prepared the Red Army's route by infiltrating Czechoslovakia with many illegal residents disguised as Western tourists. They were to gain the trust of and spy upon the most outspoken proponents of Alexander Dubček's new government. They were to plant subversive evidence, justifying the USSR's invasion, that right-wing groups—aided by Western intelligence agencies—were going to depose the Communist government of Czechoslovakia. Finally, the KGB prepared hardline, pro-USSR members of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSČ), such as Alois Indra and Vasiľ Škultéty, to assume power after the Red Army's invasion.
The KGB's Czech success in the 1960s was matched with the failed suppression of the Solidarity labour movement in 1980s Poland. The KGB had forecast political instability consequent to the election of Archbishop of Kraków Karol Wojtyla as the first Polish Pope, John Paul II, whom they had categorised as "subversive" because of his anti-Communist sermons against the one-party régime of the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR). Despite its accurate forecast of crisis, the PZPR hindered the KGB's destroying the nascent Solidarity-backed political movement, fearing explosive civil violence if they imposed the KGB-recommended martial law. Aided by their Polish counterpart, the Służba Bezpieczeństwa (SB), the KGB successfully infiltrated spies to Solidarity and the Catholic Church, and in Operation X co-ordinated the declaration of martial law with Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski and the Polish Communist Party; however, the vacillating, conciliatory Polish approach blunted KGB effectiveness—and Solidarity then fatally weakened the Communist Polish government in 1989.
According to declassified documents, the KGB aggressively recruited former German (mostly Abwehr) intelligence officers after the war. The KGB used them to penetrate the West German intelligence service.
In the 1960s, acting upon the information of KGB defector Anatoliy Golitsyn, the CIA counter-intelligence chief James Jesus Angleton believed KGB had moles in two key places—the counter-intelligence section of CIA and the FBI's counter-intelligence department—through whom they would know of, and control, US counter-espionage to protect the moles and hamper the detection and capture of other Communist spies. Moreover, KGB counter-intelligence vetted foreign intelligence sources, so that the moles might "officially" approve an anti-CIA double agent as trustworthy. In retrospect, the captures of the moles Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen proved that Angleton, though ignored as over-aggressive, was correct, despite the fact that it cost him his job at CIA, which he left in 1975.
In the mid-1970s, the KGB tried to secretly buy three banks in northern California to gain access to high-technology secrets. Their efforts were thwarted by the CIA. The banks were Peninsula National Bank in Burlingame, the First National Bank of Fresno, and the Tahoe National Bank in South Lake Tahoe. These banks had made numerous loans to advanced technology companies and had many of their officers and directors as clients. The KGB used the Moscow Narodny Bank Limited to finance the acquisition, and an intermediary, Singaporean businessman Amos Dawe, as the frontman.
On 2 February 1973, the Politburo, which was led by Yuri Andropov at the time, demanded that KGB members influence Bangladesh (which was then newly formed) where Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was scheduled to win parliamentary elections. During that time, the Soviet secret service tried very hard to ensure support for his party and his allies and even predicted an easy victory for him. In June 1975, Mujib formed a new party called BAKSAL and created a one-party state. Three years later, the KGB in that region increased from 90 to 200, and by 1979 printed more than 100 newspaper articles. In these articles, the KGB officials accused Ziaur Rahman, popularly known as "Zia", and his regime of having ties with the United States.
In August 1979, the KGB accused some officers who were arrested in Dhaka in an overthrow attempt, and by October, Andropov approved the fabrication of a letter in which he stated that Muhammad Ghulam Tawab, an Air Vice-Marshal at the time, was the main plotter, which led the Bangladesh, Indian and Sri Lankan press to believe that he was an American spy. Under Andropov's command, Service A, a KGB division, falsified the information in a letter to Moudud Ahmed in which it said that he was supported by the American government and by 1981 even sent a letter accusing the Reagan administration of plotting to overthrow President Zia and his regime. The letter also mentioned that after Mujib was assassinated the United States contacted Khondaker Mostaq Ahmad to replace him as a short-term President. When the election happened in the end of 1979, the KGB made sure that the Bangladesh Nationalist Party would win. The party received 207 out of 300 seats, but the Zia regime did not last long, falling on 29 May 1981 when after numerous escapes, Zia was assassinated in Chittagong.[better source needed]
The KGB started infiltrating Afghanistan as early as 27 April 1978. During that time, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was planning the overthrow of President Mohammed Daoud Khan. Under the leadership of Major General Sayed Mohammad Gulabzoy and Muhammad Rafi – code named Mammad and Niruz respectively – the Soviet secret service learned of the imminent uprising. Two days after the uprising, Nur Muhammad Taraki, leader of the PDPA, issued a notice of concern to the Soviet ambassador Alexander Puzanov and the resident of Kabul-based KGB embassy Viliov Osadchy that they could have staged a coup three days earlier hence the warning. On that, both Puzanov and Osadchy dismissed Taraki's complaint and reported it to Moscow, which broke a 30-year contract with him soon after.
The centre then realized that it was better for them to deal with a more competent agent, which at the time was Babrak Karmal, who later accused Taraki of taking bribes and even of having secretly contacted the United States embassy in Kabul. On that, the centre again refused to listen and instructed him to take a position in the Kabul residency by 1974. On 30 April 1978, Taraki, despite being cut off from any support, led the coup which later became known as Saur Revolution, and became the country's leader, with Hafizullah Amin as Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Vice-Chairman of the Revolutionary Council. On 5 December 1978, Taraki compared the Saur Revolution to the Russian Revolution, which struck[clarification needed] Vladimir Kryuchkov, the FCD chief of that time.
On 27 March 1979, after losing the city of Herat in an uprising, Amin became the next Prime Minister, and by 27 July became Minister of Defense as well. The centre though was concerned of his powers since the same month he issued them a complaint about lack of funds and demanded US$400,000,000. Furthermore, it was discovered that Amin had a master's degree from Columbia University, and that he preferred to communicate in English instead of Russian. Unfortunately for Moscow's intelligence services, Amin succeeded Taraki and by 16 September Radio Kabul announced that the PDPA received a fake request from Taraki concerning health issues among the party members. On that, the centre accused him of "terrorist" activities and expelled him from the party.
The following day General Boris Ivanov, who was behind the mission in Kabul along with General Lev Gorelov and Deputy Defense Minister Ivan Pavlovsky, visited Amin to congratulate him on his election to power. On the same day the KGB decided to imprison Sayed Gulabzoy as well as Mohammad Aslam Watanjar and Assadullah Sarwari but while in captivity and under an investigation all three denied the allegation that the current Minister of Defence was an American secret agent. The denial of claims was passed on to Yuri Andropov and Leonid Brezhnev, who as the main chiefs of the KGB proposed operation Raduga to save the life of Gulabzoy and Watanjar and send them to Tashkent from Bagram Airfield by giving them fake passports. With that and a sealed container in which an almost breathless Sarwari was laying, they came to Tashkent on 19 September.
During the continued investigation in Tashkent, the three were put under surveillance in one of the rooms for as long as four weeks where they were investigated for the reliability of their claims by the KGB. Soon after, they were satisfied with the results and sent them to Bulgaria for a secret retreat. On 9 October, the Soviet secret service had a meeting in which Bogdanov, Gorelov, Pavlonsky and Puzanov were the main chiefs who were discussing what to do with Amin who was very harsh at the meeting. After the two-hour meeting they began to worry that Amin would establish an Islamic republic in Afghanistan and decided to seek a way to put Karmal back in. They brought him and three other ministers secretly to Moscow during which time they discussed how to put him back in power. The decision was to fly him back to Bagram by 13 December. Four days later, Amin's nephew, Asadullah, was taken to Moscow by the KGB for acute food poisoning treatment.
On 19 November 1979, the KGB had a meeting on which they discussed Operation Cascade, which was launched earlier that year. The operation carried out bombings with the help of GRU and FCD. On 27 December, the centre received news that KGB Special Forces Alpha and Zenith Group, supported by the 154th OSN GRU, also known as Muslim battalion and paratroopers from the 345th Independent Guards Airborne Regiment stormed the Tajbeg Palace and killed Amin and his 100–150 personal guards. His 11-year-old son died due to shrapnel wounds. The Soviets installed Karmal as Amin's successor. Several other government buildings were seized during the operation, including the Interior Ministry building, the Internal Security (KHAD) building, and the General Staff building (Darul Aman Palace). Out of the 54 KGB operators that assaulted the palace, 5 were killed in action, including Colonel Grigori Boyarinov, and 32 were wounded. Alpha Group veterans call this operation one of the most successful in the group's history. In June 1981, there were 370 members in the Afghan-controlled KGB intelligence service throughout the nation which were under the command of Ahmad Shah Paiya and had received all the training they need in the Soviet Union. By May 1982, the Ministry of Internal Affairs was set up in Afghanistan under the command of KHAD. In 1983, Boris Voskoboynikov became the next head of the KGB while Leonid Kostromin became his Deputy Minister.
Main article: 1991 Soviet coup d'état attempt
The KGB was succeeded by the Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK) of Russia, which was succeeded by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB).
The Committee for State Security was a militarized organization adhering to military discipline and regulations. Its operational personnel held army style ranks, except for the maritime branch of the Border troops, which held navy style ranks. The KGB consisted of two main components - organs and troops. The organs included the services directly involved in the committee's main roles - intelligence, counter-intelligence, military counter-intelligence etc. The troops included military units within the KGB's structure, completely separate from the Soviet armed forces - the Border Troops, the Governmental Signals Troops (which in addition to providing communications between the central government and the lower administrative levels, also provided the communications between the General Staff and the military districts), the Special Service Troops (which provided EW, ELINT, SIGINT and cryptography) as well as the Spetsnaz of the KGB (the Kremlin Regiment, Alpha Group, Vympel, etc.). At the time of the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991 the KGB had the following structure:
The Soviet Union was a federal state, consisting of 15 constituent Soviet Socialist Republics, each with its own government closely resembling the central government of the USSR. The republican affiliation offices almost completely duplicated the structural organization of the main KGB.
The Chairman of the KGB, First Deputy Chairmen (1–2), Deputy Chairmen (4–6). Its policy Collegium comprised a chairman, deputy chairmen, directorate chiefs, and republican KGB chairmen.
A Time magazine article in 1983, reported that the KGB was the world's most effective information-gathering organization. It operated legal and illegal espionage residencies in target countries where a legal resident gathered intelligence while based at the Soviet embassy or consulate, and, if caught, was protected from prosecution by diplomatic immunity. At best, the compromised spy was either returned to the Soviet Union or was declared persona non grata and expelled by the government of the target country. The illegal resident spied, unprotected by diplomatic immunity, and worked independently of Soviet diplomatic and trade missions, (cf. the non-official cover CIA officer). In its early history, the KGB valued illegal spies more than legal spies, because illegal spies infiltrated their targets with greater ease. The KGB residency executed four types of espionage: (i) political, (ii) economic, (iii) military-strategic, and (iv) disinformation, effected with "active measures" (PR Line), counter-intelligence and security (KR Line), and scientific–technological intelligence (X Line); quotidian duties included SIGINT (RP Line) and illegal support (N Line).
The KGB classified its spies as:
The false-identity (or legend) assumed by a USSR-born illegal spy was elaborate, using the life of either:
The agent then substantiated his or her false-identity by living in a foreign country, before emigrating to the target country. For example, the KGB would send a US-bound illegal resident via the Soviet embassy in Ottawa, Canada.
Tradecraft included stealing and photographing documents, code-names, contacts, targets, and dead letter boxes, and working as a "friend of the cause" or as agents provocateurs, who would infiltrate the target group to sow dissension, influence policy, and arrange kidnappings and assassinations.
Main article: List of chairmen of the KGB
|Ivan Aleksandrovich Serov||1954–1958|
|Aleksandr Nikolayevich Shelepin||1958–1961|
|Pyotr Ivashutin||act. 1961|
|Vladimir Yefimovich Semichastny||1961–1967|
|Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov||1967–1982 (Jan.–May)|
|Vitali Vasilyevich Fedorchuk||1982 (May–Dec.)|
|Viktor Mikhailovich Chebrikov||1982–1988|
|Vladimir Aleksandrovich Kryuchkov||1988–1991|
|Leonid Shebarshin||act 1991|
|Vadim Viktorovich Bakatin||1991 (Aug.–Dec.)|
Honored Worker of NKVD, 1940
50 years Cheka–KGB, 1967
60 years Cheka–KGB, 1977
70 years Cheka–KGB, 1987
Honored Worker of State Security, 1957
Anniversary Badge 10 years OGPU, 1927
Excellent Border Troop 1st class, 1969
Excellent Border Troop 2nd class, 1969
70 years Border Troops KGB, 1988
70 years Komsomol Cheka–KGB
((cite book)): CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)